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THE HISTORY

OF

TWENTY-FIVE YEARS

1856–1880

IN FOUR VOLUMES

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

THE HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIVE YEARS

1856—1880

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TWENTY-FIVE YEARS

1856–1880

BY

SIR SPENCER WALPOLE, K.C.B.

AUTHOR OF

'A HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE CONCLUSION OF THE GREAT WAR IN 1815'

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VOL. IV

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THE

HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIVE YEARS.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE EASTERN QUESTION, 1856–76.

THE years which have rolled by since the Crimean war have witnessed a remarkable change in public opinion. There is no longer any general desire, either in this country or elsewhere, to maintain the integrity of the Turkish Empire as a bulwark against Russia. The caustic apothegm of a Conservative Prime Minister,[1] 'that we had put our money on the wrong horse,' commands large acceptance; and, in the present temper of the nation, we should move neither a regiment nor a ship to enforce the views for which we fought in 1854. The obstinate refusal of the Porte to redeem its pledges by initiating the reforms which it has over and over again undertaken to carry out, its reckless extravagance, its widespread corruption, its hideous cruelties, have alienated sympathy; and the rule of the Turk, which used to be considered as a necessity to be retained, is now regarded as a nuisance to be repressed.

[1] The late Lord Salisbury.

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The Crimean War.

At this distance of time, moreover, the Crimean war seems especially deplorable, because it terminated the long period of peace which had practically prevailed in Europe for forty years. It led directly to the Franco-Austrian war of 1859;[1] the war of 1859 was the predecessor, if not the cause, of the Danish war of 1864, and the war between Austria and Prussia in 1866. The war of 1866 led to the great duel between France and Prussia which desolated Western Europe with blood and fire in 1870. The Russo-Turkish war of 1877 was largely due to the determination of Russia to reverse the decision of 1856. The Crimean war therefore let loose the dogs of war on Europe. Whether right or wrong in its inception or in its conduct, it introduced continental Europe to a quarter of a century of blood-shedding.

If, however, the modern writer is prepared to regard the Crimean war as a blunder and a crime; if he is disposed to hold up its real authors—Napoleon III. in France, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe at Constantinople—to the condemnation of posterity; if he can see no excuse for the Minister who, against his own will and his own opinion, suffered the ship of State to drift from error to error into the whirlpool of calamity, he is bound on every principle of justice to endeavour to place fairly before his readers the views of the statesmen of another age which he so unreservedly condemns. No fair man has a right to judge the statesmen of the past by the light which later experience has thrown on their policy. And in 1854 the statesman had a reason for maintaining

[1] It was the position which Piedmont obtained at the Congress of Paris, and which was the reward of the part played by her in the Crimea, that enabled Count Cavour to bring about the war of 1859.

the rule of the Porte, or thought he had a reason, which his successor can afford to neglect.

For, in 1854, the prodigious expansion of Russia perplexed and alarmed the statesmen of Western Europe. Napoleon's prediction that Europe would be either Republican or Cossack inspired the belief that monarchy had as much to fear from Russia as from revolution. In this country the advance of the Muscovite was associated with another danger. Great Britain had vast interests in India and the East, and the power which held Constantinople—the magnificent prize for which Russia was working—might presumably cut the nearest route to Hindostan. During the reign of George IV. statesmen like the second Lord Ellenborough, already dreaming of empire, had watched, in consequence, every advance of Russia with dismay. Her progress in Armenia placed her on the flank of the route which it was in contemplation to make the chief link of communication with the East.[1] Novelists who were to become statesmen were haunted by the same apprehension; and Mr. Disraeli made Fakredeen suggest to Tancred the suzerainty of England over Asia Minor.[2] Lord Palmerston had neither the arrogance of Lord Ellenborough nor the imagination of Mr. Disraeli. But he was animated by the same

[1] *Hist. of England*, vol. v. p. 276. Lord Ellenborough wrote in his Diary, on the 22nd of August 1829: 'The Russians have taken Erzeroum, and have quite dispersed the Turkish army in Asia. Every success of theirs gained in that quarter makes my heart bleed. I consider it a victory gained over me, as Asia is mine.' Lord Ellenborough's *Diary*, vol. ii. p. 88. Lord Ellenborough was President of the Board of Control when he wrote this arrogant sentence.

[2] *Tancred*, bk. iv. ch. iii. The chapter is well worth referring to. It contains, I believe, the first passage in our language in which Queen Victoria is spoken of as Empress of India.

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Lord Palmerston's policy.

desire to resist the advance of Russia,[1] and he thought that the best means of resisting it was to maintain the integrity of Turkey. Thus, in the thirties, he made it 'his persistent aim' to neutralise and overthrow the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, which he thought virtually bound Turkey hand and foot to Russia.[2] In the forties he prevented the dismemberment of Turkey, at the risk of a war with France, by the military and naval movements[2] which culminated in the bombardment of Acre. While in the fifties, as a member of a Cabinet which desired peace, he advocated war from first to last; or—if that statement be too strong—he refused to be a party to any settlement which left Russia a predominating influence in Turkey.[3]

It ought to be added in Lord Palmerston's excuse that he believed almost to the end of his life in the possible regeneration of Turkey.[4] His almost childish faith in this respect was partly due to a want of know-

[1] Lord Palmerston in 1833 spoke of Turkey as 'the road to India.' Ashley's *Palmerston*, vol. ii. p. 284.

[2] *Ibid.*, vol. i. p. 353.

[3] *Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 286. It is fair to recollect that the apprehensions which haunted Lord Palmerston and affected his Eastern policy were present to a much greater man—the first Napoleon. Modern Frenchmen, engaged in analysing the aims and ideas of their great Sovereign, have persuaded themselves that Napoleon's original object was to unite the Empires of the West and of the East under his own rule; and, in order to secure himself a free hand in Eastern Europe, to thrust back Russia into Asia. But they have also argued that the difficulty of accomplishing the latter part of his programme induced him to maintain, as an alternative, the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. If Turkey could not be placed under his own rule, it should, at any rate, be preserved from Russian ambition. See Driault, *Politique Orientale de Napoléon*, pp. 372-392. M. Driault has some instructive remarks in which he contrasts the policy of Russia and the policy of Midhat Pasha, the founder of Young Turkey. Russia, he thinks, was aiming at Pan-Slavism; Midhat at Pan-Islamism. *Ibid.*, pp. 207, 208.

[4] Mr. Ashley says that 'he had a sincere belief in the possibility, if not the probability, of the possible regeneration of Turkey' (*Palmerston*, ii. 407); and, even in July, 1861, he told Mr. Sidney Herbert that the Sultan (Abdul Aziz) 'seems destined to resuscitate the Turkish Empire.' *Life of Sidney Herbert*, vol. ii. p. 436.

ledge; for Lord Palmerston was almost as ignorant of the abuses which were sapping the power of the Ottoman Government as he was unacquainted with the causes which were building up a new German Empire. The natural resources were great, and if the Sultan would only clear out his harem, dismiss his architects, and turn off his robber Ministers, all would be well.[1] Lord Palmerston might as well have desired the sun to stand still in its course through the heavens. Years before, indeed, when the Crimean war was still raging, Lord Palmerston himself had been righteously indignant[2] because the Sultan had squandered on his own vicious pleasures the proceeds of a loan which he had been allowed to raise on the joint guarantee of the Western powers. But even this object-lesson did not bring home the hopelessness of the Ottoman position to the Prime Minister. With a firm and lively faith in the virtues of reform in every country except his own, he addressed to the Ottoman Government, through our Minister to the Porte, reams of sensible advice. He thought that Turkey would reform herself; and 'long experience had proved'—in the language of one of his successors—'that Turkey would not reform herself.'[3]

Even Lord Palmerston, however, could not conceal from himself that the reform of the Ottoman Government was impossible unless Ottoman finance was placed on a sound footing. The Porte was always ready to promise financial reform, because its

[1] Ashley's *Palmerston*, vol. ii. p. 408.

[2] See Lord Palmerston's own statement. 'At this crisis, when a proper sense of duty would have led the Sultan to stint himself in order to find money for the defence of his throne and empire, he launches into extravagance in repairing and building palaces; and he nearly doubles the amount of money applied to his personal expenses and to the allowances to members of his family.' *Ibid.*, p. 314.

[3] Lord Salisbury, in the House of Lords, 20th of February, 1877. *Hansard*, vol. ccxxxii. p. 691.

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Fiscal disorder in Turkey.

promise usually led to the floating a new loan, the proceeds of which could be applied to the gratification of new extravagances and old vices. In the years which succeeded the Crimean war, the Porte, with the assistance of this country and France, proved an adept in the art of borrowing: 5,000,000*l.* was lent to Turkey in 1854, 5,000,000*l.* in 1855, 5,000,000*l.* in 1858. But these successive drafts on the credulity of Western capitalists proved a little too much for the money markets of Paris and London, and in 1860 Sir H. Bulwer, who had succeeded Lord Stratford de Redcliffe as Ambassador at the Porte, was telling the Sultan's Ministers that no new loan could be arranged except upon conditions which included the appointment of a Committee of Control.[1] The Porte practically accepted the conditions, and two delegates, chosen by France and England, were placed on the Council of the Turkish Treasury.[2] The Porte obtained another 2,000,000*l.* from Western Europe as a reward for this concession. But the new Control proved useless,[3] and Lord John Russell, the British Foreign Minister, in despair of obtaining improvement by any other way, decided on empowering two Englishmen—Lord Hobart, who had held office under the Board of Trade; Mr. Foster, a subordinate officer in the Treasury—to inquire[4] into the financial condition of Turkey. Their report was in one sense satisfactory. All that, in the opinion of these gentlemen, was required was good administration. The Turkish debt was comparatively small. Turkish taxation, if duly adjusted, was extremely light; the hopeless

[1] Papers relating to Administrative and Financial Reform in Turkey. *Parl. Papers*, 1861, p. 47.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 52.

[3] 'Tous nos efforts jusqu'ici sont restés stériles.' Report of British and French Representatives, *ibid.*, p. 87.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 110.

condition of Turkish finance was due to 'financial disorder, caused chiefly by inattention to the ordinary rules of political economy and fiscal administration.' They had no reason to suppose that the promise under which the new reign [1] had opened would not be fulfilled, or that the simple reforms required to restore Turkish credit would be unaccomplished.[2]

This report had important if unexpected consequences. Fuad Pacha, who with the concurrence of Lord Palmerston's Government [3] had been made Grand Vizier, availed himself of Lord Hobart's and Mr. Foster's arguments to frame a fresh report to the Sultan, in which he proved to his own satisfaction that Turkey under its new Sultan was commencing a reign of glory, prosperity, and financial ease. Fuad Pacha's glowing pictures deceived other people besides himself. In 1862 Mr. Farley, a man who had held an official position in Syria, and who had acquired means both in the Levant and at Constantinople of ascertaining the truth, published an elaborate work on 'The Resources of Turkey considered with especial reference to the profitable investment of capital in the Turkish Empire.' Mr. Farley, who obviously relied on Lord Hobart's figures and Fuad Pacha's report, declared that report to be clear and straightforward, and added that there was nothing in the financial condition of Turkey which need excite alarm or distrust.[4]

Mr. Farley was not the only offender. In 1864 a French writer approaching the subject from a French

[1] In the summer of 1862 Abdul Aziz had succeeded to the throne of Abdul Medjid.

[2] See concluding passages of Report, *Parl. Papers*, 1862, p. 42.

[3] *La Turquie sous le Règne d'Abdul Aziz*, p. 265. For Fuad's Syrian administration *vide infra*.

[4] Farley, *Resources of Turkey*, pp. 20 and 21, note. Mr. Farley had been Consul in Syria in 1857–8, and had been subsequently Accountant-General to the Bank of Turkey.

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standpoint, declared[1] that credit had been restored, that paper money had been withdrawn from circulation, that administration had been reorganised, that agriculture and commerce had been encouraged and extended, that the equality of all men without distinction of creed had been announced, and that confidence had replaced anxiety.

Fresh loans to Turkey.

It is not surprising that roseate accounts of this character, founded as they were to some extent on official reports, should have made an impression on Western Europe. Small capitalists are always on the look out for some investment for their money which breaks the monotony of three per cent. Large finance houses are always ready to pander to these tastes by bringing out some new loan on whose issue they may make an immediate profit, and which they may dispose of to others more credulous than themselves. But when high interest and patriotic motive unite their attractions the bait is irresistible. The small investor flies into the arms of the foreign government which is certified to be the ally of his country with the alacrity with which Mr. Joseph Hume fled into the arms of Greece, 'when with twenty per cent. she embellished her charms.'[2] Turkey procured fresh loans of 8,000,000*l.* in 1862; of 6,000,000*l.* in 1864; and of a further 6,000,000*l.* in 1865. Financial assistance was not confined to loans to the Government. 'Turkey,' wrote a distinguished City merchant who was rapidly developing into a distinguished statesman, 'is a favourite field for the projectors of public companies.' 'There we have the Imperial Ottoman Bank to conduct the business of

[1] *La Turquie en* 1864, par M. B. C. Collay, p. ix.

[2] The quotation is, of course, from Moore's ballad 'The Two Bondsmen.'

the Government, and to familiarise the Moslem with the modern substitute for gold. We have the Ottoman Financial Association, professing to undertake all financial operations from discounting a bill to making a railway. We have the Société Générale de l'Empire Ottoman, whose ambition it is to take up that ground in Turkey which the Crédit Mobilier occupies in France; and we hear that negotiations are already in progress for a Turkish Crédit Foncier.'[1] If a country could be regenerated by gold, if it could be saved by the company projector, Turkey would have had a new birth in the years which succeeded the Crimean war. But these commercial undertakings projected with insufficient knowledge, conducted with insufficient skill, these huge loans, rashly contracted and rashly granted, only arrested the development which they were intended to promote. For the companies, when they succeeded, merely fattened on the country; when they failed, they added to the distrust which was already treading on the heels of confidence. As for the loans, their produce was expended, not on remunerative enterprises, but on pandering to the follies and vices of an extravagant sovereign, and the interest to be paid on them afforded a fresh excuse for extracting a little more taxation from the unfortunate people who were subject to his rule.

The sums which were poured into Turkey from Western Europe in the ten years which succeeded the Crimean war did no good to Turkey. They enriched no one in Western Europe except the wealthy financiers who drew large commissions on the loans which they floated; they merely helped

[1] Lord Goschen, *Essays on Economic Subjects*, p. 23. The particular essay, 'Ten per Cent.,' from which this extract is taken, was written in 1866.

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the worst Government in the world on its downward career. But the loans were granted with the best intentions. The small investor was no doubt fascinated by the prospect of high interest for his money. But he genuinely believed that he was helping to promote the development of a country which had been the ally of his own. Even more ignorant than Lord Palmerston, he believed in the regeneration of Turkey, and accepted the conclusions which men like Lord Hobart and Mr. Foster, like Mr. Farley and M. Collay, laid before him. They had not the advantage which a later writer derived from a longer experience and a keener insight. 'If,' so wrote Sir Charles Elliot years afterwards in a memorable book, 'one takes as a basis the laws, statistics and budgets as printed, it is easy to prove that the Ottoman Empire is in a state of unexampled prosperity. Life and property are secure; perfect liberty and toleration are enjoyed by all; taxation is light; balances large, trade flourishing. Those who have not an extensive personal acquaintance with Turkey . . . find it difficult to realise that all this official literature is absolute fiction; and, for practical purposes, unworthy of a moment's attention . . . No reform is clamoured for, which does not already figure on the Statute Book; no complaint is made which cannot be disproved by statistics . . . The natural divorce between literature and statistics is so complete that the Oriental attaches little more importance to striking statistics or to declarations of the imperial clemency than he does to epistolary compliments. He feels that it would be rude and bad style to say anything else.' And again: 'No one, after the Crimean war, realised the real obstacle to the regeneration of Turkey.

Fictitious financial statements.

No one understood that, in Turkey, the Statute Book may change, but the Turk changes not.'[1] The modern student who reads, if the unfortunate wretch exists who has had the courage to read, the long despatches from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, Sir Henry Bulwer, Sir Henry Elliot, and Sir Henry Layard, who successively, to the misfortune of their country, represented the British Government at the Porte from the days of the Crimean war to the days of the Berlin Congress, cannot avoid the regret that none of these great men should have understood the Turk, as Sir Charles Elliot understands him. A few clear sentences in the despatches, inspired by an insight as clear as that of 'Odysseus,' might have induced Lord Palmerston to modify his policy, might have saved the British investors millions of money, might have spared England the reproach that for years she was the supporter of the worst Government, and thus indirectly of the worst deeds, which modern Europe has had the misfortune to witness.

It seemed convenient to anticipate the narrative by dwelling on the financial expedients by which the Porte was gradually assisted from embarrassment to bankruptcy. But it is now necessary to revert to the proceedings which immediately followed the conclusion of the Crimean war. The policy of this country in these proceedings was affected from first to last by that unfounded belief in the regeneration of Turkey and the reform of her institutions which had been responsible for the loans which were readily granted to her from 1854 to 1856. The main cause of the Crimean war, indeed, had been the reluctance of Western Europe to permit the interference of Russia

[1] Sir Charles Elliot, in *Turkey in Europe*, by 'Odysseus,' pp. 137–8

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in the interests of the Christian subjects of the Porte; and the powers felt that it would be a scandal if, as the result of the war, Greeks and Bulgarians were handed over to the Ottomans without even so much protection as Russia had previously afforded them. Christian Europe found it, consequently, necessary to obtain some concessions for these unfortunate peoples. Mainly through the exertions of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe,[1] the British Ambassador at the Porte, on the 18th day of February, 1856—a few days before the Congress met at Paris to arrange the terms of peace—the Sultan, Abdul Medjid, issued a decree or charter (a Hatti-Humayoun it is called),[2] in which he promised religious liberty and civil equality to all sections of his subjects. It required a large exercise of the Christian virtues of faith, hope, and charity to attach any importance to this worthless document. In the first place, it was notorious that similar promises made in 1839 had been shamelessly broken.[3] In the next place, the Turkish Minister, a few months before, had told the British Ambassador at the Porte that the Sultan would abdicate his position as the successor of Mahomed if he exempted from the punishment of death those who had renounced or blasphemed the faith of the Prophet;[4] and it was obvious that, if this declaration still held

The Hatti-Humayoun.

[1] *Life of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe*, vol. ii. p. 440.

[2] I have not thought it necessary to set out in detail the provisions of this document. It will be found in *State Papers*, vol. xlvii. p. 1323; in Farley, *Resources of Turkey*, p. 272; and in *La Turquie et le Tanzimet* (Reform), vol. i. p. 263, a work in which Mr. Engelhardt, a writer who brought to his task a long acquaintance with the East, has said all that it is possible to say on the difficulties which the Porte experienced in giving effect to the reforms to which it committed itself.

[3] For the Hatti Scheriff of 1839 see *La Turquie et le Tanzimet*, vol. i. p. 267; and cf. M. d'Avril's more recent and more importan work, *Le Traité de Berlin*, p. 22

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 130.

good, a promise of civil equality and religious liberty to Christians was not worth the paper it was written on;[1] and, in the third place, the same Minister in Paris vigorously resisted any attempt to entrust Europe with the task of seeing that the pledges of the new decree were respected and fulfilled. The Turk had got rid of the inconvenient interference in his internal affairs which the seventh article of the Treaty of Kainardji had given to Russia, and he had no intention of subjecting himself to the provisions of a new seventh article at Paris.[2]

If some 'Odysseus' could have risen up in Paris and told the diplomatists, who were gravely wrangling over trifles, that 'in Turkey all official intervention is absolute fiction, and for practical purposes unworthy of a moment's attention,' it is just possible that, even at the eleventh hour, something might have been done. The Congress, for very shame, might have devised some more effectual methods for ensuring the better government of the Porte's Christian subjects than a reliance

[1] It is fair to recollect that the failure of these reforms was largely due to the reluctance of the Mohammedan population to tolerate any reform. In Turkey, where civil and religious government are equally based on the Koran, the man who introduces a reform is an infidel, the man who resists it a believer. 'Quand vous essayez d'expliquer à un Turc le Hatti-Chérif de Gulhané ou le Hatti-Humayoun de 1856, il y a une chose qu'il ne comprend pas: c'est que le Sultan puisse faire que l'infidèle soit l'égal du croyant. Cette idée . . . lui paraît surtout ridicule; c'est comme si l'on eût décrété que les nègres soient blancs.' M. d'Avril, *Le Traité de Berlin*, p. 17; and see the whole section on the Exécution du Hatti Chérif de 1859, pp. 27 *seq.*

[2] *La Turquie et le Tanzimet*, vol. i. p. 144. I am aware that Lord Palmerston argued that the fact of the Firman of 1856 having been recorded in the Treaty of Paris gave the allied powers a moral right of diplomatic interference which, he conceived, would be sufficient to ensure a compliance with its provisions. See his speech, *Hansard*, vol. cxlii. p. 125. But Lord Palmerston and his successors were, unfortunately, almost uniformly opposed to diplomatic interference; and the Porte showed, over and over again, that when diplomatic pressure was applied it could always find some pretext for evading it.

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The European Congress.

on the worthless promises of a worthless potentate. Unhappily, however, there was no one at Paris, or no one connected with the Western powers, who had either the knowledge of an 'Odysseus' or the insight which knowledge had given him. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, indeed, seems to have foreseen that the decree, if it was not followed by action, would be useless. But Lord Stratford's opinion was for once disregarded. England and France, who had fought the battles of the Turk, could not very well state publicly that they had no reliance on his word. Russia, worsted in the war, had no desire to see her adversaries installed in the position from which she herself had been driven. The chief parties to the Congress were, therefore, ready to adopt some form of words which would be satisfactory to the Turk, and which would not mean a great deal; and it was finally decided, on the suggestion of the representative of France, that the Congress should formally record that the Sultan, in his constant solicitude for the welfare of his subjects, had issued a decree which consecrated his generous intentions towards the Christians of his Empire; and that his Majesty, wishing to give a new proof of his disposition, had communicated to the contracting powers the firman which had emanated from his sovereign will. The contracting powers, while acknowledging the high importance of this communication, placed on record their understanding that the decree gave no right to the powers, either collectively or individually, to interfere in the relations between the Sultan and his subjects or in the administration of the Ottoman Empire.[1]

[1] See the 13th Protocol of the Congress in *State Papers*, 1856, vol. xlvi. p. 96, and Article IX. of the Treaty of Paris, *ibid.*, p. 12.

Either intentionally or by accident the high contracting powers had used the language which the autocratic Governments of the Continent had employed at Troppau. At Troppau the Northern Courts had formally declared that all useful and necessary changes in legislation and administration should only emanate from the free will of those whom God had trusted with power.[1] At Paris the contracting powers similarly recorded that the firman of February had emanated from the sovereign will of the Sultan. The declaration of 1820 prevented the introduction of reasonable reforms into Italy for forty years; the declaration of 1856 fell stillborn from the Sultan's pen.[2] No one paid any attention to its provisions.[3] 'The relations between the Sultan and his subjects, that is to say, the relations between the tyrant and his victims, have gone on just as they went on before.'[4]

If, however, the unhappy subjects of the Turk gained nothing from the decree of their sovereign, the Sultan derived considerable benefit from his idle promises. By the 7th Article of the Treaty of Paris the Porte was allowed to participate in the advantages of public law and of the European concert; by the same article the contracting powers agreed not merely to respect, but also to guarantee the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire;[5] while three of them, Austria, France, and Great Britain, a little distrustful of the other allies, pledged

M. Ollivier says that these words were added at the suggestion of England. *L'Empire Libéral*, vol. iii. p. 345.

[1] *State Papers*, vol. viii. p. 1203; *Hist. of England*, vol. iii. p. 24.

[2] 'Le Hatti-Humayoun est resté lettre morte.' *La Turquie et le Tanzimet*, p. 142.

[3] Sir Charles Elliot in *Turkey in Europe*, p. 323.

[4] Freeman, *Ottoman Turks in Europe*, p. 198.

[5] *State Papers*, vol. xlvi. p. 12.

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themselves to the same course, and undertook to regard every infraction of any part of the Treaty of Paris as a cause of war.[1]

The guarantee of Turkey's integrity.

The objections to these provisions were obvious. They were stated years afterwards with great force by a writer whose position as an historian commands the respect of his fellow countrymen, whether they agree or disagree with the polemical language which he habitually used in writing of the Turk. 'To admit the Turk to the European concert,' wrote Mr. Freeman, 'was to give a European recognition to a power which is not and never can be European. It was to give the sanction of Europe to the position of the Turk; it was to give a European approval to the bondage of European nations held down under a barbaric yoke . . . To guarantee the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire could only mean that the powers would hinder any part of the lands which were under the yoke of the Turk from being set free from his yoke, whether by becoming independent states or by annexation to any other power. It meant, for instance, that Thessaly, Epirus, and Crete might not be joined to Greece. It meant that Bosnia, Herzegovina, or Bulgaria might not become

[1] The separate Treaty is printed in *ibid.* p. 25. M. Ollivier says that the article in favour of the Christians was inserted immediately after the article relating to the European concert at the suggestion of Napoleon. He wished to emphasise the connection between the two provisions. *L'Empire Libéral*, vol. iii. p. 244. It ought, I think, to be added that the policy of the British Government under Lord Palmerston differed materially from the policy of the British Cabinet under Lord Aberdeen, The intention of the Coalition Government under Lord Aberdeen was not to abandon the Christian subjects of the Porte to the tender mercies and useless promises of the Ottoman Government, but to substitute a European for a Russian guarantee of their liberties. See *Life of the Duke of Argyll*, vol. ii. p. 471. But under Lord Palmerston the guarantee disappeared, and nothing but the worthless Hatti-Humayoun took its place.

independent states as Greece had become. It meant that no part of these lands might be added to Montenegro, or even put under the power of Austria. It was declared to be a matter of European interest that the Turk should keep what he had got; and it was further declared to be a matter of European interest that the Turk should be allowed to treat all that he had got as he thought good. For the powers guaranteed the independence of the Ottoman Empire, which could only mean the right of the Sultan to do what he pleased.'[1] The distinguished and amiable statesmen who negotiated the Treaty of Paris would probably have been a little surprised if they had been told that the rough phrases in which, years afterwards, Mr. Freeman summarised the result of their proceedings, correctly represented the meaning which they had concealed in their courteous periods. But Mr. Freeman did no small service in explaining what these articles of the treaty did mean. If the explanation had been published a quarter of a century before, perhaps the treaty itself would have been declared impossible.

The plenipotentiaries at Paris, indeed, though they could not altogether ignore the condition of the Porte's Christian subjects, were much more concerned with the clauses of the treaty intended to arrest the advance of Russia than with the woes of Bulgarian or Greek. With this object the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus were closed to all ships of war.[2] The Black Sea was neutralised,

[1] Freeman, *The Ottoman Power in Europe*, pp. 195, 196.

[2] *State Papers*, vol. xlvi. p. 21. There was exception in favour of light vessels employed in the service of the Legations or stationed at the mouths of the Danube, but the exception was not of much importance.

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Treaty barriers against Russia.

and the riparian owners were forbidden to maintain either fleets on its waters or arsenals on its shores.[1] All nations were allowed the free use of its waters for commercial purposes, and were authorised to station consuls at its ports. The navigation of the Danube was opened on equal conditions to the whole world, and in order better to insure freedom of navigation upon it, the boundaries of Russia were set back from the Danube to the Pruth.[2] The ceded territory was attached to Moldavia, which, with the adjacent principality of Wallachia, was confirmed in its existing privileges and allowed an independent administration under the suzerainty of the Porte. The principalities were even permitted to organise an armed force for the preservation of order and the defence of their frontiers. The adjacent principality of Servia was also given an independent administration, but the Porte was allowed the right to garrison the provinces. The little principality of Montenegro found no mention in the Treaty; but in the protocol which preceded its conclusion the representatives of Russia undertook to enter into no direct relations with the inhabitants of this mountainous district.[3]

Yet it was in Montenegro that the first trouble arose. Early in 1858 the troops of the Prince crossed into Herzegovina on the pretence that the adjacent villages were in Montenegrin territory. Insurrectionary movements simultaneously occurred in Herzegovina and Bosnia, and the Ottoman Government found it necessary to dispatch troops for the restoration of order, though it simultaneously entrusted two

[1] *State Papers*, vol. xlvi. pp. 12, 13.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 14. It must be borne in mind that this is only the conventional description of the change in frontier, which will be found detailed in *ibid.*, p. 15.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 102.

high officials with the task of inquiring into the complaints of the insurgents and of redressing any grievances. The great powers of Europe who had signed the treaties of 1856 showed some disposition to interfere in the difficulty that had arisen. The Porte remonstrated against any such interference, and declared that it would be a breach of the ninth article of the Treaty of Paris, and the powers were compelled to content themselves with the appointment of a joint Commission to mark out the boundaries of Montenegrin territory.[1]

The truce was probably all the more welcome because the attention of Europe was already occupied with a more difficult question. An independent administration had been assured to the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia at Paris, and the Sultan had undertaken to summon a divan in each of the two provinces empowered to express the wishes of its inhabitants. This provision was the only indication in the Treaty of Paris that the plenipotentiaries who framed it were prepared to show any consideration for the wishes of any of the unhappy peoples who were subject to the Porte; and it was the more welcome because Napoleon III., already anxious to do something for Italy, had suggested that the principalities might be handed over to Austria in return for the cession of Lombardy and Venetia to Piedmont.[2] The suggestion was dropped, but the question of the

[1] *La Turquie et le Tanzimet*, vol. i. pp. 144, 145; *State Papers*, vol. l. p. 1001.

[2] This monstrous proposition, which will be found in Ollivier, *L'Empire Libéral*, vol. iii. p. 346, was rejected by Austria. It was frequently revived in a modified form in the succeeding years, and seems in 1863 to have received some support both from Lord Palmerston and Lord Russell. *Memoirs of ount Pasolini*, p. 290.

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principalities was destined to become a future source of difficulty to the Western allies.

Moldavia and Wallachia.

In the discussions at Paris M. Walewski, on the part of France, had suggested that Moldavia and Wallachia should be united into one principality. Lord Clarendon[1] supported the French contention, adding that it was always desirable to pay attention to the wishes of the people themselves. The Turkish Minister had, however, violently opposed the proposal, which he declared would be actually distasteful to the majority of the inhabitants, and had been strongly supported, in the same sense, by Count Buol, the Austrian representative. The contention had been so sharp that the plenipotentiaries had found it convenient to refer the dispute to a committee, which had suggested the compromise, ultimately adopted, that the question should be settled by the people themselves.

Up to this point the majority of the Congress had apparently been in favour of the union of the two principalities. France had been warmly in favour of their union; England had supported France, and Russia and Sardinia had adhered to the French project.[2] Turkey and Austria—for Prussia was not yet admitted to the Congress—were the minority opposed to it. Within a few months, however, the whole aspect of affairs was changed by a radical alteration in the views of England; for the project which Lord

[1] According to M. Ollivier, the attitude of the English representatives was affected on this occasion by the strong representations made by Count Cavour to Lord Palmerston on the subject. M. Ollivier, however, seems to imagine that the discussion turned not on the union of the principalities, but on their dependence on, or independence of, Turkey. Cf. Ollivier, *L'Empire Libéral*, vol. iii. p. 346, and *State Papers*, vol. xlvi. p. 80.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 82. It is well to make this plain, as M. Ollivier (*L'Empire Libéral*, vol. iii. p. 348) is inexact.

Clarendon had supported in the Congress was about to be strongly opposed by the British Government.[1]

It is fair to recollect that if Lord Clarendon had supported M. Walewski in Paris, he had not done so with much warmth. He had, indeed, told Napoleon that the union of the principalities would probably lead to their independence; that Servia would follow in their train; and that Turkey would be deprived of six millions of her subjects.[2] He had not, therefore, even in Paris, been a warm supporter of the union.[3] But in the following autumn he became its strong opponent. What were the causes which occasioned this remarkable change of front so conveniently ignored by English writers?[4]

In the first place there seems to be little doubt that Lord Clarendon at Paris, and Lord Palmerston

[1] Lord Granville wrote from Paris on the 8th of April, 1857: 'The only difficulty he (Walewski) now foresees is the question of uniting or not the principalities. In the original draft of what should be settled at the Conference Walewski, merely in order to obtain an opinion, proposed the union. Clarendon concurred. Afterwards it was settled at the Conference that the opinions of the divans summoned for the purpose should be taken, and France, having the belief that the union was not disagreeable to England, pronounced herself openly in favour of it. Walewski now understood that England, convinced by Austria—Turkey had already been—was against the union. He hoped that the position of affairs would be calmly considered by Clarendon. If the divans pronounce in favour of the present state of things, France would acquiesce. If they give a doubtful answer, she will acquiesce. But if they are strongly in favour of union, France, Russia, Prussia, and Sardinia will be strongly in favour of that which is the declared wish of the principalities themselves; whilst England, Turkey, and Austria would be the other way, and great difficulties would arise.' *Life of Lord Granville*, vol. i. p. 229.

[2] See Martin's *Life of the Prince Consort*, vol. iii. p. 465.

[3] M. Thouvenel says that the project had been 'soutenue par Lord Clarendon, chaudement adoptée par la Sardaigne.' Thouvenel, *Trois Années de la Question d'Orient*, p. 4.

[4] Sir Theodore Martin, who has much the fullest account, quotes what Lord Clarendon had said against the union, but omits to mention that he had supported it in Paris. Mr. McCarthy ignores the dispute. Mr. Herbert Paul (*Hist. of Modern England*, vol. ii. p. 84) ignores the change of front.

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in London, were watching with some apprehension the evidence that France was slowly drifting into the arms of Russia. It was characteristic of the better side of Napoleon III.'s character that he did not wish to deal harshly with a defeated adversary; and M. Walewski seemed, throughout the Congress, much more anxious to smooth the course for Russia than to support the sterner policy which the British Government was disposed to advocate. Almost immediately after the Congress separated, the divergence in the views of the allies was seen on a 'minor point.' It had been decided at the Congress that the new frontier of Russia in Europe, which had been thrown back from the Danube to the Pruth, should pass to the south of a town called Bolgrad; and after the treaty had been signed the Russians discovered, or pretended to discover, that the true Bolgrad was situated further south than the Bolgrad marked on the maps exhibited at the Congress.[1] The action of Russia in this matter was not either very creditable or very dignified; but the point was one of comparatively slight importance, and certainly did not justify the rage into which Lord Palmerston threw himself. He even threatened to tear up the treaty if he had not his way.[2] His firmness prevailed; but his enemies did not scruple to assert that he had bought the adhesion of Austria to his views about Bolgrad by offering to support her resistance to the union of the principalities.[3]

[1] See Article XX. of Treaty and cf. *Life of Palmerston*, vol. v. p. 119.

[2] See the remarkable correspondence with Count Walewski in *ibid.*, pp. 117 *seq.*

[3] Thouvenel, *Trois Années de la Question d'Orient*, p. 148. There was a kindred dispute about the possession of some islands in the mouth of the Danube. Lord Granville, writing on the 7th of August, 1856, said: 'The Island of Serpents was for-

There is, however, no reason to suppose that the change in the attitude of the British Ministry was solely due to a desire to purchase Austrian support. The man who represented the country at Constantinople in 1856, and who still exercised a dominating influence on British policy in Eastern Europe, was that Great Elchi—Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, who fills so picturesque a place in Mr. Kinglake's pages. Lord Stratford was the most powerful diplomatist of the nineteenth century. Whether his career was for good or for evil is a question which will be answered differently by those who approve, and those who disapprove, the Crimean war. For there can be little doubt that the one man who was mainly responsible for that war was Lord Stratford; and that in all probability it might have been avoided if Lord Aberdeen and Lord Clarendon had summoned up sufficient courage to recall their resolute and independent agent. If Lord Stratford had the chief responsibility for the war, he had no responsibility for the peace by which it was concluded. He declared, indeed, that he would rather have cut off his right hand than signed the treaty; but the conditions which he wished to impose, the revival of the Duchy of Warsaw, the independence of Circassia, and the setting back of the Russian frontier in Europe to the Dniester, would have been scouted by the plenipotentiaries at Paris.[1] Lord Stratford had not much desire to facilitate the execution of a settlement which he so strongly disapproved, and he made it his special

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gotten in Paris. . . . It is clear that there was too much hurry.' *Life of Lord Granville*, vol. i. p. 186. There is a good statement of the Bolgrad question in *Life of Sidney Herbert*, vol. ii. p. 62.

[1] *Life of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe*, vol. ii. pp. 436, 437.

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business to prevent the union of the principalities which France so strenuously desired. His course was comparatively easy. For the Congress had resolved that the future of the principalities should be decided by themselves, and all that was necessary was so to manipulate the electoral roll in these provinces that a majority of the voters in one or both of them should be opposed to union. The revision was conducted so effectually by the agents of the Porte in Moldavia that, out of 40,000 persons qualified to vote, only 4000 were left on the register. This proceeding was a little too strong even for the Porte, and the Turkish Minister desired that the elections should be postponed for a fortnight in order that opportunity might be given for recasting and strengthening the list of electors. But Turkey's agents in Moldavia, supported by Austria and Lord Stratford, refused to postpone the elections; the registered electors proceeded to throw their votes against union; and as the Porte declined to reverse the decision of its agents, the representatives of France, Prussia, Russia, and Sardinia broke off relations with the Turkish Government.[1] If the British Cabinet had sat down calmly to reconsider the situation which had thus arisen, it could hardly have avoided the conclusion that the position in which it had been placed by Lord Stratford was untenable. Our own representative at Paris had given his support to the union of the principalities; he had accepted the suggestion that the question of their union should be decided by the people of the provinces, and it was intolerable that our agent at

[1] See the whole story in Thouvenel's *Trois Années de la Question d'Orient*, pp. 132, 136. Cf. also Driault's *La Question d'Orient*, p. 193.

Constantinople should be practically thwarting this arrangement by weeding the register, as the authorities in Ireland had weeded the panel by which O'Connell was tried.[1] But unhappily the British Cabinet did not examine the question with the necessary calm. Lord Palmerston regarded it as a mere struggle between British and French influence at Constantinople, and, without entering into the merits of the question, gave a characteristic support to his own man. And the struggle, it must be admitted, was acute. M. Thouvenel, who represented Napoleon III. at Constantinople, was writing to the Duc de Gramont that Lord Stratford's recall was the sole condition on which the Anglo-French alliance could be maintained.[2] Lord Palmerston was telling the French Ambassador at London that M. Thouvenel was doing his best to produce an open rupture between France and England, and that, come what might, England was prepared for every emergency.[3] Lord Palmerston himself had never made a more unnecessary or unwise declaration. For he was risking the peace of the world on a point which Lord Clarendon's action at Paris had shown to be of no importance, and in support of Lord Stratford's action at Constantinople, which no honest or honourable man would have cared to defend.

Happily, at this moment Napoleon III., the warm supporter of the Anglo-French alliance, interfered with decisive effect between the angry statesmen who were recklessly preparing a breach. By a fortunate

[1] For the weeding of the O'Connell Jury see *Hist. of England*, vol. v. p. 108.

[2] *Trois Années de la Question d'Orient*, p. 130. Cf. *La Turquie et le Tanzimet*, p. 153.

[3] *Trois Années de la Question d'Orient*, p. 135; Ollivier, *L'Empire Libéral*, vol. iii. p. 414.

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The Emperor Napoleon's intervention.

chance Napoleon, in fulfilment of an arrangement which had been made two months before, paid a visit to the Queen at Osborne on the 6th of August, 1857. The situation was very critical. On the 28th of July M. Thouvenel had formally demanded that the elections in Moldavia should be at once and unreservedly annulled; on the 29th his demand had been supported by the representatives of Russia, Prussia, and Sardinia. On the 5th of August M. Walewski, setting out with Napoleon for Osborne, had telegraphed to M. Thouvenel the Emperor's approval of his conduct, and had desired him, if he failed to obtain satisfaction, to break off diplomatic relations with the Porte. On the 6th M. Thouvenel had carried out these instructions, and the Emperor actually received the information that his orders had been obeyed on his arrival at Osborne.[1] A preliminary conversation with the Prince Consort paved the way for more formal conferences with Lord Palmerston and Lord Clarendon; and a compromise was finally arrived at, under which it was decided that the Moldavian elections should be annulled and that fresh elections should take place immediately.[2] The Emperor's intervention and the Prince Consort's common sense had put an end to

[1] Thouvenel, *Trois Années de la Question d'Orient*, pp. 136, 138; and Ollivier, *L'Empire Libéral*, vol. iii. p. 415.

[2] Sir Theodore Martin says that in the memorandum which Lord Palmerston drew up, and which was shown to Count Walewski, it was added that the British and French Governments were to combine at the proper time in endeavouring to secure the suzerainty of the Sultan over the Danubian provinces. *Life of Prince Consort*, vol. iv. p. 114. M. Ollivier says that in the memorandum of the interview drawn up by M. Walewski the Emperor offered to modify the view which he had expressed for the union of the principalities under a foreign power. *L'Empire Libéral*, vol. iii. p. 417. The French wrote with some natural satisfaction of Lord Stratford being forced to make the Porte accept the conditions which he had previously made the Turks refuse. *Trois Années de la Question d'Orient*, p. 149.

the difficulty, but the end was reached by the abandonment of the position in which Lord Stratford had unwisely and recklessly placed the country.

The new elections left little doubt as to the true opinions of the people. The divans both in Moldavia and Wallachia pronounced in favour of the union of the principalities in a single autonomous state subject to the suzerainty of the Porte, but under the constitutional and hereditary government of a foreign prince.[1] The policy which Napoleon III. had so strenuously desired had been adopted by the people. But the passion which the controversy had provoked a few months before no longer disturbed the atmosphere of diplomacy. The Emperor, with the memories of Osborne fresh upon him, was anxious to promote some compromise not wholly unacceptable to the British Court and Ministry. Great Britain, face to face with mutiny in India, had no strength to spare for a vigorous policy in Europe. The opinions of her public men were by no means unanimous in supporting the policy which Lord Palmerston had so strenuously advocated. Mr. Gladstone asked the House of Commons to affirm that just weight should be given to the wishes of the people of Moldavia and Wallachia; and though his motion was defeated it received the support of such different men as Lord John Russell and Lord Robert Cecil.[2] The European powers again assembled in Paris, and decided, notwithstanding the opposition of Austria and Turkey, to place the two principalities under two native Hospodars, elected by their own divans, and bound

[1] *Trois Années de la Question d'Orient*, pp. 188, 234.

[2] Mr. Gladstone's motion is in *Hansard*, vol. cl. p. 44. For Lord Robert Cecil's speech, *ibid.*, p. 76. For Lord John Russell's, *ibid.*, p. 91. The motion was rejected by 292 votes to 114, *ibid.*, p. 106.

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Union of the Principalities.

to carry on their government with the assistance of responsible ministers, and the concurrence of two chambers. They were to be known as the United Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia; they were to enjoy the same laws; they were to have a military organisation common to both; and they were to have one High Court. To the Sultan, their suzerain, they were required to pay a tribute; but they were free from all interference in their domestic affairs.[1]

This arrangement, which was only adopted after much discussion, was obviously a compromise. It did not grant the full union under a foreign prince which the people of the principality desired, but, in the opinion of its advocates and critics, it prepared the way for it.[2] And the next step which the principality took showed how clearly the way had been prepared. For each principality separately chose as its Hospodar the same man, Colonel Couza. The choice may have been within the letter, but it was certainly contrary to the spirit of the decision of the great powers.[3] The great powers, however, again assembled, on the invitation of Turkey, in conference, did not venture on setting aside the election. Though Turkey protested that it was a violation of the Convention drawn up at Paris; though Baron Hübner, on the part of Austria, associated himself with the argument of his Turkish colleague, the representatives of the five other powers, in order to avoid the inconvenience of a fresh election, strongly advised

[1] The Convention will be found in *State Papers*, vol. xlviii. p. 70.

[2] Cf. Ollivier, *L'Empire Libéral*, vol. iii. p. 426, and Sir T. Martin, *Life of Prince Consort*, vol. iv. p. 255, and note.

[3] M. Ollivier says that the election was evidently contrary to the recent decision of the Conference, vol. iii. p. 427. Sir T. Martin, more accurately, calls it a step which, probably from an oversight, the terms of the Convention had not prohibited (vol. iv. p. 258).

the Porte to proceed with the Colonel's investiture. The Porte after some months' delay consented to adopt this advice; and the principalities, already endowed with institutions common to them both, were placed under the same Hospodar.[1] Two years later 'the inconvenience of the union, imperfect in form but practically complete, was removed by the consent of the Sultan to a complete administrative union during the life of Prince Couza.'[2] Finally, in 1866, on the abdication of Prince Couza, the crown was conferred on Prince Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen; and the policy of Napoleon—the union of the principalities under a foreign prince—was complete.[3]

In his original advocacy of the arrangement which was thus accomplished, Napoleon was no

[1] The Conference at which this decisive step was taken met on the 6th of April, 1859. It held no sitting between the 13th of April and the 6th of September. In the interval, during which the representatives of Austria and Turkey had undertaken to refer the opinion of their colleagues to their respective governments, the issue of the French-Austrian war had, of course, strengthened the power of France and weakened the opposition of Austria. For the protocols, *State Papers*, vol. xlix. pp. 454 *seq.* It ought perhaps to be added that the tribute payable to the Porte was raised from 3,000,000 piastres, at which it had been fixed in 1834, to 4,000,000 piastres under the Convention of 1858. Cf. *ibid.*, vol. xlviii. p. 72, and vol. lxi. p. 1056.

[2] Sir Theodore Martin in *Life of Prince Consort*, vol. iv. p. 255.

[3] The election of Prince Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen was carried out by a plebiscite on the 16th–28th April, 1866, and it was communicated to a Congress of the great powers which had been convened at Paris in consequence of Prince Couza's abdication, and which was almost simultaneously deciding that the Assembly about to meet at Bucharest must proceed to the election of a native Hospodar. The Conference on the 25th of May formally declined to recognise the validity of Prince Charles's election. *Parl. Papers*, 1861, pp. 48, 56, 63. The Government of Russia desired to go further, and at a fresh meeting of the Conference, summoned specially at its request, proposed that the Porte should be asked to send a Commissioner into the provinces, who should be accompanied by delegates from the powers, and who should inform Prince Charles that, if he refused to accede to their demand, coercive measures would at once be taken to compel him to do so. The Russian proposal was naturally warmly supported by Turkey, and less warmly by Austria. The French and British plenipotentiaries—it must

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Lord Palmerston's attitude.

doubt actuated by his desire to give effect to that doctrine of nationalities which was about to carry him in triumph to the Adige, and which ultimately led to his fall. But he had also the generosity to avow that though as a statesman he was not prepared to abandon the cause for which he had fought in the Crimea, as an individual he 'could not muster up any sympathy for such a sorry set as the Turks.' In resisting the union of the provinces—to which Lord Clarendon had assented at Paris—Lord Palmerston, on the contrary, was actuated by the belief that their union would lead to their independence, and that their independence, followed by that of Servia, would deprive the Porte of six millions of subjects; that the foreign prince selected would inevitably be a prince belonging, like most of the population, to the Greek Church, and that such a prince would as inevitably be chosen from the royal family of Russia. From his point of view, therefore, the French project would strengthen the position of Russia and weaken the power of Turkey to resist the Russian advance. And

be recollected that Lord Palmerston was dead—refused to be parties to a coercion which might eventually lead to the gravest complications. They were supported by Prussia and Italy, and the Conference broke up without arriving at any decision. There were, however, many reasons for arriving at a settlement. The month had already begun in which Austria was to commence the war which was to terminate at Sadowa, and the prostration of Austria and the success of Prussia made it less easy to resist the claims of Prince Charles. Lord Clarendon, on behalf of England, urged the Porte to recognise Prince Charles on his undertaking to do homage to the Sultan. The Porte, in the following October, was prevailed on to accept this arrangement, which was sweetened by the Prince consenting to increase the customary tribute; and Roumania was at last placed—as Napoleon, to do him justice, had wished she should be placed in 1856—under an hereditary foreign prince. *Ibid.*, pp. 68, 73, 75. For an account of the honours paid to Prince Charles on the investiture see Ollivier, *L'Empire Libéral*, vol. ix. pp. 11, 12.

it is fair to recollect that the consequences which Lord Palmerston foresaw did occur. Though the prince ultimately chosen for the crown of Roumania was German and not Russian by extraction, the union of the principalities did lead indirectly to their independence, and did weaken the position of Turkey in Europe. What Lord Palmerston failed to see throughout these long discussions was that the Ottoman power could no longer be relied on as an obstacle to the Russian advance. Mr. Gladstone was much nearer the truth when he said in the House of Commons in 1858, 'The best resistance to be offered to Russia is by the strength and freedom of those countries that will have to resist her. You want to place a living barrier between her and Turkey. There is no barrier like the breasts of free men. . . . If you want to oppose an obstacle to Russia, arm these people with freedom, and with the vigour and prosperity that freedom brings.' Mr. Gladstone's conduct of foreign affairs is not usually regarded with much satisfaction, but if Mr. Gladstone could have controlled the policy of the Foreign Office from 1856 to 1858 the country would have been saved some danger and some humiliation.[1]

For Lord Palmerston's attitude in resisting an arrangement to which Lord Clarendon had agreed did create a very great danger. His opposition to the union of the principalities did bring this country to the verge of a rupture with France; and the breach was only healed by his consenting

[1] The words of the Emperor Napoleon quoted in the paragraph were used to the Prince Consort. See *Life of Prince Consort*, vol. iv. p. 102. Lord Palmerston's statement that the prince would inevitably be a prince of the Greek Church are in *Hansard*, vol. cl. p. 88. Mr. Gladstone's words are from the same debate, *Ibid.*, p. 59.

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to annul the election which his agent at Constantinople had done so much to bring about. Lord Palmerston recovered from the consequences of his rash policy. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe never again regained the influence which he had lost. In the autumn of 1857, after the election had been annulled, he came home on leave. It was predicted at the time that he would never return. It was added that Lord Palmerston and Lord Clarendon were both anxious that he should hand them his resignation.[1] As a matter of fact Lord Stratford did resign office on the fall of Lord Palmerston in the following spring; and though he was allowed to pay one more visit to the Porte and take leave of the Sultan, he was expressly instructed to be careful to give any observations he might make 'the character of general advice,'[2] and to leave all matters of detail to be dealt with through the ordinary channel of the Embassy.

It is difficult to believe that, as the years wore on, Lord Palmerston did not feel increasing doubts on the wisdom of his own policy. In the beginning he had satisfied himself that it was possible to regenerate Turkey: and the last state of Turkey was worse than the first. In 1858, a massacre occurred at Jeddah, in which the British and French Consuls were murdered, and Lord Palmerston's Government was actually compelled to send a British vessel to bombard the town.[3] It was not, however, only the

[1] See Count Walewski's letter to M. Thouvenel, in *Trois Années de la Question d'Orient*, p. 209.

[2] Lord Malmesbury's instructions to this effect will be found in Papers relating to Administration and Financial Reform in Turkey, 1858–1861, *Parl. Papers*, 1861, p. 1.

[3] A dispute had arisen respecting the nationality of a vessel belonging to some of our Indian subjects, who desired to place it under Ottoman law. The dispute was brought before a legal tribunal, when it was decided that the ship was English, and not Turkish. But, in the course of

massacre at Jeddah that produced general uneasiness or alarm. Throughout the whole of Turkey there reigned a feeling of mingled apprehension and irritation. In Crete, in Thessaly, in the Northern Provinces, even in Constantinople itself, there was a feeling of unrest, leading to brigandage and confusion, and resulting too frequently in active insurrection; while in Syria a state of things was arising which was destined to sweep away declarations and treaties, and to compel the intervention of Europe.[1]

The Lebanon.

In Northern Syria, fringing the Mediterranean, lies a rugged region intersected from north to south by the parallel ranges of the Lebanon and the Anti-

a few days, notwithstanding this decision, the English flag was lowered and the Ottoman flag hoisted. The people, excited by these occurrences, raised a fanatical riot. The crew of H.M.S. Cyclops, which was lying at Jeddah at the time, carried off some of the survivors of the massacre, but her commander did not feel himself strong enough to take further measures. He was at once ordered to return to Jeddah with three other vessels, and insist on adequate reparation. As a matter of fact, he bombarded the town and obtained the execution of some of the reputed ringleaders in the massacre. The Porte undertook to place 1,000,000 piastres at the disposal of the French and English Governments for distribution among the sufferers from the massacre, and to settle an annuity on the representatives of the murdered Consuls. See *Hansard*, vol. cli. pp. 1655, 1931. But up to the 24th of April, 1860, the indemnity had not been paid. Papers relating to Administration and Financial Reform in Turkey, *Parl. Papers*, 1861, p. 31.

[1] See Sir H. Bulwer's Report, 24th of April, 1860, in Papers relating to Syria, *Parl. Papers*, 1861, pp. 30–33. I have not thought it necessary to allude in these pages to the serious conspiracy of Mussulmans against the Sultan in 1859, which will be found described in M. d'Avril's pages, pp. 55 *seq.* I have been equally silent on the Russian proposal of 1860 that the five great Powers should tell the Porte that they would tolerate no longer the state of things existing in the Christian provinces of the Porte, *ibid.*, p. 63, or on Kyprisli Pacha's abortive mission to repress abuses, *ibid.*, p. 64. The fact was that Russia realised, what this country refused to admit, that in Turkey 'ce sont les gendarmes qui volent et qui violent.' *Ibid.*, p. 61.

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Lebanon. The valley between the two lines of hills was known in the ancient world as Cœle-Syria, while east of Anti-Lebanon, in the province of Hauran, lay the famous city of Damascus. The wild and warlike races of this mountainous region contained, among other races,[1] two peoples: the Druses, who professed the Mohammedan faith,[2] and the Maronites, who owed their name to a Christian monk, and who were Roman Catholics. By an arrangement made in 1842, and confirmed and enlarged in 1845 through the instrumentality of the great powers, these peoples, who for centuries had maintained a blood feud, were severally placed under their own chiefs, subject to the supervision of the Turkish Governor-generalship of Syria,[3] an office which for many years had been sold to the highest bidder.[4] The chief of the Maronites was known as the Christian Kaimakam; his yoke-fellow, who was placed over the territory chiefly inhabited by Druses, was called the Druse Kaimakam. The Congress of Paris in 1856, while considering the state of Turkey generally, had paid special attention to the condition of Syria, and had formulated some proposals which the Turk accepted with the alacrity with which he commonly pledges himself to introduce reforms. But this procedure not unnaturally tended to increase the unrest which was characteristic of Syria. The Christians heard that the Porte had promised to place them on an equality with

[1] Lord Dufferin said, 'Syria is inhabited by ten distinct races ... split up into seventeen distinct sects.' Papers relating to Syria, *Parl. Papers*, p. 208.

[2] They may more properly be described as Mohammedan schismatics. See *Life of Lord Dufferin*, by Sir Alfred Lyall, vol. i. p. 100.

[3] See Lord John Russell's account in *Hansard*, vol. ccxi. p. 1115.

[4] *Parl. Papers*, 1861, p. 209.

their Mohammedan neighbours, and were irritated at finding that no steps were taken to carry out the promise. The Mohammedans, on the contrary, were angered by discovering that under a Mohammedan rule Christians were to be admitted to the same privileges as themselves. Men who, like the Guelfs and the Ghibellines, or the Capulets and the Montagus, were always ready to fly at one another's throats on the smallest pretext, saw, either in the promise of these privileges or in the non-fulfilment of these promises, good reason for action; and in April 1860 the Druses attacked the Maronites in isolated places. The Maronites retaliated on the Druses, and blood was shed on both sides.[1]

Outbreak in the Lebanon

In the following month these disturbances developed into more serious trouble. A Maronite monk was murdered between Beyrout and Deir el Kamar. Suspicion fell upon the Druses, one of whom was afterwards killed by the Maronites. Bloodshed provoked bloodshed, and, on May 28, 'a general attack was made by the Druses on the Maronite villages in the neighbourhood of Beyrout and Lebanon.' So far disturbance had followed its customary course, and there was not much to distinguish the disorders from the sanguinary incidents inevitably produced by hereditary feuds among wild uncivilised people. But on the day which succeeded this furious onslaught a much more serious incident occurred. Hasbeya, a large town lying under Mount Hermon,

[1] M. de la Gorce ascribes the commencement of the struggle to the Druses, on the authority of Mr. Graham's report to Lord Dufferin. Further Papers relating to the Disturbances in Syria, *Parl. Papers*, 1860, p. 40. But it is difficult to determine when the outrages began. The disturbances and outrages had been going on, in fact, since 1858. Despatches from Her Majesty's Consuls in the Levant, *Parl. Papers*, 1860.

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was the object of attack; and the Christian inhabitants were persuaded to lay down their arms under the promise of protection from Osman Bey, the Turkish commander. The promise gained the miserable Christians a week's respite. But, on June 6, the Druses attacked them in their helpless condition. The Turkish troops, so far from preserving order, joined in the slaughter. When the men whose duty it was to preserve peace joined the combatants, the last chance of checking outrage disappeared. Rasheiya, Sidon, Deir el Kamar, and Zahleh became the scene of similar massacres. At Zahleh alone some 1200 Christians are computed to have perished in one day.[1]

When news of these frightful outrages reached Western Europe they everywhere excited a feeling of horror. The nations which had shed their blood and spent their money in the hope of preserving the integrity of the Ottoman Empire were receiving a lesson on the consequences of Ottoman misgovernment. If these feelings prevailed everywhere, they were felt acutely at Paris. France had always regarded herself as the protector of the Roman Church in the Levant. The unhappy Maronites looked for protection to the French people, and Napoleon, touched in his better nature by the account of the atrocities, desired to interfere by force to put down outrage. He could not venture, however, to intervene without the concurrence of the other powers, and England, as the ruler of a great Mohammedan population in the East, was disposed to constitute herself

[1] Papers relating to Disturbances in Syria, *Parl. Papers*, 1861, pp. 141 *seq.* There is a good summary of what occurred in the *Annual Register* for 1860, Hist., p. 25 *seq.*

the champion of the Druses, and was not inclined readily to tolerate a French intervention, which might lead to a French occupation of Syria. Her Ministers were consequently disposed to throw a good deal of cold water on the generous proposal of the Emperor of the French. While, however, they were hesitating news arrived of a more serious massacre at Damascus. On the 9th of July the Moslems commenced an attack on the Christian quarter of Damascus. In the words of the British Consul, 'A Christian community was attacked and possibly a third part of the male population massacred, with scarcely an attempt on the part of the authorities to avert or arrest so awful a calamity.'[1] Lord Dufferin, who had spent some time at Damascus in 1860, and who revisited it as the representative of the British Government in 1861, has himself recorded that he saw the ruins of 2000 houses which had been burnt or destroyed during this horrible massacre.[2]

The news was so grave that the British Government could no longer deny the necessity for intervention. All the provisions which had been elaborately devised in Paris in 1856 for protecting the Turk against European interference faded into nothingness before the shadow of massacre. At a new Conference at Paris in August 1860 the great powers offered, and the Porte was compelled to accept, a body of European troops, which, it was agreed, might be increased to 12,000 men, to stop the effusion of blood and to re-establish tranquillity. The Emperor of the French undertook to supply one-half of the force, and the

[1] Papers relating to Disturbances in Syria, *Parl. Papers*, 1861, p. 7; *Annual Register*, 1861, Hist., p. 252 *seq.*

[2] *Life of Lord Dufferin*, vol i. p. 106.

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contracting powers, in a separate protocol, severally engaged to seek for no territorial advantages, no exclusive influence, and no commercial concessions which could not be granted to the subjects of all other nations. The great powers at the same time agreed to despatch a Commission to inquire into the origin of the outrages, to see that their authors were duly punished, and that the victims were compensated as far as possible for their losses and their sufferings.[1]

Interference of the European Powers.

For once the concert of Europe had been made to work. At the cost of destroying the chief feature of the artificial edifice which diplomacy had erected in 1856 the great powers agreed in intervening to restore peace and order. In 1827 three only of the five powers had taken part in the battle of Navarino; in 1840 four only of the five powers had shared in the action which had stopped the career of Ibrahim Pacha; in 1854 the dissensions among the powers had led to the Crimean war. It was a welcome change after these differences to find all the five powers agreed on the steps to be taken in Syria. But the agreement, it must be confessed, was more nominal than real. France was determined to impose peace on the Porte and its revolted subjects. Great Britain, on the contrary, was anxious that the Sultan himself should take measures to repress disturbances. France was ready to lend her troops; Great Britain was resolved not to send troops, and was anxious to persuade France that armed intervention was unnecessary.[2] France, shocked at the massacre of 10,000 Christians, was disposed to a policy of

[1] Papers relating to Disturbances in Syria, pp. 36, 39, 41.

[2] Correspondence relating to the affairs of Syria, *Parl. Papers*, 1861, p. 11.

'thorough.' Great Britain, still anxious for the integrity of the Turkish Empire, and nervous at the possibility of French aggression, was aiming at half-measures. CHAP. XVII.

Happily for the good name of England, her Ministers, while still striving to reduce interference to a minimum, selected as the British member of the International Commission a young man who was wholly free from the traditions of the Foreign Office. Lord Dufferin, on whom their choice fell, was already widely known by an account which he had lately published of a yachting tour in the northern seas. He had visited Syria in a private capacity in the preceding year; and his agreeable manners had made him the favourite of English society and had commended him to the notice of Lord John Russell. Lord Dufferin, however, so far had received no opportunity of displaying his capacity for dealing with a difficult question; yet by selecting him for the position Ministers had almost unconsciously done much to retrieve the error which they had originally made. For Lord Dufferin soon showed that he was more determined than even the French themselves to punish the guilty and to provide adequate securities for the future; and, by the mere accident of his appointment, this country, instead of resisting reform, became the foremost advocate of radical changes of administration. Lord Dufferin.

Lord Dufferin was, indeed, under one disadvantage. He was placed nominally under the orders of Sir Henry Bulwer (Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's successor at Constantinople), a diplomatist who during his career filled many high positions, whose abilities were equal to the discharge of any functions, but whose presence at Constantinople—as years before

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it had been at Madrid[1]—was a misfortune, and whose character and conduct did not particularly attract the critical and respectable statesman who held the French Foreign Office in 1860.[2] It is to Lord Dufferin's credit that even the untoward presence of Sir Henry Bulwer at Constantinople did not affect his policy, and that he became a much more powerful instrument for good in the complicated negotiations which were immediately to arise than even General Beaufort, who commanded the French expeditionary force, who spoke with the weight attaching to the force which he represented, and who, in addition, had a knowledge of Syria and an experience of Turkish methods possessed by few men.[3]

The appointment of the Commission roused the Sultan from his customary lethargy. For once he found himself face to face with all the eventualities which might result from the interference of Europe in his own internal affairs. The independence which he had secured at Paris was slipping away. There was, however, still time, so he was told by his advisers, to ward off the threatened mischief. If he could only restore order and punish outrage before the arrival of the European Commissioners, these gentlemen might find that they had been anticipated in their labours and that there was nothing left for them to do. It

[1] *Hist. of England*, vol. v. p. 359.

[2] M. Thouvenel said of him 'Tout ce qui me revient de cet étrange Ambassadeur . . . est vraiment incroyable. Il n'est entouré que de femmes perdues et de gens tarés, et c'est dans les coulisses du harem, en dehors des Ministères Turcs, qu'il fait sa politique.' *Le Secret de l'Empereur*, vol. ii. p. 187.

[3] General Beaufort had been attached to the head-quarters of Ibrahim Pacha, and, according to M. Thouvenel, knew every inch of the country. Correspondence relating to the affairs of Syria, *Parl. Papers*, 1861, p. 21; cf. *Souvenirs de Syrie par un témoin oculaire*, p. 228.

required, indeed, some faith to suppose that any Turk could move with the necessary promptitude. But the Porte happened to have at its disposal a man who had many qualifications for the task. Fuad Pacha, on whom the Sultan's choice fell, was, according to Lord Dufferin, one of the most remarkable public men in Europe.[1] According to Millingen, an officer who served the Porte as Osman Bey, he was one of the most unscrupulous of the many unscrupulous men in the Porte's service. Honest or unscrupulous, he deserved the epithet which the Sultan himself applied to him—'an energetic and distinguished vizier.'[2] Our consul at Damascus, indeed, said of him that he was the only pacha he had met with possessing energy and enlightened views.[3]

Fuad Pacha.

Fuad Pacha reached Beyrout in the middle of July, 1860, before either the French troops or the Commissioners, or even Lord Dufferin—who was in advance of his other colleagues—had arrived in Syria. On the 26th, in deference to the strong remonstrance of Admiral Martin, who commanded the British squadron on the coast, he suspended Khoorshid Pacha, the Governor-General of Syria.[4] On the 29th he reached Damascus; on the 4th of August he was able to assure the British Consul at Beyrout that he had arrested, or was arresting, 500 individuals. Turkish tribunals do not take long in deciding on questions of life and death. Fifty-six persons were at once shot, 111 hanged, and some hundreds were sentenced

[1] *Life of Lord Dufferin*, vol. i. p. 107; *La Turquie sous le Règne d'Abdul Aziz*, pp. 264 *seq.* There is an account of Fuad Pacha in *Souvenirs de Syrie par un témoin oculaire* which is also worth referring to, pp. 201 *seq.*

[2] Correspondence relating to the affairs of Syria, p. 43.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 133.

[4] Correspondence relating to the affairs of Syria, pp. 61, 62.

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to perpetual imprisonment.[1] These, however, were the less important malefactors. It still remained to deal with the more prominent and responsible criminals. On the day of Lord Dufferin's arrival at Damascus, Ahmet Pacha (the governor of the town at the time of the massacre),[2] Ali Bey (who was in command of the Christian quarter of the town), Osman Bey (who had commanded at Rasheiya), and Ali Agha (who had held a similar position at Hasbeiya), were all shot.[3] In insisting on these punishments being carried out, Lord Dufferin had also the satisfaction of saving the lives of some thirty or forty Arabs whose guilt was not clear, and who had been sentenced to be hanged on the following morning.[4]

If blood-shedding could atone for blood-shedding, Fuad Pacha might have claimed that he had redeemed the situation by his energy, and rendered the interference of Europe unnecessary. Satisfied with the vigorous measures which he had taken, and—what was more to the purpose—having satisfied Lord Dufferin by carrying out the sentence on Ahmet Pacha,[5] Fuad Pacha returned to Beyrout. On his arrival he was met by evidence that he could not ignore that the control of events was passing out of his hands. French troops were encamped in the pine woods which adjoined the city; the flag of France was floating over its walls; and the representatives of the great powers, with the single exception of

[1] I have followed the official account. In the *Souvenirs de Syrie*, p. 236, other numbers are given.

[2] I cannot doubt the justice of Ahmet Pacha's fate, for, at the lowest, he miserably failed to do his duty. But something may be said against the hurried trial and hasty execution; and this is well said in *Souvenirs de Syrie*, p. 143.

[3] Correspondence relating to the affairs of Syria, pp. 116, 124.

[4] *Life of Lord Dufferin*, vol. i. p. 109.

[5] Correspondence relating to the affairs of Syria, p. 125.

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Proceedings of the Lebanon Commission.

the Prussian Commissioner, had already arrived.[1] But Fuad Pacha was equal to the situation. He at once took energetic steps to anticipate the action of the powers. Khoorshid Pacha, the Governor-General of Syria, was placed on his trial. The Druse chieftains were invited to surrender within five days on the understanding that complete security should be afforded to them if they proved their innocence, and that those who failed to appear would be punished by the sequestration of their goods and the outlawry of their persons. Arrangements were at the same time made for a military movement by which the French and Turkish troops were intended to sweep Lebanon and intercept the flight of the Druse chieftains into the little known region of the Hauran.[2]

The military operations which were thus decided on were not successful. Either from the connivance of the Turks themselves, or—if it be possible to take a more charitable view—from the defects in their preparations, the guilty Druses were allowed to escape through the Turkish lines.[3] The judicial proceedings, on the contrary, after long delays, resulted more satisfactorily. Khoorshid Pacha was found guilty and, with other Turkish officers, was sentenced to perpetual imprisonment. The eleven Druse chieftains who had surrendered were condemned to death. At this point, however, Lord Dufferin, who had

[1] Correspondence relating to the affairs of Syria, p. 135, and De la Gorce, *Histoire du Second Empire*, vol. iii. p. 330.

[2] The Hauran is situated to the south-east of Damascus. See *inter alia* the description in De la Gorce, *Histoire du Second Empire*, vol. iii. p. 299. For the facts in this paragraph, *ibid.*, p. 332, and Correspondence relating to the affairs of Syria, p. 136.

[3] The French thought that their escape was due to the connivance, the English to the stupidity or indolence of the Turkish forces. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 203, and De la Gorce, *Histoire du Second Empire*, vol. iii. p. 332, and Driault, *La Question d'Orient*, p. 196.

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gradually come round to the conclusion that, however guilty the Druses may have been, 'the original provocation had come from the Christians,'[1] intervened in their favour. He desired to aggravate the punishment of the guilty Turks, and to mitigate the sentence on the Druse chieftains. This proposal led to a sharp difference of opinion among the representatives of the great powers themselves, and Fuad Pacha, taking advantage of their dissensions, decided to confirm the verdict of his extraordinary Court and 'to refer the further consideration of the subject to Constantinople.'[2]

If in matters of punishment the Commissioners displayed some differences of opinion, they laboured for the protection of the inhabitants and for the indemnities for the victims of the massacres. At a very early date Lord Dufferin had the satisfaction of reporting that, with the exception of one little girl whom he had been unable to trace, 'every woman or child abducted by the Moslems of Damascus during the late disturbances had been restored to their friends,'[3] and an indemnity of 75,000,000 piastres, payable in six instalments in three years, was granted by the Porte to the Christians.[4]

The Commissioners also addressed themselves to the future government of the province. Lord Dufferin himself desired that Syria should be placed under a Governor-General appointed by the Sultan in concert with the great powers, and that, except for the payment of a fixed tribute, the province should be practically independent of the Porte.[5]

[1] Correspondence relating to the affairs of Syria, p. 440.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 486.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 166.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 512.
[5] See Lord Dufferin's scheme in *ibid.*, p. 208.

The Porte, however, declared that it was 'impossible' to assent to a plan which would place Syria in the position of Egypt or the Roumanian provinces,[1] and formulated a scheme of its own which confined the arrangement to the Lebanon, and which restored part of the settlement which had been made in 1842–5.[2] This plan was subsequently elaborated by the representatives of the five powers at Constantinople, and the Lebanon was placed under a Christian governor nominated by the Porte, and practically immovable during the three years for which his appointment was to run. The choice of the Porte fell on Daouf Effendi, a Roman Catholic Armenian,[3] under whose administration the Lebanon, if not well governed, was probably better governed than any other portion of the Sultan's dominions.[4]

Settlement of the Lebanon.

There is some satisfaction in reflecting that, for once in the nineteenth century, misgovernment in one portion of the Turkish dominions was punished, and that the great powers of Europe consented to co-operate for the prevention of misrule. It is bare justice to add that the steps which were then taken were adopted on the initiative of the French Empéror, and if statesmen are to be judged by their conduct, the action of Napoleon III. was as disinterested as it was generous. But it is equally bare justice to add that in Lord Dufferin the country had the good fortune to secure an excellent representative. No one

[1] Correspondence relating to the affairs of Syria, p. 321.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 364.

[3] *Ibid.*, Part II., pp. 127, 138. For Daouf, or Davoud Effendi, see *Souvenirs de Syrie*, p. 244. Driault calls him Davoud Pacha, *La Question d'Orient*, p. 197.

[4] See *Life of Lord Dufferin*, vol. i. p. 124. For Lord J. Russell's account of the arrangement, see *Hansard*, vol. clxii. p. 1881, and cf. *Parl. Papers*, 1877 (No. 18), Turkey, p. 23.

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can read the long record of a dreary story without seeing that his was the stronger voice on the joint Commission. The French, indeed, thought that he showed too much favour to the Druses and paid too much attention to the wishes of the Porte. But there was a good deal of force in Lord Dufferin's contention that the horrible excesses which the Druses committed were provoked by the Maronite attacks, and that the worst criminals were not the wild uncivilised people who perpetrated massacres, but the cold-blooded Turkish officials who either approved it or took no steps to prevent it.

It is fair also to recollect that the measure of reform which Lord Dufferin proposed was far more drastic than that which was ultimately adopted, and that French writers of authority and repute admit that, in providing for the future, Lord Dufferin was right and their own statesmen wrong.[1] Perhaps, indeed, if a perfect accord had existed among the powers, Lord Dufferin's argument might have ultimately prevailed, and the Porte might have been compelled to yield a larger measure of autonomy to Syria. But while it was the distinction of 1860 that the five great powers of Europe were able to join in the work of suppressing outrage in Syria, it was their misfortune that there was no cordial agreement among them. Russia wished to regain the influence

[1] See M. St. Marc Girardin in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1st May, 1864, and *Life of Lord Dufferin*, vol. i. p. 123, note. 'Le moyen le plus efficace de consolider la tranquillité et de faire de la Syrie l'une des provinces les plus florissantes de l'Empire, eut été, sans doute, de lui accorder l'autonomie qui avait hanté un instant l'imagination généreuse de Lord Dufferin.' *Souvenirs de Syrie*, p. 204. The author goes on, however, to say that Lord Dufferin's plan was set aside by the British Government as involving the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire. *Ibid.*, p. 260.

in the East of which the Crimean war had deprived her; Austria, the consistent opponent of reform, had little or no disposition to encourage autonomy in the East; Prussia had not yet reached the stage of her development which enabled her, later on, to take a commanding position in the councils of Europe; and England, jealous of French ambition, was much more anxious to get France out of Syria than to effect a really salutary reform.

Withdrawal of European troops from Syria.

At the Conference in Paris 'the High Parties, convinced that such a period will be sufficient to attain the object of pacification,' fixed at six months the occupation of the European troops in Syria; and as the French troops arrived in the latter half of August[1] they should, under the terms of the protocol, have been withdrawn in the following February. Long before February arrived, Lord John Russell, on the part of this country, was stating 'the insuperable objections to a prolonged occupation of Syria by European troops.' Such an occupation would be a precedent for other occupations in Bulgaria, in Bosnia and other provinces, and thus lead the way to a further partition of the Turkish Empire.[2] The lengthened discussions of the Commissioners in Syria obviously made the literal observance of the protocol impracticable, and M. Thouvenel, on the part of France, while admitting that the French Government was bound to withdraw its troops, declared that 'in his soul and conscience' he believed that their withdrawal would be followed by a fresh massacre, and announced his intention of asking the great powers to determine whether the troops should

[1] Correspondence relating to the affairs of Syria, p. 82.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 186.

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be withdrawn in February or not.[1] Finally, at the end of February it was suggested at a conference in Paris that the occupation should be prolonged till the 1st of May, when it was assumed that naval squadrons might be stationed off the Syrian coast,[2] and it was finally decided that the occupation should terminate on the 5th of June, 1861.[3]

In the month in which the French troops sailed away from Syria—sacrificed, as a French writer insists, to the Emperor's desire to please his British allies[4]—an event occurred which some sanguine people thought might lead to even happier results than the pacification of the Lebanon. For Abdul Medjid, whom a French writer has called 'le meilleur et le plus doux des Turcs,'[5] but whose dissolute life had made him the slave of Ministers of stronger will and sterner hearts than his own, died at Constantinople, and his brother Abdul Aziz succeeded to the throne.

During the twenty-two years of Abdul Medjid's reign Abdul Aziz had lived in the comparative obscurity which is the frequent destiny of heirs apparent in absolute autocracies. He had occupied himself with the cultivation of his estate and the amusements of the chase.[6] Nature had not endowed

[1] Correspondence relating to the affairs of Syria, p. 317, and cf. later despatch, p. 329.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 407.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 455, 458. Lord Palmerston wrote: 'I am heartily glad we have got the French out of Syria, and a hard job it was to do so. The arrangement made for the future government of the Lebanon will, I dare say, work sufficiently well to prevent the French from having any pretext for returning thither.' *Life of Lord Palmerston*, vol. v. p. 212; cf. Martin, *Life of Prince Consort*, vol. v. pp. 308, 309, and *Souvenirs de Syrie par un Témoin Oculaire*, pp. 285 *seq.*

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 307. [5] *Ibid.*, p. 200.

[6] There is a good description of his life in Millingen, *La Turquie*, p. 262, which I have no reason to suppose inaccurate.

him with any particular ability. Education had done nothing to supply the deficiencies of Nature. Yet his accession was welcomed by a people accustomed to the disorder which Abdul Medjid's careless and dissolute character had made possible. And there was on the surface some reason for believing that the new Sultan might deserve the confidence which was felt in him. For it was known that he disliked his brother's policy, and that he disapproved his extravagance. Even foreign statesmen, with whom the wish was father to the thought, believed that the accession of a new Sultan might lead to the regeneration of Turkey. In Lord Palmerston's opinion Abdul Medjid had been 'a good-hearted, weak-headed man, running two horses to the goal of perdition—his own life and that of his Empire. Luckily for the Empire his own life won the race.' Abdul Aziz, on the contrary, 'if he will apply to his Empire the well-regulated economy with which he is said to have managed his own private affairs, may be able to rescue his country from the downfall with which it has lately seemed to be threatened.'[1]

Accession of Sultan Abdul Aziz.

The first acts of the new Sultan seemed to encourage the hope. Abdul Aziz took immediate steps to curtail the extravagance of his household. He took no pleasure in the idle display which consumed the revenue of his predecessor. He reduced the personnel of the palace. He punished the creatures of Abdul Medjid who had enriched themselves by abusing the opportunities of their position; he even sold his brother's jewels. He showed an anxiety to introduce reform into the army, the navy, and

[1] *Life of Palmerston*, vol. v. p. 212.

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his own establishment.[1] Foreign statesmen were assuring him that 'integrity, order, and impartial justice would soon redeem the most flagrant evils.'[2] If it had not been that the same hopes had been raised, twenty-two years before, on Abdul Medjid's succession, there seemed some reason for expecting that the era of extravagance and maladministration was at last over.[3]

The promise which was thus held out at Abdul Aziz's succession was on the whole fulfilled during the earlier months of the reign. The new sovereign, in the first instance, displayed virtues unusual in a Sultan. But the temptations of his position, the corrupt interests of the bureaucracy which controlled the throne, and the influence of Fuad Pasha, anxious to divert the attention of the sovereign from affairs of State to the distractions of pleasure, paved the way for his ruin.[4] Surrounded by these temptations, Abdul Aziz drifted into a life of vicious extravagance, which even Abdul Medjid had hardly realised. The man who began his reign with one wife had soon collected 900 women into his harem. Palaces were erected, destroyed, and re-erected with a lavish

[1] Millingen, *La Turquie*, p. 251.

[2] See Lord John Russell's despatch written within ten days of Abdul Aziz's accession. Papers relating to Administration and Financial Reform in Turkey, p. 115.

[3] According to a speech of Mr. Gladstone in 1878, 'Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell . . . sustained by the opinion of all their colleagues, were desirous of taking practical measures in the year 1862 for procuring the cession of Epirus and Thessaly to Greece. The Porte was unwilling to agree.' *Hansard*, vol. ccxlii. p. 685.

[4] 'D'Autocrate qu'il [le Sultan] est censé être, par la force des faits il n'est qu'un monarque, dont le pouvoir était contrebalancé . . . par l'influence prépondérante des bureaucrates de la Sublime Porte (par Sublime Porte on entende la réunion des ministères et bureaux du gouvernement ottoman'). Millingen, *La Turquie sous le Règne d'Abdul Aziz*, p. 255, and cf. the whole account.

prodigality ruinous to the exchequer.[1] Abdul Aziz himself, worn out by excitement and dissipation, was reduced to a condition of nervous exhaustion almost bordering on insanity;[2] and the Treasury, for which, only a few years before, Mr. Foster and Lord Hobart had hoped so much, had no cash in its coffers and no credit abroad.[3] In his dry style, Lord Russell summed up the situation in January 1862: 'It would appear that the honest and patriotic men have not sufficient capacity and vigour, and that the active and able men have not sufficient integrity or public spirit to carry out those reforms which are essential to the welfare of the Empire.'[4]

Disturbances in Crete.

Financial disorder led to internal disturbance and external difficulties. The Christian subjects of the Sultan throughout Europe were in a state of 'effervescence'[5] bordering on rebellion. The semi-independent Roumanian Principalities and Servia were taking advantage of the weakness of their Suzerain—the principalities to secure their formal union under a foreign prince, and Servia to obtain the evacuation of her fortresses by the Turkish garrison.[6] The integrity of the Ottoman Empire, which the great powers at Paris had been at pains to guarantee, was visibly threatened. But these incidents, and even renewed risings in Syria, were soon forgotten in the events which occurred in Crete. From its position, from its population, from its historical associations, from its religion, Crete naturally

[1] Millingen, *La Turquie sous le Règne d'Abdul Aziz*, pp. 299–303.
[2] Mill, *The Ottomans in Europe*, p. 112.
[3] Millingen, p. 368.
[4] *Parl. Papers*, 1877, Turkey (No. 17), p. 30.
[5] The word is Prince Gortchakoff's. See Sir A. Buchanan's despatch of the 8th of November, 1866. Correspondence relating to the affairs of Syria, p. 2.
[6] *Ibid.*, and cf. *La Turquie sous le Règne d'Abdul Aziz*, p. 347.

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looked towards Greece. Count Capodistrias had clearly foreseen that Greece could not exist without Samos and Crete.[1] And the student who examines the history of Europe during the nineteenth century will probably exhaust his intellectual resources in trying to understand why diplomacy has again and again interfered to prevent a union which commends itself to every fair mind by considerations of race, religion, geography, and good feeling. In the spring of 1866 the Cretans were in a state of discontent bordering on insurrection. They were meeting in their thousands and drawing up petitions enumerating their grievances both to the Sultan and to foreign sovereigns.[2] The Porte, alarmed at the aspect of affairs, reinforced its troops in the island, despatching, among other soldiers, an Egyptian contingent of 6000 men, and, gaining confidence with increased strength, abruptly refused the prayers of the petitioners.[3] 'The General Assembly of Cretans'—for the masses which had collected in demonstration thus styled themselves—formally declared, on the 2nd of September, 1866, that the Ottoman dominion was abolished and that the island was 'for ever and inseparably united to Greece.'[4]

These things, it must be recollected, happened at a time when all Europe was anxiously contemplating the surprising events which preceded, which signalised, and which followed the Prusso-Austrian war of 1866. Napoleon III. was too much occupied with the situa-

[1] See the whole passage in Stockmar's *Memoirs*, i. 86 *seq.*

[2] The petition to the Sultan will be found in Correspondence respecting the affairs of Crete, 1866–7, *Parl. Papers*, 1867, p. 6. That to the Queen, which prayed for union with Greece, in *ibid.*, p. 10. Lord Lyons, who had succeeded Sir H. Bulwer as Minister at the Porte, returned the petition to the Queen to the gentleman who transmitted it to him. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 15, 20

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 53.

tion in Central Europe to pay attention to the affairs of the Cretans.[1] Lord Stanley, the British Foreign Minister, was strongly opposed to intervention;[2] and though Russia was suggesting action, it was finally decided that Mustapha Pacha, who in former years had been Governor of Crete, should be sent to the island to restore order, with instructions to avoid, if possible, a collision between the troops and the people.[3]

Mustapha Pacha arrived in Crete in the middle of September, and at once issued a proclamation promising a careful inquiry into the grievances of the Cretans and urging them to return to their obedience.[4] But the conciliatory attitude came too late. Hostilities had already commenced, and the Pacha found that he had to use force to put down open rebellion.[5] His operations were, in the first instance, successful. He was able, in fact, to report in November that the insurrection was 'completely quelled';[6] and the information which arrived from other and less prejudiced quarters tended to confirm this conclusion.[7] But the insurrection was not quelled. Hostilities, which diplomacy was vainly persuading itself would cease, broke out with more fury than ever. Even in Lord Lyons's official language—and Lord Lyons was scrupulously careful to use language which became the representative of a power which was admittedly friendly to the Turk—the war was carried on by the Turkish troops 'with inhumanity, not to say

[1] Correspondence respecting the affairs of Crete, 1866–7, *Parl. Papers*, 1867, p. 34.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 38.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 50.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 57.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 69.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 105.
[7] Her Majesty's Minister at Athens telegraphed that the insurrection was at an end. See Lord Stanley's despatch, 2nd of November, 1866, *Parl. Papers*, 1867, Turkey (No. 17), p. 40.

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ferocity';[1] and, in April, 1867, the Sultan, disappointed at the ill-success of his arms, decided on sacrificing his chief agent, on recalling Mustapha Pacha, and on replacing him with Omar Pacha, who had won distinction in the war with Russia.[2]

The Cretan rebellion.

The appointment of a new commander was dictated by the necessity under which the Porte obviously lay of bringing the insurrection to an end. Christian Europe was viewing with increasing disapproval the continuance of the war and the methods which the Turkish soldiers were adopting to crush the rebellion. Unhappily, indeed, Christian Europe was not united on the subject. Russia, Prussia, France, and Italy were agreed in recommending that Turkey should terminate the revolt by ceding Crete to Greece; and, in the week in which Lord Lyons announced Omar Pacha's appointment, he had to report that the French Ambassador had waited on Fuad Pacha and recommended him to give the islanders an opportunity to decide on their future lot 'by a full and free vote.'[3] The course which these powers took was dictated by humanity; it was certainly based on the interest of Crete, and possibly on that of Turkey itself. Unhappily, however, it was deprived of all chance of success by the attitude of England. Though Lord Palmerston was no longer alive, the spirit which had animated his Eastern policy still influenced his successors. Lord Stanley was ready enough to advise the Turk to grant some sort of autonomous institutions to Crete,[4] provided

[1] Correspondence relating to the affairs of Crete, Part I., *Parl. Papers*, 1867, p. 142.

[2] *Ibid.*, pt. ii. p. 80.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 55, 56, 61, 79.

[4] 'We are willing to support the proposition of France and Russia for giving local autonomy to Crete. But we respect the independence of the Porte, and shall consider that, in offering this advice, we have discharged our duty. We disclaim all idea of putting pressure on the Porte.'

that it was clearly understood that the Porte was to be at full liberty to accept or reject the counsel. He was anxious to induce the Porte to temper repression with mercy. But the Sultan himself was not more eager that the revolt should be repressed, and that it should be repressed by the Porte's own efforts, than the chief of the British Foreign Office. He had satisfied himself that the Porte was as much entitled to put down insurrection in Crete 'as England in India, France in Algeria, or Russia in Poland'; and he was not prepared to blame the Government of the Sultan for doing what every other Government of the world would do if necessity arose.[1]

The position which Lord Stanley thus took was attended with many inconveniences. The most valuable result of the Crimean war was that it had forced Russia to withdraw from her mission of protecting the Orthodox Church in the East. But the policy of this country in insisting on the right of the Turk to do what she would with her own had enabled Russia again to resume the part of which the Crimean war had deprived her. The Christian subjects of the Porte were taught to believe that their hope lay in Russia, and that they had no hope in Western Europe. The somewhat cold and unsympathetic language in which Lord Stanley expressed his views increased this feeling: Greeks naturally sympathised with the cause of their fellow Greeks in an adjacent island; Greek vessels carried arms and stores and even volunteers to assist the insurgents, and the Greek Government had perhaps no more desire to interfere with this irregular

Correspondence relating to the affairs of Crete, Part I., *Parl. Papers*, 1867, p. 160. The Porte, of course, had an 'insurmountable objection' to accept advice offered in such a fashion. *Ibid.*, p. 176.

[1] *Ibid.*, Part II., p. 56.

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support than Count Cavour had shown six or seven years before to stop the sailing of Garibaldi and his thousand from Genoa. Lord John Russell, in the case of Naples, had hardly concealed his pleasure at the course which Garibaldi then took with Count Cavour's connivance. Lord Stanley, on the contrary, took the opportunity of lecturing the Greek Government on its conduct, and of warning it that if Greece provoked a war with Turkey Greece would 'alone be responsible for the consequences.'[1] But Lord Stanley took an even stronger step to mark the rigid neutrality of his conduct. At the request of the British Consul at Canea Commander Pym, of H.M.S. *Assurance*, received on board his vessel and carried to Greece some three hundred women and children and some twenty-five wounded men, all of whom were in imminent danger of being massacred by the advancing Turkish troops.[2] Lord Stanley curtly refused to allow any contribution to be made to the support of these unfortunate people, and though he told the British Consul that he would not disapprove his conduct, he gave orders which effectually prevented any repetition of a similar act of humanity.[3]

Lord Stanley's action.

Lord Stanley's action seemed more unnecessary because other nations took a much more liberal view of their duties as neutrals. A Russian frigate at once followed the example which had been set by the captain of the *Assurance*, and rescued 1200 miserable fugitives who were escaping from the Turks. France, Austria, Italy, and Prussia allowed their vessels to convey the families of the insurgents to Greece and safety,[4] while

[1] Correspondence relating to the affairs of Crete, Part I., *Parl. Papers*, 1867, pp. 115, 128.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 127.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 129, 150.

[4] *Ibid.*, Part II., p. 267.

the Government of the United States gave formal instructions to its squadron in the Mediterranean to receive on board as many refugees as might present themselves, and carry them to Greece. Many English citizens saw with regret that foreign Governments did not scruple to forward a work of humanity in which Lord Stanley was thus refusing to engage, and the Minister's conduct was freely criticised by high authorities in Parliament.[1] But perhaps the day may arrive when posterity will consider that there was nothing in this criticism so damaging to Lord Stanley's reputation as the effusive expression of gratitude which he received from the Sublime Porte. 'The only thing which consoles us,' wrote Fuad Pacha, 'is the holding aloof of the Cabinet of St. James's from associating itself with the intervention of the other great powers. We are happy to recognise in this a new proof of the sincere and loyal friendship of the Government of Her Britannic Majesty towards our country; and nothing is more pleasing to us than to express on every occasion our lively gratitude and to continue to draw closer those ties. . . . We confidently hope that Lord Stanley will with his usual justice . . . continue this friendly policy towards us, which will render it easy for us to avoid all the complications which might arise from the attitude of the above-mentioned powers.'[2]

It would be grossly unfair to compare Lord

[1] Correspondence relating to the affairs of Crete, Part II., *Parl. Papers*, 1867, pp. 170, 175. Lord Stanley's conduct in this matter was strongly condemned by the Duke of Argyll in *Hansard*, vol. clxxxv. pp. 1522 *seq.* For Lord Stanley's own statement, *ibid.*, p. 447. Mr. Freeman declared that 'no blacker page in the history of England . . . can be found' than that relating to Lord Derby's action on this occasion.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 81. Fuad Pacha at the same time told the French Ambassador that the cession of Crete to Greece would require a new Navarino. *Ibid.*, p. 83.

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Stanley with Lord Malmesbury. For Lord Malmesbury was merely an amiable member of his order, while Lord Stanley was one of the deepest thinkers and wisest statesmen of his age. But Lord Stanley undoubtedly contrived to render the same service to Turkey in 1866–7 that Lord Malmesbury rendered to Austria in the spring of 1859. By taking his stand on the Treaties, which it was the object of Piedmont to destroy, Lord Malmesbury, while nominally maintaining the most correct neutrality, virtually decided every point in favour of Austria. Similarly, by insisting that a handful of insurgents in Crete should be left to struggle alone against the whole Turkish Empire, Lord Stanley practically conferred an enormous advantage on the Turk. The effect of Lord Malmesbury's proceedings, fortunately for the future of Italy, was destroyed by the fall of Lord Derby's Ministry and the accession of Lord John Russell to the Foreign Office. For Lord John professed the doctrine of Italy for the Italians, which was as acceptable to the friends of liberty as it was distasteful to diplomacy; and under this doctrine Lord John maintained that an Italian state had a right to interfere in the affairs of another Italian state; and that for a non-Italian power to prevent such interference was in itself an act of intervention. Unfortunately for Greece, unfortunately perhaps for the future of Europe, neither Lord Stanley nor any other British statesman maintained the parallel doctrine of Greek territory for the Greeks; and, in consequence, though Crete now enjoys autonomous institutions under a Greek prince; though the ultimate union of the island with Greece is as certain as, to a plain man, uninfluenced by diplomatic tradition,

The policy of non-intervention.

it is desirable, innumerable insurrections, and almost continuous bloodshed have characterised the dreary history of the interval; and the end, which Lord Stanley might have brought to pass in 1867, still awaits its consummation.

The practical withdrawal of Lord Stanley from the European concert[1] was the more significant because, for the first time in the history of Turkey, the Sultan was contemplating a visit to the European Courts. The fact that the French Government was organising a great exhibition in Paris afforded an excuse for a journey which was dictated by a desire to revive the waning interest of the West in the fortunes of the East.

In Paris, which he reached on the 1st of July, the Sultan experienced some disappointment. It was remarked by a keen observer that he was the guest of the Court rather than of the nation, and his public appearance excited more curiosity than sentiment.[2] It is said, too, that the Emperor caused him intense annoyance by suddenly suggesting to him that he should terminate rebellion in Crete by ceding that island to Greece.[3] Any annoyance which he may have experienced in Paris from the Emperor's sensible though unseasonable suggestion was dissipated by the brilliancy of the reception which he experienced in London. Official England showed its appreciation of a sovereign who still exercised some sort of control

[1] I do not think this phrase too strong. In fact, Lord Stanley himself on the 1st of June told the Italian Minister in London that 'the statement as to the present re-entrance of England into the European concert on Eastern affairs was not strictly correct.' Correspondence relating to the affairs of Crete, Part II., *Parl. Papers*, 1867, p. 130.

[2] See *La Turquie sous le Règne d'Abdul Aziz*, pp. 380, 381.

[3] See Sir H. Elliot, *Diplomatic Recollections* (unpublished), page 251.

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over the highway to India. Financial England displayed its zeal for a ruler whose credit was enhanced by the warmth of his reception. The public generally displayed an unreasonable curiosity to see a potentate who, if worthless, was at any rate Oriental, and were almost as eager to crowd round the red turban of Abdul Aziz as they had been sedulous, a few years before, to cheer General Garibaldi in his red shirt.[1]

Persistence of the Cretan revolt.

If the singular visit to Western Europe gave London and Paris a new interest in the Sultan, it did not affect the progress of events in Crete. Omar Pacha had not much more success than his predecessor in quelling insurrection. In these circumstances four of the great powers of Europe—France, Russia, Prussia, and Italy—urged the Porte to send a commissioner to Crete to inquire into the grievances of the islanders, and to allow representatives of the great powers to accompany the commission. Austria practically supported the suggestion of the four powers.[2] Unhappily England, under Lord Stanley's guidance, persisted in refusing to put any pressure on the Porte, and the abstention of England naturally encouraged the Sultan's advisers in their determination to put down revolt.[3] In these circumstances the condition of the island became worse than ever. Omar Pacha, unable to secure victory in the field, endeavoured to suppress revolt by massacre. Men, women, and children were indiscriminately murdered, and the chances of quelling the insurrection seemed as far off as ever.[4] Severity having failed, the Turks had recourse to a policy of lenity, and sent Ali

[1] See *La Turquie sous le Règne d'Abdul Aziz*, p. 382.

[2] Correspondence relating to the affairs of Crete, Part II., *Parl. Papers*, 1867, p. 166.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 169. For the Porte's reply, *ibid.*, p. 182.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 238.

Pacha — who had succeeded Fuad Pacha as Grand Vizier[1] — to the island with the offer of a general pardon to the insurgents, and of large administrative reforms to the people.[2] Neither the promises which Ali Pacha was authorised to make, nor the bribes which he ventured to offer, had the slightest effect. His mission completely failed.[3] On its failure, France, Russia, and Italy, three of the four powers which had suggested inquiry, addressed a new note to the Porte stating that the amnesty which Ali Pacha had been instructed to offer contained no guarantee which would justify its being looked upon as a serious measure; that the refusal of the Porte to institute the inquiry which the powers had suggested showed that no remedy was available for the abuses which had provoked the insurrection; that as, in consequence, nothing had been done to satisfy the Christians, the powers feared that the obstinate resistance of the Porte might precipitate a crisis in the East; and that, in that case, the Porte would ask in vain for even the moral support of the Cabinets in the difficulties which the neglect of their advice had created.[4]

The insurrection had now lasted eighteen months. There seemed to be no prospect of its suppression. If, indeed, the insurgents themselves showed symptoms of exhaustion, they were encouraged by the constant sympathy and active assistance of the Greeks on the mainland. Greek vessels brought supplies to Crete, and carried refugees to Greece with the knowledge

[1] For the fall of Fuad Pacha see, *inter alia*, Ollivier, *L'Empire Libéral*, vol. ix. p. 9.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 260, 279, and cf. *La Turquie sous le Règne d'Abdul Aziz*, p. 385.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 387, and Correspondence relating to the affairs of Crete, Part II., *Parl. Papers*, 1867, p. 280.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 297.

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or connivance of the Greek Government, and almost with the regularity of a mail service.[1] And Greece, acquiring boldness from impunity, and perhaps relying on the notorious sympathy of Russia, organised a new expedition of volunteers under a man named Petropoulaki, which—in the late autumn of 1868—was despatched to the island.[2]

Crete aided by Greece.

Judged by the ordinary rules of international law, the conduct of the Greek Government was indefensible. There could be no doubt that it was affording its subjects every opportunity to organise on its own shores expeditions which deserters from its own army were allowed to join, in support of an insurrection on an island under the nominal sway of an adjacent Government. It was in fact as impossible to justify the conduct of Greece as to defend the conduct of Piedmont and Count Cavour in allowing General Garibaldi to sail from Genoa with his famous thousand in 1860.[3] The only real difference between Petropoulaki and Garibaldi was that the Italian succeeded and that the Greek failed; and filibustering ceases to be filibustering just as treason ceases to be treason when it succeeds.[4] But the people of this country had notoriously wished for Garibaldi's success, and the Foreign Minister of England had defended the General's conduct by reminding a respectable House of Commons that we too in England had once a great filibuster,[5] who landed,

[1] The Blue-book is full of the romantic achievements of the *Arkadi*. For her final loss see p. 265.

[2] *State Papers*, vol. lix. pp. 584, 585, and cf. Ollivier, *L'Empire Libéral*, vol. ix. p. 4.

[3] *Ante*, vol. i. p. 288.

[4] I am not, of course, laying down any new doctrine, but only applying the old couplet:

'Treason doth never prosper.
What's the reason?
Why, if it prosper, none dare call it treason.'

[5] *Ante*, vol. i. p. 289.

in the month of November 1688, on the south-west coast of England. The Greeks may almost be pardoned for thinking that the nation which had made a hero of Garibaldi would not inquire too closely into the morality of Petropoulaki's raid; and the Greeks had an additional excuse for their conclusion in the knowledge that at the time of Petropoulaki's raid the general election of 1868 was deciding the fate of Mr. Disraeli's Government, and that the new Prime Minister, Mr. Gladstone, was recognised as the friend of nationalities and the warm champion of the Greek cause.[1]

Unfortunately for the Greeks, the Ministers at this conjuncture overlooked the fact that, while Ministers rise and fall, the policy of the Foreign Office rarely changes. At the very time at which the general election was being fought in England, Mr. Henry Elliot, who had suceeeded Lord Lyons as Ambassador at Constantinople, was taking upon himself to tell Ali Pacha that he wondered that the Turkish Government continued to tolerate the open and undisguised assistance which the Greek Government was giving to the insurgents.[2] Fortified by Mr. Elliot's observation, the Turkish Government addressed an ultimatum to Greece,[3] and on the failure of the Greek Government to send a satisfactory answer, withdrew its minister, closed Turkish ports to Greek

[1] See Lord Clarendon's despatch in *State Papers*, vol. lix. p. 595.

[2] Sir H. Elliot, *Diplomatic Recollections*, p. 254. Officially Mr. Elliot denied that he had instigated the Porte in the advice which he thus gave. See, *inter alia*, *State Papers*, vol. lix. p. 766. I shall not attempt to reconcile his public despatches with his private recollections, but the reader who wishes to do so should carefully compare Mr. Elliot's letter to Lord Stanley of the 29th November, 1868 (*State Papers*, vol. lix. p. 589), with the private reminiscences.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 599.

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shipping, and directed all Greek subjects to leave Turkish territory.[1]

The flames of insurrection were visibly spreading, and threatening to involve Europe in a new war; and a new war was precisely the one end which all the great powers were anxious to avoid. Neither Russia, which thought that the Porte had acted with precipitation,[2] nor this country, which was declaring that it was impossible to impugn the measures of repression which the Turkish Government was about to adopt,[3] had any desire that the Turco-Greek quarrel should disturb the peace.[4] Something had obviously to be done to smother the fire before it spread; and so it came to pass that while the Cretan insurrection had dissolved the concert of Europe, the imminent prospect of a Greco-Turkish war brought the great powers into line again.

The Paris Conference.

If, indeed, the great powers were at one in their desire to stop the flood, they were not unanimous as to the best machinery for doing so. Russia and France were in favour of referring the dispute to a Conference of the great powers. Lord Clarendon was in the first instance anxious to confine any action to the three powers who had guaranteed the independence of Greece—France, Russia, and Great Britain. Lord Clarendon, however, found it ultimately necessary to give way on this point, and the great powers of Europe, including Turkey, ultimately agreed to a Conference at Paris. Greece, only admitted to a *voix consultative*, declined to allow her

[1] *State Papers*, vol. lix. p. 611.

[2] See Baron Brunnow's report to Lord Clarendon, *ibid.*, p. 609.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 595.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 609. Of the other powers, Prussia and France were watching each other and preparing for the duel which was fought out in 1870, and Austria had not recovered from the sacrifices of 1866.

representative to take part in the proceedings. But the Conference was not deterred from its work by this refusal. The Turk was persuaded to postpone any measure of offence till after its deliberations; Greece was compelled to sign a declaration practically agreeing to strict neutrality in the future;[1] and the Conference broke up with the knowledge that if it had left Turkey master of the situation, it had averted the possibility of a new European war.

The decision of the Conference was fatal to the success of the insurrection. Deprived of all support from Greece, the insurgents had no longer power to continue the struggle. The Porte, moreover, adopted more energetic proceedings to enforce its blockade of the island. Captain Hobart, the brother of the Lord Hobart who had been instructed to report on Turkish finance a few years before, was selected to command the Turkish squadron.[2] Captain Hobart, who had already gained distinction as a successful blockade-runner in the American Civil War, succeeded in infusing some of his own energy into the men under his command, and the rebellion, deprived of external support and exhausted by the length of the struggle, collapsed.[3]

The Cretan revolt suppressed.

If 'Freedom shrieked,' diplomacy rejoiced at the success of the Porte. Insurrection in Crete had threatened the integrity of the Turkish Empire, on

[1] *State Papers*, vol. lix. pp. 740, 769, 780, 802.

[2] Captain Hobart's appointment and his instructions were announced by Mr. Elliot in his despatch of the 6th of December 1868. *Ibid.*, p. 598. Freeman says, with some exaggeration: 'Of all the deeds done in naval warfare the basest surely was when Hobart abused English naval skill to bring back Greeks under the Turkish yoke.' *Ottoman Power in Europe*, pp. 209, 210.

[3] See *State Papers*, vol. lix. pp. 706, 711, 741, 796. Stillman says that the suppression of the rebellion cost the Porte over 50,000 men and 10,000,000*l.*, and inflicted a blow on it from which, in its decaying condition, it has never been able to recover. Stillman, *Herzegovina and the Late Uprising*, p. 5.

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which the powers of Europe had laid such stress in 1856, and had revived the differences which have almost always made the concert of Europe an impossible remedy for oriental embarrassment. Though Abdul Aziz was already yielding to the temptation of his position and destroying the hopes which the promises of his opening reign had encouraged, statesmen trained in the school of Palmerston still believed in the regeneration of Turkey, and in the settlement which had followed the Crimean war. Their faith, however, was to be immediately subjected to a new shock. In the year which succeeded the suppression of rebellion in Crete the great duel between France and Germany was fought out in Western Europe, and in the crisis of the struggle Russia took advantage of the discomfiture of France and the isolation of England to tear up one of the most important articles of the Treaty of Paris. Lord Granville, indeed, ultimately succeeded in inducing the Russian Government to consent to refer the matter to a Conference of the great powers, and in this way Europe itself accomplished the act which Russia had proposed to perform of its own volition. From an international standpoint Lord Granville's management of the crisis had undoubtedly been beneficial. It is of the highest importance that every nation should recognise that Europe alone can undo what Europe has done. But from any other point of view the Conference of London had merely emphasised the fact that the results of the Crimean war had already disappeared, and that the arrangements which had been made in Paris in 1856 were hardly worth the paper that they were written on.[1]

[1] I have referred thus shortly to the events of 1870 because I have

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Nullity of Turkish reforms.

For, if any one had carefully compared the settlements of 1856 with the facts of 1871 he would have found ample cause for meditating on the results of the Crimean war. (1) The Porte had retained the right of garrison in Servia, and the right of garrison had been given up. (2) The Porte had communicated to the powers the charter under which it hoped to ameliorate the lot of the Christian population of Turkey, and the Firman had become notoriously a dead letter. (3) The powers had renounced the right of either collective or separate interference in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire, and the powers had interfered in Syria, and were actually interfering with the management of Ottoman finance. (4) The neutrality of the Black Sea had been proclaimed, and the neutrality of the Black Sea had been abandoned on the dictation of Russia. (5) Austria, France, and Great Britain had separately and collectively guaranteed the execution of the treaty, and no one of these powers had taken up arms to enforce it. (6) The treaties implied the separation of the two principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia; Great Britain, at any rate, had laboured since the conclusion of the treaty for the separation, and the two principalities were united under a foreign prince. (7) The treaties had assumed that a regenerated Turkey would remain a power in Eastern Europe, and Turkey, so it seemed, was neither regenerated nor a power.

described them at length in the first chapter of vol. iii. pp. 28 to 36. It is remarkable how completely English writers ignore the state of Turkey after the Crimean war. Even Mr. Morley quotes Mr. Gladstone to the effect that the war 'gave Turkey, for the first time perhaps in her blood-stained history, twenty years of a repose not disturbed either by herself or any foreign power.' *Life of Gladstone*, vol. ii. p. 548.

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If, indeed, regeneration had depended on official documents the friends of Turkey could allege that much had been done. The Firman of 1856, they argued, had confirmed and developed the Firman of 1839 which had first proclaimed the right of civil and religious liberty and initiated the work of reform in Turkey. Time was necessary to give effect to a provision which involved changes in every branch of administration; but it was contended that a step had already been taken by substituting a 'vilayet' for a 'pachalic' in the provinces south of the Danube, by endowing the vilayet with some form of local government,[1] and by separating three years afterwards the Bulgarian from the Greek Church. But in Turkey, to repeat a quotation already used, the Turk changes not, it is his statute-book that changes.[2] The old abuses which had flourished in the pachalic under the pacha remained uncorrected in the vilayet when the pacha had become a Vali. The constitution of the Bulgarian Church introduced a new cause of difference into a distracted country. It proved a 'practical exemplification of the maxim *Divide et impera*.' Nothing, so a modern author has declared, has strengthened the Sultan's hold on Macedonia so much as the 'dissensions between the Bulgarian and the Greek Church.'[3]

Whatever effect, however, these reforms may have had on that part of European Turkey in which they had been introduced, they obviously could have had no influence on that much larger portion to

[1] See Fuad Pacha's report in *State Papers*, vol. lxiii. p. 1261. For the constitution of the vilayet, *ibid.*, p. 1260, and cf. D'Avril, *Le Traité de Berlin*, p. 68.

[2] Odysseus, *Turkey in Europe*, p. 139.

[3] *Ibid.* p. 284.

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Bosnia and Herzegovina.

which they were never applied. To the west of Servia, and bordering on Austrian Dalmatia, lie the comparatively remote provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. A quarter of a century before, the native beys, by whom the provinces had been administered, had been replaced under Omar Pacha by Turkish officials.[1] The inhabitants of the districts comprised a Mussulman proprietary and a Christian peasantry.[2] The Christians naturally resented the rule of the Turk. Close neighbours to Montenegro on the one side, and to Servia on the other, in a country marching with Dalmatia, they saw men of the same race as themselves in enjoyment either of some kind of autonomy, or, as in the case of Dalmatia, of firm and orderly government. They were ripe at any moment for revolt. Early in 1875, a visit of the Emperor of Austria to Dalmatia, which was accepted as a proof of his desire to conciliate his Sclavonic subjects, and in which he incidentally received the Prince of Montenegro with the respect due to an independent sovereign,[3] inflamed the passions of a people who were fretting under the oppression of their Turkish masters. Some inhabitants of Herzegovina, who had taken refuge in Montenegro, returned to their own country and raised the standard of revolt.[4] An insurrectionary movement of this character, if it is not at once suppressed, is likely to spread. The insurrection—if such a term may be applied to the movement in its earlier stages—

[1] D'Avril, *Le Traité de Berlin*, p. 93.

[2] See Count Andrassy's note, *State Papers*, vol. lxvi. p. 927.

[3] Freeman, *Ottoman Power in Europe*, p. 216; Mill, *Ottomans in Europe*, p. 93.

[4] *Parl. Papers*, 1876, Affairs of Turkey, Part II., p. 1; and see Stillman, *Herzegovina and the Late Uprising*, p. 3. M. d'Avril points out that the rebellion was coincident with an increase by a fourth of the excise, p. 94.

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was encouraged by the Slavs in Servia,[1] in Montenegro, and even in Austria; it was actually assisted by the secret organisation, the Omladina, which is said to aim at the establishment of a great Sclavonic Republic in Eastern and Central Europe,[2] and it enlisted the moral if not the material support of the two great neighbouring empires, Austria and Russia.

The attitude of Austria, on this occasion, was novel. Austria, since 1856, had been the power which had been associated with England in a desire to maintain the *status quo* in Turkey. She had opposed the union of the principalities; she had languidly followed the lead of the other powers in Syria; she had taken no part in the vigorous remonstrances which France, Russia, Prussia, and Italy had addressed to the Porte on the subject of Crete. And yet, in 1875, she was using language and displaying sympathies which were, in the view of friend and foe of Turkey,[3] undoubtedly encouraging revolt. But the whole internal and external circumstances of Austria had changed since the suppression of the Cretan rebellion. She had in the meanwhile recovered from the losses inflicted on her in Italy in 1859, and in Bohemia in 1866, and her new alliance with Germany and Russia had again raised her to a prominent position in the family of nations; while a growing coolness between Russia and Germany had

[1] Stillman says that it would have been unsafe and futile for Prince Nikita to have attempted to cut off all aid from the insurgents. *Herzegovina and the late Uprising*, p. 23.

[2] For this Society and its aspirations see Mill, *The Ottomans in Europe*, pp. 38 *seq.*; but *cf.* Consul-General Sir W. A. White's report in *Parl. Papers*, 1876, Turkey (No. 3), p. 126.

[3] Such different men as Mill, *Ottomans in Europe*, p. 93, and Freeman, *Ottoman Power in Europe*, p. 218, both trace the revolt to the Emperor of Austria's visit to Dalmatia.

Austrian policy.

given, in German eyes, a new importance to the Austrian alliance.[1] But, if Austria had regained externally some of her old influence, her internal necessities, and the desire to satisfy the susceptibilities of her large Sclavonic population, induced her to regard with sympathy the aspirations of the large Slav communities adjoining her own territory. Her new Minister, Count Andrassy, who years before had been condemned to death for his share in the Hungarian insurrection of 1849, had perhaps some not unnatural sympathy with rebellion in the abstract; and, in a private conversation with Sir H. Elliot, in the year preceding the rising in Herzegovina, he had declared that 'it could not but be to the advantage of Turkey if their people—the Sclavonic communities—were taught to turn their eyes to Austria, which was a thoroughly friendly power, and to look to her for sympathy and support in obtaining redress of their grievances, instead of to Russia, of whose hostility to Turkey every one was aware.'

In 1874 some indications of the change in Austrian policy had been given. In concert with the Governments of Russia and Germany she desired to conclude a treaty of commerce directly with the Danubian principalities. The Porte had objected that, under the terms of the treaties of 1856, the principalities

[1] The Drei Kaiser Bund was formed at a meeting of the three Emperors in Berlin in September 1872. The harmony of the Russian and German Courts was shattered in 1875 'by the provocation of Prince Gortschakoff, who (wrote Prince Bismarck) spread the lie that we intended to fall upon France before she had recovered from her wounds.' *Prince Bismarck, his Reflections and Reminiscences*, vol. ii. p. 249. Sir H. Elliot attributes the breakdown of Turkey in 1875 to the effects of the Triple Alliance (*Diplomatic Recollections*, pp. 277 *seq.*), and his remarks receive some confirmation from the language of the German Press. See the extracts from it in Busch's *Bismarck*, vol. ii. p. 248.

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had no power, without the sanction of their suzerain, to make such an arrangement. The Governments of England and France had supported the objection. But the three powers had persisted in their claim. The Government of the United Kingdom wisely decided not to convert an unimportant dispute into a great international question,[1] and the convention between Austria and Roumania was in due course concluded.[2] The convention undoubtedly marked a new milestone on the road that was leading to Roumanian independence; but it pointed still more clearly to the drift which, in Eastern matters, was carrying Austria from the policy which still found favour in London toward the policy which had hitherto been associated with St. Petersburg.

Insurrection in Herzegovina.

And the drift was to become more apparent. In the summer of 1875 the insurrection in Herzegovina attracted little attention in this country. It was merely regarded as one of those chronic disturbances which were perpetually recurring in Eastern Europe. Lord Derby—for the Lord Stanley of the Ministry of 1866 had now succeeded to his father's title—was not disposed, in the first instance, to attach much importance to the new movement. He thought of Herzegovina as years before he had thought of Crete, and desired that Turkey might be left to suppress insurrection unaided and alone.[3] He did not think

[1] See a debate in the House of Lords, *Hansard*, vol. ccxxvi. p. 10, and Lord Derby's speech, *ibid.*, pp. 24–28.

[2] The convention will be found in *State Papers*, vol. lxvi. p. 155.

[3] See his despatch to Sir H. Elliot, *Parl. Papers*, 1876, Turkey (No. 2), p. 6. In August he assented 'with reluctance' to a consular mission to the insurgents, which had been initiated by the three northern powers, and which had been accepted by the Porte; but he added that he doubted 'the expediency of the intervention of foreign consuls. Such an intervention is scarcely compatible with the independent authority of the Porte over its

that a movement which was to convulse the East, and bring this country to the very verge of war, required any particular notice; and, on the conclusion of the session, he did not advise the Queen to add a single word to the Speech on the subject of Turkey. But Parliament had hardly separated before events occurred which gave new encouragement to the insurgents in Turkey and alienated the sympathies of Western Europe. For the crash at last came which is the inevitable consequence of reckless finance either in public or in private life, and Turkey, confronted with a huge deficit, had to confess her inability to pay more than half of the interest of her debt in cash. Even the British Ministry was unable to ignore the significance of repudiation. 'It would be affectation to deny'—so spake the Prime Minister at the Mansion House in November—'that a partial revolt in a province of European Turkey has brought about a state of affairs which, in that part of the world, very often becomes critical. In the present instance the wise forbearance of the great powers immediately interested in the question produced an effect so happy that at one moment, some months ago, we had a right to believe that this serious disturbance would immediately cease. An unfortunate event—the financial catastrophe of one of our allies—revived the expiring struggle, gave a new aspect to all the circumstances, and created hopes and fears in quarters and in circles which before that did not exist.'[1] 'Though the collapse'—so wrote a great

own territory, offers an inducement to insurrection as a means of appealing to foreign sympathy against Turkish rule, and may not improbably open the way to further diplomatic interference in the internal affairs of the empire.' *Ibid.* p. 8. The mission was a failure. *Ibid.* p. 23.

[1] *Times*, 10th of November, 1875; Hitchman's *Beaconsfield*, pp. 512, 513.

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English newspaper—'had long been foreseen by competent observers as inevitable, it nevertheless at the moment took capitalists and politicians by surprise. No other occurrence has done so much to create a belief in the early disruption of the Turkish empire, and one immediate result has been the revival of the hopes and activity of the insurgents in Herzegovina.'[1]

Insurrection, even under the most approved conditions, is an ugly thing. Insurrection in a half-civilised country, crushed by a harsh and alien Government, is apt to become a bloody business. The insurgents in Herzegovina, and their friends who crossed over the boundary of Montenegro to help them, did many things which history has neither the right nor the desire to excuse. It is only fair to the Turk to recollect that if in the immediate future he shocked Christianity by his outrages, the ghastly work had been commenced by the insurgents themselves. News of what was going on, however, only travelled slowly to Western Europe, and for some time all that Paris and London knew was that one more insurrection had broken out in European Turkey, and that the Porte, which was confessedly

[1] *Times*, 31st December, 1875. The repudiation of her debt by Turkey led to discussions in Parliament on the position of the loans contracted in 1854 and 1855. The 1854 loan had been raised on the security of the Egyptian tribute, which was transmitted half-yearly direct by the Pacha of Egypt to the agents for the loan in London. Mr. Russell Gurney argued that this condition and the recommendation of the loan by Lord Clarendon entitled the Government to put pressure on Turkey to fulfil its obligations. See the debate, *Hansard*, vol. ccxxx. p. 1728. The 1855 loan was issued on the joint guarantee of England and France, and the interest on this loan was paid by these powers till 1878, when the Cyprus tribute was applied to meet it. See as to the 1855 loan, *Hansard*, vol. ccxxxi. pp. 423, 966. For the whole question of the repudiation see *Parl. Papers*, 1875, Turkey (No. 6), and *Parl. Papers*, 1876, Turkey (No. 1), 1876.

unable to pay either its creditors abroad or its troops at home, was apparently unable to suppress it.

Count Andrassy's Note.

In Vienna, however, the insurrection attracted more attention. The men who were fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina were kin in blood to the Emperor's Sclavonic subjects. The fires which were kindled by the insurgents could almost be seen from Austrian territory, and the Government of Austria, even if the accession of Count Andrassy to power had not modified its policy, could have hardly watched unmoved a conflagration close to its own doors. But the change in Austrian policy, which had led to the formation of the Drei Kaiser Bund—the fatal Drei Kaiser Bund, as Sir H. Elliot called it[1]—would in any case have necessitated Austrian interference. And on the 30th of December, 1875,[2] Count Andrassy, after consulting the allied Courts of Berlin and St. Petersburg, formulated the Note which has ever since borne his name.

The Note,[3] after alluding to the efforts which the European powers had already made to restore peace by the friendly action of their consuls—efforts which had been directed toward inducing the insurgents to state their grievances, and prevailing upon the Turks to temper repression with reform—declared that the moment had come for the powers by concerted action to prevent the spread of the insurrection and the disturbance to the peace of Europe threatened by its continuance. The reforms which the Sublime Porte

[1] *Diplomatic Recollections*, p. 300.

[2] Austria, Germany, and Russia were co-operating closely on the Eastern question from the 14th August, 1875. D'Avril, *Le Traité de Berlin*, p. 94.

[3] The Andrassy Note is in *State Papers*, vol. lxvi. p. 921. Cf. D'Avril, *Le Traité de Berlin* pp. 101 *seq.*

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had been persuaded from time to time to proclaim had been based on some admirable principles of administration, but their authors had failed to carry them into practice. The three powers for whom Count Andrassy had undertaken to speak were now agreed that the Porte must redeem the promises which it had given, by introducing, not in theory, but in effect, full and lasting religious liberty; by instituting a rational system of collecting instead of farming the taxes; by passing a law which would compel the produce of any direct tax levied in Bosnia and Herzegovina to be spent in the development of those provinces; by the appointment of a mixed commission composed in equal numbers of Mohammedans and Christians to control the execution of these reforms; and by measures which would gradually enable the rural population to become proprietors of the land which they cultivated. These measures, if they were agreed upon by the powers of Europe, might be recommended to the Porte, not in a collective note—for a collective note might wear the appearance of insulting its dignity and of assailing its independence—but by the joint and friendly action of the European representatives at Constantinople.

The means which Count Andrassy was suggesting for the pacification of the insurgent provinces were not more radical than those which had been adopted by the European powers in dealing with the disturbances in Syria thirteen years before. They could hardly have been rejected by any power which had been a party to the measure for pacifying Syria. Lord Derby who, on behalf of England and in deference to the wishes of the Porte, wished to infuse a little British moderation into the for-

Lord Derby's views

ward policy of the northern powers,[1] consented to instruct Sir Henry Elliot 'to give a general support to the proposals of the Austro-Hungarian Government and to act with his colleagues for this purpose.'[2] But Lord Derby contrived, while nominally assenting to Count Andrassy's suggestion, to throw a good deal of cold water upon it. The Porte, according to his argument, had already assented to everything which Austria had required: the principle of religious liberty had been acknowledged throughout the Ottoman Empire to the fullest possible extent; her Majesty's Government had been informed by her Majesty's Ambassador in Constantinople that the entire suppression of the system of tax farming was resolved upon; and the institution of a special Commission, composed of an equal number of Mussulmans and Christians, had been already to some extent provided for. The promises of 1839 and 1856 had, indeed, been extended and confirmed by new firmans, issued in the autumn of 1875, dealing with Justice, Taxation, and Administrative Reforms.[3] And though the two other points concerning the proceeds of direct taxation and the acquisition of land by the cultivators 'involve in their detailed application to districts like Bosnia and Herzegovina many questions upon which they were not prepared, in their present state of information, to offer a definite opinion,' her Majesty's Government was prepared to support a scheme which had already been adopted by the Porte itself.

[1] *Parl. Papers*, Turkey (No. 2), 1876, p. 86.

[2] Lord Derby's reply to the Austrian Note is in *State Papers*, vol. lxvii. p. 1218. See especially p. 1226.

[3] These firmans are reprinted in *State Papers*, vol. lxvii. pp. 1210–1213.

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Anyone who made it his business to study these famous documents could hardly fail to perceive that, however much they professed agreement, there was a radical difference between the views of Lord Derby and those of Count Andrassy. The argument of Count Andrassy was that the promises of the Porte were worthless. The argument of Lord Derby, on the contrary, was that the Porte by its promises had shown that it was ready to introduce the reforms which the powers required. And the Porte was adroit enough to follow Lord Derby's lead. A new decree was at once issued applying four out of the five reforms, which Count Andrassy's memorandum had indicated, to the revolted districts. The Porte could not, indeed, without disturbing its financial system, consent to devote the produce of direct taxation levied in Bosnia and Herzegovina to the necessities of these provinces. But, in its anxiety to promote the welfare of its subjects and to accede to the views of the friendly powers who were making the suggestion, it undertook to do the same thing in another way, and to apply a fixed sum of money to meet the needs of these localities. If Governments could be judged by their language and not by their deeds, the Turkish Ministry could claim that, in its benevolence, it was setting an example to the ministers of other nations.[1]

Neither the Andrassy Note nor the Turkish reply was of any avail. The insurgents declared, with some reason, that the experience of the past convinced them that they could put no reliance on the promises of the Porte; the Porte replied that it was impossible to introduce new reforms into a province

[1] The Turkish reply is in *State Papers*, vol. lxvii. pp. 1227-1230.

which was overrun by insurgents in arms.[1] The insurgents were notoriously assisted by Montenegro, by Servia, and by men of the same race as their own in Dalmatia. But the flames of insurrection not only continued to desolate the districts in which they had burst forth: they spread to other parts of Turkey.[2]

Spread of insurrection.

The first remarkable outburst occurred at Salonica, a port whose admirable situation has given it a commanding influence, and, under any decent government, might enable it to supplant Brindisi as the port for the Indian and Australian mails. On the 6th of May 1876 a scuffle arose concerning a girl who, born of Bulgarian parents, was alleged to have embraced Christianity. The girl was seized by the Greeks and carried, in the American Consul's carriage, to the American Consulate. The Mohammedans, on the following day, resolved to attack the American Consulate and to regain possession of the girl, and, while they were collecting for the purpose, seized and murdered the French and German Consuls.[3] The German Government at once demanded an indemnity for the widow, and, on Prince Bismarck's vigorous remonstrance, secured its immediate payment.[4] Twice that sum was demanded by the Government of France as compensation for the murder of their own Consul.[5]

This fanatical outburst, and the knowledge that

[1] See the language of the Berlin Note in *State Papers*, vol. lxvii. p. 1230.

[2] *Parl. Papers*, 1876, Turkey (No. 3), 1876, pp. 22, 29, 40.

[3] The facts are given in *Parl. Papers*, 1876, Turkey (No. 4), pp. 1 *seq.*; but a succinct account will be found in Mr. Bourke's answer to a question in the House of Commons, *Hansard*, vol. ccxxix. p. 111, and, almost in the same language, in Sir H. Elliot's *Diplomatic Recollections*, pp. 304 *seq.*

[4] Jacks' *Life of Bismarck*, p. 413.

[5] *Diplomatic Recollections*, p. 312.

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other portions of European Turkey were in a state of excitement menacing to peace,[1] induced the three Courts for whom Count Andrassy had undertaken to speak in December 1875 to formulate a stronger policy in May 1876. Count Andrassy and Prince Gortschakoff happened to be in Berlin. They used their meeting to formulate a new Note, much shorter but much more decisive than that which Count Andrassy had written five months before. It was declared that the promise of the Porte to carry out the reforms which the Andrassy Note had suggested, and which Europe, for once in concert, had recommended, had given the powers a moral right to watch over their accomplishment. The efforts of the peacemakers, however, had been rendered useless by the refusal of the insurgents to trust the Porte and the inability of the Porte to introduce reform into the insurgent districts. Hostilities had, in consequence, been renewed; disturbances had increased, and had led to the deplorable murders at Salonica and to a threat of rebellion in other parts of Turkey. If the situation were prolonged there could be little doubt that it would afford fresh encouragement to the insurgents in Herzegovina, and help to kindle a general conflagration throughout European Turkey. The great powers of Europe, therefore, should at once insist on the Sultan fulfilling his engagements and redeeming his promises, and, as a pledge of sincerity, on proclaiming an armistice for two months. The breathing space which would thus be obtained could be used by the Porte to carry out its proposed

[1] 'La surexcitation menaçante qui se manifeste sur d'autres points de l'Europe ottomane.' See the Berlin note, *State Papers*, vol. lxvii. p. 1232.

reforms, and by the powers to arrange terms of peace between the Ottoman Government and the insurgents. The Porte, among other things, might engage to supply materials for the reconstruction of houses and churches destroyed during the insurrection; it might temporarily provide for the subsistence of any refugees who returned to Bulgaria. In carrying out these duties the Turkish officers might consult and defer to the views of the mixed Commission which the Andrassy note had recommended, and which it was now proposed to place under the presidency of a Herzegovinian Christian; while, to avoid all possibility of conflict, the Turkish troops might be concentrated; the Christians, like the Mussulmans, being left in possession of their arms. The whole of these arrangements should, it was suggested, be carried out under the surveillance of foreign consuls. It was hoped that they would succeed. But if they failed, and hostilities were resumed, the allied powers proposed to consider what steps they should take to stop the mischief and prevent its spread.[1]

The Berlin Note.

Such was the gist of the famous paper which, from the place whence it was dated, is known to history as the Berlin Note. The three powers by whom it was framed at once forwarded the draft to Paris, Rome, and London, in the hope that they might receive the support of France, Italy, and England. And if a perfectly impartial ministry, free from the traditions of the Foreign Office and the prejudices which were the natural legacy of the Crimean war, had sat down coolly and impartially to examine the situation, many reasons would probably have been found

[1] The Berlin Memorandum is reprinted in *State Papers*, vol. lxvii. p. 1230.

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for trying to arrive at some agreement with the three Empires. Ministers might possibly have suggested modifications in the note: they would hardly have taken the responsibility of refusing it altogether. For in the first place, any such examination must have shown that the policy of the Crimean war had failed. Many of the most important articles of the treaty of Paris had been revised; and the union of Roumania, the extrusion of Turkish garrisons from Servia, the steps by which Syria had been pacified were proofs almost as cogent as those which had been afforded by the Conference of London, that the stipulations agreed upon at Paris could not be trusted to endure. And, in the next place, whatever faint hopes men like Lord Palmerston may have entertained as to the possible regeneration of Turkey had been destroyed by the succeeding twenty years. The last state of the Sick Man was worse than the first; the promise under which Abdul Aziz's reign had been commenced had been nullified; and bankruptcy had been added to the many evils which had been sapping the foundations of Ottoman rule in Europe. If, however, no man who had dispassionately examined the situation could have any longer believed in the regeneration of the Turkish Government, there was an increasing probability that the vassal territories which had achieved a qualified independence constituted a resisting power to Russian advance which Turkey herself could no longer be trusted to supply. The Emperor Nicholas understood the Eastern question from the Russian standpoint much better than the ordinary British statesman, when he told Sir H. Seymour that the one thing to which he could never be brought to consent would be the

erection of a powerful Greece.[1] He saw, what Lord Palmerston failed to see, that, defective as Greek government was, it afforded a guarantee for the maintenance of existing boundaries which the Ottoman rule no longer supplied. The same thing might have been inferred in 1876 from the position of the vassal states of Roumania, Servia, and Montenegro. They were all proud of the independence which they had so far secured, and which they were determined to preserve. It is true, indeed, that they were ready to welcome Russian interference, but they were only ready to welcome it for the sake of still further relieving themselves from the power of the Porte. The same thing proved true a few years later, when the arms of Russia gained autonomy for Bulgaria, and when the new Christian state, which owed its existence to Russia, showed itself determined to brook no interference of Russia in her affairs. The power of Russia, in short, has done more than anything else to liberate large portions of European Turkey from Ottoman rule; and yet the independence which Greece, Roumania, Servia, and Roumelia have secured has been more potent to check the advance of Russia to Constantinople than the Crimean war.

Such a result would not have ensued if the vassal territories which had been rescued from the rule of the Porte had not acquired prosperity. Even in Greece, and the Greeks were perhaps the least favourable example, there was no comparison between the condition of the country before its emancipation and its later progress. Increased and increasing prosperity met the eye of the traveller in Roumania. The state of the people of that province might have been described in

[1] Sir H. Elliot, *Diplomatic Recollections*, p. 293.

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the words used to depict the condition of the people of Bulgaria twenty years after she too had acquired independence: 'In agriculture, manufactures, commerce, education, literature, and military matters alike they have made enormous strides. It is only necessary to go westward from Turkey and cross the frontier to see what twenty years of autonomy have done. In that brief space one seems to advance, not twenty, but two hundred years.' [1]

Its reception by the English Ministry.

And there was another reason which might have induced a perfectly impartial minister, free from all predilection, to hesitate before he refused to subscribe the Berlin Note. All history had shown that the traditional policy of the Porte was to play off the great powers one against the other. The Sultan was impotent against the concert of Europe; he was ready to dare much when Europe was not united. And for once there was a fair chance of maintaining at any rate the nominal agreement which the Andrassy note had succeeded in establishing. France and Italy at once agreed to support the northern powers.[2] The Italian Government, indeed, gave reasons for its action in doing so which, though they failed to convince the British Ministry at the time, seem to-day unanswered and unanswerable. It 'considered that united action between all the powers was the surest means of securing the maintenance of peace, and that by associating themselves with the policy of the three Imperial Cabinets in the present instance the Western powers would be in a better position to exercise an influence over subsequent proceedings should the measures now proposed fail to realise the hoped-for

[1] Odysseus, *Turkey in Europe*, p. 351.

[2] *Parl. Papers*, 1876, Turkey (No. 3), p. 148.

pacification.'[1] Unhappily these words, so wise in themselves, so true in their prediction, failed to influence the policy of the two men who guided the policy of England at the moment. Mr. Disraeli, the Prime Minister, had never shown the smallest sympathy with the aspirations of subject nationalities. With him the patriot of to-day was the brigand of to-morrow, and he had no more feeling for one than for the other.[2] He was, moreover, free from the feeling which animated his great rival, that Christian Europe should not tolerate the oppression of Christian people by Mohammedan tyrants. Oriental by extraction, he was fascinated by the East, and he perhaps saw with mixed feelings an Eastern race repaying to Christians in Turkey some of the enormities which Christian races in other parts of Europe had inflicted on his own race. His temperament, moreover, was not easily moved by suffering. In the game of foreign politics he did not allow himself to be disturbed by feelings of compassion. He could watch with equanimity 'a hero perish or a sparrow fall.'

Lord Derby, who guided our foreign policy in 1876, under Mr. Disraeli's supervision, was not constitutionally fitted to correct the defects of his chief. The very virtues that made him, in dealing with other nations, a model Foreign Minister, disqualified him from dealing with the Eastern. Endowed with a singularly calm judgment and a cold and dispassionate nature, he was bent, as perhaps few of his predecessors had been bent, on pursuing a policy of strict non-inter-

[1] *Parl. Papers*, 1876, Turkey (No. 3), p. 174.

[2] See his speech, 'In the one country (Calabria) the insurgents are called brigands, in the other (Poland) patriots; but, with this exception, I have not learned from this discussion that there is any marked difference between them.' *Hansard*, vol. clxx. p. 1486.

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vention in every part of Europe. But he failed to see that non-intervention, so desirable in the case of other nations, is not applicable to the case of Turkey. For Turkey exists by and through the continuous intervention of Europe. But for that intervention it would have succumbed long ago before the assaults of disaffection at home and enmity abroad. The Minister who, like Lord Derby, considers that, on the strict principles of non-intervention, Turkey has as much right to deal in her own fashion with rebellion as England has to repress disaffection in Ireland, forgets the radical distinction between the two cases. For England, whether her methods are just or unjust, wise or unwise, acts on her own responsibility and owes nothing to any other power, while Turkey would be powerless to act at all if the treaties to which England is a party, and which are largely the handiwork of English statesmen, had not secured her immunity from external interference—interference to which, if it were not for these treaties, the sympathy of races allied to her own oppressed subjects by race and religion would over and over again have exposed her.

This conclusion will perhaps be clearer if attention is momentarily diverted from the East to the West. In Western, as in Eastern Europe, a State exists under the guarantee of Europe whose territory has excited the envy of neighbouring potentates. But it may safely be said that, however important the neutrality of Belgium may seem, its independence would not be tolerated if, in lieu of its settled institutions and orderly government, which have made it an example to its neighbours, it was the prey of alternate massacre and insurrection. The contrast

between the history of the West and the East is still more striking. For, in the arrangement of 1815, Europe, in order to give greater strength to the little nation, whose neutrality and independence it was so anxious to secure, placed Roman Catholic Belgium and Protestant Holland under the same sovereign. And twenty years afterwards, when experience showed that difference of religion and politics made the marriage inharmonious, Europe formally divorced the parties whom it had united. The differences between the Roman Catholic Belgians and the Protestant Dutch were far less acute than the differences between Turk and Slav or Turk and Greek. But Europe persistently refused to Christianity in Turkey the remedy which it had spontaneously applied to Roman Catholicism in Belgium. Instead of contemplating the expediency of divorce, British Ministers kept on repeating—Those whom Europe hath joined together let no man venture to put asunder.

Rejection of the Berlin Note.

Mr. Disraeli's Oriental sympathies, Lord Derby's determination to maintain in Turkey the principle of non-intervention which he was applying with excellent effect elsewhere, both led them, though by different routes, to the same conclusion, to reject the Berlin Memorandum; and in an evil hour for the peace of Europe and the fortunes of the human race, the proposal was accordingly rejected. This country deliberately stood aside and refused to be a party to the remedy for misrule which the three empires had concerted, and in which France and Italy concurred. But England's separation from the other powers of Europe was due to no dwindling interest in Eastern affairs. On the contrary, the

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author of 'Tancred' was giving effect in his old age to the policy which he had published in 'Tancred' in his youth. And, at the cost of interrupting the tale of insurrection and violence, it is worth while to trace some other features of his policy.[1]

In the winter of 1875–6 the Prince of Wales paid a visit to India. He spent the best part of four months in travelling through our great dependency. His genial manners, his courtesy and tact, won him popularity wherever he went; and the accounts of his visit published in the English newspapers gave many people a new interest in that mysterious East which has as many fascinations for the speculative mind as it has interests for the historical inquirer. Nothing but good had resulted from the visit till it occurred to Mr. Disraeli to disturb the unanimity with which it was regarded by suggesting that it afforded an opportunity for making an addition to the style and title of the sovereign. The Queen of England was to become Empress of India.[2] The proposal was not popular either in Parliament or out of doors. The instinctive conservatism of the English people was opposed to adding a brand-new title to the good old name of King or Queen which the sovereign of England had borne for a thousand years. It was true that the Statute-book had re-

[1] M. d'Avril—by far the first authority on the subject—so far from exonerating England, thinks that the northern powers did not go far enough. He thinks that Austria should have occupied the provinces upon the failure of counter-action in 1875 (p. 122). He adds that England's motives for refusing were so miserable that it is necessary to find other reasons for her policy of isolation. *Ibid.*, p. 123.

[2] The change was recommended in the Speech from the Throne. *Hansard*, vol. ccxxvii. p. 4. And Mr. Disraeli subsequently, *ibid.*, p. 408, asked leave to introduce a Bill 'authorising her Majesty to proclaim the addition to her style and titles which she deems expedient and proper.'

The Queen-Empress of India.

cognised that the crown of England was an imperial crown,[1] and that some of the greatest masters of literature had addressed the occupant of the throne by an imperial title. But these examples only showed that there was nothing to be gained by the new change. For if a king was as supreme as an emperor, there was nothing to be gained by calling the sovereign an empress in one part of her dominions and queen in the other. But, on the other hand, if common sense was opposed to the change, respect for the occupant of the throne and for the wishes which she was understood to entertain, crippled the power of the Opposition; and though Lord Hartington in one House, and Lord Shaftesbury in the other, moved amendments that 'it is inexpedient to impair the ancient and royal dignity of the crown by the assumption of the style and title of empress,'[2] and asking her Majesty to assume a title more in accordance than the title of empress with the history of the nation,[3] men in both houses

[1] See the 24 & 25 Henry VIII.

[2] *Hansard*, vol. ccxxviii. p. 75.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 1039. For Lord Shaftesbury's opinion on the subject see his *Life*, vol. iii. p. 366. Perhaps there is no better illustration of how the same thing can be said badly and well than can be found in Mr. Lowe's and Lord Shaftesbury's speeches on the Bill. Mr. Lowe offended many people who were at one with him on his main conclusion by talking of the possibility of our losing India, as we had lost France in 1450. But our kings had not given up the title of Kings of France till 1801, '350 years after the last possibility of getting it back had disappeared. That shows the inconvenience of loading yourselves with titles you are not sure of retaining.' *Ibid.*, vol. ccxxvii. p. 415. Lord Shaftesbury said, 'The time may come when, after a long course of happy rule, we may surrender India to natives, grown into a capability of self-government. Our posterity may then see an enlargement of the glorious spectacle we now witness, when India shall be added to the roll of free and independent powers that wait on the Mother Country, and daily rise up and call her blessed. But to attain this end we must train them to British sentiments, infuse into them British principles, imbue them with British feeling, and, rising from the vulgar notion of an emperor, teach them that the deepest

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stayed away from the division, and the measure was passed.

This measure, one of the few things which remain to us of Mr. Disraeli's accomplishments, was, at any rate, consistent enough with his earlier writings. In later days, indeed, he had struck another note, and had declared that no Minister would 'do his duty who neglects any opportunity of reconstructing as much as possible our Colonial Empire.' The speech of 1872 was forgotten in 1876, as was rather cruelly said by one of his warmest admirers; and his zeal for the consolidation of the empire was satisfied by the new title with which he decorated his sovereign.[1]

At this very time, however, he was taking another step to increase the hold of England on the East. Years before he had declared that the project of executing a canal across the Isthmus of Suez was a most futile idea, totally impossible to be carried out.[2] The futile idea had long since been a practical reality. 1460 vessels, with an aggregate capacity of nearly 2,100,000 tons, were passing yearly through the canal, and more than three out of every four of the vessels which used the canal were under the British flag. The receipts from the impracticable project exceeded 1,220,000*l.* a year,[3] and were already affording a moderate return to those who had embarked their money in the enterprise. The Khedive of Egypt was the largest shareholder in the undertaking, and the Khedive was in a condition of pecuniary embarrassment which compelled him to raise

thought and noblest expression of a genuine Briton is to fear God and honour the king.' *Hansard*, vol. ccxxviii. p. 1047.

[1] Froude's *Beaconsfield*, p. 241.

[2] *Ante*, vol. i. p. 335.

[3] *State Papers*, vol. lxvii. pp. 68–70.

The shares of the Suez Canal.

money on his shares.[1] The editor of a leading London newspaper, Mr. Greenwood, happened to hear that the Khedive was anxious to sell his holding, and carrying the information to Mr. Disraeli, he suggested that it would be to the advantage of this country that the shares should be purchased by the British Government.[2] The proposal by no means commended itself to the Cabinet as a whole. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Stafford Northcote, was strongly opposed to it. 'Our policy, or our proceedings, with regard to the canal,' so he wrote to the Prime Minister,[3] 'has not been such as to gain us much credit for magnanimity. We opposed it in its origin; we refused to help Lesseps in his difficulties; we have used it when it has succeeded; we have fought the battle of our shipowners very stiffly; and we now avail ourselves of our influence with Egypt to get a quiet slice of what promises to be a good thing.' Mr. Disraeli, however, was not likely to be affected by his colleague's scruples. The canal was the road to India; everything that tightened our hold on the canal tended to preserve the road to India; and India was the great dominion which was giving the Queen a new title. A French company, moreover, agreed to pay the Khedive a very large sum of

[1] M. Ollivier, after recording that Ismail raised the debt of Egypt from 600,000,000 to 2,550,000,000 francs, proceeds to defend him. He declares that most of the money was expended in creating the agricultural domain (Daira Senieh) 'qui, réunis à l'Etat, lui ont assuré 500,000,000 francs,' and the port of Alexandria, worth 150,000,000; in constructing railways at a cost of 600,000,000; in investing 184,000,000 in one shape or another in the Suez Canal; and in securing the independence of the country by a payment of 400,000,000 to the Sultan. Ollivier, *L'Empire Libéral*, vol. ix. p. 2.

[2] Mr. Greenwood's part in the transaction was told by himself at a dinner given in his honour in 1905.

[3] Lang's *Life of Northcote*, vol. ii. p. 84.

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money on his shares, and Mr. Disraeli thought, with some reason, that it was undesirable that the whole of the shares of the canal should be held in France.[1] He accordingly decided to acquire the shares for this country, and as he could not constitutionally devote any money to the purchase until it had received the sanction of Parliament, he employed Messrs. Rothschild to buy the shares and hold them till he was in a position to pay for them.[2] Mr. Disraeli afterwards said that, in taking this course, Messrs. Rothschild ran a great risk.[3] The critics of the Government policy, on the contrary, declared that they made a very good bargain.[4] But the merits or demerits of the policy did not depend on the subsidiary question whether the country paid too much or too little for the shares. Even thirty years after the transaction, when the shares proved of far greater value than the sum that was paid for them, the financial success of the operation sinks into significance. It is on the higher grounds of policy that the purchase must be approved or condemned, and when the subject is approached in this way there are few incidents in modern history on which more can be said on both sides.

[1] *Hansard*, vol. ccxxvii. p. 97.

[2] I have not thought it necessary to go into the anterior history of this transaction. The reader who wishes to examine it from a French standpoint should consult an article in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* of the 15th November, 1904, on 'L'Achat des Actions de Suez.' Mr. Lucien Wolf contributed an equally long account, from an English standpoint, to the *Times*, 26th of December, 1905. That account was corrected, as to fact, by Mr. Frederick Greenwood, *Times*, 27th of December, 1905, and 13th January, 1906.

[3] *Hansard*, vol. ccxxvii. p. 100.

[4] See especially Mr. Gladstone's speech, *ibid.*, p. 591. Messrs. Rothschild received 2½ per cent. commission on the transaction and 5 per cent. interest on the money advanced by them. Mr. Gladstone calculated that, as they would not be out of their money for more than three months, and as 2½ per cent. for three months is equivalent to 10 per cent. per annum, they virtually made 15 per cent. by the transaction.

Purchase of the Canal Shares.

In the first place, there would have been an obvious inconvenience in the canal being exclusively in the hands of France. This country was providing it with three fourths of its traffic, and our merchants would naturally desire that we should have some voice in its management. The canal, moreover, was proving the direct route to India; and, from a national point of view, there was much to be said for acquiring some share of its control. On the other hand, there can be little doubt that the acquisition of the canal brought us one stage nearer to the occupation of Egypt, and that the occupation of Egypt brought us to the very verge of war with France. If, in other words, Messrs. Rothschild ran no great financial risk from the part which they took in the transaction, this country ran a great political risk from the purchase. These are, no doubt, dangers which a great country must occasionally encounter. But, in summing up the merits of a political transaction, the historian has no right to overlook the possibility of a great danger because it was ultimately averted.

It may, indeed, be replied that, if the purchase of the canal shares led directly to the occupation of Egypt, the importation of British administration into Egypt has done more than any other act of modern times to increase the happiness of mankind. For it has made one small corner of the earth, which had been the hell of oppression, a paradise of content. The heart refuses to condemn a policy which has replaced rapine and ruin with peace and prosperity. Yet the head may hesitate when the heart is satisfied. For there must be a limit to the capacity of one small people to reform all that requires reformation in an ill-administered world. Resolute as every honest

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man may be to drive the plough of improvement to the very end of the furrow in his own domain, he may hesitate to carry it into his neighbour's fields, though the tangled thistles may be choking the wheat across the boundary.

If, however, a good deal could be urged against the purchase of the shares and the policy which underlay it, a good deal more could be urged against the language which was commonly used at the time of the transaction. The more sober members of the Government, men like Lord Derby and Sir Stafford Northcote, did their best to minimise the political aspects of the transaction.[1] But the public press took another view, 'that a great blow had been struck for the assertion of British power, that, in the critical circumstances of the Turkish Empire, notice had been given to the world that, so far as Egypt was concerned, we intended to have the first and largest share in determining what should be its destiny.'[2] If Mr. Disraeli did not actually repeat this language himself, he certainly did nothing to discourage it.[3] And an impression was accordingly produced that, in the eventual collapse of the Ottoman power, this country was assuring itself a safe route to India through the dominion of the Khedive.[4]

[1] See Lord Derby's remarks, *Hansard*, vol. ccxxvii. p. 43, and Sir Stafford Northcote's, *ibid.*, p. 266.

[2] The language in the text is Mr. Gladstone's summary of the belief promoted by nearly the whole of the metropolitan press. *Hansard*, vol. ccxxvii. p. 586.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 95.

[4] The purchase of the shares had the indirect effect of paralysing the Opposition. Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville disapproved the purchase. Lord Hartington thought that it would be a mistake to condemn in Parliament a transaction which was approved by the country, and Mr. Goschen thought that, while nothing could be said for the commercial aspect of the bargain, a good deal could be urged for it on political grounds. *Life of Lord Granville*, vol. ii. pp. 157, 158.

And this impression was increased by other action on the part of the Government. In October 1875, the repudiation of the Turkish debt created an apprehension in the Stock Exchanges of Europe that the Khedive might follow the example of his sovereign. The price of Egyptian securities fell rapidly,[1] and the Khedive, confronted with financial difficulties, applied to the British Government for the services of one or two gentlemen to assist his ministers in the management of his finances. The Government was deliberating on the application when the purchase of the Suez Canal shares increased its interest in Egypt; and it decided, instead of complying directly with the Khedive's request, to instruct two gentlemen—one of their own colleagues, Mr. Cave, the Paymaster-General, and Colonel Stokes—to ascertain what sort of person they should send and what sort of position he should occupy. Mr. Cave's report led to the selection of Mr. Rivers Wilson, a gentleman who had begun life as a clerk in the Treasury, who had since been made Controller of the National Debt, and who had gained a reputation for financial ability which has been enjoyed by few of the permanent servants of the Crown.[2] Mr. Cave's mission, following on the purchase of the Suez Canal shares, created the impression that the Government was taking Egypt, Egyptian finance, and Egyptian interests under its special protection, and that, however prudently the Puritan side of the British

[1] See Mr. Lucien Wolf's article in *Times*, 26th December, 1905.

[2] Mr. Lowe, when he resigned the Chancellorship of the Exchequer, paid him the high compliment of saying that he felt the satisfaction of knowing that he left someone in the Treasury who knew more about finance than himself. For Mr. Cave's mission see a debate, *Hansard*, vol. ccxxxi. pp. 615-653.

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character may have rejected the overtures which the Emperor Nicholas had made to Sir Hamilton Seymour in 1853,[1] regard for British interests was inducing Mr. Disraeli's Ministry to lay a protecting hand on the territory which Russia had offered to assign to Great Britain.[2]

General policy of the Disraeli ministry.

Thus, while England, under the inspiration of Mr. Disraeli, was steadily pursuing an Oriental policy of her own by proclaiming the Queen Empress of India, by the purchase of the Suez Canal shares, and by interference in the financial administration of Egypt; under the guidance of Lord Derby she was separating herself from the great powers of Europe and refusing to join in the Berlin Memorandum.[3] This refusal was destined to be followed by many consequences. It led directly to a disastrous war. But, at the moment, it was forgotten amidst the excitement of a new incident; for, at the end of May, the Sultan, Abdul Aziz, whose reign had opened with such promise, was deposed, and his nephew, Murad Pacha—a man whom intemperance had already reduced to a condition bordering on insanity—reigned in his stead.[4]

[1] *History of England*, vol. v. pp. 81, 82.

[2] I purposely stop here at the state of things at the end of April and the beginning of May, 1876, when Mr. Rivers Wilson had left England to take up his appointment. I reserve for a later page a consideration of the Khedive's decrees of the 2nd and 7th of May for establishing a 'caisse' for the service and for the unification of the debt (*State Papers*, vol. lxvii.). I wish at the present moment to focus attention on our relations with Eastern Europe at the moment when Lord Derby refused to join in the Berlin Memorandum.

[3] For Lord Derby's reply, *State Papers*, vol. lxvii. p. 1234.

[4] Abdul Aziz was either murdered, or committed suicide, five days afterwards, on the 4th of June. Sir Henry Elliot believes in the suicide theory. *Diplomatic Recollections*, pp. 328 *seq.* For the deposition, *Parl. Papers*, Turkey (No. 3), 1876, pp. 203, 207.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR AND THE BERLIN TREATY.

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THE accession of a new Sultan induced the northern powers 'to postpone the execution at Constantinople of the measures proposed at Berlin.'[1] The man who had been chiefly concerned in the deposition of the late Sultan, and who was afterwards charged with instigating his murder, was Midhat Pasha[2]—in Sir Henry Elliot's language 'a very remarkable man, as unlike as possible to the ordinary Turkish pasha, who, in every province in which he had been governor, had distinguished himself by his activity in developing its resources, in putting down corruption, in smoothing religious animosities, and advancing education.'[3] And it was naturally thought that some opportunity should be given to the new Sultan and his advisers of formulating their own programme. But the new reign, which had commenced in violence, was destined only to a brief period of disorder. Within a fortnight of Murad's accession two of his Ministers, while seated in council at Midhat's house, were attacked by a fanatical Circassian and shot dead.[4] Within three months Murad

[1] *Parl. Papers*, Turkey (No. 3), 1876, p. 235.

[2] M. Driault perhaps describes the matter accurately when he says, 'Pour plus de sûreté, Abdul Aziz fut suicidé.' *La Question d'Orient*, pp. 212, 213.

[3] Sir H. Elliot, *Diplomatic Recollections*, pp. 317, 318, 335.

[4] *Parl. Papers*, Turkey (No. 3), 1876, p. 373; Sir H. Elliot, *Diplomatic Recollections*, p. 337.

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himself had been deposed, and his brother, Abdul Hamid, had been proclaimed Sultan in his stead.[1]

Bulgarian atrocities.

While Murad still occupied his unsteady throne a series of events occurred in Bulgaria which in their ultimate effects led to the dismemberment of Turkey, and in their immediate consequences shook Mr. Disraeli's Ministry to its foundation. On the 23rd of June 1876, the 'Daily News' published a letter from its correspondent, Mr. McGahan, describing some horrible outrages which had taken place in Bulgaria. In the preceding month an insurrection had broken out among the Christians in that province; the insurgents had undoubtedly committed excesses, and had murdered and plundered many of the Mohammedans in the province. It was the duty of the Porte to repress disorder. The Porte attempted to do so by letting loose the Bashi-Bazouks on a comparatively defenceless population. 'The result is what everybody acquainted with the materials composing such a force might expect—the plundering of all movable property, the burning of the houses and villages of the peasantry without the slightest regard to the question whether the occupants have taken part in insurrection or not, and the almost indiscriminate slaughter of old men, women, and children. One of the most fertile and productive provinces of the Turkish Empire is thus being laid waste. . . . It is too soon yet to ascertain the number of those who have been killed. An intelligent Turk, who has just arrived, estimates it at 18,000, Bulgarians speak of 30,000, and of the destruction of upwards of 100 villages.'[2] According to official inquiries instituted

[1] *Parl. Papers*, 1877, Turkey (No. 1), pp. 87, 90.

[2] *Daily News*, 23rd of June, 1876. But the letter is reprinted

afterwards, the number of persons massacred in the district of Philippopolis alone amounted to 12,000.[1]

The story of these massacres excited a thrill of horror through Western Europe. It is possible that in some cases it was exaggerated in the telling. Sir H. Elliot mentions as a 'most curious example of British credulity' the statement of two English clergymen, that they had seen from the deck of an Austrian steamer on the river Save the body of a man, still alive, writhing on a stake close to a Turkish guard-house.[2] It is, happily, not necessary for history to determine whether the evidence of Canons Liddon and MacColl of what they saw is or is not to be rejected for the argument of Sir Henry Elliot that they saw something else. Mr. Baring himself said—and Mr. Baring was the most competent official whom Sir H. Elliot himself selected to inquire into the massacres—that in Bulgaria 'a child is said to have been impaled on a standard and paraded in the streets.'[3] And it is not clear to the ordinary mind why, if such a deed was possible, the testimony of two excellent men to the same effect is to be rejected as untrustworthy. However these things may be, here is the official English report of what occurred at a place called Batak. Early in May 'preparations for revolt were going on in this village,' and a

in *Parl. Papers*, Turkey (No. 3), 1876, p. 334. It was followed by a still stronger letter published on the 8th of July, *ibid.*, p. 362. Mr. McGahan is described by his friend, Mr. T. P. O'Connor, as 'a man of a bravery that no danger could shake, of a modesty that no triumph could disturb.' *Life of Lord Beaconsfield*, p. 628. The services which Mr. McGahan rendered to the cause of humanity were so great that I have pleasure in inserting this tribute to Mr. McGahan's character. He died in hospital at Constantinople at the age of thirty-three.

[1] See Mr. Baring's Report, Turkey (No. 1), p. 150.

[2] See Sir H. Elliot, *Diplomatic Recollections*, p. 365.

[3] See his report in *Parl. Papers*, Turkey (No. 1), 1877, pp. 143 and 157.

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Massacres in Bulgaria.

Turk named Achmet Agha was ordered to attack it. 'The inhabitants[1] had a parley with Achmet, who solemnly swore that if they gave up their arms not a hair of their heads should be touched. The villagers believed Achmet's oath and surrendered their arms, but this demand was followed by another for all the money in the village, which of course had also to be acceded to. No sooner was the money given up than the Bashi-Bazouks set upon the people and slaughtered them like sheep. A large number of people, probably about 1000 or 1200, took refuge in the church and churchyard, the latter being surrounded by a wall. The church itself is a solid building, and resisted all the attempts of the Bashi-Bazouks to burn it from the outside. They consequently fired in through the windows, and getting upon the roof tore off the tiles and threw burning pieces of wood and rags dipped in petroleum among the mass of unhappy human beings inside. At last the door was forced in, the massacre completed, and the inside of the church burned. The spectacle which the church and churchyard present must be seen to be described; hardly a corpse has been buried. . . . I visited this valley of the shadow of death on the 31st of July, more than two months and a half after the massacre, but still the stench was so overpowering that one could hardly force one's way into the churchyard. In the streets at every step lay human remains rotting and sweltering in the summer sun. . . . Just outside the village I counted more than sixty skulls in a little hollow. From the remains of female wearing apparel scattered about it is plain that many

[1] This description is taken from the same report, pp. 154, 155; cf. also Mr. Baring's private note to Sir H. Elliot in *ibid.*, p. 29.

of the persons here massacred were women. It is to be feared also that some of the richer villagers were subjected to cruel tortures before being put to death, in the hope that they would reveal the existence of hidden treasure. Thus Petro Triandaphyllos and Pope Necio were roasted, and Stoyan Stoychoff had his ears, nose, hands and feet cut off. Enough, I think, has been said to show that to Achmet Agha and his men belongs the distinction of having committed perhaps the most heinous crime that has stained the history of the present century—Nana Sahib alone, I should say, having rivalled their deeds. As regards the number killed, I have before stated that about 5000 is my estimate [*i.e.* in Batak alone]. I am aware that others place it higher, but, be this as it may, whether the slain are to be counted by hundreds or thousands does not lessen in the least degree the criminality of the slayers. The intention was to exterminate all except those few girls (probably about eighty) whom they carried off to satisfy their lusts. Those that escaped owed their safety to their own good fortune, and not to the tender mercies of their neighbours. For this exploit Achmet Agha has received the order of the Medjidié.'[1] In the pre-

[1] For Mr. Baring's report see *Parl. Papers*, 1877, Turkey (No. 1), p. 155. It is right to recollect that the ghastly story of Batak had been told by Mr. McGahan before it was told by Mr. Baring, and that Mr. Disraeli had it before him in Mr. McGahan's language when he made the heartless speeches presently to be recorded. Achmet Pacha should not have the sole credit of the atrocities. A French writer says: 'Le Gouverneur de la Bulgarie, Chefket Pacha, reçut-il l'ordre d'écraser l'insurrection sans regarder aux moyens? Cela est vraisemblable. Des bandes de Bachi-bouzouks et de Circassiens, appelées d'Asie, furent lâchées sur la Bulgarie, et en quelques jours elle fut mise à feu et à sang. Ils assouvirent à l'aise leurs sauvages passions, brûlèrent les villages, massacrèrent les hommes au milieu des tortures les plus raffinées, violèrent ou éventrèrent les femmes, coupèrent en morceaux les enfants. Il y eut environ 25,000 à 30,000 victimes.

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sence of such a story as this what boots it to inquire whether Canon Liddon did or did not see a wretched man writhing on a stake on the banks of the Save?[1]

When the first news of these horrible atrocities was published in the columns of the 'Daily News,' Mr. Disraeli was at once asked in the House of Commons whether he could give the House any information either confirming or contradicting the allegations of the newspaper, and Mr. Disraeli's reply was unhappily couched in a tone which seemed to show that he was both ignorant and apathetic. Ignorant, for he assumed that the disturbance had been begun by strangers entering the province, and that the Bashi-Bazouks and Circassians who repressed them were settlers in the country.[2] Apathetic, for he avowed that he had

L'insurrection fut écrasée complètement, Chefket Pacha fut comblé de faveurs et promu au poste du Gouverneur Général d'Erzeroum.' Driault, *La Question d'Orient*, p. 214; and cf. M. de Bourgoing's report to the French Government, D'Avril, *Le Traité de Berlin*, p. 128, and cf. p. 139.

[1] For Canon Liddon's story, see *Parl. Papers*, Turkey, 1877 (No. 1), p. 403; *ibid.* (No. 2), p. 253; and *ibid.* (No. 21), p. 3. In the latter paper will be found also an inquiry into the truth of another impalement story.

[2] Mr. Disraeli (so Mr. T. P. O'Connor has pointed out) declared on the 10th of July that the Government was in constant communication with the consuls at Belgrad, Ragusa, Cettinje, and other places, and that from none of these places had come information confirming the statement of the *Daily News*. Mr. Evelyn Ashley, therefore, at once pointed out that Belgrad, Ragusa, and Cettinje were not in Turkey; that the nearest of them was 200 miles from the scenes of massacre, and asked what news had come from our consuls at Adrianople and Philippopolis. Mr. Disraeli thereupon declared that the Government was in constant communication not only with the consuls at the places he had named, but also with the consuls at the places named by the hon. member, and that by none of them had the details been mentioned. Yet, as a matter of fact, there was no British consular agent at Philippopolis. *Life of Lord Beaconsfield*, p. 620. Perhaps in consequence an acting consul was sent there in the following month.

It is almost incredible, but it is nevertheless the fact, that when Mr. Disraeli made the speech the Government had despatches in its possession warning it of the consequences of arming the Circassians, and reporting outrages which had already occurred.

little doubt that the war—'if you can call it a war'—between the invaders and the Bashi-Bazouks was carried on with great ferocity. The Porte had, however, on Sir H. Elliot's advice, ordered some regular troops to be sent into the provinces, and the disturbances had ceased.[1] A little later, warned by the expressions of disapproval which his cold language elicited, he expressed in more seemly language his hope for the sake of human nature that it would be found that the statements which had been made had been scarcely warranted.[2] But even on this occasion he could not refrain from employing language which showed him insensible to the feelings of an audience whose blood, in the language of one of them, was curdling with indignation.[3] He could not believe that torture had been practised on a great scale, because an oriental people seldom resort to torture, but generally terminate their connection with culprits in a more expeditious manner; while on the 31st of July he dismissed the report of one of our own consuls in Bulgaria as 'coffee-house babble.'[4]

Mr. Disraeli's language.

The feelings of the people had been profoundly moved by the accounts which had appeared in the 'Daily News' and elsewhere of atrocities in Bulgaria, but they were raised to white heat by the unsympathetic and, as it was thought, unworthy language of the Prime Minister. Mr. Disraeli, as 'Punch' represented, was closing his eyes to the scenes of slaughter and arson because he could find no allusion to them in the official reports. Before the end of July

[1] *Hansard*, vol. ccxxx. p. 424.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 1181.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 1184.
[4] *Ibid.*, vol. ccxxxi. p. 203. This celebrated and obnoxious phrase is, it is worth while pointing out, a combination of two of Mr. Disraeli's old epigrams. A 'coffee-house tale' is in *Tancred*; the 'babble of clubs' is in *Sybil*.

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Lord Shaftesbury [1] was presiding over an influential meeting at Willis's Rooms, which resolved to 'express its deep abhorrence of the cruelties committed by the Turkish irregular troops upon the women and children and unarmed inhabitants of Bulgaria, and to record its opinion that the notorious abuses of Turkish rule in Europe, and the repeated failures of the Sublime Porte to fulfil its solemn obligations rendered it hopeless to expect that any settlement of the Eastern question would prove permanent which did not confer upon the inhabitants of the insurgent provinces the full rights of self-government.' The meeting in Willis's Rooms was followed by meetings in other parts of the country; and 'an outburst of righteous indignation' was provoked which, according to the 'Quarterly Review,' had known no parallel since September 1792.[2]

Mr. Gladstone on the Bulgarian atrocities.

The agitation was stimulated and inflamed by the writings and speeches of a great statesman. Since his fall in 1874 Mr. Gladstone had taken a comparatively small part in active politics. He had been an irregular attendant in the House of Commons through the session of 1874, and he had actually resigned the leadership of the Liberal party in the beginning of 1875. His decision had been accompanied by a great literary activity, and had been confirmed by the sale of his London house. His enemies said that, like Achilles, he was sulking in his tent; his admirers declared that he had at any rate nobly earned the rest that he was seeking. His biographer, indeed, afterwards applied to him the words which Herodotus puts into the mouth of Grinos: 'I am too old, O king,

[1] Hodder's *Life of Lord Shaftesbury*, vol. iii. p. 374.

[2] *Quarterly Review*, October, 1876.

and slow to stir; bid one of these youngsters undertake it.'[1]

Thus Mr. Gladstone in 1875–76 was withdrawing from active politics, and devoting himself to the claims of the Papacy and to Homeric studies. Occasionally, indeed, he emerged from his retirement to give the House of Commons the advantage of his advice. He spoke in 1876 on the Andrassy Note, on the purchase of the Suez Canal shares, on the Royal Titles Bill, and as late as July, he defended the policy of the Crimean war, and advocated the maintenance of the concert of Europe. But when Parliament separated in August the old war horse was still grazing in the paddock. Some premonitory neighs had convinced the bystanders that he had scented the battle, but it was only as the weight of evidence increased, and as the awful story of massacre and lust was established beyond doubt that he pawed in the valley and rejoiced in his strength, and went forth to meet the armed men.

Then it was that the contrast between the two men who had been so long opposed one to the other stood out in utter nakedness. On the one side Mr. Disraeli, who was just seeking release from the heavy labour of the Lower House by accepting an earldom, cold and dispassionate, dreaming of Eastern empire, with an hereditary interest in Oriental rule and in the descendants of Abraham, whether they worshipped the God of Jacob or the God of Mohamed,[2]

[1] Herodotus, bk. iv. ch. 150. I have taken the reading of the first part of the sentence from Mr. Morley, and of the last part from Canon Rawlinson.

[2] 'On the top of Mount Sinai are two ruins—a Christian church and a Mohammedan mosque. In this, the sublimest scene of Arabian glory, Israel and Ishmael alike raised their altars to the great God of Abraham.' *Tancred*,

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closely occupied with British interests, and callous alike to bloodshed and to suffering so long as British interests were unassailed.[1] On the other, Mr. Gladstone, returning to the labour from which he had withdrawn, passionate and eager, and bitterly resenting the notion that the Crimean war, to which he had himself been a party, and the supposed interests of his country should have maintained the Sultan in a position which had made him powerful for evil-doing. His 'Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East' was struck off the literary anvil at white heat. It glows with the indignation which was burning in the author. Unlike the majority of its author's writings, there is nothing involved, nothing doubtful in its argument. It has been said, not inaptly, that 'it beats with a sustained pulse and passion that recalls Burke's *Letters on a Regicide Peace*.'[2] Within three or four days of its appearance 40,000 copies had gone. A French author has said of it that Mr. Gladstone's 'phrases indignées retentirent à travers tout le continent.'[3] Mr. Glad-

bk. iv. ch. vii., and cf. Mr. T. P. O'Connor's *Life of Lord Beaconsfield*, p. 610 and note.

[1] M. d'Avril says that the first mention in a despatch of British interests—'appelés à jouer plus tard un si grand et finalement un si triste rôle'—was in Lord Derby's despatch to Lord A. Loftus of 30th October, 1876. D'Avril, *Le Traité de Berlin*, p. 153. But there can be little doubt that the whole Eastern policy of this country from the time of the Crimean war, with the exception of the Syrian incident, was based on a conception, or misconception, of British interests.

[2] Morley's *Life of Gladstone*, vol. ii. p. 553.

[3] 'I return to, and I end with, that which is the Omega as well as the Alpha of this great and mournful case. . . . Let the Turks now carry away their abuses in the only possible manner, namely, by carrying off themselves. Their Zaptiehs and their Mudirs, their Bimbashis and their Yuzbashis, their Kaimakams and their Pashas, one and all, bag and baggage, shall, I hope, clear out from the province they have desolated and profaned. This thorough riddance, this most blessed deliverance, is the only reparation we can make to the memory of those heaps and heaps of dead; to the violated purity alike of matron, of maiden, and

stone's pamphlet was only the first note of his trumpet call to justice. A few days later, under dripping rain-clouds, with Lord Granville at his side, he poured forth his ultimatum to the Turks: 'You shall receive your regular tribute; you shall retain your titular sovereignty; your empire shall not be invaded. But, never again, as the years roll in their course, so far as it is in our power to determine, never again shall the hand of violence be raised by you; never again shall the floodgates of lust be open to you; never again shall the dire refinements of cruelty be devised by you for the sake of making mankind miserable.'[1] The example which Mr. Gladstone had set was imitated by other speakers in every part of the country, and England rang with denunciations of Turkish cruelty and with a resolution to withhold support from the Sultan in his extremity.

And his extremity was very great. For the flame of insurrection, which had broken out in Herzegovina in 1875, and which had spread to Bulgaria in 1876, was exciting the quasi-independent provinces of Servia and Montenegro. On the first of July Servia declared war against the Porte; on the 2nd Montenegro followed her example. These little countries, indeed, would have hardly ventured on entering into a contest with the Ottoman Empire if they had stood alone. But they knew that they were only acting as an advance guard of a great movement

of child; to the civilisation which has been affronted and ashamed; to the laws of God, or, if you like, of Allah; to the moral sense of mankind at large,' &c., &c. *Bulgarian Horrors*, pp. 61, 62. This, of course, is not literature: it is rhetoric. But it was rhetoric, not literature, which was required to move a nation, and it roused the people as they had not been roused for years.

[1] Morley's *Life of Gladstone*, vol. ii. p. 554; and MacColl, *Three Years of the Eastern Question*, p. 133.

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Excitement in Russia.

which was uniting the Slavs of Europe in a new crusade. For ten years a movement, which had its centre in Moscow, had been stirring the thoughts and feelings of the Slavs in South-Eastern Europe. The men who were at the head of this movement were vigorously propagating their opinions; they were spending money; they were sending men to aid the insurgents who were rising against their oppressors. The Russian Government was conscious of a movement, which it did not perhaps disapprove. Its representative at Constantinople—General Ignatieff—was known to be a warm friend of Panslavism; the man who commanded the Servian army—General Tcherneiaff—had held high military rank in Russia; and the lady who ventured to defend the cause of Panslavism in England, and who became the eloquent apologist of Russia in this country, lost a brother, the Protesilaus of the great Sclavonian movement.[1] Mr. Disraeli subsequently declared in a speech at Aylesbury that 'the secret societies of Europe through Servia had declared war upon Turkey.'[2] And there can be little doubt that, without Russian sympathy and Russian help, Servia would have hardly ventured to draw the sword. But, in the first place, societies which did not attempt to conceal their objects, and whose advocates openly gloried in their achievements,[3] could hardly be described as secret. And in the next place, the English people—

[1] For General Tchernaieff's mission, *Parl. Papers*, 1876 (No. 3), p. 201. I need hardly refer to Madame Novikoff's books, *Is Russia Wrong?* (London 1877), and *Russia and England from 1876 to 1880* (London, 1880). Both are dedicated to the memory of her brother, Nicholas Kiréef, 'the first Russian volunteer killed in Servia.' For the Pan-Slavonic movement see Driault, *La Question d'Orient*, p. 207.

[2] Mill, *The Ottomans in Europe*, p. 37.

[3] *Russia and England*, pp. 19 *seq.*

who, in former times, had sent a Sidney to die for the cause of liberty at Zutphen, who, in more recent times, had given a Byron to the cause of Greece, and who had suspended the Foreign Enlistment Act to enable a British legion to take part in the civil war in Spain—were the last people that were entitled to condemn the Russians for aiding men of the same blood as themselves in Servia.

The Herzegovinian insurrection had indirectly led to the deposition of Abdul Aziz. Before the Servian war had lasted two months his successor—Murad—was deposed, and Abdul Hamid was proclaimed Sultan of Turkey.[1] Before this new revolution, however, things had not been going well with the Servians. The Servians were rolled back from Turkish territory; the Turkish troops invaded Servia; and Servia, decisively worsted, was forced to appeal to Europe for mediation.

The policy of the British Government during this episode was remarkable. On the first of July, the day on which Servia declared war, Lord Derby told the Russian Ambassador that he intended to pursue a policy of non-intervention, but that it must be clearly understood that her Majesty's Government entered into no engagement to abstain from intervention in the event of a different course being pursued by other powers.[2] In plain language, he proposed to make a ring round the combatants and let them fight it out. But the news of atrocities in Bulgaria, and the horror which the news excited, made the policy which Lord Derby had laid down at the beginning of July impracticable at the end of

[1] *Parl. Papers*, Turkey (No. 1), 1877, p. 91.

[2] *Ibid.*, Turkey (No. 8), 1876, p. 351.

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August; and Lord Derby told the British Ambassador at Constantinople that the lamentable occurrences in Bulgaria had completely destroyed any sympathy previously felt for the Turks; that the indignation excited in all classes of English society had risen to such a pitch 'that in the extreme case of Russia declaring war against Turkey, her Majesty's Government would find it practically impossible to interfere in defence of the Ottoman Empire'; and that the speedy conclusion of peace had become in consequence 'a matter of urgent necessity.'[1]

Lord Derby's changed attitude.

The sudden change in Lord Derby's policy was the more remarkable because the course of the campaign was favourable to the Turks. The generous aid of Russian volunteers, who came in their thousands to her assistance, did not enable a small principality to resist the might of the Ottoman Empire; and on the 24th of August its chief, Prince Milan, was compelled to ask the representatives of the great powers to use their good offices to stop the war.[2] The great powers at once proposed the conclusion of an armistice, and the Porte, instead of complying with their demand, had the arrogance to lay down the terms on which she was prepared to grant peace to her adversary. Turkey was to resume her right to reoccupy the Servian fortresses; the Servian army was to be reduced, and the Servian militia to be suppressed; the Servians were to bear the cost of the war, and the Prince was to acknowledge his defeat by submitting to a fresh investiture. Happily for Servia,

[1] *Parl. Papers*, Turkey (No. 1), 1877, p. 105. These words are taken from Lord Derby's despatch. The telegram which preceded the despatch, to the same effect, on the 29th of August, 1876, is in *Parl. Papers*, Turkey (No. 6), 1877.

[2] *Parl. Papers*, Turkey, 1877 (No. 1), p. 57.

one power in Europe, at any rate, was not prepared to allow to Turkey the fruits of conquest. Russia[1] at once declared that she should insist on an unconditional armistice, or the *status quo ante bellum* for Servia and Montenegro, with some rectification of the Montenegrin frontier, and liberal concessions of local or administrative autonomy to Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria. Such concessions, Russia added, should be categorically imposed on the Porte. 'The dignity of Europe,' in the words of Prince Gortschakoff, 'does not allow of our contenting ourselves with promises which the Porte constantly eludes.'

If these things had happened in the previous May, Lord Derby would undoubtedly have resented the Russian demand. It was only natural, so he would have argued, that the little State which had ventured to declare war should suffer for the consequences of its own action; and it was unjustifiable that Russia should interfere between the victor and the vanquished. The horror which the Bulgarian atrocities had excited, and Mr. Gladstone's indignant rhetoric, were happily making such a policy impossible in September; and Lord Derby busied himself to devise terms to which the great powers, including Russia, might agree, on which peace might be restored. He eventually decided, with the concurrence of the powers, to insist on three points: (1) the *status quo*, speaking roughly, both as regards Servia and Monte-

[1] For the Turkish proposals, *Parl. Papers*, Turkey, 1877 (No. 1), p. 124. For the Russian, *ibid.*, p. 134. Lord Derby's own views—(1) *status quo ante* for Servia and Montenegro, (2) local autonomy for Bosnia and Herzegovina, (3) guarantee against the maladministration of Bulgaria—are on p. 129. Lord Derby added that he would regard as inadmissible any modification of the Treaty of Paris unfavourable to Servia, the resumption of the right to garrison Servian fortresses, or the deposition of Prince Milan.

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Terms of peace proposed.

negro; (2) local or administrative autonomy for Bosnia and Herzegovina, to be conceded in a protocol to be signed at Constantinople with the representatives of the mediating powers; (3) guarantees, the details to be settled hereafter, against maladministration in Bulgaria. But, in recommending these conditions to the Porte, Lord Derby, or his representative at Constantinople, hesitated to say frankly that they were dictated as the penalty of wrongdoing. On the contrary, he was careful to explain that the British Government had exerted itself to the utmost, and not without success, in moderating the views of other powers; and that if the Porte should decline the proposals and war should ensue, the state of public feeling in England would make it impossible for Turkey to expect from Great Britain the support which it might otherwise have looked for.[1]

Such language, indicating that Great Britain still wished to be the friend and not the judge of Turkey, was calculated to encourage the Porte to resort to its usual dilatory tactics.

Relying, perhaps, on the friendship of England, and at any rate on the friendly language of the British Ambassador at Constantinople, who clung strongly to the tradition that British interests 'are deeply engaged in preventing the disruption of the Turkish Empire,' and that the occurrence of atrocities in Bulgaria afforded no sufficient reason for abandoning a traditional policy,[2] the Turks demurred to

[1] *Parl. Papers*, Turkey, 1877 (No. 1), p. 380 M. d'Avril rightly says that Lord Derby's scheme was important, because it was supported by the other powers, and became the base of all that followed. *Le Traité de Berlin*, p. 146.

[2] See Sir H. Elliot's despatch, *Parl. Papers*, Turkey, 1877 (No. 1), p. 197.

Lord Derby's terms. They objected to pronounce the hateful word 'autonomy'; they objected to a protocol which made the great powers of Europe parties to the reforms which they were required to institute; and the Russian Government, sick of endless delays, came forward on the 26th of September with a fresh proposition [1]—that in the event of Lord Derby's terms being refused by the Porte, Bosnia should be occupied by an Austrian, and Bulgaria by a Russian force, and that the united fleets of the powers should enter the Bosphorus. Lord Derby hesitated to accept so drastic a remedy, and he prevailed upon Russia, in the event of a Turkish refusal, to fall back upon a proposal for an armistice to be followed immediately by a Conference of the great powers. Sir Henry Elliot was instructed, if the Porte refused the armistice, to leave Constantinople, and Lord Derby, perhaps a little conscious of his agent's sympathies with Turkey, especially added that it was desirable that his 'language and manner should be very earnest, for the consequences of the refusal by Turkey of these last overtures are incalculable.' [2]

The Russian proposals.

In consequence of Sir H. Elliot's insistence the Porte consented to grant an armistice of five or six months,[3] and in the meanwhile it endeavoured to get rid of a Conference which it disliked, and of an intervention which it deplored, by a greater act of con-

[1] *Parl. Papers*, 1877, Turkey (No. 1), p. 317.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 391. With the half-heartedness which characterised his policy throughout October, Lord Derby subsequently explained that Sir H. Elliot's withdrawal would not have involved a rupture of the diplomatic relations with the Porte. *Ibid.*, p. 482.

[3] The duration is given in different places as five and six months. It was intended, however, to continue till the 31st March, 1877.

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cession than the powers had formulated. Instead of granting local autonomy to Bosnia and Herzegovina it was prepared to grant representative institutions to the entire empire.[1] The project of smothering a proposal for the autonomy of two provinces to be enforced by the powers with a proposal for a self-governing empire to be constituted by the Porte did not deceive even Lord Derby. The project of a six months' armistice which would have enabled operations to recommence in spring was denounced by Russia as unfavourable to the Servians. While uncertainty thus prevailed, the Turkish troops, assuming the offensive, inflicted a decisive defeat on the Servian army,[2] and Russia, irritated at the delays of the Porte, and urged on by the natural sympathy of her people with their kinsfolk in Servia, decided on the last day of October to demand an armistice for six weeks, and to break off all relations with Turkey if the demand was not conceded in forty-eight hours.[3]

It was evident that the Russian Government was prepared in November, as it had been prepared in May, to go much further than Lord Derby. But it is right to add that if Russia thought a frontal movement necessary, she displayed a steady desire to act in conjunction with England. The Czar indeed on the 2nd of November took the unusual course of sending for the British Ambassador, of explaining his own action, of assuring him of his anxiety not to separate from the European concert, of expressing an anxious desire for an understanding and co-operation, and of

[1] The new constitution, if any one cares to study paper constitutions, will be found in *Parl. Papers*, 1877, Turkey (No. 1), p. 686.

[2] *Ibid.*, 1877, Turkey (No. 1), p. 554.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 565. The six weeks' armistice was first suggested by Bismarck. D'Avril, *Le Traité de Berlin*, p. 152.

pledging his word of honour that he had no design either on Turkey or on Constantinople. The detailed report of this interview, which made a profound impression on Lord A. Loftus, did not reach England till the 14th of November, but a telegraphic summary containing all the essential assurances was received twelve days before,[1] and the British Government knew on the 2nd or the 3rd of November the reason —the sufficient reason—for the Czar's action, and his anxiety to remove the unjust suspicions entertained in England of his policy.

It is, unfortunately, a tradition in England that the word of Russia is not as the word of other nations; and there is no doubt that, in her past history, she has stooped to action which was not consistent with her spoken or her written word. Without cumbering the present page with the inquiry whether Russia is solitary in this respect, I may remark that the definition of an ambassador as an honest man sent to 'lie' abroad for the good of his country is attributed to a great Englishman. It is evident that, with nations as with men, the worst way of binding people to their promises is to tell them that you disbelieve them. Russia had given every pledge which England could rightly demand. She had displayed anxiety to work with England and with the other powers. She had declared that, if she was forced to act alone, she had no ambitious designs either on Constantinople or on any part of Turkey. She was even consenting, at Lord Derby's invitation, to enter into conference at Constantinople to consider terms of pacification of Lord Derby's own framing to be imposed on Turkey. To the outward eye there

[1] *Parl. Papers*, 1877, Turkey (No. 1), pp. 575, 642.

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was literally no question between Russia and Great Britain; the difficulty of diplomatists obviously lay, not at St. Petersburg, but at the Porte. Yet at this moment, when the highest duty of statesmanship required that no word should be lightly spoken which could imperil the concert between the great European powers, Lord Beaconsfield took advantage of the Lord Mayor's banquet to make a declaration which was as unnecessary as it was unwise.

Lord Beaconsfield's declaration.

'I am hopeful, in the present temper of Europe, that we shall be able to accomplish the objects we have in view without those terrible appeals to war of which I think we have heard too frequently and too much. There is no country so interested in the maintenance of peace as England. Peace is essentially an English policy. She is not an aggressive power, for there is nothing which she desires. She covets no cities and no provinces. . . . But although the policy of England is peace, there is no country so well prepared for war as our own. If she enters into conflict in a righteous cause—and I will not believe that England will go to war except for a righteous cause . . . her resources, I feel, are inexhaustible. She is not a country that, when she enters into a campaign, has to ask herself whether she can support a second or a third campaign. She enters into a campaign which she will not terminate until right is done.'

These words were universally understood at the time as a threat to Russia; they were undoubtedly addressed to Russia. They were so understood in Russia, and, when the report of them reached that country, the Russian Government asked that Lord A. Loftus's account of his interview with the Czar might

be published in order that the English nation, with a full knowledge of the facts, should judge between its own Prime Minister and Russia.[1] The words of Lord Beaconsfield seemed more significant because, a day or two later, the Emperor of Russia, speaking in Moscow, declared that, if the Conference failed to obtain all they had 'a right to demand of the Porte, he was fully determined to act independently; and he was convinced that in this case the whole of Russia would respond to his summons should he consider it necessary, and should the honour of Russia require it.'

It was naturally assumed by a public which is not too careful to examine dates that in these speeches Lord Beaconsfield had thrown down the glove to Russia and that the Emperor of Russia had taken it up. But, as a matter of fact, when the Emperor spoke at Moscow, the news of the Guildhall speech had not reached him,[2] while it is plain that, while Lord Beaconsfield's menace was addressed to Russia, which was entering the Conference which Lord Derby had proposed, the Emperor's threats were addressed to the Porte, and intended, rightly or wrongly, to strengthen the position of the Conference.

The Guildhall speech marks the commencement of a new chapter in Mr. Disraeli's policy. He had begun by ignoring or discrediting the shameful tales of massacre which were stirring England to its depths. He thenceforward endeavoured to revive the memories which the Crimean war had bequeathed, and to stir up the anti-Russian prejudices of the British public. His own Government was asking Europe to sit in judgment on Turkey, while its leading members

[1] *Parl. Papers*, 1877, Turkey (No. 1), p. 695.

[2] *Ibid.*, 1877, Turkey (No. 2), p. 25.

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were asking the public to support Turkey against Russia.

Some excuse was afforded for the readiness with which the public responded to Lord Beaconsfield's appeal by the news that Russia was mobilising an army of 160,000 men, and this news was easily capable of exaggeration as a proof that Russia was entering on a war of conquest. The reason which she gave for her action was, indeed, quite different.

'While diplomacy has been deliberating for a whole year with a view to reduce to practice the combined wishes of Europe, the Porte has had time to summon from the recesses of Asia and Africa the *ban* and *arrière-ban* of the least disciplined forces of Islamism and to crush under the weight of its numbers the Christian population who are struggling for their very existence. His Imperial Majesty does not wish for war, and will do his utmost to avoid it. But he is determined not to halt till the principles recognised by the whole of Europe as just, humane, and necessary have been fully carried out and secured by efficient guarantees.' [1]

The words of the Czar and of his Ministers were surely capable of an honourable interpretation. But the British public at home was fast losing the calm and cool judgment which is never so necessary as in those times of stress and storm when it is, unfortunately, most rare. One section of it, with even less knowledge of the facts than Lord Beaconsfield had displayed, was shouting its approval of Lord Beaconsfield's language.

We don't want to fight, but, by Jingo, if we do,
We've got the ships, we've got the men, we've got the money too,

[1] *Parl. Papers*, 1877, Turkey (No. 1), p. 695.

was the popular way in which the music-halls echoed the words of the Prime Minister—'If England enters into conflict in a righteous cause, her resources are, I feel, inexhaustible.' And the Jingoism of the masses was unfortunately encouraged and inflamed by the rhetoric of men on the other side, whose tradition and training should have taught them the value of moderation in language. Mr. Freeman, speaking at St. James's Hall, said: 'Perish the interests of England, perish our dominion in India, sooner than we should strike one blow or speak one word on behalf of the wrong against the right.' It is extraordinary that men of mature age and ripe experience cannot see that it is possible to pursue right and to abstain from wrong without sacrificing the interests either of their own country or of the British Empire.

The Conference at Constantinople.

In the meanwhile negotiations for the coming Conference were progressing. It is right that an Englishman should recollect that the invitation for the Conference proceeded from England, and that the bases on which the discussions of the Conference were conducted were suggested by England.[1] Most wisely, moreover, Lord Derby decided that the chief voice in the English delegation should not be given to the British Ambassador at Constantinople. Sir Henry Elliot had attained to a distinguished position in the diplomatic service. He had represented this country at Constantinople for an unusually long period, and had obtained an influence at the Porte which was enjoyed by few Ministers. But Sir Henry Elliot, in his exile on the Bosphorus, had not felt the wave of impulse which had carried the Conservative Ministry to the proposal of a Conference. He still

[1] *Parl. Papers*, 1877, Turkey (No. 1), p. 598.

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adhered to the policy of the Crimean war; he still believed that the integrity of Turkey was essential to British interests, and he could not understand how the necessity to prevent 'changes most detrimental to ourselves' could be affected by the question whether it was 10,000 or 20,000 persons who perished in Bulgaria.[1] Rightly or wrongly, moreover, there was a general belief that Sir Henry Elliot's attitude was encouraging the Porte in its resistance to the powers,[2] while there was no doubt that, in a diplomatic sense, he was the avowed opponent of General Ignatieff, who represented Russia at the Porte, and that he was opposed to the policy of a Conference which in his old age he described as 'ill-starred.'[3] Without subscribing to the many harsh things which were said of Sir Henry Elliot at the time, it is certain that he could not have been accepted as a fitting exponent of the new policy to which the British Ministry had been forced. Lord Derby, however, who hesitated to deprive Sir Henry of the position to which his appointment at Constantinople gave him some claim, associated with him Lord Salisbury, the Secretary of State for India, who was rapidly acquiring a reputation as the ablest member of the Cabinet. Lord Salisbury's appointment caused some surprise. He was the Minister who, ten years before, had left Lord Derby's Government on the Reform Bill of 1867; he was the writer who had described the Bill as the great Conservative surrender; he was the orator whom Mr. Disraeli had called a master of flouts and jeers. There seemed then little proba-

[1] *Parl. Papers*, 1877, Turkey (No. 1), p. 197.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 714.
[3] *Diplomatic Recollections*, p. 383.

bility that Lord Salisbury and his chief would see eye to eye on the Eastern question more than on any other subject; and his appointment was accordingly regarded as an indication that a large party in the Cabinet was not prepared to follow the Prime Minister. The same impression was derived from the instructions carried by Lord Salisbury with him to Constantinople, which incorporated the reforms enumerated in the Andrassy Note. These instructions, in which some critics thought that they could trace his own style, declared in language that might have been adopted by Mr. Gladstone himself, that 'the whole history of the Ottoman Empire, since it was admitted into the European concert, under the engagements of the Treaty of Paris, has proved that the Porte is unable to guarantee the execution of reform in the provinces by Turkish officers, who accept them with reluctance and neglect them with impunity.' They proceeded to argue that it was necessary to establish some system of reforms, 'which shall combine the elective principle with external guarantees for efficient administration,' and to suggest that the Valis (the governors-general) should be appointed for fixed periods with the approval of the ambassadors of the guaranteeing powers, and should be immovable except with the concurrence of the ambassadors; while the instructions finally laid down that 'if the Porte by obstinacy or apathy opposes the efforts which are now making to place the Ottoman Empire on a more secure basis, the responsibility of the consequences which may ensue will rest solely with the Sultan and his advisers.'[1]

Lord Salisbury's conduct, on his arrival at Con-

[1] *Parl. Papers*, 1877, Turkey (No. 2), pp. 1–10.

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stantinople, tended to confirm the impression which was thus created. The British representative was seen walking arm in arm with General Ignatieff in the streets of Constantinople, and Sir H. Elliot recorded that he had already become a docile instrument in the hands of the Russian Ambassador. In fact, Lord Salisbury had the good sense to see that, if the Conference was to do any good, that end was to be attained by working with, and not against, Russia. As he said afterwards in the House of Lords, Russia —the fear of a breach with Russia—was the motive force of the Conference. It was with Russian help that he might hope to succeed, without Russian help he was sure to fail.[1]

Proceedings of the Conference.

Perhaps a regard for this consideration induced him to take another step. In the negotiations which had preceded the Conference there is evidence that Russia desired, and that England objected to, the exclusion of the Turks from its meetings.[2] But, by a somewhat unusual arrangement, both the Russian and the English plans were adopted at Constantinople. The representatives of the six great powers held some preliminary meetings at which they decided their policy, and the formal conferences to which the Turkish representatives were admitted were not held till everything was arranged. The preliminary meetings of the Conference derived fresh significance from being held at the house of General Ignatieff. The plenipotentiaries, however, at these meetings decided that peace should be concluded between the Porte and Servia and Monte-

[1] It is fair to say that he adopted these words, which had been used by Lord Kimberley, as true. *Hansard*, vol. ccxxxii. p. 693.

[2] Cf. *Parl. Papers*, 1877, Turkey (No. 1), pp. 509, 531.

negro on the basis of the *status quo ante*, subject in either case to a slight rectification of frontier;[1] that Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria should be reorganised under governors appointed by the Porte, but with the approval of the great powers; and that an international commission should be specially charged with the duty of superintending various reforms which were specified as necessary.[2]

In arriving at their decisions the Conference had both followed and extended the principles which had been laid down by Lord Derby in his instructions to the British plenipotentiaries. Lord Derby, for example, had contemplated the rectification of the Montenegrin, but not of the Servian frontier; he had suggested that the Valis or governors should be appointed with the approval of the ambassadors, or the majority of them, but not of the powers. And though he had indicated that external guarantees for efficient administration would be necessary, there was nothing in his words to show that he had contemplated the institution of an international commission to watch over the execution of internal reforms. One of the British plenipotentiaries—Sir Henry Elliot—desired to record in writing his objection to a programme which appeared to him to travel beyond Lord Derby's instructions, and to be 'in excess of what the Porte is at all likely to consent to.' When, however, Lord Salisbury pointed out to him how embarrassing it would be for the Government to receive contradictory reports from their two plenipotentiaries, he withheld the despatch which he

[1] Cf. *Parl. Papers*, 1877, Turkey (No. 2), p. 248.

[2] For the actual decisions cf. *ibid.*, pp. 96 *seq.* I have of course, only enumerated in the text the most important points.

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had drawn up, and which was not destined to see the light for another twenty-five years.[1] And there could hardly be a doubt that nothing but inconvenience must have resulted if the two representatives of England had advocated different policies. The proposals to which the Conference had provisionally agreed might be wise or unwise, necessary or unnecessary, authorised or unauthorised. But it was obvious that the only chance of their acceptance by the Ottoman Government lay in the conviction of that Government that the six powers of Europe were for once unanimous as to the changes which it was necessary to introduce, and as to the necessity, at whatever cost, of enforcing them.

Nevertheless the mere presence of Sir Henry Elliot at Constantinople must alone have thrown doubts on the unanimity of the powers. Officially, indeed, Sir Henry Elliot supported—he could not help supporting—the views of the Conference.[2] But every well-informed person, whether Turk or Christian, knew that he privately disapproved them. And unhappily Sir Henry Elliot's attitude at Constantinople was confirmed by the action of the Cabinet in London; for, on the 22nd of December, when the preliminary meetings had come to an end and the formal Conference was about to begin, the Cabinet decided to tell Lord Salisbury that 'Her Majesty's Government will not assent to, or assist in, coercive measures, military or naval, against the Porte. The Porte must, on the other hand, be made to understand, as it has from the first been informed, that it can expect no assistance from England in the event

[1] It is printed in *Diplomatic Recollections*, p. 392.

[2] See, for example, *Parl. Papers*, 1877, Turkey (No. 2), p. 189.

of war.'[1] Most people would think, on reading these sentences, that the first of them was intended for Lord Salisbury's information, and the second for communication to the Porte; for no sane person, bent on forcing a decision on a reluctant power, would dream of telling that power that, in the event of its refusal, he did not intend to assent to, or assist in, coercion. But Lord Derby was not content with telegraphing the decision to Lord Salisbury. On the same afternoon he saw the Turkish Ambassador, and communicated to him the substance of his telegram to Lord Salisbury.[2] What he may have said in addition is perhaps buried for ever in the graves where he and the ambassador lie. But Lord Derby's words certainly did not diminish the force of his written despatch. For the Turkish Ambassador hastened to telegraph them to the Porte; and the Porte replied:[3]

Lord Derby's telegram.

'Telegram received. I have read it to the Grand Vizier. His Highness received the communication with deep gratitude, and begs you to express to his Excellency Lord Derby his acknowledgments. You will explain to his Lordship, in the name of the Grand Vizier, that the Sublime Porte reckons more than ever on the kind support of the Government of her Britannic Majesty under the difficult circumstances we are passing through. The great wisdom and spirit of justice which distinguish the eminent Minister who directs with such loyalty the foreign relations of England form a sure guarantee to us that he will gladly give us a new proof of his kindness and valued friendship.'

[1] *Parl. Papers*, 1877, Turkey (No. 2), p. 56.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 182.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 62.

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This was the language in which the Foreign Minister of Turkey acknowledged the good tidings which had been sent to him by his ambassador, and though Musurus Pasha handed a copy of the telegram to Lord Derby on Christmas Eve, Lord Derby took no steps till the 5th of the following January to remove the misapprehension which he must have seen his words had created.[1] How great this misapprehension was Lord Derby must have realised three days afterwards, for on the 8th of January he received a telegram from Lord Salisbury stating that 'The Grand Vizier believes that he can count upon the assistance of Lord Derby and Lord Beaconsfield.'[2]

It was afterwards argued that the Government was right in abstaining from any threat of coercion if it was unprepared to translate words into action, and there is no doubt that nothing can be worse than idle menaces which lead to no result. But if it was right to abstain from threats it was wholly unnecessary to assure the Turk that England would take no part or lot in coercive measures. England, on the contrary, had resorted to the Conference to prevent war between Russia and Turkey. She had desired Lord Salisbury to make the Porte understand that if by obstinacy or apathy it opposed the decision of the Conference the responsibility of the consequences which might ensue would rest solely with the Sultan and his advisers. And it was illogical, it was indecent, that while Lord Salisbury was instructed to use this language at Constantinople, Lord Derby should be telling the Turkish Minister in London that her Majesty's Government would not assent to, or

[1] *Parl. Papers*, 1877, Turkey (No. 1), pp. 144, 182.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 183.

assist in, coercive measures, military or naval, against the Porte. Such language justified the assumption that the Cabinet, in Lord Salisbury's absence, was reverting to the language of the Guildhall speech from the instructions which it had given to him as their representative. The Grand Vizier was thereby induced to believe that, if he had to reckon with Lord Salisbury at Constantinople, he could count upon the assistance of Lord Derby and Lord Beaconsfield in London.

The words of Lord Derby were as inopportune as they were unwise. The preliminary meetings of the representatives of the great powers were at last over, and the Conference itself was at last meeting, with the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs in the chair. Its sittings extended from the 23rd of December to the 26th of January. But from the first it was evident that the Turks declined to accept the suggestions of the powers. They opposed the intervention of the great powers in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire, and they brought forward as an alternative of their own the specious proposal of constitutional government which had been occupying the attention of Midhat Pasha. When, in fact, the Conference held its first full meeting its proceedings were temporarily interrupted by salvoes of artillery announcing 'the promulgation of the Ottoman Constitution.' These dramatic salutes were the only respect paid to a scheme of reform which was destined before many months were over to be replaced by a pure autocracy. Its promulgation did not for one moment deceive the men who were deliberating at Constantinople on the best means of terminating Turkish misrule. For the sake of securing the assent of the Sultan, indeed, the representa-

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The Sultan's refusal of proposals.

tives of the six powers slightly modified their recommendations. As, however, they still insisted that the appointment of governors should be made with the approval of the powers and that the reforms to be carried out by Turkey should be executed under commissioners of control appointed by the guaranteeing powers,[1] the Sultan, relying on the assistance of Lord Derby and Lord Beaconsfield, hardened his heart and declined to give way.

Then Lord Salisbury, as the mouthpiece of the six powers, rose to point out to the Porte the consequences of its folly. The Conference, he said, had already been sitting for a considerable time, and the Porte had not even accepted in principle the arrangements proposed to it by the powers; the prolonged discussion of so thorough a refusal must shortly be brought to a close. 'If this Conference breaks up because the Sultan and those in the confidence of his Imperial Majesty will not listen to the counsels of the six guaranteeing powers, the position of Turkey before Europe will have been completely changed, and will be extremely perilous. . . . It is my duty to free her Majesty's Government of all responsibility for what may happen, and I am, therefore, instructed to declare formally that Great Britain is resolved not to give her sanction either to maladministration or to oppression, and that if the Porte, from obstinacy or inactivity, offers resistance to the efforts now being made to place the Ottoman Empire on a more sure basis the responsibility of the consequences[2] will rest solely with the Sultan and his

[1] *Parl. Papers*, 1877, Turkey (No. 2), pp. 189, 190, 362.

[2] Lord Salisbury was presumably responsible for the French version of the speech in which the good French *la responsabilité des suites* appears. The translator has rendered this 'responsibility of the consequences.'

advisers.' Lord Salisbury went on to add that if the principles of the proposals were not accepted at the next meeting of the Conference on the 18th of January, the representatives of the six powers would consider the Conference at an end and leave Constantinople.[1]

Close of the Conference.

Lord Salisbury's weighty words were in exact accordance with his original instructions.[2] Unhappily their force had been largely discounted by Lord Derby's subsequent language in London, and Lord Salisbury's wine, adulterated with Lord Derby's water, had no virtue. The Porte rejected the recommendations of the six powers, the Conference was closed, and Lord Salisbury and Sir Henry Elliot left Constantinople. War, however, which might have logically followed from the failure of the Conference, did not immediately break out. At one of its earlier meetings, indeed, the armistice had been prolonged to the beginning of March,[3] and this prolongation afforded a welcome breathing time. Prince Gortschakoff, on behalf of Russia, took advantage of the interval to consult the great powers of Europe on the consequences of the failure. In a despatch dated the 31st of January,[4] he declared, with great moderation, that from the outset his Government had desired to consider the 'question as a European one, which should not and cannot be solved but by the unanimous agreement of the great powers'; that the refusal

[1] *Parl. Papers*, 1877, Turkey (No. 2), p. 362. [2] *Ante*, p. 121.

[3] *Parl. Papers*, 1877, Turkey (No. 2), p. 236.

[4] The despatch is dated 19th of January. But I assume that the date should be $\frac{19}{31}$ January. It is hardly conceivable that Prince Gortschakoff could have written on the 19th, as the Conference only held its last meeting on the 20th. See *Ibid.*, 1877, Turkey (No. 8), p. 1.

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of the Turkish Government threatened both the dignity and the tranquillity of Europe; and that it was necessary for him to know what the Cabinets, with whom he had hitherto acted in common, proposed to do, with a view of meeting this refusal and securing the execution of their wishes.[1]

The ink with which this despatch was written was hardly dry when a new revolution at Constantinople altered the conditions of the problem. Midhat Pasha had been the chief agent in the conspiracy which had deposed and 'suicided'[2] Abdul Aziz. He had stood at the right hand of Abdul Hamid since his accession to the throne; he was the author of the famous constitution which was endowing the Ottoman Empire with parliamentary government; he was the hope of the 'young Turkey' party; and, in justice, let it be added that after a life in which he filled many important offices he died, as he had lived, poor. The position which Midhat Pasha had attained through his abilities and conduct did not make him acceptable to his master. The recollection that he had deposed two Sultans and suicided one did not commend him to a sovereign who probably agreed with David in thinking that it was desirable that his highest and meanest subjects should 'respect the Lord's anointed.' Midhat Pasha accordingly was dismissed and desired to leave Ottoman territory, while his successor, Edhem Pasha, was instructed to 'watch over the good conduct of the affairs of the state,' and to submit for his master's sanction the laws and regulations promised by the constitution.[3] Up to 1876 Turkey had been

[1] *Parl. Papers*, 1877, Turkey (No. 8) p 1.

[2] I venture to adopt the French *suicidé*, which so exactly represents Abdul Aziz's fate.

[3] *Ibid.*, 1877, Turkey (No. 15), p. 84.

governed, or misgoverned, by an oligarchy called the Porte; in 1876 Midhat had intended that the tyranny of the Porte should be replaced by the counsels of the Parliament. In 1877 Abdul Hamid took the first steps to throw over Porte and Parliament and to found a system of personal rule. In view of this new revolution and the negotiations for peace which were going on between the Turkish Government on one side, and Servia and Montenegro on the other, the British Cabinet decided, perhaps wisely decided, to send no immediate answer to Prince Gortschakoff,[1] and in the meanwhile to use their efforts to arrange peace between the combatants. They succeeded so well that peace between Servia and Turkey was concluded before the end of February; and the armistice was prolonged to the 21st of March, in order to enable a similar result to be attained in the case of Montenegro.[2]

In this decision, at any rate, Russia herself concurred. In fact, in the beginning of March she actually asked Lord Derby to delay his reply.[3] For, resolute as she was to give effect to the wishes of her Sclavonic population and to insist on good government in Turkey, she still hesitated to take the plunge into war. General Ignatieff, who had represented her with so much efficiency at Constantinople, was conveniently anxious at this particular conjuncture to consult a better oculist than St. Petersburg could supply, and Prince Gortschakoff decided to avail himself of the opportunity, and instructed the General to give to the several Governments in Berlin, Vienna, Paris, and London explanations which

[1] *Parl. Papers*, 1877, Turkey (No. 8), p. 3.

[2] *Ibid.* (No. 15), pp. 144, 150.

[3] *Ibid.* (No. 8), p. 3.

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General Ignatieff's mission.

would very much facilitate their answer to the Russian circular.[1] Since the days of Tobit so strange a remedy for sore eyes had not been prescribed perhaps by man or angel. But whatever effect General Ignatieff's mission may have had on his eyesight, it had much influence on the negotiations. For the General brought with him a draft protocol for signature by the six guaranteeing powers. The protocol began by affirming that the powers who had undertaken in common the pacification of the East recognised that the surest way of attaining their object was to 'maintain the agreement so happily established between them'; and, in the form which was ultimately adopted, it went on to state that the peace already concluded with Servia and about to be concluded with Montenegro were steps accomplished towards the pacification which was the object of their common wishes. Accordingly the Porte was invited to replace its armies on a peace footing, and relying on its promises to carry out the reforms which it had expressed to the Conference its readiness to undertake, the protocol proposed that the powers should watch carefully the manner in which the promises of the Ottoman Government were carried into effect, and that if their hopes should once more be disappointed they should 'reserve to themselves to consider in common the means which they may deem best fitted to secure the well-being of the Christian populations and the interests of the general peace.'[2]

The protocol was only accepted by Lord Derby after he had procured 'the omission or modification

[1] *Parl. Papers*, 1877, Turkey (No. 15), p. 158.

[2] *Ibid.* (No. 8), pp. 5–7. But the protocol was printed in at least three Parliamentary papers presented in the Session of 1877.

of those passages to which he thought that the Porte could with any reason object,'[1] and with the declaration that if it did not lead to reciprocal disarmament it should be regarded as null and void.[2] The Russian Ambassador, on the contrary, in signing it declared that 'if peace with Montenegro was concluded, and the Porte accepts the advice of Europe and shows itself ready to replace its forces on a peace footing, and seriously to undertake the reforms mentioned in the protocol, let it send to St. Petersburg a special envoy to treat of disarmament, to which his Majesty the Emperor, on his part, would also consent. If massacres similar to those which have occurred in Bulgaria should take place this would necessarily put a stop to the measures of demobilisation.'[3]

It was the opinion of Lord Derby that the 'protocol, taken in conjunction with the declaration made on behalf of Russia, gave an opportunity for the arrangement of a mutual disarmament by Russia and Turkey, of which the latter ought on every account to endeavour to avail herself.' And he directed Mr. Jocelyn, who since Sir H. Elliot's departure had been in charge of the British Legation at Constantinople, to state to the Porte that 'a contrary course of action would have the appearance of a reckless refusal by Turkey of the overtures made by Russia, and would have

[1] *Parl. Papers*, 1877, Turkey (No. 15), p. 321.

[2] Lord Hartington afterwards complained with much force in the House of Commons that, in declaring that it was solely in the interest of peace that they had signed the protocol, her Majesty's Government had thrown over the whole policy of ameliorating the lot of the Christian subjects of the Porte which it was the object of the protocol to procure. *Hansard*, vol. ccxxxiii. p. 1091. Sir Charles Dilke in the same debate repeated the argument in stronger language, p. 1150.

[3] *Parl. Papers*, 1877, Turkey (No. 8), p. 8.

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the effect of putting her in the wrong in the eyes of Europe.'[1]

The effects of Lord Derby's excellent advice were neutralised by his action. He signed the protocol on the 31st of March, and, on the 1st of April, decided on sending a new ambassador to Constantinople. In the interests of the European concert it was obviously desirable that Turkey should realise that all the great powers of Europe were acting on the same principle and in the same manner. Yet this precise moment was taken to indicate that her Majesty's Government considered that the interests of Great Britain required[2] that the rank of the British representative in Constantinople should be higher than that of a Chargé d'Affaires. This unfortunate step, which again drew a contrast between this country and the powers with whom she was supposed to be co-operating, became doubly unfortunate from the choice which was made for the new post. Lord Derby could not venture to restore Sir H. Elliot to the place where he had been the notorious advocate of Turkish interests.[3] But in his place he sent Mr. Layard, who for some years had been Minister at Madrid. Except that Mr. Layard had been a Liberal member of Parliament and a subordinate member of Mr. Gladstone's Administration, which he had left in 1869, no choice could have been more unfortunate. He was profoundly impressed with the wisdom of the policy which England had hitherto promoted in the East. He regarded the integrity of the Ottoman

[1] *Parl. Papers*, 1877, Turkey (No. 15), p. 321.

[2] *Ibid.* (No. 15), p. 315.

[3] I have not thought it necessary to refer to the debate on Sir H. Elliot, which will be found in *Hansard*, vol. ccxxxiii. pp. 568 *seq.* But that debate justifies the statement in the text.

Empire as a bar to Russian ambition, and the Sultan as a useful or necessary ally to England in the East.[1] Mr. Layard had achieved reputation by explorations in Asiatic Turkey; his long residence in the East had won him many friendships among the Turks, and had made him singularly blind to the defects and abominations of Turkish rule. The Turkish Ministry at once showed the interpretation which it placed on the appointment by expressing itself sensible of 'this delicate mark of attention,' the more so as the Sultan 'knew by reputation the eminent qualities of Mr. Layard and his sentiments of friendship for our country.'[2] The German Government, with a much truer appreciation of the necessities of the situation, determined 'to wait before sending the German Ambassador back to his post at Constantinople until the Porte had returned a favourable reply to the communication of the protocol, and had sent a special envoy to St. Petersburg to settle the question of disarmament.'[3]

The Porte rejects the protocol.

Strengthened in its obstinacy by the new indication of England's good will, the Porte decided to protest against the protocol. Its contents it persisted in regarding as 'derogatory to the Sultan's dignity and independence,' and as a virtual abrogation of the ninth article of the Treaty of Paris.[4] The Porte took upon itself the responsibility of rejecting the protocol, and Russia replied by ordering her armies to cross the frontier.[5]

[1] *Revue des deux Mondes*, 15th of September, 1906, p. 288.

[2] *Parl. Papers*, 1877, Turkey (No. 15), p. 327.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 338.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 340, 351, 354. See also *ibid.* (No. 12), p. 1. As I have blamed the Turks throughout, it is right to add that M. d'Avril praises their courage for rejecting the ultimatum. *Le Traité de Berlin*, p. 185.

[5] *Parl. Papers*, 1877, Turkey (No. 18), p. 1.

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The Russo-Turkish War.

The war which thus broke out was attended, in the first instance, with some unexpected consequences. In Asia, where it was generally expected that the Russians would achieve an easy victory, they were foiled in several engagements, and forced to retire. In Europe, on the contrary, where it was assumed, from the experience of 1854, that the Turks might, at the outset, resist the Russian advance, the Turks failed to avail themselves of the advantage of their situation. The Russian armies were allowed to pass the Danube,[1] and General Gourko, with a considerable force under his command, crossed the Balkans and descended on Roumelia. In the middle of July, within three months after the commencement of the war, Turkish defence had apparently collapsed in Europe, and succeeded in Asia. But the next few months largely modified these results. In Asia the Russians, gaining knowledge from experience, again advanced, defeated with great loss the Turkish army, and stormed the fortress of Kars, the principal Turkish stronghold. In Europe, on the contrary, the Turks under Osman Pasha threw themselves into Plevna, a strong position in Bulgaria, which the Russians in their hasty advance had neglected to occupy; while Suleiman Pasha forced General Gourko back into the Balkans, and checked the Russian advance. Thus, while in the summer the Russians, unsuccessful in Asia, were apparently carrying everything before them in Europe, in the late autumn they were paralysed in Europe but making rapid progress in Asia. From this

[1] In this short account I am not able to trace the history of the very difficult question raised by the passage of the Russian troops through Roumania, but on this point, as on most points connected with the Eastern policy of 1877–78, the reader will find an admirable guide in M. d'Avril, *Le Traité de Berlin*, pp. 209 *seq.*

time, however, the growing exhaustion of the Turks left the ultimate issue no longer uncertain. In December Osman Pasha, invested by General Todleben, was forced to yield the strong position which he had so long and so bravely held. His capitulation compelled the other Turkish armies to retire. The Balkans were again passed; Adrianople was occupied by the Russians; Constantinople itself appeared to be at their mercy, when an armistice at last closed a struggle which had lasted for more than three hundred days.[1]

In England these grave events were watched with mixed feelings. Some there were who still believed in what the Prime Minister called the traditional policy of England—the maintenance of Ottoman rule—and who, therefore, came to think that the welfare of the Christian subjects of the Porte was a secondary consideration,[2] and that a desire to support the Sultan in Constantinople was equivalent to a determination to maintain the Empire of England. Others, on the contrary, considered that the true interests of England could not be identified with misrule, and that the only remedy which could produce peace or happiness was the removal of a Government which was a reproach to Europe. The one set of people would have liked, as the Prime Minister would have liked, to forbid the advance of Russia; the other set were disposed to agree with a London newspaper which declared that the war which Russia was

[1] I have not thought it necessary to cumber the text with a detailed narrative of military movements. The reader will find a short history of the campaign in *Le Traité de Berlin*, p. 195 *seq.* M. d'Avril is almost as good in describing the salient points of the campaign as when recording the great diplomatic struggle between England and Russia. For a short history of the war, see *Ann. Reg.* 1877, Hist. pp. 186–197.

[2] See Lord Beaconsfield's speech in *Hansard*, vol. ccxxxii. p. 726.

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making was the most just and necessary war of our time.[1] But between the two extremes of those who would have withstood Russia in arms, and those who would have aided Russia with, at any rate, a moral support, there stood a great mass of men who were horrified and ashamed at the conduct of the Turks, and who nevertheless could not reconcile themselves to a Russian intervention.[2] These men remembered the sacrifices which Great Britain had made only twenty-three years before to withstand the advance of Russia; they were perhaps reminded of them by some vacant chair in their own home, or some voice that was gone in their own family; and they disliked to acknowledge that the cause for which those who had been near and dear to them had fought was a mistake, and that the blood which had been freely shed had been given to uphold wrong-doing. The integrity of Turkey still seemed to these men a British interest, the advance of Russia a British danger. Yet in the language which Lord Dudley, in his youth, had applied to French intervention in Italy, they thought that if the Russian Government was 'not just the instrument one would choose for such a work,' there was 'no choice, and Satan himself ought to be supported if he would undertake it.'[3]

It must not be supposed that these rival views were held exclusively on either side of the House. Opinion was sharply divided both on the Government

[1] *Spectator*, 28th of April, 1877. O'Connor's *Life of Lord Beaconsfield*, p. 657.

[2] On the outbreak of war a portion of the British fleet which had been lying for six months at the Piræus was moved up to Besika Bay, and the garrisons in the Mediterranean were strengthened. D'Avril, *Le Traité de Berlin*, p. 238.

[3] *Letters to Ivy*, from the first Earl of Dudley, p. 281.

and on the Opposition benches. In the Cabinet, which, it should be recollected, was a comparatively small body of twelve members, a large and influential minority was apparently anxious to disown or repudiate the ungenerous language of the Prime Minister. Lord Carnarvon, speaking in October 1876, declared, in language which Mr. Gladstone might have used, that the Bulgarian atrocities were 'horrors which turned men's blood to flame.'[1] In the previous month Mr. Cross, speaking as Home Secretary, had said, 'With all due respect for Turkey, the time has come when this country should refuse to be put off with paper currency; they should demand that Turkish promises should be paid in sterling coin.' Sir Stafford Northcote, in November,[2] had declared it to be impossible really to secure the peace of Europe 'unless we take steps also for the improved administration of the provinces of Turkey. As long as you leave that sore open, any peace you may promote will be but a hollow peace, and be but as a patchwork—a piece of sticking-plaster put over a wound when there is festering matter still left below'; while Lord Salisbury had shocked Sir Henry Elliot by giving expression to these views in forcible language at Constantinople. When such opinions as these were openly expressed by important members of the Cabinet even Lord Beaconsfield knew that there was no possibility of drawing the sword for the Turk. But, on the other hand, opinion was almost as sharply divided on the Opposition benches. Lord Hartington, who led the Opposition in the House of Commons, did not conceal from his friends that he

[1] *Hansard*, vol. ccxxii. p. 82.

[2] Speech at Bristol, 13th of November, 1876, *Hansard*, vol. ccxxii. pp. 31 and 90.

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had not the slightest confidence in Russia.[1] Mr. Forster was disposed to agree with Lord Hartington,[2] and Lord Granville was more anxious to smooth any possible differences among his friends than to take any strong line of his own.[3]

If differences of opinion in the Cabinet to some extent restrained the action of the Prime Minister, differences of opinion in the Opposition prevented any effective criticism of Lord Derby's policy. He took upon himself, at the commencement of the war, to address a lecture to the Russian Government. In reply to Prince Gortschakoff's circular announcing the war, he declared that he could not accept the Prince's statements and conclusions as justifying his resolution. The protocol, in Lord Derby's view, had required no fresh guarantee from the Sultan for the reform of his administration. It had merely given the powers the right to watch carefully the manner in which the promises of the Ottoman Government were carried into effect; it reserved to them the privilege of considering in common the measures which they might deem best fitted to secure the well-being of the Christian populations and the interests of the general peace. The course on which the Russian Government had entered, moreover, was in contravention of the Treaty of Paris, by which Russia and the other signatory powers had undertaken to respect the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire; and Russia, so lately as 1871, had joined the other powers in affirming it to be an essential principle of the law of nations that no power

[1] *Life of Lord Granville*, vol. ii. p. 168.

[2] *Life of Forster*, pp. 406 *seq.*

[3] *Life of Lord Granville*, vol. ii. p. 169.

can liberate itself from the engagements of a treaty or modify its stipulations without the consent of the contracting parties. Russia, however, in taking action against Turkey, had separated herself from the European concert, and had departed from the rule which she had affirmed in 1871, and she could not, consequently, expect her proceedings to have either the concurrence or approval of her Majesty's Government.[1]

Parliamentary discussions.

Lord Derby's arguments did not, probably, disturb Prince Gortschakoff's phlegm. They could hardly even have deceived Lord Derby himself. The Minister who had given only a reluctant consent to the Andrassy Note, and who had refused to assent to the Berlin Memorandum, was the last person who was entitled to condemn Russia for breaking up the concert of Europe. The Minister who had issued invitations for the Conference of Constantinople, and who formulated the proposals which the Conference should discuss, was equally disabled from condemning Russia for giving effect to the opinions of the Conference. But the fatal defect in Lord Derby's argument was the implication that a unanimous Europe had no remedy against Turkish misrule; for it was obvious that Europe could not enforce its decisions without assailing the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The position of the British Minister implied that Turkey had the right to concede or refuse such reforms as she thought proper, and that

[1] Lord Derby, on the rejection of the protocol, had expressed his regret, and declared war to be inevitable. *Parl. Papers*, 1877, Turkey (No. 15), p. 355. If he was sincere in this declaration, it is difficult to understand how he could have lectured Russia for making war. But perhaps Dr. Rose is right in saying that while the earlier despatch was Lord Derby's, the later despatch was inspired by Lord Beaconsfield. *The Development of European Nations*, p. 182.

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Europe was powerless to intervene and insist that a power, which only existed on the sufferance of the other powers, should not pursue for all time a policy of massacre.

Parliamentary and public opinion.

But if Lord Derby's argument was not unanswerable, it was not ill-suited to the existing temper of the British people. Horrified at the story of massacre which had reached them from Bulgaria, and roused by Mr. Gladstone's indignant rhetoric, the people were determined not to spend a shilling to support the Turk. At the same time, a generation which remembered the sacrifices of the Crimean war was not prepared to see Russia resume the part which she had tried to play a quarter of a century before. Opposed to Turkish misrule, Englishmen did not wish to see the Government of the Porte replaced by the Government of the Czar. Unprepared to follow the Prime Minister in his desire to repeat the policy of the Crimean war, they were equally unwilling to follow Mr. Gladstone in his defence of Russia.

The divergence of opinion in the country was reflected in Parliament. The time of the Legislature was largely occupied with the affairs of the East, but the discussions which took place in both Houses did not materially advance the matter. Far the most important emanated from Mr. Gladstone, who, immediately after the Russian declaration of war, gave notice of a series of five resolutions expressing dissatisfaction with the conduct of the Porte in taking no steps to carry out the requirements of Lord Derby's despatch relating to the Bulgarian massacres; declaring that, until its conduct had been essentially changed, the Porte had lost all claim to the moral or material support of England; expressing a desire that

the influence of the Crown should be employed for 'the development of local liberty and practical self-government in the disturbed provinces'; and affirming that this influence should be addressed to promoting the concert of the European powers.[1]

Mr. Gladstone's notice at once revealed the differences which were already distracting the Liberal party. The front bench disapproved of four out of the five resolutions, and a section of the party thought the whole of them inopportune.[2] Lord Granville himself, desiring to extricate the party from a grave embarrassment, suggested to Mr. Gladstone that a way out of the difficulty should be found by a vote on the previous question. Happily, a growing sense among his old colleagues that Mr. Gladstone was representing a preponderating mass of public opinion suggested a worthier solution of the difficulty. Mr. Gladstone was left to move the first of his five resolutions, was induced to assent to a slight modification of the second of them, and to intimate his intention not to proceed with the others.[3]

The credit, if any credit attaches to it, of arranging this compromise was claimed by Mr. Forster for himself, for Lord Granville by his biographer.[4] History, however, cares but little for the part which these men played in thwarting or in forwarding Mr. Gladstone's purpose; but it cares a great deal for the new effort which Mr. Gladstone was making for the wretched people who were groaning under the Ottoman yoke. He was rising from a bed of sickness,[5]

[1] *Hansard*, vol. ccxxxiv. p. 101.
[2] *Life of Lord Granville*, vol. ii. p. 169.
[3] *Hansard*, vol. ccxxxiv. p. 366.
[4] Cf. *Life of Forster*, p. 413, and *Life of Lord Granville*, vol. ii. p. 169.
[5] For his illness in the previous week, see Morley, *Life of Gladstone*, vol. ii. p. 563.

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yet in the two and a half hours in which he held the House he betrayed no symptoms of weakness or suffering. He spoke like one inspired.[1] Mr. Balfour said,[2] years afterwards, that, as a feat of parliamentary courage, parliamentary skill, parliamentary endurance, parliamentary eloquence, he believed this speech would always be unequalled.

Mr. Disraeli supported in the House of Commons.

Eloquence, however, was powerless against a compact opposition on the one side of the House and divided counsels on the other. After five nights' debate the Commons agreed on an amendment in which it 'declined to entertain any resolution which might embarrass Her Majesty's Government in the maintenance of peace and in the protection of British interests'; and the Ministry accordingly was given a free hand to deal with the matter in its own way.[3] And, unhappily, as the war went on the sympathy with the Turk increased, the dread of Russia became more marked. In 1876 the governing classes of Turkey had shown themselves at their worst; in 1877 the Turk as an individual showed himself at his best. Even a Turk has some power to 'coerce and to conciliate' when he dares in the cause of his faith and his race, nobly to do, nobly to die. And the Turkish soldier by his endurance and his courage won the sympathy of many persons who had been horrified by the atrocities which had been committed by his kin. Thus it happened that the Minister who had done so much to defeat his own policy by the cold and cynical manner in which he had apologised for outrage and massacre in 1876, saw

[1] *Life of Forster*, p. 413.

[2] Morley, *Life of Gladstone*, vol. ii. p. 566.

[3] The amendment moved by Sir H. Drummond Wolff was carried by 354 votes to 223. *Hansard*, vol. ccxxxiv. p. 973.

a gradual change in the opinion of the public, and at the end of 1877 found himself in a position to revert to the policy which he had personally favoured in the middle of 1876.

Proposals for peace.

In the middle of December 1877 it was no longer doubtful that the fortune of war had gone against the Turks, and on the 12th of that month the Turkish Government sent a circular to the great powers, requesting their good offices for the restoration of peace. 'It soon became evident that there was little prospect of joint mediation being agreed upon.'[1] Lord Derby offered to address the Russian Government alone and to inquire if the Emperor would entertain any overtures for the conclusion of the war. The Porte naturally grasped at this offer, and Prince Gortschakoff as naturally replied, that while Russia desired nothing better than peace the Porte must apply to the Imperial commanders-in-chief in Europe and Asia, who would state the conditions on which an armistice could be granted.[2] Some further negotiations took place, with which it is unnecessary to encumber the narrative, and on the 31st of January, 1878, an armistice was signed at Adrianople.[3]

Before formally conceding an armistice the Russian Government stipulated that the conditions on which it was prepared to make peace should be accepted by the Porte. It so happened that, in the previous June, the Russian Ambassador in London had frankly discussed with Lord Derby the terms on

[1] Lord Derby to Mr. Layard, 24th of December, 1877. *Parl. Papers*, 1878, Turkey (No. 2), p. 4.

[2] *Ibid.*, 1878, Turkey (No. 2), p. 8.

[3] *Ibid.* (No. 7), p. 2. For the sake of abbreviating a long story, I have omitted any reference to Lord Derby's despatch of the 6th and Prince Gortschakoff's reply of the 20th of May, 1877, to which M. d'Avril attaches so much importance. *Le Traité de Berlin*, pp. 267–269.

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which Russia would agree to end the war. If the Porte sued for peace before the Russian armies had crossed the Balkans the Czar would undertake not to cross that mountain-chain. Bulgaria north of the Balkans would become an autonomous vassal province under the guarantee of Europe. The best possible guarantees for a regular administration of Bulgaria south of the Balkans would be required.[1] Servia and Montenegro would each receive an accession of territory. Bosnia and Herzegovina would be provided with a good indigenous administration. The future of Roumania, which had just proclaimed its independence, could only be settled by a general understanding. Russia, on her part, would only require the restoration of her European frontier of 1856, with the cession of Batoum and some adjacent territory in Asia; and she met the susceptibilities of England by declaring that she would in no circumstances take permanent possession of Constantinople; that she had no desire to trouble England in her Indian possessions, or consequently in her communications with them; and that she recognised that the existing arrangements about the passage of the Dardanelles, 'though conceived in a spirit of distrust and hostility, could only be revised by a general agreement.'[2] Two months later the Czar himself informed the British military attaché in Bulgaria that he adhered to these terms, and he added that Europe would be invited to a Conference for the final settlement of the conditions of peace; and that he had not the slightest

[1] Six days later, on the 14th June, the Russian Ambassador told Lord Derby that Prince Gortschakoff had arrived at the conclusion that he could not separate Bulgaria into two provinces. D'Avril, *Le Traité de Berlin*, p. 273.

[2] *Parl. Papers*, 1878, Turkey (No. 15), pp. 3, 4.

wish or intention to menace the interests of England in any way, with regard to either Constantinople or Egypt, the Suez Canal or India.[1]

Strictly speaking these conditions were dependent on the conclusion of the war before the Russian armies had crossed the Balkans. Count Schouvaloff had very frankly told Lord Derby in the previous June that if the war went on beyond this stage the terms of the Russian Government might be altered. But in December, when the collapse of Turkey was no longer doubtful, Lord Derby had again approached Count Schouvaloff, had told him that even the temporary occupation of Constantinople by the Russian forces was an event which on all accounts it was most desirable to avoid; that if such an occupation appeared to be imminent public opinion in this country might call for measures of precaution; that with the object of avoiding a course which might endanger the good relations between the two countries, the Cabinet hoped that no attempt would be made to occupy Constantinople or the Dardanelles;[2] and that otherwise her Majesty's Government must hold themselves free to take whatever course might appear to them necessary for the protection of British interests.[3]

Lord Derby had placed the Russian Government in a position of some difficulty. A belligerent must be prepared to follow the enemy wherever he may retreat; and the knowledge that a defeated army can retire to some position which may be safe from attack will naturally induce it to withdraw to quarters where it may rest in safety. Prince Gortschakoff declared with great force that Lord Derby's

[1] *Parl. Papers*, 1878, Turkey (No. 9), p. 2.

[2] This appears to be the first mention of the Dardanelles in the correspondence.

[3] *Ibid.* (No. 3), p. 1.

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anticipations, if they were known at Constantinople, were precisely of a nature to render inevitable the eventualities against which he desired to guard. 'If the Turks were to acquire the conviction that a menace or an attack directed against Constantinople would cause England to depart from her neutrality, their policy would naturally be to prolong their resistance, in spite of its evident uselessness, in such a way as to force Russia to pursue her operations as far as the capital.' The Russian Government, therefore, could not divest itself of 'the full liberty of action which was the right of every belligerent,' but Prince Gortschakoff asked Lord Derby 'to define more clearly what were the British interests which he considered might be touched by the eventualities of the war,' in order that means might be sought of reconciling them with the interests of Russia.[1]

Negotiations with Russia.

No objection could be raised to the reply either as to form or as to time. Lord Derby had only made his communication to the Russian Ambassador on the 13th of December, and Prince Gortschakoff's reply was dated the 16th of December and received in London on the 2nd of January, 1878. On the 12th of January Lord Derby replied that 'any operations tending to place the passage of the Dardanelles under the control of Russia would be an impediment to the proper consideration of the final terms between Russia and Turkey,'[2] and he asked Prince Gortschakoff to give him an assurance that no Russian force should be sent to the Peninsula of Gallipoli. There was no doubt that such a request was unusual; but on the 15th the Russian Government declared that they had no intention of directing military operations on

[1] *Parl. Papers*, 1878, Turkey (No. 3), pp. 1-3. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 4.

Gallipoli, unless the Turkish regular troops should be concentrated there; but they supposed that 'in addressing to them this question her Britannic Majesty's Government have no intention of occupying that peninsula, a step which would not be in accordance with their neutrality, and might give rise in Constantinople to illusions which would not favour the conclusion of peace.' On the 21st Lord Derby expressed his satisfaction at the reply, and added that her Majesty's Government did not, under present circumstances, contemplate any occupation of the position in question.

Any one who will carefully consider the position of Russia as a belligerent, and the assurance which she nevertheless thus gave, will probably admit that she went as far as a belligerent could be expected to go. But on the 12th of January, the very day on which Lord Derby was asking Prince Gortschakoff for an assurance that Gallipoli would not be occupied, the Cabinet was considering the propriety of sending the fleet to the Dardanelles. It was obvious that the fleet could only enter the Dardanelles as allies or as opponents of the Porte.

'If we enter with the consent of the Sultan (so Lord Carnarvon said afterwards in the House of Lords), we enter, disguise it as we may, as allies, intervening at the last moment between him and his enemy; if we enter without his consent, we shall be setting at naught those treaties which we have professed it our object to uphold.'[1] The reasons for the course were, in fact, so weak, the objections to it were so strong, that the Cabinet, notwithstanding the views of the Prime Minister, adjourned for three days

[1] *Hansard*, vol. ccxxxvii. p. 443.

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without arriving at a decision. On the 15th, however, it was decided to move the fleet into the Dardanelles, and Lord Carnarvon thereupon resigned his post as Secretary of State for the Colonies.[1]

The very day on which this decision was taken Lord Derby received Prince Gortschakoff's assurance that he had no intention to occupy Gallipoli, and Lord Beaconsfield, with the only excuse for his action removed, sent his private secretary to tell Lord Carnarvon that subsequent telegrams had induced him to change his mind, and that the orders to the fleet would not be given.[2]

Parliament met on the 17th of January—summoned, as the Queen was advised to say, before the usual period in order that the members might become acquainted with the efforts which had been made to terminate the war[3]—and nothing in the debates of that evening indicated that the crisis had assumed an aspect of exceptional gravity. On the contrary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer told the Commons that the Government trusted and believed that the terms of peace to be proposed by Russia would be in accordance with the declarations made by her before the war. And though he went on to add that it was impossible to say what effect this long struggle might have had on the views of Russia, the Government had no immediate proposals to make.[4] The Chancellor of

[1] *Hansard*, vol. ccxxxvii. p. 439. I have not thought it necessary to cumber my narrative with any reference to the 'severe censure' which Lord Beaconsfield had passed on Lord Carnarvon in the Cabinet — a severe censure for saying that he did not believe that anyone, whether Englishman or Russian, was insane enough to desire a repetition of the Crimean war. *Ibid.*, p. 438. This is the only record I know of where a Prime Minister has severely condemned one of his colleagues in the Cabinet.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 439.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 101, 102.

the Exchequer's language was so cool that it was not quite clear to those unacquainted with the crisis which had nearly broken up the Cabinet two days before, why Parliament had been prematurely summoned. Six days later, however, on the 23rd of January, the Cabinet again met, and decided to direct the fleet not merely to enter the Dardanelles, but to go up to Constantinople; and, in order to make the action more impressive, Parliament was asked for a vote of credit. Lord Carnarvon again resigned, and his resignation was accepted.[1]

Lord Carnarvon's resignation.

What had happened in the interval between the 15th and the 23rd of January to induce the Cabinet to revise its policy? Lord Beaconsfield said, on the 25th, in the House of Lords, that (1) the Cabinet had received no information respecting the negotiations between the belligerents; that (2) the Russian forces were making considerable advances in a direction where British interests were involved; and that (3) they had been informed by the Sultan that there was no security for life and property in Constantinople. And it is true that Mr. Layard had sent a series of sensational telegrams to the Cabinet in which he had spoken of the rapid advance of the Russian forces towards Constantinople and Gallipoli, and of the consternation among the Mussulman population, who were flying for shelter to Constantinople, and even crossing into Asia.[2] Such incidents are the usual accompaniments of war, and, even if they had been reported by a cooler agent than Mr. Layard, ought not to have disturbed the equanimity of the Cabinet. It is true also that on the 23rd the Cabinet was not

[1] *Hansard*, vol. ccxxxvii. p. 441.

[2] *Parl. Papers*, 1878, Turkey (No. 3), pp. 10–12.

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aware of the Russian terms of peace; but, as the Turkish plenipotentiaries were not expected to reach the Russian headquarters before the 17th or 18th,[1] it was hardly reasonable to suppose that they should have been known in London before the 23rd It may have been true that the Sultan had informed the Cabinet that there was no security for life and property in Constantinople; but, if it were true, the Cabinet neglected, in laying the papers before Parliament, to insert any despatch in justification of the statement. And on the 27th the Turkish Government, in reporting that the British fleet had entered the Dardanelles on the 25th, declared that this measure was not suggested by the Sublime Porte, but was taken by the English Government upon its own initiative.[2] Except in the fervid despatches of Mr. Layard,[3] therefore, there was no justification for the hasty order of the 23rd.

Mr. Layard's despatches.

Forty-eight hours, indeed, had hardly passed before the more cool-headed members of the Cabinet must have themselves admitted that their action on the 23rd had been unnecessary; for on the 24th Lord Derby received from Mr. Layard the terms of peace which Russia was demanding, and these terms were repeated to him by the Russian Ambassador, Count Schouvaloff, on the 25th. There was nothing in these terms which was inconsistent with the decision of the Conference or with the language which Russia had held from first to last. They required independence

[1] *Parl. Papers*, 1878, Turkey (No. 3), p. 9.

[2] *Ibid.* (No. 6), p. 1.

[3] I have no interest or desire to deal harshly with Mr. Layard, but from his arrival in Constantinople his despatches were sensational. See *e.g.* his complaints of cruelties and outrages committed by Russian troops, which were contradicted by British officers attached officially to the Russian armies. *Ibid.*, 1877, Turkey (No. 24), pp. 1-12.

for Roumania, Servia, and Montenegro, with either a territorial indemnity or the rectification of frontier in each case; they asked for autonomous institutions, sufficiently guaranteed, for Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the other Christian provinces of the Porte; they claimed an indemnity to Russia for the expenses of the war, and 'an ulterior understanding' for safeguarding the rights of Russia in the Straits; and, in communicating these terms to Lord Derby, Count Schouvaloff was instructed to repeat the assurance that questions affecting Europe would not be settled by Russia alone.[1] There was nothing then, either in the terms themselves or in the manner of making them, to disturb the equanimity of the British Government. It is true that Mr. Layard[2] said of these terms that it was 'scarcely necessary to say' that they amounted to the 'destruction of the Turkish Empire in Europe.' But it is 'scarcely necessary' to reply that, if Mr. Layard was right, the blow had been already inflicted by the Constantinople Conference. Even Mr. Layard could hardly have expected that Russia would be content, after the war, with less than Lord Salisbury before the war had been prepared to exact. And the case for Russia was so clear that even the British Cabinet directed the fleet, instead of going up to Constantinople, to return to Besika Bay.[3]

[1] It is highly discreditable to the British Government that, four days after Lord Derby's interview with Count Schouvaloff, Lord Derby sent a despatch to the Governments of Berlin, Paris, Rome, and Vienna declaring that he could recognise no peace which did not receive the assent of the European powers; and, in making this declaration, made no allusion to the assurance which Count Schouvaloff had given him. See M. d'Avril's comment on this in *Le Traité de Berlin*, p. 277.

[2] For this paragraph see *Parl. Papers*, 1878, Turkey (No. 3), pp. 13–15.

[3] *Parl. Papers*, 1878, Turkey (No. 6), p. 1; *Hansard*, vol. ccxxxvii. p. 580.

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Order and counter-order reflected the divisions which were distracting the Cabinet. They had already lost Lord Carnarvon. The order for the fleet to sail involved the resignation of Lord Derby; the order for its return to Besika Bay was followed by his return to office.[1] If, however, the Cabinet vibrated between action and inaction in regard to the fleet, it persisted in carrying out its original intention of a vote of credit. It might have been argued that, although such a vote might have seemed to be necessary in the commencement of January, it was hardly required towards the close. Parliament, however, rarely refuses a Ministry a supply which is said to be required to support the interest of England, and the 6,000,000*l.* which the Government asked for on the 28th of January was granted after six nights' debate[2] on the 8th of February.

Parliamentary debates.

A debate which had extended over six nights, and which, commencing on the 28th of January, had been suffered to terminate only on the 8th of February, showed that the representatives of the people had, at any rate, some doubt as to the necessity of the course which the Government was taking. In fact, on the second night of the discussion Mr. Forster, with the concurrence of most of the Liberal leaders, but against the wish of Lord Hartington, moved an amendment to the effect that, as the conditions on which her Majesty's neutrality had been founded had not been infringed 'there was no reason for adding to the burden of the people by voting unnecessary supplies.'[4] If there was no reason for add-

[1] *Hansard*, vol. ccxxxvii. p. 522.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 535, 1310, 1417.
[3] *Life of Forster*, p. 421; Fitzmaurice, *Life of Lord Granville*, vol. ii. p. 174.
[4] *Hansard*, vol. ccxxxvii. p. 729.

ing to the burdens of the people while Mr. Forster was speaking, there seemed less reason for doing so two days afterwards. For the news reached England on the 2nd of February that the armistice had been signed, and, whatever preparations might have been necessary while the war was in progress, there seemed no excuse for them when hostilities were definitely suspended.[1]

There was one man, however, with whom Mr. Forster had not reckoned. Even Lord Beaconsfield was not more anxious to sustain the power of the Porte than the excitable diplomatist who represented or misrepresented the country at Constantinople. On the 5th of February Mr. Layard telegraphed to Lord Derby that 'although the armistice has been concluded the Russians are pushing on towards Constantinople.' On the 6th he added, 'The Russians have occupied Tchavaldje in considerable force . . . The Turks have been compelled to retire, leaving Constantinople quite undefended.' These telegrams reached England on the evening of the 6th of February. They created the impression that, notwithstanding the armistice, and in defiance of it, the Russians were pressing on to Constantinople.[2] The impression was so widespread that Mr. Forster determined to withdraw his amendment, and that even Mr. Gladstone

[1] *Parl. Papers*, 1878, Turkey (No. 7), p. 1.

[2] Madame Novikoff says that the panic in London as to Russian occupation of Constantinople arose from English ignorance of French. 'While the discussion of Mr. Forster's amendment in the House of Commons was proceeding Count Schouvaloff, talking to a lady at an evening party in London, observed, "Oh, mon Dieu, quant à Constantinople, nous sommes dedans!" a colloquial expression, meaning we have been deceived. It passed from mouth to mouth . . . and next morning several London papers appeared with excited articles, commencing "Nous sommes dedans! The Russians are in Constantinople! Such was the categorical declaration of Count Schouvaloff, the Russian Ambassador."' *Russia and England*, p. 174.

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acquiesced in its withdrawal.[1] When the leader of the Opposition thus abandoned the contest the Government naturally secured an easy victory, and the vote of credit was carried by a large majority.

On the day when this vote was taken the telegraph brought to Lord Derby the terms of the armistice on which the Russians and the Turks had agreed; and it was then seen that the Russian advance, which Mr. Layard had implied had been made in defiance of the alliance, had been conducted in strict accordance with its provisions.[2] On the other hand, it also showed that the terms of the armistice had placed European Turkey at the mercy of Russia. In Mr. Layard's language, 'Almost all Bulgaria, Roumelia, and Thrace, up to the lines of Constantinople and Gallipoli,' were placed in Russian hands. And the Turks, Mr. Layard added, were already removing their guns from the Constantinople lines. The Cabinet thought—Lord Derby himself agreed with his colleagues in thinking—that in the event of any interruption of the armistice Constantinople was 'absolutely indefensible,' and Mr. Layard was reminding the ministers of 'the danger that will exist of disorder and anarchy in the event of a Russian advance to the city.' They therefore decided to send, not the fleet, but a detachment of the fleet, to the Bosphorus, for the protection, in case of need, of British subjects and of others who might be in danger from an excited population. But, in order to avoid any possibility of misapprehension, they invited the neutral powers to follow their example, and they communicated their reason for the action to the Government of St. Petersburg. Lord Derby added that while the

Signature of armistice.

[1] See *Life of Forster*, p. 423. [2] *Hansard*, vol. ccxxxvii. p. 1319.

armistice was unsigned he had regarded the despatch of any naval force to Constantinople as unwise and dangerous, since Turkey might look upon it as an encouragement to continue a hopeless resistance, and Russia as 'an act of hostility, or at least of defiance.' But these objections no longer applied. There was no Turkish resistance to encourage; there were no military operations in which we should even seem to be taking part. The great issues of the war were to be referred to the decision of Europe.[1]

The contradictory decisions at which the Cabinet had thus arrived reflected the rival views of Lord Beaconsfield and of Lord Derby—of the party in the Ministry which was prepared for war, and of the party which desired peace. On the 15th of January the Cabinet had ordered the fleet to enter the Dardanelles; on the 17th the order had been cancelled. On the 23rd of January, at the price of losing Lord Carnarvon's services, it had ordered the fleet to enter the Dardanelles and go up to Constantinople. On the 25th, for the sake of retaining Lord Derby's services, it directed the fleet to return to Besika Bay. Finally, on the 8th of February, it determined to send, not the fleet, but a detachment of it, to Constantinople, in order to protect British subjects; and, in order to deprive the movement of any appearance of menace, to invite other powers to imitate our example But this decision produced unexpected results. The Porte declared, on its part, that order and security in Constantinople had never been disturbed, and refused to grant the necessary Firman to enable the British vessels to pass into the

[1] I have given these reasons in Lord Derby's words. *Hansard*, vol. ccxxxvii. pp. 1319, 1320. Cf. Sir Stafford Northcote's simila language in the House of Commons, *ibid.*, p. 1331.

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Dardanelles.[1] The Russians declared, on their part, that, with the same desire to preserve order and to protect the lives of Christians of every race, they would send a part of their troops into the city. The two Governments, Prince Gortschakoff added, 'would thus be fulfilling a common duty to humanity.'[2] And the British Cabinet had thus the mortification of seeing that their decision, which had brought a detachment of the fleet to Constantinople, had elicited a protest from the Turkish Government,[3] and had given the Russians an excuse for occupying the lines of Constantinople—the very thing which it was intended to prevent.

Treaty of San Stefano.

Negotiations between Russia and Turkey were rapidly pressed forward, and, on the 3rd of March, peace between the two powers was signed at San Stefano, a little village on the Sea of Marmora, close to Constantinople. By this Treaty the independence of Montenegro, Servia, and Roumania was recognised; Bulgaria was constituted an autonomous tributary principality, and Bulgaria was defined to include the largest portion of Roumelia. The arrangements contemplated by the Conference at Constantinople were applied to Bosnia and Herzegovina. A large pecuniary indemnity was imposed on the Porte. But the Czar, taking into account the financial embarrassments of Turkey, consented to commute the greater proportion of this indemnity for that part of the Bulgarian territory south of the Danube known as Dobrudja; and Russia reserved the right of transferring this territory to Roumania in exchange for the part of Bessarabia detached from her by the Treaty of 1856. In addition,

[1] *Parl. Papers*, 1878, Turkey (No. 14), p. 2. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 3. [3] *Hansard*, vol. ccxxxvii. p. 1599.

the Porte undertook to transfer to Russia a slice of Armenia, and the territory so ceded comprised the fortress of Kars and the port of Batoum.[1] If these provisions are carefully examined they will be found closely to correspond with the arrangements which had been supported by Lord Salisbury at Constantinople. The chief difference between the treaty and the arrangements consists in the cession to Russia of the territory which she had lost in 1856, of the exaction of an indemnity, and of the annexation of an important slice of Armenia. It is true that Lord Beaconsfield rhetorically declared that it abolished 'the dominion of the Ottoman Empire in Europe' by creating 'a large state which, under the name of Bulgaria, is inhabited by many races not Bulgarians.'[2] But the autonomous Bulgaria of the Treaty bore a close resemblance to the Bulgaria which, in Lord Derby's instructions to Lord Salisbury, was to receive 'a system of local or administrative autonomy'; and it was not quite clear why, if such a recommendation could be made before the war by the Foreign Minister of England, the development of the same principle after the war should have been regarded by the Prime Minister as anathema.[3]

Peace, however, had been happily concluded; but some of the conditions of the peace were admittedly open to revision by Europe. The Russian Government had over and over again stated that Russia alone did not intend to settle European questions,[2] and that their settlement would be concerted with the

[1] The treaty is printed in *Parl. Papers*, 1878, Turkey (No. 22).

[2] See *Lord Beaconsfield's Collected Speeches*, vol. ii. p. 170.

[3] I advise any reader who hesitates to accept the statement in the text to compare it with M. d'Avril's conclusions in *Le Traité de Berlin*, p. 255.

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other powers of Europe. It might be a matter for consideration which of the articles agreed upon at San Stefano required the sanction of Europe, but there could not be a doubt that some of them (*e.g.* the retransfer of a slice of Bessarabia to Russia) required, if the Russian promises were to hold good, submission to the other powers. On the 4th of February the Government of Austria, recognising this necessity, invited the great powers to a Conference, which, it was suggested, should be held at Vienna, 'to establish an European agreement as to the modifications which it might become necessary to introduce into the existing treaties;'[1] and Lord Derby accepted the invitation. Some objection was taken to Vienna as the place of meeting, and, after Baden-Baden had been suggested, it was finally decided, on the 9th of March, that the Conference should be turned into a Congress, and held at Berlin. In assenting to this arrangement, Lord Derby suddenly made a new claim. He said that it would be desirable to have it understood, in the first place, that all questions dealt with in the Treaty of Peace between Russia and Turkey should be considered as subjects to be discussed in the Congress, and that no alteration in the condition of things previously established by treaty should be acknowledged as valid until it had received the assent of the powers, or, in the words used by him a few days afterwards, 'Her Majesty's Government must distinctly understand before they enter into Congress that every article in the treaty between Russia and Turkey will be placed before the Congress, not necessarily for acceptance, but in order that it may be considered what articles require acceptance or concurrence by the several powers and what do not.'[2]

The Berlin Congress.

[1] *Parl. Papers*, 1878, Turkey (No. 24), pp. 1, 4. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 4.

Whatever opinion may be formed on the merits of this demand, there can be no doubt that it far exceeded the claim which Lord Derby had previously made and to which Russia had assented. For while Lord Derby, up to the 9th of March, had consistently held that European questions (or questions affecting treaties to which other European powers had been parties) should be submitted for settlement to the powers, it had never been suggested that all the articles of any treaty should be reviewed by Europe. Russia, however, in her reply showed some disposition to meet the views of the British Government. Prince Gortschakoff undertook that a complete copy of the treaty should be officially communicated to the treaty powers, and that any member of the Congress should be at liberty to refer to any article of the treaty; but he added that Russia could only accept a discussion on those portions of the treaty which affected European interests;[1] or, as he afterwards explained,[2] 'Russia left to the other powers the liberty of raising such questions at the Congress as they might think fit to discuss, and reserved to itself the liberty of accepting or not accepting the discussion of those questions.'

The offer which the Russian Government thus made was in exact accordance with the pledges which it had given; just as the terms of peace which had been agreed upon at San Stefano followed in a remarkable manner the terms which Russia had intimated nine months before that she would demand, and against which Lord Derby had not protested.[3]

[1] See Lord A. Loftus's account of his interview with Prince Gortschakoff, *Parl. Papers*, 1878, Turkey (No. 24), p. 7.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

[3] See Lord Granville's remark on this point. *Hansard*, vol. ccxxxix. p. 784.

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Russia, moreover, had frankly admitted that it was open to England, or any other power, to bring any of the clauses of the treaty before the Congress, and there seemed no reason, therefore, why the Congress should not meet. Austria, which had at least as great an interest in the future of South-Eastern Europe as England, adopted that view. She considered that the concessions which Russia had made were adequate; and that it was not for the interest either of England or of Austria to raise further difficulties.[1]

Lord Beaconsfield, however, thought otherwise. He knew that the temper of the country in the spring of 1878 was very different from that of the previous year. In 1877 the people were still influenced by the atrocious cruelties which Turkey had committed, and by the magic of Mr. Gladstone's indignant rhetoric. In 1878 they were moved by the spectacle of a victorious Russian army, and ready to believe that a Russian victory was equivalent to a British defeat. At the moment, therefore, when the entire Continent desired peace, Lord Beaconsfield took a step which pointed to war. Prince Gortschakoff's despatch reached England on the 27th of March. The Cabinet at once met, and decided, on Lord Beaconsfield's advice, to call out the Reserves. The decision deprived it of the service of one of its most distinguished members. Lord Derby,[2] during his whole tenure of office, had laboured to preserve the independence and integrity of Turkey. But Lord Derby was as much in favour of peace as Lord Beaconsfield was prepared for war. He could not bring himself to regard the decision of the Cabinet as prudent,

Lord Derby's resignation.

[1] See MacColl, *Three Years of the Eastern Question*, p. 270.

[2] For Lord Derby's resignation, vol. ccxxxix. pp. 100 *seq.*

necessary, or warrantable, and at once retired from a Government with which for some time he had been in disaccord.[1]

In Lord Derby's room Lord Beaconsfield selected the brilliant statesman who had represented this country with so much vigour at the Constantinople Conference, and who had hitherto been regarded as animated by very different views on the Eastern Question from those of the Prime Minister; and Lord Salisbury at once issued a despatch to our embassies abroad explanatory of the views and objects of the Cabinet. In this famous document Lord Salisbury, after expressing his regret at the refusal of Russia to comply with the British demand, proceeded to criticise the terms which had been agreed upon at San Stefano; and he asserted that in 'every material stipulation' they involved 'a departure from the Treaty of 1856.' In Bulgaria the treaty created a strong Slav State, possessing harbours on the Black Sea and Ægean, which would be under the auspices and control of Russia, and would thus confer on them power and preponderating influence in those seas. A 'highly commendable' provision of improved institutions for the populations of Thessaly and Epirus was accompanied by the provision that the law securing them should be framed under the supervision of Russia. 'The compulsory alienation of Bessarabia from Roumania, the extension of Bulgaria to the shores of the Black

[1] Lord Derby had tendered his resignation on the Vote of Credit but had withdrawn it. *Hansard*, vol. ccxxxix. p. 789. I have not thought it necessary in the text to enter into the controversy which raged at that time as to whether the Cabinet did or did not resolve to take Cyprus and a point on the Syrian coast with or without the consent of the Sultan. Lord Derby's account is in *ibid.*, vol. ccxl. pp. 1793, 1814. For Lord Salisbury's contradiction, *ibid.*, p. 1809.

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Sea . . . and the acquisition of the important harbour of Batoum will make the will of the Russian Government dominant over all the vicinity of the Black Sea. The acquisition of the strongholds of Armenia will place the population of that province under the immediate influence' of Russia; and an 'indemnity, of which the amount is obviously beyond the means of Turkey to discharge,' would be 'an instrument of formidable efficacy for the coercion of the Ottoman Government.' The combined effect of all these provisions would be 'to depress, almost to subjection, the political independence of the Government of Constantinople.' But that Government was able to close or open the straits which form the natural highway of nations between the Ægean and the Euxine. 'Its dominion is recognised at the head of the Persian Gulf, on the shores of the Levant, and in the immediate neighbourhood of the Suez Canal'; and it could not be otherwise than 'a matter of extreme solicitude to this country that the Government to which this jurisdiction belongs should be so closely pressed by the political outposts' of the Russian Empire. The whole argument of this famous despatch turned on the hypothesis that the integrity and independence of Turkey were essential to the British Empire, that the integrity of Turkey had been destroyed by the Treaty of San Stefano, and that its independence had been converted into dependence on Russia.[1]

Lord Salisbury's despatch.

The arguments which were embodied in the

[1] The despatch will be found in *Parl. Papers*, 1878, Turkey (No. 25). Prince Gortschakoff's very able reply to it is in *ibid.* (No. 27). M. d'Avril has said, 'On peut dire réellement que, sous l'œil jaloux des Anglais, tout chemin mène à l'Inde. Donc il faut que l'Angleterre domine tout chemin.' *Le Traité de Berlin*, p. 348.

despatch were repeated in even stronger language, a week afterwards, by Lord Beaconsfield in the House of Lords. The Treaty, he said, completely abrogated what was known as Turkey in Europe. It created a large state stretching from the Euxine to the Ægean to be organised, supervised, and for two years garrisoned by Russia. The distant provinces of Thessaly and Epirus were to be taken from the Porte and placed under the administration of Russia. The harbour of Batoum was to become Russian, all the strongholds of Armenia were to be Russian, and the Black Sea was to become as much a Russian lake as the Caspian. Bessarabia, moreover, of which Russia was deprived after the Crimean war, which, in the opinion of Lord Palmerston, involved the freedom of the Danube—that freedom which was the great boast of the Congress of Vienna, and 'almost the only remaining achievement of the Congress'—was to be restored to Russia. In fact, by the Treaty of San Stefano, the Sultan of Turkey was said to have been reduced to a state of absolute subjection to Russia; and it was against an arrangement which practically would 'place under the command of Russia, and Russia alone, that unrivalled situation and its resources' which Europe had entrusted to the Porte, that Lord Beaconsfield and his Cabinet thought it their duty to protest.[1]

Eight days after this fiery blast from the Prime Minister, Parliament adjourned for the Easter recess. The Ministers proposed that, as the Legislature had already sat for three months, it should have an exceptionally long holiday, commencing on the 16th of April and only terminating on the 6th of May. But

[1] *Hansard*, vol. ccxxxix. pp. 769–771.

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it was naturally objected that it was unwise that Parliament should separate, in a period of crisis, for so long a period. If it was justifiable to call Parliament together at an exceptionally early date because of the advance of Russia in the East, it was surely the more unadvisable that Parliament should adjourn for three weeks at a moment when the rupture of negotiations about the Congress, the vote of credit, and the calling out of the Reserves showed that the crisis had become more acute. This objection was partly removed by Sir Stafford Northcote's statement that the Cabinet was actuated by the desire to bring about a satisfactory settlement, that Parliament had again and again approved the steps which the Government had taken with this object, and by his distinct assurance that 'at this moment there is nothing in our policy at all different from that which we have repeatedly declared to the House.'[1] The House, relieved by the satisfactory tone of Sir Stafford Northcote's speech, adjourned for its holiday; and on the following morning the members read in their newspapers that the Government had decided to bring some 7000 native Indian troops from India to Malta.[2]

Indian troops at Malta.

The sensation occasioned by this announcement was not unnatural. Parliament had been suffered to separate on the assurance that there was nothing in the policy of the Ministry different from that which had been already communicated to the Houses; and in the next dozen hours a new policy, obviously fraught with grave matter for consideration, and directly raising constitutional issues of high

[1] *Hansard*, vol. ccxxxix. p. 1391.

[2] Lang, *Life of Northcote*, vol. ii. p. 110

importance, had been sprung upon the nation. Sir Stafford Northcote himself, when he saw the paragraph in the *Times* in the morning, felt that he would be accused of being disingenuous. And it seems clear that, though the Cabinet had arrived, 'in principle,' at the decision to move the troops some time before, Sir Stafford was not aware that the arrangements for their removal were in so forward a state, or were likely to become public property.[1] But when all this has been said, it does not excuse the statement which Sir Stafford made. It was his business, as leader of the House, to know what was going on, and to make no statement which was contrary to the facts. His character, indeed, stood so high that everyone acquitted him of intentionally misleading Parliament; but the fact was none the less certain that he had misled it.[2]

Apart from the personal question created by Sir Stafford Northcote's disingenuous answer, the movement of Indian troops to Europe raised grave issues. Those who shared the Prime Minister's views, and thought that the Treaty of San Stefano was fatal to British interests and British trade, were naturally elated at a policy which showed that Britain could draw on her resources in the East to strengthen her position in the West. These men cheered when a Radical Member of Parliament pointed out that a government which brought 7000 men to Europe one year might bring 250,000 in another.[3] They considered that the weight which the country would thus acquire in the counsels of Europe would more than compensate for the danger to our institutions which

[1] *Hansard*, vol. ccxxxix. p. 1436. *ibid.*, p. 1422.
[2] See Mr. Fawcett's speech, [3] *Ibid.*, p. 1423.

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might result from the presence of a huge and unauthorised standing army in the neighbourhood. Those, on the contrary, who did not share the Prime Minister's alarm, who could not see that the Treaty of San Stefano had made either the Euxine a Russian lake, or Constantinople a Russian dependency, resented the movement of the Indian troops as unnecessary, and deplored it as an infraction both of practice and of law. No mean authority, Lord Selborne, writing, not in the heat of the moment, but in the calm of later years, declared that 'no moveable forces exceeding the number of men voted by the House of Commons for the current year, and covered by the Mutiny and Appropriation Acts, could, without the previous assent in some form or other of Parliament, be lawfully employed or maintained in time of peace elsewhere than in India and for Indian service; and that, under the expressed terms of the Government of India Act, 1858, any use of Indian revenues (which it was in this case proposed to use, at all events temporarily), without the consent of Parliament, for any military operations of Indian troops beyond the frontier of India, was unlawful, except for preventing or repelling an actual invasion of the Queen's Indian possessions or under some other sudden and urgent necessity.'[1]

These technical considerations need not, however, detain the historian. Whether he approve or disapprove the movement of Indian troops in 1878, he will admit that there are occasions when a Ministry is entitled, or even bound, to break the law, with fair reliance, if they have acted for the public good, on

[1] *Memorials, Personal and Political*, vol. i. pp. 451, 452. Lord Selborne's argument at that time is in *Hansard*, vol. ccxl. pp. 187 *seq.* Cf. Lord Cairns's reply, *ibid.*, p. 211.

condonation of the breach and confirmation of their action by Parliament. Apart from the minor question of Sir Stafford Northcote's language, the real question for decision is whether the circumstances of 1878 justified the policy on which the Government decided. If it was really wise to contemplate the possibility of war in order to overthrow the Treaty of San Stefano, a good deal no doubt may be urged in favour of this drastic policy. But while the Opposition was denouncing and the Ministry was defending the movement of the Indian troops, a strange suspicion was gradually arising that the prophets of the Cabinet were prophesying falsely; and that, while the Ministers were declaring that they could not give way, they were secretly making terms with Russia. It was perhaps not unnatural that the new Foreign Secretary should attempt some negotiations with Russian statesmen. The man who had been walking arm-in-arm with General Ignatieff at Constantinople, in the winter of 1876–7, and who had played almost as stout a part as General Ignatieff himself at the Conference, must have seen that his despatch of the 1st April, which all the world was praising, presented the public with only one side of a difficult question. At any rate, on the 27th of May, while the Houses were still debating the many complicated questions connected with the movements of the Indian troops, Sir Stafford Northcote admitted that the prospects of a congress had materially improved,[1] while, three or four days later, a Conservative evening newspaper, availing itself of methods to which newspaper enterprise does not usually stoop, startled its readers by the announcement that Lord Salisbury and Count

[1] *Hansard*, vol. ccxl. p. 748.

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Schouvaloff had come to terms, and that 'we were about to enter the European Congress pledged to concede to Russia the substance of the most important stipulations of the Treaty of San Stefano.'[1] Three days afterwards, on the 3rd of June, Lord Salisbury informed the Lords that the invitation to the Congress had been renewed, and had been accepted by Her Majesty's Government.[2]

Amidst the satisfaction which was generally expressed at the meeting of the Congress, some disquietude was felt at the conditions under which an evening paper had alleged that the Congress would be held. While the air was still ringing with Lord Beaconsfield's denunciation of the terms of San Stefano, the *Globe* was declaring that the Government had conceded almost all the conditions to which they had taken exception. Lord Grey thought, for example, that it was 'too monstrous to be believed' that Her Majesty's Government was quietly consenting to restore Bessarabia (between the Dniester and the Pruth) to Russia,[3] and he asked Lord Salisbury whether there was any truth in the report. Lord Salisbury replied that the statement was 'wholly unauthentic' and 'not deserving of confidence.'[4] And, with this untruth on his lips, he set out in the following week for Berlin.

Meeting of the Berlin Congress.

On the 13th of June the Congress met in Berlin, and on the next day the same evening paper which had already published the substance of the arrangement with Russia produced what purported to be its text. On the following Monday Ministers were naturally again questioned concerning this mysterious

[1] The words are Lord Selborne's, *Memorials, Personal and Political*, vol. i. p. 452.

[2] *Hansard*, vol. ccxl. p. 1055.

[3] Even Mr. Gladstone objected to this part of the Treaty, Morley's *Life of Gladstone*, vol. ii. p. 574.

[4] *Hansard*, vol. ccxl. p. 1061.

agreement, which had fallen like a bombshell on the Conservative camp, and whose effect on Europe had been simply 'portentous.'[1] No longer able to repeat the denial which Lord Salisbury had given, the Duke of Richmond in one House, and Sir S. Northcote in the other, declared that the document had evidently been 'furnished to the journal in which it was published by some person who had access to papers that were confidential. So far as Her Majesty's Government were concerned, the publication of the document was totally unauthorised, and therefore surreptitious; and, as an explanation of the policy of the Government it was incomplete, and therefore inaccurate.'[2] These answers naturally failed to satisfy the legitimate curiosity of either House. The Government, however, declared that it was not in the public interest to say more. They had, nevertheless, to listen to a description of their conduct, which must have been as unpalatable as it was true.

'My Lords, as the matter now stands before the country and the world, England did not enter the Congress of Berlin with free hands. It stands before Europe that England went into that International Assembly with a contract which, in the main, abandoned some of the most important points which I, and some other members of your Lordships' House, considered it to be the duty of the Government of this country to maintain.'[3] Eight years before, Lord Granville had been blamed for entering the Conference of London, though he was successful in making even Russia repeat the shibboleth that she entered it with no foregone conclusion. In 1878 Lord Salisbury and

[1] Lord Houghton's phrase in *Hansard*, vol. ccxl. p. 1571.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 1569, 1614.

[3] Lord Houghton in *ibid.*, p. 1571.

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Lord Beaconsfield entered the Congress of Berlin with the knowledge that, so far as they were concerned, they had nothing to contest, for the conclusion was foregone.

In these circumstances history need not occupy itself with the proceedings at Berlin. The story that Lord Beaconsfield convinced Russia that he was in earnest by ordering a special train to carry him back home may be perfectly true. But a theatrical display of this character could have had no effect on the Russian plenipotentiary, who had in his pocket the agreement which had been concluded between Lord Salisbury and himself. So far as Asia was concerned, Russia retained the port of Batoum and the fortresses of Kars and Ardahan, which had been acquired by the Treaty of San Stefano, but she surrendered a portion of the adjacent district, through which the caravan road from Trebizond to Tabriz ran.[1] So far as Europe was concerned, the treaty confirmed the retrocession of Bessarabia to Russia in exchange for the Dobrudja. It recognised the independence of Montenegro and Servia, and the rectification of their frontiers. It invited the Sublime Porte to arrange with Greece for a rectification of frontiers in Thessaly and Epirus, and it provided that, if they were unable to agree, the six great powers should offer their mediation to facilitate the negotiations.[2] It declined to revise the indemnity which, in the Treaty of San Stefano, Turkey had undertaken to pay. But the new treaty accepted a declaration from Russia that she would not 'seek to annex territory in satisfaction' of payment, and that it

Treaty of Berlin.

[1] Cf. Art. LVIII. and LX. Treaty of Berlin, *Parl. Papers*, 1878 (No. 38), p. 30, with Lord Salisbury's despatch, *ibid.* (No. 39), p. 3.

[2] See Protocol No. 13 of the Congress, and Art. XXIV. of the Treaty.

should not be preferred to debts guaranteed by other powers, or debts to which Turkish revenues had been hypothecated.[1] In all these respects the arrangements of San Stefano were practically confirmed at Berlin. But two important alterations were introduced into the Treaty of San Stefano. The administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina was handed over to Austria,[2] and Bulgaria was divided into two parts—one, north of the Balkans, to be styled Bulgaria, which was made an autonomous principality, paying tribute to the Porte; the other south of the Balkans, which was called Eastern Roumelia,[3] was more circumscribed than the Bulgaria of the treaty, and was to be governed by a governor-general named by the Sublime Porte, with the consent of the powers; while the governor-general was to have the right of summoning the Ottoman troops in the event of the internal or external security of the provinces being threatened.

The policy on which this country insisted at Berlin—or, to speak more fairly, which it had arranged with Russia should be adopted at Berlin—must be justified or condemned by this portion of the treaty. In all other respects the treaty—bad or good—was just as bad or good as the Treaty of San Stefano. The differences between the two treaties were not large enough to justify the movement of a regiment or even the ink of a despatch. But, so far as Bulgaria was concerned, there was a striking difference between the two treaties. It was asserted

[1] See Lord Salisbury's despatch, *Parl. Papers*, 1879 (No. 38), p. 2.

[2] Art. XXV. of Treaty. I have not thought it necessary to enter into the arrangements which it is believed were concluded between Russia and Austria before the war. See on this point Rose, *Development of the European Nations*, p. 180.

[3] See Articles XIV. *seq.*

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that the Treaty of Berlin restored to Turkey 30,000 square miles of territory and 2,500,000 people. But these figures can only be made good if Bosnia and Herzegovina are omitted from the comparison,[1] and if it is assumed that Eastern Roumelia is included in the territory which was restored to the dominion of the Turk.

The Berlin Treaty reviewed.

The odd thing, however, which at once strikes any intelligent critic of the Treaty of Berlin is that either Lord Beaconsfield or Lord Salisbury should have supposed that the arrangement which they had thus made could by any possibility endure. If they had condescended to pay attention to the teachings of history they might have been saved from a policy which was obviously impracticable. For the determination of Lord Beaconsfield to divorce the Bulgarians of Bulgaria from the Bulgarians of Eastern Roumelia recalls the decision of Lord Palmerston, twelve years before, to separate Wallachia from Moldavia; and the disastrous consequences of Lord Palmerston's attempt, which brought this country to the verge of a rupture with France, ought to have saved the Ministers of 1878 from a similar act of folly. The famous decision of Berlin to set asunder provinces which desired union was not, in fact, much more lasting than the policy of Lord Palmerston. In 1885, with no bloodshed, without disorder, the bantling which had been conceived at Berlin, and

[1] It is very doubtful whether even then Lord Beaconsfield's figures can stand. Madame Novikoff showed that half-free Eastern Roumelia contained 746,000, re-enslaved Bulgaria 1,467,000 inhabitants, 35 per cent. of the former and 40 per cent. of the latter being Mussulmans (*Russia and England*, p. 119). Madame Novikoff has also shown that the Bulgaria of San Stefano corresponds much more closely than the Bulgaria of Berlin with the Bulgaria of the Constantinople Conference.

which Lord Beaconsfield had desired should be christened Eastern Roumelia,[1] quietly proclaimed its union with Bulgaria, and Prince Alexander of Bulgaria, the nephew of the Emperor Alexander II., accepted the union. The great powers of Europe professed themselves scandalised at the youngest little principality on the Continent almost contemptuously disregarding the decision of Europe. But this country neither moved a sepoy from India nor sent a frigate to the Dardanelles to enforce the principle that what Europe has laid down Europe alone could alter. On the contrary, though Lord Salisbury was in office, England, under his guidance, supported the union which the same Lord Salisbury had been at such pains to dissolve; and Russia, discontented with Prince Alexander's conduct, was left alone to record her protest against it. The Lord Salisbury of 1885 was, indeed, at special pains to prove the mistake which the Lord Salisbury of 1878 had made.

'Every week's experience,' so he wrote, 'showed that the Porte had little to dread from the subserviency of Bulgaria to foreign influence if only Bulgaria were allowed enjoyment of her unanimous desires, and the Porte did not gratuitously place itself in opposition to the general feeling of the people. A Bulgaria, friendly to the Porte, and jealous of foreign influence, would be a far surer bulwark against foreign aggression than two Bulgarias, severed in administration, but united in considering the Porte as the only obstacle to the national development.'[2]

[1] One of the extraordinary fancies of Lord Beaconsfield at Berlin was that, by calling South Bulgaria Eastern Roumelia, he could prevent the 'constant intriguing to bring about a union of the two provinces,' which would otherwise, he foresaw, take place. *Collected Speeches*, vol. ii. p. 184.

[2] *Parl. Papers*, 1886, Turkey (No. 1), p. 424. Cf. Rose, *Development of European Nations*, p. 273.

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A sound conclusion, but a conclusion which would have saved much embarrassment if Lord Salisbury had impressed it on his chief in 1878.

The Treaty of Berlin, however, had done something more than separate Bulgaria of the north from Bulgaria of the south; it had conveniently excluded Macedonia from the Bulgaria of San Stefano. That province was left under the heel of the Turk, though the Porte undertook to introduce reforms, similar to those which had been applied to Crete, into the administration of the province.[1] It is hardly necessary to say that the reforms which the Porte had thus promised to introduce were never initiated, and that Macedonia remained the victim of misgovernment and a menace to the peace of Europe. The one condition in which the treaty of Berlin permanently and materially differed from the Treaty of San Stefano, was a condition which, a quarter of a century afterwards, every sensible person was disposed to deplore. For the man who could then prefer the condition of Macedonia to the condition of Bulgaria must have been prepared to prefer plunder to prosperity and carnage to content.

Thus the student who will carefully compare the provisions of the Treaty of San Stefano with those of the treaty of Berlin, will perhaps be disposed to regard the latter as one of the great surrenders of history, confirming as it did the arrangements against which this country had protested, and introducing alterations which were either not destined to endure, or which a later generation would almost unanimously condemn. It is fair, however, to recollect that the Government, at the opening of the Congress, had

[1] Art. XXIII. of Treaty.

assured Parliament that the compromise which it had made with Russia presented only an incomplete and therefore inaccurate statement of their policy. The summer of 1878 was destined to be fertile in surprises, and the astonishment which was felt at the awkward and unauthorised publication of the compromise with Russia was increased by the news that another treaty had been concluded between Turkey and this country. This treaty was signed on the 4th of June, nine days before the meeting of the Congress at Berlin. It had one merit, it was very short. It declared that if Batoum, Ardahan, Kars, or any of them, should be retained by Russia, and if any attempt at any future time should be made by Russia to take possession of any further territories of his Imperial Majesty the Sultan in Asia, England engaged to join his Imperial Majesty the Sultan in defending them by force of arms. 'In return, the Sultan promises to England to introduce necessary reforms, to be agreed upon later between the two powers, into the government and for the protection of the Christian and other subjects of the Porte in those territories; and in order to enable England to make necessary provisions for executing her engagement, his Imperial Majesty the Sultan further consents to assign the island of Cyprus to be occupied and administered by England.'[1]

The Cyprus Convention.

The Anglo-Turkish Treaty.

Guarantees are always obnoxious to the objection that they profess to decide beforehand what a country will do in circumstances which cannot be foreseen. Guarantees of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire are

Objections to the Convention.

[1] The treaty was followed up by another treaty of the 1st of July, providing for the evacuation of Cyprus in the event of Russia restoring Kars and her other Armenian conquests to Turkey. *State Papers*, vol. lxix. pp. 744–748.

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open to the further objection that experience, both in 1871 and 1876, has shown that they are incapable of redemption. But the guarantee of the 4th June 1878 was open to the criticism that its fulfilment depended on the introduction of necessary reforms, and there was about as much chance of such reforms being undertaken in Asiatic Turkey as of the sun again standing still in Gibeon and the moon in the valley of Ajalon. The district, in fact, which Lord Beaconsfield undertook to protect against further Russian encroachment, was the unhappy country destined before the nineteenth century was closed to be the scene of a massacre which recalled all the worst incidents of the Bulgarian atrocities; and this massacre could not have occurred if Lord Beaconsfield had insisted on good administration as the price of the guarantee which he recklessly gave.

But there was another and more striking objection to the Convention. Lord Beaconsfield was declaring that every article in the Treaty of San Stefano must be submitted to a Congress, in order that Europe might decide how far all or each of them required European sanction, but he was simultaneously concluding with Turkey a convention which he had no intention of submitting to Europe. At the same moment he was asserting a great principle by his policy, and destroying the same principle by his example.

Lord Beaconsfield and Cyprus.

Cyprus, however, still remained as the outward and visible sign of Lord Beaconsfield's triumph; and Cyprus was regarded by his followers, the majority of whom could not have accurately described either its situation or its history, as a position of infinite strength and of varied resources. In his youth Lord

Beaconsfield had declared that the English wanted Cyprus and would take it for compensation. The English would not do the business of the Turks again for nothing.[1] In his age Lord Beaconsfield reverted to the idea of his youth, and argued that Cyprus would be no burden to this country, and that it had been selected as a strong place of arms whose possession would prevent the adequate army of an enemy from marching through the passes of Asia Minor and Persia and menacing the dominions of the Queen.[2] An ordinary critic, not endowed with Lord Beaconsfield's imagination, finds it difficult to imagine how the possession of an island in the Gulf of Scanderoon could possibly influence the march of an army through the passes of the Lebanon or the valley of the Euphrates. But, as a matter of fact, no steps were taken either by Lord Beaconsfield or by any of his successors to make the island the place of arms which he declared it was to become. The resources of the island were not much more profitable. Lord Beaconsfield's admirers at the time spoke of it as a place which afforded endless opportunities for the investment of British capital and the reception of the British emigrant. There was almost as much faith in London in the potentialities of Cyprus, as (in the most delightful of Mr. Disraeli's romances) there had been faith in the great city of Hubbabub in the potentialities of the Island of Fantaisie. The people under Lord Beaconsfield's inspiration might have been almost inclined to cry 'England and Cyprus,' just as the citizens of Hubbabub had shouted 'Vraibleusia and Fantaisie against the world.'

Cyprus.

[1] *Tancred*, pp. 237–8.

[2] According to Lord Beaconsfield's biographer, Mr. Hitchman, what he said concerning Cyprus deserves to be remembered. *Life of Lord Beaconsfield*, p. 552.

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Cyprus and Vraibleusia.

In the romance, 'before the president and governor and deputy-governor and storekeepers had embarked,[1] the Vraibleusian journals, who thought that the public had been satiated with congratulations on the Colonial System, detected that the present colony was a job.' In the reality, it took the British people a little longer to discover that the new island did not even pay its way. With a magnificent contempt for wealth, Lord Beaconsfield had provided that his Imperial Majesty the Sultan, who was affirming his desire 'of extending and strengthening the relations of friendship,'[2] should not pecuniarily suffer from the British occupation of the island. He arranged, therefore, that the Sultan should receive the revenues which his officers had hitherto succeeded in extracting by Turkish methods from an impoverished people. The remains of the revenue were quite insufficient to pay the cost of the expensive establishment—a high commissioner, a commander of the forces, a chief secretary, a receiver-general, a chief justice, a puisne judge, a Queen's advocate—with which, in strict accordance with the precedent in the romance, the Colonial Office thought it necessary to equip its latest acquisition. No one, in fact, gained except the Sultan, who found the British Government acting as his tax-gatherer. At last a Chancellor of the Exchequer had the sense to recollect that, while he was paying over a large sum to the Sultan, the Sultan was neglecting to provide the interest of the loan which had been guaranteed by France and England during the Crimean war. He accordingly determined to intercept the Cyprus tribute for the pur-

[1] In the romance this great establishment was sent, not to Fantaisie, but to a still stranger island which the Private Secretary thought he had discovered.

[2] The words are the words of the Preamble to the Convention. *State Papers*, vol. lxix. p. 744.

pose of satisfying the Turkish creditors. And thenceforward, though the revenues of Cyprus continued insufficient to meet the expenses of its government, they provided means for meeting another burden which the necessities or the dishonesty of the Porte had thrown on the British taxpayer.[1]

Views of France.

One other result of the annexation of Cyprus remains for record. Aimed at Russia, it was regarded as unpalatable in France. Lord Salisbury, in communicating the convention to the French Government, tried to make it appear as an example of British moderation. Her Majesty's Government had been 'repeatedly pressed' to occupy Egypt, or at least the borders of the Suez Canal. They had likewise been recommended to occupy some part of the coast of Syria, such as Alexandretta. But they had turned 'a deaf ear' to such suggestions, and had contented themselves with temporarily occupying Cyprus until such time as Russian statesmen should satisfy themselves that the territory which they had acquired was costly and unproductive, and should abandon it 'as a useless acquisition.' But the recital of this moderation did not entirely satisfy the susceptibilities of France. She, on the contrary, was touched to the heart by the fear that her special interests in the Levant would be compromised by the action of the British Government. The surprise and uneasiness which had been created in France were, so her Minister affirmed, partially allayed by Lord Salisbury's explanations.[2] But they were probably more

[1] In *Popanilla*, storekeepers were sent out without stores; stores were sent out to Cyprus without storekeepers. Mr. Childers found them, in 1880, when he visited the island, rotting on the ground. *Life of Childers*, vol. i. pp. 284–288.

[2] *State Papers*, vol. lxix. pp. 1345, 1348.

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effectually set at rest by the assurance, which she had received in Berlin, that French predominance in Tunis would not be unfavourably regarded by Great Britain;[1] and, by the advice of Prince Bismarck, that Austria should occupy Bosnia, France Tunis, and England Egypt. For—and it is satisfactory to see that one man in Europe understood the situation—'a gradual dismemberment of the Turkish Empire is the only pacific solution of the Eastern Question.'[2]

Results of the Berlin Treaty.

As the direct result of the Treaty of Berlin, the population of European Turkey had been reduced from some seventeen or eighteen to some six millions of people. Even Mr. Gladstone had hardly contemplated so large a beneficial result when he had urged that the Zaptiehs and the Mudirs, the Bimbashis and the Yugbashis, with their Kaimakams and their Pashas, should clear out, one and all, bag and baggage, from Bulgaria.[3] But the indirect results were even larger. Cyprus, Tunis and Egypt were removed from Turkish rule. These great changes were effected, or were shortly to be effected, with the best consequences to the happiness of mankind and the peace of Europe. But the strange thing about the Treaty of Berlin is that the Ministers, who had opposed almost every one of its provisions, declared that they had secured 'peace with honour,' and deluded themselves by believing, or inducing their fellow-countrymen to believe, that these things had been done in the name of the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire.

[1] See, *inter alia*, *Encyclopædia Britannica*, Supplement to the IXth edition, *sub verbo* Tunis; and cf. Rose, *The Development of the European Nations*, p. 328.

[2] *Life of Lord Granville*, vol. i. p. 273.

[3] *Bulgarian Horrors*, p. 61. For the statistics of population quoted in the text, see Mr. Gladstone's speech, *Hansard*, vol. ccxlii. p. 672 h.

For it was the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire at which the Government professed to aim; and it was the partition of Turkey which they claimed to have prevented. They persuaded themselves, or at any rate they endeavoured to persuade the public, that a policy which had given Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria, Thessaly to Greece, Cyprus to Great Britain, an important tract of Armenia to Russia, which had enlarged the boundaries of Servia and Montenegro, which had created Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia, and which had provided for the ultimate separation of Egypt and Tunis, was not partition.[1] When the Congress at Berlin had defined the limits of the New Bulgaria, Prince Bismarck had thrown out the correct, and possibly sarcastic, observation that European Turkey once more exists.[2] The modern student, who recollects that Eastern Roumelia has long since been absorbed in the Bulgaria from which Lord Beaconsfield tried to divorce her, may be disposed to think that European Turkey still exists. Perhaps even, if at some future day Bulgaria should enlarge her boundaries by including all the districts which San Stefano allotted to her, some future statesman may say, with equal truth, Turkey in Europe still exists.

Partition of Turkey.

If Turkey in Europe still existed, the policy of April had disappeared in July. The object to which the Government professed to attach importance when

[1] 'My Lords, in consequence of that arrangement'—the occupation of Bosnia by Austria—'cries have been raised against our partition of Turkey. My Lords, our object has been directly the reverse. Our object has been to prevent partition.' *Lord Beaconsfield's Selected Speeches*, vol. ii. p. 188.

[2] 'My Lords, when the line of the Balkans was carried—and it was not carried until after long and agitating discussions—it was said by that illustrious statesman who presided over our labours, that Turkey in Europe once more exists.' *Ibid.*, p. 193.

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they called out the Reserves was dismissed as unimportant when they came into Congress. Lord Beaconsfield has conferred a debt on the whole English-speaking world by conferring on it some of the most delightful literature in the language. But in the realm of his romance there is nothing more romantic than his two speeches in the House of Lords which preceded and succeeded his mission to Berlin. An interval of one hundred days separates the two in point of time. The distance which separates them in argument is not to be expressed by the cyphers in which unimaginative man notes the immensities of time and space.

Lord Beaconsfield's two speeches.

In the earlier of the two speeches Lord Beaconsfield declared that the Treaty of San Stefano abolished the dominion of the Ottoman Empire in Europe, and abrogated what is known as Turkey in Europe. The Treaty of Berlin restored Macedonia to the Turk, but it handed over Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria. The balance of gain and loss was not very material, yet the later of the two speeches claimed that Turkey in Europe continued to exist. The speech of April declared that San Stefano had made the Black Sea as much a Russian lake as the Caspian. 'The harbour of Batoum,[1] which is still in possession of the Porte, is seized by Russia; all the strongholds in Armenia are seized by Russia.' At Berlin these arrangements were confirmed. But in the July speech, Russia naturally expected to find some reward in her conquests in Armenia for the sacrifices which she had made. 'Well, my Lords, consider

[1] In Lord Salisbury's despatch of the 1st April, on which the speech of the 8th of April is founded, Batoum is spoken of as 'the important harbour of Batoum.' *Parl. Papers*, 1878, Turkey (No. 25), p. 4.

what these conquests are. There was the strong fort of Kars. . . . Three times has Russia captured Kars. Three times, either by our influence or other influences, it has been restored to Turkey. Were we to go to war for Kars, and restore it to Turkey, and then to wait till the next misunderstanding between Russia and Turkey, when Kars would have been taken again? . . . Then, my Lords, look at the case of Batoum.[1] . . . Let us see what is this Batoum of which you have heard so much. It is generally spoken of in society and the world as if it were a sort of Portsmouth, whereas, in reality, it should be rather compared with Cowes. It will hold three considerable ships, and if it were packed like the London Docks it might hold six; but in that case the danger if the wind blew from the north would be immense.' In April, again, Lord Beaconsfield had laid particular stress on the retrocession of Bessarabia. 'It is not a matter of trifling or local interest which is at stake. The clause in the Treaty of Paris with regard to the cession of Bessarabia was one on which Lord Palmerston placed the utmost stress and to which he attached the very greatest importance. . . . The Congress of Paris was nearly breaking up because of the efforts made not to have that article carried into effect.' But in the July speech Bessarabia occupies quite another position. It is only incidentally referred to as 'a very small portion of territory, occupied by 130,000 inhabitants.'

In the famous speech in which he apologised for his conduct on the Reform Bill of 1867, Lord

[1] M. d'Avril, who—unlike Lord Beaconsfield—knows what he is talking about, calls Batoum 'le seul bon port sur la côte sud-orientale de la Mer Noire.' *Le Traité de Berlin*, p. 260.

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What might have been.

Beaconsfield had declared that he 'had to prepare the mind of his country, he had to educate his party.'[1] In the hundred days which elapsed between his two speeches in 1878, or rather in the shorter interval between the 8th of April 1878, the date of the first of these speeches, and the 3rd of June, when the invitation to the Congress was finally accepted, Lord Beaconsfield accomplished the far harder task of educating himself. He unlearned all that he thought he had established as true about Turkey itself, and about Kars, Bessarabia, and Batoum, and he learned a great deal about these places which was not to be discovered from the ordinary text-books. If he had secured leisure to pursue his studies a little further it is possible he might have ascertained from the teachings of history that he could not possibly divorce the Bulgaria of the north from the Bulgaria of the south by the childish device of giving it a new name.[2] He might have learned from the lessons of geography that the occupation of Cyprus could not control the caravan road between Trebizond and Tabriz. The historian, however, who rejoices that Lord Beaconsfield learned so much, has no right to complain that in so few weeks he did not learn more. If it were, indeed, legitimate even to speculate on what might have been, he would be disposed to regret that the information which Lord Beaconsfield acquired in June he had not obtained in the previous February. For if in February Lord Beaconsfield had realised that the

[1] *Selected Speeches*, vol. ii. p. 479.

[2] 'At one time it was proposed by some to call it South Bulgaria; but it was manifest that with such a name there would be constant intriguing between it and North Bulgaria to bring about a union between the two provinces.' *Lord Beaconsfield's Collected Speeches*, vol. ii. p. 184.

exclusion of the Turk from two thirds of European Turkey was not an act of partition; that Bessarabia was only a very small portion of territory, occupied by 130,000 inhabitants; that Kars was a fortress which Russia had already taken three times, and was certain to take again; and that the important harbour of Batoum would hold only three considerable ships—what evils, what dangers, what anxieties might have been avoided! The Cabinet might have remained compact; the Reserves might have been left to fulfil their domestic duties at home; the British fleet might have neither passed nor repassed—nor passed or repassed again—the Straits of the Dardanelles; the Indian Sepoys might not have been brought to Malta; the Exchanges of Europe might not have been perturbed by rumours of war; and the people might have joined their chosen Minister in congratulating themselves on the excellent arrangements which had been made at San Stefano, and which were happily to be sanctioned at Berlin.[1]

[1] 'Ma conviction est qu'en contribuant, en 1828, à l'affranchissement des Grecs, les Anglais ont fait les affaires de l'Angleterre. En s'acharnant, en 1876, contre l'affranchissement des Bulgares, le Ministère Tory faisait les affaires de la Russie.' D'Avril, *Le Traité de Berlin*, p. 158.



CHAPTER XIX.

RITUAL AND RELIGION.

The position of the English Church in the middle of the nineteenth century.

THOSE who have floated down some broad estuary to the ocean may have noticed that, while the tide is bearing them to the sea, some contrary current here and there is making towards the land. If they happen to be caught by these chance eddies they may mistake the backwater for the stream, and fancy even that the tide is still flowing, which has long commenced to ebb. This image—if imagery be permissible—may help to illustrate the position of the English Church in the middle of the nineteenth century. The revelations of geology, the discoveries of science, the studies of scholars, the teaching of philosophers had loosened 'the ark of the covenant' from its ancient moorings. It was slowly drifting from the safe harbour, where authority had sheltered it from the blasts of criticism, to some unknown and some unfathomed sea. But while the vessel of the Church was 'driving adrift'—while it might be said of her inmates, 'and whither, they wot not who make thither'—some of its crew, embarked in one of her skiffs, had been caught by a chance and superficial eddy and had been borne backwards to the haven. Noticing their own progress they fancied that they had found a path on which the ark itself might be steered back to the

protection of authority They failed—they may be pardoned for failing—to distinguish the great from the little, the accidental from the real; they knew not that the mighty tide, in which their own back-water was an eddy, was bearing them slowly but irresistibly to the unknown.[1]

Metaphors apart, the great question before the religious world in the middle of the nineteenth century was the possibility of maintaining religion as Christianity had maintained it before the inroads of science. Astronomy, in the two preceding centuries, had enlarged the ideas of space and had degraded this little planet from the position which authority had assigned to it as the centre of the universe. Geology in the nineteenth century was enlarging the ideas of time, and showing that a period, covering tens of thousands of years, must be substituted for the brief interval which separated us from the 23rd October, 4004 B.C.—the day on which the then Vice-Chancellor of Cambridge, at the end of the seventeenth century, had authoritatively declared that man had been created. Evolution had already insisted that the great changes of the past were not to be 'explained as catastrophes followed by successive creations,[2] but as the product of the continuous play of forces still at work.' It was on the eve of announcing that man himself had no separate origin, but was derived, through various and minute changes, effected in millions of years, from some primitive form common to all life. In the presence of such mighty problems as these which were then

[1] *Warfare of Science with Theology*, vol. i. p. 256.

[2] The words are taken from Mr. Brodrick, in the *Political History of England*, vol. xi. p. 428.

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presented to the religious world, the questions which were agitating the Church—the vestments which its ministers should wear, the exact places at which they should stand in their ministrations—seemed to the ordinary mind mere trappings and fringes, of little or no importance. What could God Himself think if, when the whole revelation which His devout followers had attributed to Him was in question, they were wrangling over the colour of a garb or the posture of a minister?

It is, indeed, fair to recollect that the men who originated the Oxford Movement, and whose successors roused the animosity of the people by the introduction of those practices into the services of the Church, were actuated in the first instance by a not unnatural desire to defend the Church from the double attack which was directed against its spiritual and temporal position. Cardinal Newman always dated the Oxford Movement from the sermon which Mr. Keble preached at Oxford in July 1832, on national apostasy[1]; and the motive which inspired this sermon was the proposed suppression of certain Irish bishoprics by Lord Grey's Government. But if the promoters of the Oxford Movement were anxious to defend the Church, they saw, or thought

[1] See *History of England*, vol. v. p. 274. In that passage I endeavoured to deal with the main features of the Oxford Movement. In this chapter I am only anxious to point out the connection between the Oxford Movement and Ritualism. For Keble's sermon see Mr. Benn's severe criticism in *Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century*, pp. 350, 351. Mr. Benn goes on to point out that the time was coming when Keble was to support a far more sweeping measure of disestablishment and disendowment. I assume that he alludes to Mr. Keble's reply to Cardinal Newman on Mr. Gladstone's intention to disestablish the Irish Church—'And is not that just?' See *Life of Pusey*, vol. iv. p. 111; a remark made at Hursley on the occasion when Newman, Pusey, and Keble met almost by accident.

they saw, that its reform was indispensable to its defence. The seven or eight thousand clergymen who, in the early days of the Oxford Movement, signed an address to the Archbishop of Canterbury, insisting upon the necessity of restoring Church discipline, maintaining Church principles, and checking the progress of Latitudinarianism,[1] were largely actuated by a desire to uphold the authority of the Prayer Book. It was just as certain to them then that the clergy were disobeying the clear directions of the Prayer Book as it is plain to the ordinary man now that the Ritualists are disregarding the rubrics. The Prayer Book, for example, had directed that every priest and deacon should say daily morning and evening prayer either privately or openly, and that every curate ministering in the parish church or chapel, 'being at home and not being otherwise reasonably hindered,' should say the same in the parish church or chapel where he ministered. But it was notorious that the parish church was uniformly closed from Sunday to Sunday, and that the curate, who was, perhaps, out shooting with the squire or following the hounds, or fishing some favourite stream, paid no regard to this order. The Prayer Book had directed that in cathedrals and chapter churches the Holy Communion should be administered on every Sunday and holy day, and that every member of the chapter should communicate; and it was notorious that this rule was commonly disregarded. The Prayer Book had directed that every parishioner should communicate three times a year, and there were many rural parishes in which the

The laxity of the clergy.

[1] Brodrick, *Political History of England*, vol. xi. p. 337; cf. *Life of Pusey*, vol. i. p. 268.

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Communion was not administered more than three times annually. The Prayer Book had enjoined the observance of certain festivals and fasts, and, incredible as it may seem, there were parishes in which neither Christmas Day nor Good Friday was celebrated.[1] The Prayer Book was silent on any change of vestment by the minister during any portion of the service, and every clergyman in England was in the habit of taking off his white surplice and putting on a black gown when he went from the Communion Table to the pulpit to preach his hebdomadal sermon. The Prayer Book had directed that when there was no Communion the prayer for the Church militant should be read, and when there was no Communion it was almost invariably omitted.

The views of the 'Broad' Church.

Lax as the practice of the Church already was, many of its more active members were in favour of increasing laxity. It was asserted that some of the bishops were in favour of changes in the Prayer Book. Pamphlets recommended that the creeds should no longer be recited in public worship; everything was to be done, or to be undone, which would facilitate the return of the Nonconformist flocks into the fold

[1] See the charge of Horsley, Bishop of Rochester in 1800: 'There can be no excuse for the neglect of the feast of our Lord's Nativity, and the stated fasts of Ash Wednesday and Good Friday even in the smallest country parishes.' And again: 'Four celebrations in the year are the very fewest that ought to be allowed in the very smallest parishes.' I owe my knowledge of this charge to the present Archbishop of Canterbury's admirable evidence before the Royal Commission on Ecclesiastical Discipline. See his answer to Question 12855. When Dr. Arnold went to Rugby he found that the Communion was only administered four times annually; Stanley's *Life of Arnold*, vol. i. p. 156.

In the second Report of the Ritual Commission of 1867, p. 298, it is incidentally stated that at the end of the eighteenth century the observance of Good Friday had almost ceased in England. Its observance was revived in 1777 by Archbishop Cornwallis and Bishop Porteus, of London, and its revival produced 'inconceivable clamour, uproar, and rage.'

of the Establishment. With such men as Dr. Arnold the Church was not the clergy, but the brotherhood of Christians in the nation. Questions relating to Church government and ritual were to be decided by the whole community being Christians.[1] Each particular church was an authority to the members of that church, and traditions were only corruptions, more or less ancient, and more or less mischievous, of the true Christianity of the Scriptures.

The views of the 'High' Church.

The position assumed by the leaders of the Oxford Movement was the exact reverse of this. With them episcopacy was a Divine institution absolutely necessary for salvation. Communion with a non-episcopal Church was anathema. Ordination had come down, in unbroken succession, through the Apostles, from Christ Himself; and though the Church of England had separated from the Church of Rome—or, as some enthusiasts would have said, the Church of Rome had separated itself from the primitive Church—the validity of orders in both Churches was equally assured. The government of the Church, from that standpoint, naturally rested with the bishops; but the bishop delegated to the priest some of his more important functions. The ordinary parish priest, in administering the sacrament of Baptism, was working the miracle of washing away sins. In the sacrament of the Lord's Supper he was working the greater miracle of securing 'the Blessed Presence of Christ Himself'[2] with the elements on the altar. But the ordinary parish priest was not merely invested with the power of working these great and

[1] See for this paragraph Church's *Oxford Movement*, pp. 6, 7; *Life of Pusey*, vol. i. p. 265.

[2] The phrase is Dr. Pusey's.

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almost incredible miracles: he was also endowed with the actual power of remitting sins and of absolving men from sin. Some men, indeed, taught that confession, with its attendant absolution, should only be used in rare and exceptional circumstances. Others made it the indispensable support of a Christian life. But whether they were in favour of its habitual or its occasional use, no one connected with the Oxford Movement had any doubt that the Prayer Book had recommended confession, and had invested the priest with the power of absolving the penitent, after confession, from his sins.

Thus, between the men who were respectively labelled High and Low Church, the gulf was very great. For with one set of men the clergyman was a priest; baptism a new birth; the Lord's Supper a sacrifice, and the Communion Table an altar. With the other set the clergyman was a minister, baptism a symbol, the Lord's Supper a memorial service, the Communion Table the table on which the memorial feast was served. It followed that, while with one set of men the government of the Church was vested in the sacerdotal order, with the other set of men the clergy were merged in the general body of the faithful who comprised and constituted the Church.

These views reflected in Church architecture and Church ritual.

Holding these different views, it was natural that they should endeavour to give expression to them in the churches where the people met, and which they used in the worship of God. With the Low Church all that was necessary was some convenient building large enough to contain the congregation of the parish. All unnecessary ornaments were discarded, or at any rate disliked, as tending to illustrate the doctrines to which their brethren of the

High Church were committed. But with the High Church the church was the building in which the faithful were periodically collected to contemplate a stupendous miracle, and to assist at a tremendous sacrifice: the chancel was the holy of holies, sanctified by the Blessed Presence of Christ Himself at every celebration of the Holy Communion. The clergyman was the priest—far more powerful than were Aaron and his successors—whose prayers and whose actions could secure this presence at every parish church on every occasion on which the Lord's Supper was administered.

If these views were correct it followed, almost logically, that the chancel, in which Christ was pleased to vouchsafe His Presence, that the altar, on which the sublime sacrifice was made, and that the clergyman who was the officiating and miracle-working priest, should be invested with every distinction that could illustrate the significance of the service. The chancel, separated from the church, should be the most beautiful part of the building; the Communion Table, which the Prayer Book had enjoined should be of wood and movable, should be replaced by a stone and immovable altar; and the clergyman, at any rate in the act of celebration, should be attired in vestments worthy of the sanctity of the rite and the greatness of the miracle.

Unluckily the whole tendency of English thought had discouraged art both in private and public buildings. Under the influence of an inartistic and careless generation nothing was done to make the church beautiful or its services attractive. The buildings, which had been handed down from our forefathers, were indeed in many cases notable

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examples of Early English architecture. The purity of earlier ages had made the parish church—like the urban minster—the noblest building in the locality; and many an English village possessed a House of God where the proportions, the columns, the sculpture, the tracery in the windows and the vaulted roof exhibited, in miniature, all the characteristics of the cathedral. But nothing had been done to preserve, and much had been done to destroy the finer features of the edifice. The Puritans had broken the stained glass windows and ruthlessly destroyed the sculptured tombs; their descendants, still imbued with the feelings of Puritanism, had covered up any mural decorations with a thick coat of whitewash. The vaulted roof had been concealed with a flat white ceiling. The whole design of the church had been hidden by the erection throughout its whole body of vast pews in which the families of the richer members of the congregation were accommodated. The ideas which such men as Calvin had introduced into Christianity were dissociated from beauty, and opposed to decoration. In their eyes a crucifix was a symbol of idolatry.

The churches and the separation of classes in church.

If the venerable buildings which had been erected by the piety of a previous age had been in many cases disfigured, the new churches which had been erected in the nineteenth century to meet the requirements of an increasing population were plain unpretentious buildings. The exterior, in the shape of a barn, was hardly relieved by the square tower in which the bell or bells, primarily intended to summon the parishioners to church, but frequently used for secular purposes, were placed. Inside any attempt at ornament was sternly repressed. There was, in many cases, no

chancel. A portion of the east end was surrounded by a wooden rail, inside which the Communion Table was placed. In the centre of the church the pulpit, the reading desk, and the clerk's seat rose one above another towards the roof like some great 'three-decker,' the word which was commonly applied to the structure. The squire and his family were accommodated in a square pew, furnished in some cases with the comforts of a drawing-room, surrounded by wooden walls, on the top of which were curtains to prevent any curious parishioners from watching the great man and his surroundings. Other pews, equally high, but not equally large, were assigned to the wealthier members of the flock. The poor were stowed away in inconvenient corners on less pretentious benches where their conduct could be closely watched by their more fortunate neighbours. If the piety of some former parishioner had endowed the village with a school, the children were marshalled to a remote gallery, where, dressed in some quaint livery, the fashion of a previous age, they bore the marks of their own dependence and testified to the charity of their benefactor. Class was separated from class with as much care as in a modern railway train. On those occasions when the Holy Communion was administered, precedence in going to the table was observed almost as rigidly as in going down to the dining-room at a London dinner-table. A poor man who had ventured on going up to the rails before his richer neighbour had communicated would not be ordering himself 'lowly and reverently' before all his betters. Whatever prospects of equality might be held out to the faithful in heaven, there was no approach to equality among the faithful in church on earth.

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A church thus planned, a congregation thus carefully separated into classes, was naturally cold. Its coldness was not relieved by any of the simpler decorations. At Christmas, indeed, the pulpit, the reading-desk, and possibly the lamps on the high pews, were decorated with holly; at harvest festivals a few sheaves of wheat were placed in some conspicuous position to bring home to the parishioners the reason for these thanksgivings. But usually on Sundays no flowers were admitted into the sacred building. The Communion Table especially was kept bare. The lilies of the field might furnish a text to the great Founder of Christianity: the meaner flowers of the meadow might move the poet to thoughts too deep for tears; but they were not allowed to console or attract the stolid congregation of an ordinary English church.

The character of the services.

The service usually corresponded with the style of the building, and the absence of all decoration. Nothing, indeed, can divest the English Liturgy of the beauty which it displays to every man of culture or feeling. In the whole realm of English literature there is nothing more beautiful than the renderings of some of the Hebrew psalms, than the simple and sonorous language of some of the collects, or than the translations of the historical and prophetical books of the Jews. If some future generation, when the English shall have perished from the earth, should collect an anthology of our language, it will probably include the description of a storm at sea in the Psalms; the prayer for all those afflicted in mind, body, or estate; the story of the revolt of Jehu; and the sublime hymn, 'Comfort ye, comfort ye, my people'—among the noblest examples which the literature of any age or any race has to offer. But the average man who,

in the middle of the nineteenth century, attended his parish church on Sunday with the regularity which carried him to his office on Monday, paid little or no attention to these beauties as he slumbered through the service. Here and there some old woman might derive comfort from the blessed word Mesopotamia. But the average Englishman heard unmoved the story of Joseph and his brethren; and repeated without emotion the alternate verses of that most pathetic of songs, 'By the waters of Babylon.' Perhaps, indeed, if other poetry, say 'Tears, idle tears,' were read to us in alternate stanzas by a cultured old gentleman whose voice was gone, and an uncultured clerk, whose voice was as harsh as it was loud, we might be disposed to deny any merit to Tennyson.

Music—in any proper sense—was excluded almost as rigorously as flowers from the dismal service. The rubrics, indeed, allowed the Psalms and certain canticles to be either said or sung, and in colleges and cathedrals services were sung and intoned. But, in the first half of the nineteenth century the ordinary Englishman would have regarded the adoption of singing the Psalms as a dangerous concession to Rome. It was the special characteristic of his own Church that everything should be audible and intelligible to the congregation; and if the Psalms were once chanted, the next step might possibly lead to their being chanted in the Latin language. Hymns—or rather metrical versions of the Psalms—were usually sung at every service; but they were not, as a rule, sung at the place appointed for the anthem. They formed a convenient interlude, if the word be permitted, between the morning prayer and

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the ante-communion service, and between the ante-communion service and the sermon.[1] The hymns were almost exclusively taken from the version of the Psalms which Messrs. Brady and Tate had made in the seventeenth century, a collection which, with one or two exceptions, appeals neither to the heart nor to the head.[2] Poor as these hymns were, their rendering in church was wretched. In a few churches, indeed, the school children were taught to sing them in unison. But no attempt was made to select the children who had musical voices, and their instructors were quite incapable of teaching them to ordinary rules of symphony. Their shrill and discordant voices drowned the singing of any members of the congregation qualified, either by nature or training, to lead their neighbours; and the music of an average English church had become, in consequence, an unpleasant feature of an unpleasing service.

[1] The rubric 'In quires and places where they sing here followeth the anthem,' was first inserted in the revised Prayer Book after the Restoration. The new version of the Psalms (Brady and Tate) was issued in 1696 under the authority of an Order in Council allowing and permitting its use in all such churches, chapels, and congregations as should think fit to receive it. In 1703 the authors added a supplement, containing hymns for Christmas, &c., which received similar sanction from an Order in Council of Queen Anne. But additions to these hymns were made towards the close of the eighteenth century, and were printed in many Prayer Books without any sort of authority. Among the additions were the well-known Easter hymn, 'Jesus Christ is risen to-day,' and Bishop Ken's morning and evening hymns, 'Awake, my soul, and with the sun,' and 'Glory to Thee, my God, this night,' which originally began 'All praise to Thee, my God, this night.' See an excellent article on hymns by the first Lord Selborne in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, and *The Book of Praise*, p. 291.

[2] The Archbishop of Canterbury, writing to Dr. Pusey in 1839, said that the version of the Psalms by Sternhold and Hopkins never received any Royal approbation or Parliamentary sanction. A version made by King James I. was allowed and recommended by his successor. The version of Brady and Tate was allowed and permitted to be used by William III. (*Life of Pusey*, vol. ii. p. 116); and, indeed, was recommended in the hope of

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The æsthetic tendencies of the middle of the nineteenth century

In the middle of the nineteenth century, however, the people were gradually acquiring a distaste for the ideas which had influenced Puritan England, and which had driven beauty both from the church and the home. If the reign of George IV. had presented London with the eastern façade of Buckingham Palace, the reign of William IV., and the early years of Victoria, had lined the southern side of Pall Mall with the four club-houses which remain the most effective examples of street architecture in the metropolis. The fire at Westminster had already cleared the ground for the preparation of plans for the erection of the new Houses of Parliament, probably the finest Gothic building of the nineteenth century. The artistic example of the Prince Consort had helped to encourage the study and to promote the love of music. The publication of the 'Christian Year,' and the writings of men like Bishop Heber, had provided the religious world with a psalmody far exceeding in beauty anything which had come down to it from Brady and Tate; while the Great Exhibition of 1851 was raising the standard of taste, and creating an æsthetic feeling among all classes of the population.

The new standards of taste which were gradually introducing harmony into the decoration of the English home were naturally felt in the religious world. The people were no longer content with the plain, whitewashed, ill-proportioned, and undecorated buildings in which they had hitherto collected to pray. They were prepared to welcome a movement which was advocating the restoration of ancient churches

restoring music to the Church Services. But then Brady was chaplain to the King, and Tate, like Pye, was Poet Laureate. 'Tate's poor page' is Pope's description of him in the *Dunciad*, i. 105.

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and the erection of new churches on old models. The passion for church restoration had unhappily its evil side. Restoration frequently destroys what it ought to preserve. But the introduction of a new ideal, or the return to an old ideal, in church architecture was, on the whole, beneficial. A great architect, Mr. Gilbert Scott, who devoted his attention to the study of Gothic architecture, gave us churches of great beauty. His example found imitators, and the parish church, under the new influences which were permeating the religious world, became the best and best cared-for building in the parish.

shared by the leaders of the Oxford Movement.

The movement which is associated with the Tractarians had the advantage of commencing at a time when the public were slowly acquiring a feeling for architecture. But its promoters were even more anxious to improve the interior than the exterior of the churches. They wished to make God's House more worthy of its sacred use. They wished to make the chancel and the altar—for so they called the Communion Table—suitable for the stupendous sacrifice which they desired to perform, not four times a year, but on every Sunday. They wished, or some of them wished, to make the vestment of the minister distinguish the priest. They wished the priest to assume a position which would indicate the nature of the rite he was performing. In the long controversy which was about to begin, in the protracted struggle which is not yet concluded, they frequently irritated the people by insisting on innovations which seemed purposeless. But the innovations were not purposeless. They were all intended to emphasise the claim that the minister was a priest, that through his agency the Blessed Presence

of Christ sanctified the elements on every altar, and that right conduct in this world and eternal happiness in the world to come were only to be secured or could most easily be secured by his intervention.

No doubt the promoters of the Oxford Movement would have resented the charge that they were introducing any innovations into the services of the Church. On the contrary, they maintained that they were protesting against the changes which a Puritanic generation had introduced or were desiring to introduce into divine service. When other men were proposing to omit the Creeds, or, at any rate, to leave the reading of the Athanasian Creed to the discretion of the minister, they were pledging themselves not merely 'to maintain pure and inviolate the doctrines, the services, and the discipline of the Church,' but to 'withstand all changes involving the denial or suppression of doctrines, a departure from primitive practices in religious offices, or innovation upon the Apostolic prerogative, order and commission of priests and deacons.'[1] Just as the claim of the Church architects was that they were restoring the ancient buildings, so the Tractarians were proposing to restore the primitive practices. But the man who attempts to restore a building whose original design has been lost, like the man who reverts to a practice which has long been disused, is apt to draw upon his imagination or his wishes for the plans which have disappeared and the procedure which has been forgotten. And the Tractarians in this respect were exposed to a serious danger. For if the practices and ritual of the English Church in the time which succeeded the Reformation had been forgotten in the

[1] *Life of Pusey*, vol. i. p. 268.

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who are consequently inclined to adopt the ritual of the Roman Church.

usage which had grown up in Puritan England, a gorgeous ceremonial, which the Church of Rome still observed, had been handed down in its original magnificence. And the Tractarians argued that as the Church of England and the Church of Rome had been one, until they separated for political reasons, it was natural to assume that the Church of England should have observed the ritual and preserved the vestments which its ministers had used in the unreformed Church.

It necessarily followed that the reform which the leaders of the Oxford Movement desired to introduce into the services of the Church tended to assimilate the practice of the Church to the practice of Rome; and it is certain that the suspicion and distrust which the movement from the first aroused and provoked arose from the fact that its tendency was Romeward. The fears which were thus felt were not unfounded. For just as it was the object of Dr. Arnold and the Low Church party to collect Churchmen and Nonconformists in one Church, closely connected with the Lutheran and Calvinist Churches of continental Europe,[1] so it was the desire of the Tractarians to reunite the Church of England with the great Episcopal Churches of the East and West, and to show that the differences which separated Rome from England, and which had not existed before the Council of Trent, could be easily healed.

[1] Dr. Arnold was ready to sacrifice episcopacy in the cause of union. He wrote: 'To insist on the necessity of episcopacy is exactly like insisting on the necessity of circumcision. Both are and were lawful, but to insist on either as *necessary* is unchristian . . . all forms of government or ritual being in the Christian Church indifferent, to be decided by the Church itself.' *Life of Arnold*, vol. i. p. 375. With him Christians were all those who believed in Christ as a divine person. Church's *Oxford Movement*, p. 6.

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The first introduction of ritualistic practices.

The first symptoms of innovation in ritual were visible only a few years after the commencement of the Oxford Movement. As early as 1837 it was asserted that at Mr. Newman's own church at Littlemore there were needless bowings, unusual attitudes in prayer, the addition of a peculiar kind of cross to the surplice, and that the bread and wine were placed on a small additional table near to the Lord's Table or altar. Dr. Pusey, to whom the bishop of the diocese referred the matter, replied that (i) he could not imagine the origin of the report as to needless bowings, as there had been no bowings except at the name of our Lord; (ii) the unusual attitudes in prayer were explained by the fact that at Littlemore the minister knelt towards the east, following an example which Mr. Newman had set at daily morning service at St. Mary's, Oxford; (iii) the additional cross referred to some small unpretending crosses on a narrow scarf worn by the minister in accordance, as Dr. Pusey claimed, with the practice of the Church in the reign of Edward VI.; (iv) the additional table had been placed for the reception of the elements to avoid 'the innovation' of the bread and wine being placed on the altar itself by clerks and sextons.[1]

Dr. Pusey's explanation was dexterous, but was not ingenuous. It was hardly accurate to speak of the innovation of the bread and wine being placed on the Communion Table by sexton or clerk. In many churches it was the habit of the clerk or sexton to hand the elements before the prayer for the Church militant to the clergyman, by whom they were placed on the altar, and as in the majority of English churches

[1] *Life of Pusey*, vol. ii. p. 15.

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there had been no 'additional' table, the provision of this table was undoubtedly an innovation. In the same way, while the practice of the Church in the reign of Edward VI. was not clearly established, narrow scarves with unpretending crosses had not been worn by the clergy within living memory.[1]

The ornaments rubric.

But while doubts existed on the propriety of novel scarves embroidered with unpretending crosses, less doubt could be felt regarding the use or disuse of the surplice. The 'ornaments rubric,' which is still printed immediately before the Order for Morning Prayer in most of our Prayer Books, directs that 'such Ornaments of the Church, and of the Ministers thereof, at all times of their ministration, shall be retained, and be in use, as were in this Church of England, by the authority of Parliament, in the second year of the reign of King Edward the Sixth.' It is not, happily, necessary to cumber this narrative with the prolonged controversy which arose on the meaning of this famous rubric. Years afterwards the Privy Council laid down that vestments were illegal, and that the surplice was the only vestment which the clergyman was justified in wearing.[2] But

[1] Two years afterwards, in 1837, Mr. Seager, who was Dr. Pusey's assistant lecturer in Hebrew, wore a cross on his stole in St. Mary's. *Life of Pusey*, vol. ii. p. 141. I mention these crosses because they seem to have been overlooked by the Archbishop in the evidence to which I have already referred, and in which he traces the earliest introduction of vestments to St. Thomas's, Oxford. The Archbishop, however, I understand, considered that unpretending crosses, or scarves, or stoles were not vestments. They were, however, the first beginnings of vestments. It is worth recollecting that Dr. Pusey himself discouraged the use of vestments. 'It seems beginning at the wrong end,' so he wrote, 'for the ministers to deck their own persons; our own plain dresses are more in keeping with the state of our Church, which is one of humiliation.' *Ibid.*, p. 142.

[2] See Herbert *v.* Purchas, Moore's *Privy Council Cases*, vol. vii. pp. 468-551.

the position which the Privy Council took up in 1871 was opposed to the general feeling of the country from 1840 to 1850. The introduction of the surplice in the pulpit was then commonly regarded as an innovation of a Romanising tendency. Bishop Blomfield, indeed, who held the bishopric of London, recommended in 1842 that a compromise should be adopted, and that the surplice should be worn in the pulpit at the morning service, the gown only at evensong. The bishop plainly indicated by this suggestion an opinion that when the sermon formed an interlude in the communion or ante-communion service no change of vestment should take place, while on occasions when—as at evensong—the sermon formed one part of the appointed service, the feelings of the people should be consulted by the retention of the black gown. But the bishop's suggestion aroused so much opposition in his diocese that he felt compelled four years later to withdraw it.[1]

The riots on the introduction of the surplice in the pulpit.

Riots in London, riots in the provinces, made it impracticable.[2] The heads of the Church, the Primate himself, recommended that the clergy should refrain from making any further inroads into usage, or, as the Primate phrased it, 'In churches where alterations have been introduced with general acquiescence, let things remain as they are; in those which retain the less accurate usage, let no risk of division be incurred

[1] See, as to Bishop Blomfield's suggestion, the Archbishop of Canterbury's evidence, Royal Commission on Ecclesiastical Discipline, *Q.* 12855 A (c).

[2] The riots in the provinces were mainly in the Diocese of Exeter, where the Bishop (Phillpotts) was supposed, with some reason, to be in sympathy with the Tractarian Movement. For these see the *Times* of February and March 1845. For the riots in London see Stoughton, *Religion in England*, 1800 *to* 1850, vol. ii. p. 202; and for the whole subject my earlier *History*, vol. v. p. 280, and cf. *Life of Sidney Herbert*, vol. i. p. 156.

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by any attempt to change.' In other words, Where the people have accepted the surplice let them have it. But where the 'less accurate' black gown is used let it remain.[1] Lord Melbourne might have envied this admirable exposition of his favourite question, so dear to all those who administer in Church and State—Why cannot you leave it alone?

It is possible that, if Archbishop Howley's advice had been followed, the great movement which had been stirred into activity by the Tractarians might have languished or died in the atmosphere of general disfavour which it was creating. But its enemies in the Church had no fancy to let it perish from exhaustion. They were determined to expose the nature of the movement, which they believed was carrying, and perhaps was intended to carry, its supporters into the arms of Rome; and by their intolerance they fanned the flame which might otherwise have expired. No less a man than Dr. Arnold led the way in an article in the 'Edinburgh Review,' which, his biographer admits, contains the most startling and vehement, because the most personal, language which he ever allowed himself deliberately to use. The editor, in publishing the attack, emphasised Dr. Arnold's offence by entitling the article 'The Oxford Malignants.'[2]

The attack on the Tractarian leaders.

On the publication of Tract XC.—which maintained that the Thirty-nine Articles of the Anglican Church contained no propositions inconsistent with the Catholic Faith, or with a Catholic interpretation of them, four Oxford tutors—one of whom, Mr. Tait, lived to be Archbishop of Canterbury—wrote to

[1] See, again, the Archbishop of Canterbury's evidence in Royal Commission on Ecclesiastical Discipline, *Q.* 12855 A (*c*).

[2] *History of England*, vol. v. p. 275, note; Stanley, *Life of Arnold*, vol. ii. p. 9.

Mr. Newman, as the editor of the Tracts, to say that both the Church and University are entitled to ask that some person besides the printer and publisher of the Tract should acknowledge himself responsible for its contents.[1] A little later the Hebdomadal Board, at a special meeting and by a large majority, formally condemned and censured the Tract.[2] Mr. Newman's own diocesan, Dr. Bagot, suggested that, 'for the peace of the Church, discussion upon the Articles should not be continued,'[3] and Mr. Newman yielded to his bishop's request. But this concession did not stop the attack. 'The bishops, one after another, began to charge against Mr. Newman.'[4] The hostile charges were continued for two or three years. Before they had ceased a sermon of Dr. Pusey's on the Eucharist was referred to six specially selected judges, and on their report Dr. Pusey was suspended from preaching at Oxford for two years.[5] A year later the 'Ideal of a Christian Church' was declared by Convocation at Oxford inconsistent with the principles of the Thirty-nine Articles, and its author, Mr. Ward, was degraded from his degrees.[6] Authority did not

[1] The letter itself will be found in *Life of Pusey*, vol. ii. p. 268, note, and in *Life of Archbishop Tait*, vol. i. p. 81.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 173. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 185.

[4] *Apologia*, p. 139.

[5] *Life of Pusey*, vol. ii. p. 314 *seq.* Newman, evidently alluding to this action, wrote: 'The authorities find that by the statute they have more than military power, and the general impression seems to be that they intend to exert it and put down Catholicism at any cost.' *Apologia*, p. 179.

[6] Convocation desired to go a step further, and to impose a new form of subscription to the Articles on all graduates, with a view to avoiding such interpretations as Mr. Ward and the supporters of Tract XC. had put upon them. But this resolution was stopped by the intervention of the proctors. See, *inter alia*, *Life of Archbishop Tait*, vol. i. pp. 127–130. It is worth observing that, when the proctors in 1836 had interfered in Hampden's favour, Mr. Keble had remarked that 'others, too, might play at the game.' *Life of Pusey*, vol. i. p. 378. His saying was verified in a remarkable way by the proctors' action on the proposal of this new test, which, however, was condemned by men of sense

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content itself with attacking the leaders of the movement. The Bishop of Winchester, in 1841, refused to admit Mr. Keble's own curate to priest's orders.[1] The Bishop of London declared that 'no power on earth would induce him to ordain any person who held systematically the opinion of Tract XC.'[2]; and Mr. Williams,[3] a scholar of some eminence and a poet of some distinction, was forced to withdraw his candidature for the professorship of poetry at Oxford in consequence of the opposition that was raised to him as one of the contributors to the Tracts.[4]

So strong was the feeling against the Tractarians and their literature that some years later a chaplain complained that one of the nurses at Scutari had circulated 'improper' books in the wards. On investigation it was discovered that the nurse had lent a sick midshipman 'The Christian Year.'[5]

The first secession.

The antagonism which the Tracts were exciting led to momentous consequences. The younger men who had come under the influence of their authors began to secede to Rome.[6] Mr. Newman himself did not, in the first instance, accompany them; but from the end of 1841, as a member of the Anglican Church,

on both sides. The reader who is impressed by this dismal account of intolerance at Oxford should recollect that the High Church party had set the example in the proceedings against Dr. Hampden. See, *inter alia*, *Life of Pusey*, vol. i. p. 370. The two proctors who interfered in Mr. Ward's favour were Messrs. Guillemard and Church. Mr. Wilfrid Ward says they 'uttered the words which, except on one memorable occasion, no one now living had ever heard pronounced in Convocation.' *W. G. Ward and the Oxford Movement*, p. 342.

[1] *Life of Pusey*, vol. ii. p. 231.

[2] *Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 272.

[3] Hurrell Froude, Robert Wilberforce, and Isaac Williams had been Keble's pupils in the Long Vacation of 1823. Church's *Oxford Movement*, p. 23.

[4] For Mr. Williams's case, *ibid.*, p. 67 *seq.*

[5] *Memoir of Sidney Herbert*, by Lord Stanmore, i. 381, note.

[6] Church's *Oxford Movement*, pp. 208–11. Mr. Newman said 'there were no converts to Rome till after the condemnation of Tract XC.' (*Apologia*, p. 140), but he is clearly inaccurate in this.

he was already on his departure. In the beginning of 1843 he determined publicly to retract all the hard things he had said at various times of the Church of Rome.[1] In the following September he resigned his Oxford living,[2] and in 1845 he entered the Roman Church. His conversion was immediately followed by that of hundreds who had been waiting for a lead from their revered spiritual guide.[3]

These secessions naturally created a feeling of consternation. The men who had attacked the Tractarian Movement saw in them a fulfilment of their prediction. They had said from the first that the arguments of the Tracts were creating a drift which would carry those who were influenced by them Romeward, and in every new secession they saw a confirmation of their fears. But Mr. Newman and his friends replied that the conversions were not due to the arguments of the Tracts but to the action of their opponents. Mr. Newman himself asserted that there had been no converts to Rome till after the condemnation of Tract XC. His own resignation of his Oxford living closely followed Mr. Pusey's suspension. His final conversion followed the condemnation of the 'Ideal of a Christian Church,' the degradation of Mr. Ward, its author, from his degrees, and a proposal for the condemnation by the University of Oxford of the famous Tract which had already been condemned by the Hebdomadal Board.[4]

It is not necessary to inquire very deeply into

[1] *Life of Pusey*, vol. ii. p. 297.

[2] This step was quickened by the secession to Rome of one of Newman's younger associates. See *ibid.*, p. 370, and cf. *Apologia*, p. 179.

[3] Benn, *History of Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century*, vol. i. p. 17. W. G. Ward was received into the Roman Church in the same year. See Wilfrid Ward, *W. G. Ward and the Oxford Movement*, p. 365.

[4] *Life of Pusey*, vol. ii. p. 426.

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these rival arguments. Most people who have examined the controversy will conclude that the reasoning of the Tractarians carried them inevitably Romeward; but most people who have examined its history will admit that the drift to Rome was quickened by the opposition to the movement.. Whether this be so or not, there can be little doubt that Mr. Newman's secession deprived the Oxford Movement of the leader who had exerted the chief influence on its supporters; for, though a competent authority has asserted that four men—Messrs. Rose, Palmer, Hook, and Perceval—had carried on the work of immediate preparation,[1] and a recent writer has asserted that Pusey 'and not Newman was the chief founder' of the Oxford Movement, while the late Dean Church considered that Keble had given the inspiration, Froude the impulse, and that Newman had taken up the work,[2] there can be no doubt that Mr. Newman was the man who gave the Oxford Movement force and direction. The sweetness of his character, the charm of his style, whether in verse or prose, the earnestness of his mind, the impression which he made on younger men, all contributed to give him an influence which none of his contemporaries enjoyed. It was said of him, in 1837, that 'every man of talent who during the last six years has come to Oxford has joined Newman, and when he preaches at St. Mary's (on every Sunday afternoon) all the men of talent at the university come to hear him. His triumph over the mental empire of Oxford is said to be complete.'[3]

Dr. Pusey succeeds Mr. Newman as leader of the High Church movement.

[1] Liddon's *Life of Pusey*, vol. i. p. 262.

[2] Church's *Oxford Movement*, p. 28. Dean Church says that the person who first gave force to Church theology was Dr. Hook, *ibid.*, p. 10.

[3] *Life of Pusey*, vol. i. p. 406.

After 1841, when Tract XC. had been censured and the Tracts themselves had been stopped, the influence which Mr. Newman had previously excited tended to decline. And from 1843, when Mr. Newman resigned his Oxford living and permanently withdrew from Oxford, he had not the same opportunities of influencing thought as those which he had previously possessed. His place, perhaps, would have been most adequately filled by Mr. Keble, whose religious views closely corresponded with the doctrines which Mr. Newman had expounded in the Tracts. But Mr. Keble was no fighter. In the congenial atmosphere of Hursley, where nature had done much to improve the surroundings of the parish church, and where chance had given him the society of a squire who represented his university in Parliament, and who was the brother-in-law of one of the four founders of the Oxford Movement, he had gained an ideal haven. His kindly nature could not be roused into resentment even by the refusal of his diocesan to ordain his curate. If Mr. Keble was thus impossible as a militant leader, Mr. Ward had made himself impossible by his own conduct; for in the 'Ideal of a Christian Church' he had advocated clerical celibacy, and, in defiance of his principles he had married Miss Wingfield. It is true that at the time of his marriage he was only in deacon's orders. But the distinction hardly satisfied the ascetic men who had been restrained by his arguments from the comfort and solace of married life. No renegade, whatever excuse he may have for backsliding, can hope to place himself at the head of a great religious movement; and

The testimony of the Low Church party was quite as strong. See Principal Shairp's words in *Life of Archbishop Tait*, vol. i. p. 105.

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consequently Mr. Ward, though for different reasons, was no less impossible than Mr. Keble. Thus, by a process of elimination, the control of the movement naturally fell into the hands of Dr. Pusey.

Dr. Pusey's character.

Dr. Pusey in many respects resembled Mr. Newman. Both men were convinced that the English Church was the lineal descendant of the Church of Mediæval Christianity; and, though one of them was destined to go over to Rome, while the other man remained to the end in the Anglican fold, both men at one time hoped for the union of episcopal Christianity. Both men achieved eminence in the pulpit; but while Mr. Newman attracted his audience by the charm of his style and the grace of his delivery, Dr. Pusey held them by the extent of his learning and the depth of his convictions. In the kind of knowledge which theology delights in, Dr. Pusey had hardly a rival. Professor of Hebrew, he could read the Bible in the original; he had the whole realm of Patristic literature at his fingers' ends. But in the wider knowledge which the nineteenth century was acquiring he was singularly deficient. The whole tendency of his mind incapacitated him from appreciating the discoveries of modern science or even the criticism of modern scholarship. He thought that he could establish an *eirenicon* between science and religion by saying—'Theology does not interfere with science as it reads the book of God's works; let not science interfere with the book of God's word.'[1]

Under Dr. Pusey's guidance the movement became more combative than it had been under Mr. Newman. For, while Mr. Newman's graceful nature

[1] *Life of Pusey*, vol. iv. p. 333.

indisposed him for acute conflict, Dr. Pusey's ascetic temperament made him obstinate in controversy. Under Mr. Newman, moreover, the Tractarians had endeavoured to deal with doctrine, while under Dr. Pusey they were mainly engaged in a struggle for ritual. Dr. Pusey, moreover, not merely fought hard for the things on which his own heart was set, he struggled for the objects which the younger members of his party desired to secure. Dr. Pusey, for example, deprecated the introduction of vestments; but when vestments were attacked, he ranged himself on the side of the defence. He attached no importance to the eastward position of the celebrant; yet, when the eastward position was declared illegal, he at once adopted it.[1] Resenting the interference of the State in the affairs of the Church, it is hardly an exaggeration to say that he was ready to identify himself with anything which the State or the State Courts disapproved.

At the time when Dr. Pusey found himself in the position which Mr. Newman had previously occupied, the great movement, which had been initiated in 1833, was apparently exhausted. 'Puseyism,' wrote a high authority, 'though still living, looks dead. . . . The better sort of men are turning to practical matters, new examination statutes, and university reform. The worse sort are becoming more careless and sensual.'[2] Dr. Pusey himself was 'an object of widespread, deep, and fierce suspicion.'[3] After his two years' suspension he had returned to the university pulpit and selected as the subject of his sermon the

[1] *Life of Pusey*, vol. iv. pp. 224, 225.

[2] Professor Goldwin Smith to Sir R. Palmer, Selborne's *Memorials, Family and Personal*, vol. ii. p. 64.

[3] The language is that of his biographer. *Life of Pusey*, vol. iii. p. 137.

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reality of priestly absolution; and, whatever teachings may be drawn from the Gospels or the Prayer Book on the subject, the majority of English men and women have always been opposed to a claim which arms the priest with the keys of hell and heaven, and have always detested the confessional, which is the invariable corollary of the claim. In the course of his sermon he had gone out of his way to restate the views which he had expounded two years before on the doctrine of the Eucharistic presence.[1] His isolation was so complete that some Heads of Houses would not speak to him when they met him in the street. His new diocesan—for Dr. Wilberforce had just succeeded Dr. Bagot at Oxford—had addressed him in terms of warning and disapproval.[2] His friends in the earlier days of the movement were 'more distant than in former years,' while Dr. Hook, the vicar of Leeds, was reproaching him, and there was much cause for the reproach, with organising opposition to him in his own parish.[3]

The Gorham case.

At this time, however, when everything suggested that the movement might be smothered by its increasing unpopularity, Mr. Gorham, the incumbent of a Cornish parish, was presented by the Crown to the vicarage of Brampford Speke. Both the living which he held and the cure to which he was appointed were in the diocese of Exeter, and the bishop, Dr. Phillpotts, believed that Mr. Gorham's views on baptismal regeneration were not in accordance with the doctrines of the Church. Instead, therefore, of

[1] *Life of Pusey*, vol. iii. p. 65.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 46.
[3] See *ibid.*, p. 126, and cf. *Life of Hook*, pp. 394 *seq.* I have not thought it necessary to give in greater detail the melancholy history of St. Saviour's, Leeds, round which the controversy raged.

instituting Mr. Gorham to his new living, the bishop proceeded to examine him on points of doctrine; and as from the results of his examination he understood that Mr. Gorham held that spiritual regeneration was not given or conferred in baptism, he declined to institute him. Mr. Gorham appealed—as he was entitled to appeal—from the decision of his own diocesan to the Primate, and the Archbishop's Court—the Court of Arches, as it is called—affirmed Bishop Phillpotts's decision. Mr. Gorham then appealed to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council,[1] and the Judicial Committee reversed the decision of the Court of Arches.

This decision was calculated to create consternation among the group of men who were rallying round Dr. Pusey. Their leader owed his position in the Oxford Movement to the Tract on Baptism which he had contributed to the Tracts for the Times. In this Tract Dr. Pusey endeavours to show that regeneration—'the act by which God takes us out of our relation to Adam, and makes us actual members of His Son—is connected in Scripture with baptism, and that there is nothing in Scripture to sever it from baptism.'[2] Mr. Gorham, on the contrary, contended that the grace of regeneration depended on the right reception, and that right reception implied in the case of adults 'faith and repentance,' in the case of infants God's grace and favour.[3] Dr. Pusey, and those who thought with

[1] For the Gorham case see *Life of Pusey*, vol. iii. pp. 201 *seq.*; *Life of Bishop Wilberforce*, vol. ii. p. 35; and Lord Selborne's *Memorials, Family and Personal*, vol. ii. p. 64. But the whole case is elaborately set out in a collection of the judgments of the Privy Council in Ecclesiastical Cases, by Mr. Brodrick and Mr. Fremantle, pp. 64-115.

[2] See the *Tract*, and cf. *Life of Pusey*, vol. i. pp. 343, 346.

[3] I am adhering as far as pos-

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him, laid the whole virtue on the sacrament; Mr. Gorham, and the large party associated with him, on the state of the recipient. The former held that the administration of the rite worked a miracle almost as stupendous[1] as that which they asserted that every clergyman accomplished in consecrating the elements in Holy Communion. The latter contended that the efficacy of the sacrament depended on the state of the receiver, or on God's grace and favour. The whole issue which the Tractarian party had originally raised, when they so strenuously insisted upon the powers of the priest, lay at the root of the controversy.

In one sense the efficacy of baptism was an awkward question to bring before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The common law of the Church, the rubrics of Edward VI. and Elizabeth and the statute law had all recognised the validity of lay baptism. The Church of Rome had gone even further in this respect than the Church of England. And Sterne had made merry with the subject in the opening pages of 'Tristram Shandy.' In the famous case of Escott *v.* Mastin[2] the Judicial Com-

sible to the words of the judgment. See Brodrick and Fremantle, p. 95.

[1] Coleridge had said many years before: 'The assertion that what is phenomenally bread and wine is substantially the Body and Blood of Christ does not shock my common sense more than that a few drops of water sprinkled on the face should produce a momentous change, even a regeneration, in the soul.' *English Divines*, vol. i. p. 329.

[2] Mr. Escott, a clergyman of the Church of England, had refused to bury an infant, the daughter of Thomas and Sarah Cliff, on the ground that the child had only been baptised by a Wesleyan minister, which Mr. Escott maintained to be no baptism at all. The Judge of the Arches Court decided in favour of Mr. Mastin, who promoted the case by virtue of letters of request from the chancellor of the diocese of Lincoln, and suspended Mr. Escott for three months. Mr. Escott appealed to the Judicial Committee, which in 1842 affirmed the sentence of the Arches

mittee had decided that a clergyman was bound to bury a child baptised by a layman, and incidentally had pointed out that 'the rubric had declared the sufficiency of baptism so performed, and that the child so baptised ought not to be baptised again in the Church.'[1] In the Gorham case, however, it went much further. After defining Mr. Gorham's doctrine, their lordships 'proceeded to quote the opinions of divines, from Bishop Jewel to Bishop Prideaux, and to decide in their judgment that the doctrine held by Mr. Gorham is not contrary or repugnant to the declared doctrine of the Church of England.'[2]

Court. Bishop Phillpotts in charging his clergy in the same year endeavoured to mitigate any alarm which the judgment might have excited by pointing out that the Judicial Committee 'had only decided that a minister is bound to bury *an infant* which had been baptised by a *layman*. It did not decide whether he is bound to bury an adult who having been so baptised had never sought to have the deficiencies of his baptism duly supplied. See for the whole case Brodrick and Fremantle, pp. 4–29. Some thirty-four years later the Judicial Committee had to overrule the decision of the Dean of Arches that a clergyman was entitled to refuse permission for the erection of a tombstone in the churchyard because it described a girl as daughter of the Reverend H. Keet, Wesleyan Minister. For this case see *Law Reports*, Probate Division, pp. 73–80, and Mr. H. Paul's *History of Modern England*, vol. iii. p. 421.

[1] Some of my readers may recollect that Mrs. Pusey, Pusey's own wife, was distressed towards the close of her life by scruples about the validity of her own baptism, which had been performed by a dissenter. She even abstained from Communion between December 1837 and April 1838. At Mr. Newman's suggestion the Bishop sanctioned a 'conditional' baptism, and she was conditionally baptised by Mr. Newman himself on Easter Eve 1838. *Life of Pusey*, vol. ii. p. 89. Poor Mrs. Pusey did not live to read the judgment of the Privy Council in Escott *v.* Mastin. But I fear that no judgment of a lay court would have satisfied her sensitive and superstitious intellect.

[2] Brodrick and Fremantle, pp. 89–105. The judgment went on to advise her Majesty to remit the cause to the Arches Court of Canterbury, in order that right might be done; and the Bishop of Exeter applied to all the courts in turn to prevent Mr. Gorham's institution. The polemical bishop who had instituted the proceedings declared that 'the common law judges were all equally wrong,' and had the folly to inform his clergy that he re-

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The decision of the Privy Council fell like a clap of thunder on the ears of the Ritualists. The Court for the first time in its history had delivered a judgment on a point of doctrine. The judgment had struck at the efficacy of one of the two sacraments which were recognised by the Church of England; and though the two archbishops and the Bishop of London had sent an assessor to the Court, and the two archbishops had concurred in the judgment, the decision on a purely spiritual matter had been pronounced by laymen. Mr. Gladstone declared the issue to be stupendous.[1] Mr. Roundell Palmer[2] said that the decision was equally difficult to understand from a lawyer's and from a Churchman's point of view. The judges, so he added, took their law from the bishops, and the bishops their divinity from the judges.[3] Bishop Wilberforce considered — if his opinion may be inferred from the language of his biographers—'that the whole sacramental teaching of the Prayer Book was endangered by the Gorham judgment,'[4] and Mr. Keble, whose mind was more logical than that of some of his fellow-workers, told Dr. Pusey that 'People are feeling more and more that we *must* come to agitate for no Establishment.'[5]

The consternation of the High Church party.

For, deadly as that judgment seemed to men who were prepared to stake their faith on the efficacy of sacraments and the power of the priest, its worst offence was not what it did, but the possibility

nounced communion with the archbishop. See Brodrick and Fremantle, pp. 107–115; *Life of Campbell*, vol. ii. p. 276; and *Life of Bishop Wilberforce*, vol. ii. p. 38.

[1] Morley's *Life of Gladstone*, vol. ii. p. 378.

[2] *Memorials, Family and Personal*, vol. ii. p. 60.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 66.

[4] *Life of Bishop Wilberforce*, vol. ii. p. 29.

[5] *Life of Pusey*, vol. iii. p. 245.

of such a thing being done. The whole contention of persons who thought as Mr. Newman had thought, and as Dr. Pusey and his friends were thinking, was that spiritual matters must be determined by spiritual interpreters. The Gorham judgment had shown that the royal supremacy invested the Crown with a power of hearing and deciding the appeal in all matters, however purely spiritual, both of discipline and doctrine. And such a power—in the language of a famous declaration—was 'at variance with the Divine office of the universal Church, as prescribed by the law of Christ.'[1] The gentlemen who drew up the declaration would have had some trouble to define what they meant by 'the universal Church,' or 'the Divine-office of the universal Church,' or to point out where Christ had prescribed any law which prevented a supreme Court from discharging the duties which had been thrown upon it by statutes. But inexact and elusive as the phraseology was, the words, it must be supposed, conveyed some meaning to those who drew them up. For the man who first attached his signature to them (Archdeacon Manning) went over to the Church of Rome within a year, and Archdeacon Wilberforce, whose signature followed that of Archdeacon Manning, shortly afterwards imitated his example.

The men who joined in this protest against the supremacy of the Crown in spiritual matters affected to believe that the position of the Privy Council was due to a pure oversight. 'When the old Court of Delegates was superseded in 1833 by the Judicial Committee it was not contemplated—so they asserted—that questions of Church doctrine would ever come

[1] *Life of Pusey*, vol. iii. p. 271.

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before the new tribunal.'[1] But this assertion is one of those rash statements which disappear on a careful examination of the facts. Legislation in this country, indeed, is not always based on scientific principles, and Acts are passed in shapes which their framers never contemplated. But no such charge can be made against this particular law. In 1830 a Royal Commission was issued for the purpose of making full inquiry into the course of proceeding and jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical Courts, and the then Primate (Archbishop Howley) and five other bishops served on the Commission. In the following year the Commissioners were invited by the Chancellor to report specially and immediately on the jurisdiction of the Court of Delegates, and the expediency of transferring their jurisdiction to the Privy Council, and the Commissioners, in an elaborate argument, declared that the constitution of the Court was essentially defective, and added 'though we might have found difficulty in proposing an unobjectionable substitute, if our attention had not been directed to the expediency of removing that jurisdiction to the Privy Council, we have no hesitation in assenting to that proposition. . . . The Privy Council, being composed of lords spiritual and temporal, the judges in Equity, the chiefs of the Common Law, the judges of the civil law Courts . . . seems to comprise the materials of a most perfect tribunal for deciding the appeals in question.' The Commissioners, there-

[1] *Life of Bishop Wilberforce*, vol. ii. p. 39. The phrase 'oversight' is from the *Life of Pusey*, vol. iii. p. 202. Cf. Dr. Pusey. The Acts of 1833 and 1834, without intending to do so, had placed the decision of doctrinal questions in the hands of a Final Court of Appeal which was being constituted for other purposes. *Life of Pusey*, vol. iii. p. 250.

fore, could not be rightly charged with any oversight in the matter. Lord Brougham, in introducing the Bill framed on the Commissioners' report, was at pains to point out the objection to the constitution of the old Court of Delegates. Whatever tricks his memory may have played him in his old age,[1] he was therefore guilty of no oversight in 1832; the Act of 1832 was supplemented by an Act of 1833, under which the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was constituted. A second opportunity was, therefore, afforded for correcting any oversight which might have occurred; while later on, in 1840, when the Oxford Movement had attained its zenith, a fourth Act, introduced with the consent of the Episcopal Bench, and which received in its passage through Parliament the support of the Bishop of Exeter, the Prelate on whom the promoters of the movement mainly relied, confirmed the appeal to the Privy Council from the Archbishop's Court, placed upon the Judicial Committee all archbishops and bishops being Privy Councillors for hearing of ecclesiastical appeals, and directed that no appeal from the Archbishop's Court shall be so heard unless at least one archbishop or bishop was present at the hearing.[2]

The new secession.

Clearly as the case was proven, it was not clear to men who had no desire to recognise the supremacy of the Crown in spiritual matters, and the Gorham judgment led almost directly to two consequences:

[1] Both Dr. Pusey and Dr. Wilberforce relied on a later dictum of Lord Brougham's for this allegation. For Lord Brougham's later dictum see *Hansard*, vol. cxi. pp. 600 and 609, and Canon Liddon's *Letter to Sir J. Coleridge*, p. 34.

[2] 3 & 4 Vict. c. 86, sect. 15, 16. For Bishop Phillpotts's declaration see *Hansard*, vol. lv. p. 73, and for the whole story see Dean Fremantle's Introduction to the *Collection of the Judgments of the Privy Council* (which I quote elsewhere as *Brodrick and Fremantle*), pp. lviii–lxx.

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the secession of Archdeacon Manning, of Mr. Hope Scott, and many others to Rome; and the revival, after an interval of more than a hundred and thirty years, of Convocation.[1]

Archdeacon Manning.

[1] Archdeacon Manning was regarded by many persons as the most distinguished member of the Church of England. In his early days he had looked forward to a political career. But his father's ruin had compelled him to sacrifice his wishes, and with some reluctance to take orders. His career in the Church seemed for a time exceptionally fortunate. He became in 1833 the curate of Mr. Sargent of Lavington, and in the same year married his rector's daughter, two of whose sisters were married to Wilberforce, the Bishop of Oxford, and Henry Wilberforce, the Bishop's brother. His father-in-law's death made almost immediately a vacancy in the living, and Mr. Sargent, of Lavington House, conferred it on Mr. Manning. *Life of Manning*, vol. i. pp. 95–103.

It is Mr. Manning's misfortune that his biography was entrusted to Mr. Purcell, the most candid of biographers; and his character may appear less attractive than if it had been presented to us with more reserve or with more discretion. But the reader of Mr. Purcell's pages is almost continuously shocked by expressions or phrases which reflect unpleasantly on Mr. Manning's character. Most men, for example, who have the misfortune to lose their wives are overwhelmed by the blow. Even in those comparatively few cases in which married life has not brought that 'bliss beyond all that the poet has told,' they are careful to keep silence. The man, on the contrary, who was to become Cardinal Manning, had the indecency to include his wife's death four years after his marriage, 'as among God's ten special mercies.'[1] It is difficult to know which to condemn most: the heart of the man who could record such an opinion, or the taste of the biographer who could publish it.

Archdeacon Manning had little or no connexion with the Oxford Movement, and after the publication of Tract XC. he took pains to dissociate himself from it. As his biographer very frankly says, 'Tractarianism was a losing cause. To a losing cause Manning was never partial early in life or later. His nature instinctively shrank from trees that are falling down.' On the 5th of November, 1843, he preached at Oxford a sermon which is known as his Gunpowder Plot Sermon against Rome. He seemed, said Mr. Mozley of this sermon, so carried away by fear of Romanism that he almost took under his patronage the Puritans and Whigs of 1688.[2]

During the next seven years Mr. Manning was rapidly advancing in his profession. He was the most prominent clergyman in the Church of England; he was well known in London society;

[1] *Life of Manning*, vol. i. p. 184, note. It was a crowning mercy because it enabled the man to pursue his career in the Church of Rome.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 214, 240, 247–249, note; *Life of Pusey*, vol. ii. p. 378.

The effects of Archdeacon Manning's secession were immediate and marked. The fact that the

The consequences of this secession.

he was the warm friend of Mr. Gladstone, Mr. Sidney Herbert, and Lord Aberdeen; he was obviously marked out for high preferment. He was no doubt ambitious of advancement, and anxious to do nothing to prejudice his chances. To his most intimate friends his language was always the language of an attached supporter of the Church of England. After Mr. Newman's secession he said to Mr. Gladstone of the secessionists: 'Their common bond is a want of truth.' He said to Mr. Lockhart after his son's conversion in the same year: 'I would rather follow a son to the grave than hear he had taken such a step.' He said to Mr. Gladstone in 1848: 'Dying men, or men within the shadow of death, as I was last year, have a clearer insight into things unseen of others, and a deeper knowledge of all that relates to divine faith. In such a communion with death and the region beyond death, I have an absolute assurance in heart and soul, solemn beyond expression, that the English Church—I am not speaking of the Establishment—is a living portion of the Church of Christ.' It is true that in later years Cardinal Manning disputed the accuracy of Mr. Gladstone's memory on this point. He had taken the precaution to procure the return of all his letters to Mr. Gladstone and to destroy them. But he used language similar to that which Mr. Gladstone attributed to him as late as May 1850.[1]

While Archdeacon Manning was using this language to men like Mr. Gladstone he was using quite other language '*under the seal*' to men like Archdeacon Robert Wilberforce who followed him to Rome.[2] Under the seal he had declared as far back as 1846, the Church of England to be organically and functionally diseased; and he was declaring in 1850,[3] that he could not rest it on anything higher than an intellectual basis.

The fact was that Archdeacon Manning was bitterly opposed—not to the doctrine of the English Church—but to the subservience of the Church to the State. He described, oddly enough,[4] the appointment of Hampden to a bishopric, the Gorham Judgment, and Lord John Russell's Durham letter as his 'three calls.' The Hampden bishopric was a proof that the State had the power to force on the Church a bishop of whom the Church disapproved. In a charge to the clergy of his archdeaconry, indeed, he argued that there was 'no formal decision stamping the doctrine of Dr. Hampden with a specific character of heterodoxy'; and that 'until any member of the Church was judicially pronounced by a proper tribunal to be unsound he ought to be publicly treated as orthodox.'[5] But writing almost at the same time 'under the seal' to Robert Wilberforce he was asserting that Hampden's Bampton Lectures

[1] *Life of Manning*, vol. i. pp. 318, 449, 473, 481, 569, 570, 583.

[2] For Archdeacon Wilberforce's secession see *Life of Bishop Wilberforce*, vol. i. p. 26.

[3] See *Life of Manning*, vol. i. pp. 483, 509.

[4] *Ibid.*, vol. i. p. 632. Oddly enough, for a 'call' is usually supposed to be a persuasive, not a repelling, force.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 479.

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Archdeacon was accompanied by Mr. Hope Scott made the occasion more memorable. For if Archdeacon Manning was the best known clergyman of his day, Mr. Hope Scott had acquired almost the largest parliamentary practice of his time. There was something exceptionally dramatic in one of the keenest legal intellects and one of the keenest clerical intellects of the day simultaneously passing under the sway of Rome. But if the effect was felt anywhere, it fell with almost crushing weight on the most rising statesman of the time. Archdeacon Manning and Mr. Hope Scott were the closest of Mr. Gladstone's friends. They had travelled together abroad; they had lived in the closest intimacy at home. How great that intimacy was may be inferred from the

were: (i) heretical in matter; (ii) heretical in form; and that (iii) the episcopate was fully made partakers in his heterodoxy by his consecration.[1] Such an opinion Archdeacon Manning had a perfect right to hold, but he had no right—if these were his real views—to be asserting at the same time in public that until Hampden was pronounced by a proper tribunal to be unsound he ought to be publicly treated as orthodox.

Archdeacon Manning's conduct after he joined the Church of Rome was not much better than his conduct in the Church of England. He was received into the Roman Church in the spring of 1851, and he became Archbishop of Westminster in May 1865. At the time of his conversion, Dr. Errington, Bishop of Plymouth and Archbishop of Trebizond, had been appointed Cardinal Wiseman's coadjutor with the right of succession. *Life of Manning*, vol. ii. p. 82. Manning worked steadily from 1855 to 1862 to effect Errington's removal. Though he was opposed by the episcopate he carried his point with the Pope, and Errington, in obedience to the Pope's command, resigned. Pius IX. called the removal a *coup d'état* of the Lord God. *Ibid.*, p. 95. But Purcell admits that 'had it not been for Manning's high courage, splendid energy, and dogged perseverance, and it must in justice be confessed his somewhat unscrupulous methods of attack, the victory over Errington would never have been won.' Manning would have contended, no doubt, that he fought the battle in the interests of his Church. Whether he fought it in the interests of his Church is a question on which opinions may differ; but there can be no doubt that he fought it in his own interest.

[1] *Life of Manning*, vol. i. pp. 508, 509.

fact that the Archdeacon and the lawyer were the godfathers of Mr. Gladstone's eldest son.

Mr. Gladstone was not merely the warm and attached friend of these men. His own sympathies had notoriously been with the efforts which they had made to increase the authority of the Church. With him, to use his biographer's words, some revival or institution of the corporate organisation of the Church was ever a cherished object.[1] The Bishop of London had been persuaded 'to introduce a Bill requiring the Judicial Committee to refer theological questions coming before them to the bishops or other divines as experts; but the Bill had been rejected by a large majority';[2] and Mr. Gladstone, though he had very little faith in most of the existing bishops, and not much hope that their successors would be superior to them,[3] busied himself with Dr. Pusey and Bishop Wilberforce in securing the revival of Convocation.

The revival of Convocation.

But if these men were all agreed in desiring the revival of a great Council of the Church, they differed as to its composition. Mr. Gladstone's instinct induced him to recommend that the laity should be duly represented on any such body. Dr. Pusey, on the contrary, was determined that ecclesiastics, and ecclesiastics alone, should be judges of doctrine.[4] In this argument precedent was with Dr. Pusey. For the old Convocation, which he was desiring to revive,

[1] *Life of Gladstone*, vol. ii. p. 162.

[2] The words are Mr. Roundell Palmer's, *Memorials, Family and Personal*, vol. i. p. 70. For the Bill see *Hansard*, vol. cxi. p. 598.

[3] 'Every rational principle and calculation leads to the conclusion that the tone of the Episcopal Bench with respect to dogma or authoritative teaching will decline instead of rise in the course of any period of future years.' See a memorandumn by Mr. Gladstone in the *Life of Bishop Wilberforce*, vol. ii. p. 135.

[4] *Life of Pusey*, vol. ii. pp. 347 *seq.*

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had no lay element upon it, and it was plainly easier for a Government, if it did anything at all, to revive an old machine instead of devising a new one. Men there were, indeed, of position and influence, who were opposed to the whole proposal. The Archbishop of Canterbury thought that if Convocation met and debated, discussion and controversy would be sure to arise.[1] Lord Shaftesbury vehemently argued that a body which had been justly extinguished in the last century should not be allowed to meet at all; and that, if it was allowed to meet, it should be stripped of any real power. The hopes of the active prelates and the fears of the Evangelical press were equally baseless. The history of Convocation in the past might have taught them that its days were gone; its history in the future was to prove that a body, practically dead, could not be galvanised into life.[2]

The History of Convocation.

[2] The Convocation of the province of Canterbury (for that of York seems never to have been important) consisted of the suffragan bishops forming the Upper House; of the deans, archdeacons, and proctors or proxies for each chapter, and two from each diocese elected by the parochial clergy, who together constituted the Lower House. In this assembly subsidies were granted and ecclesiastical canons enacted, but the power to enact fresh canons was expressly taken away by a statute of Henry VIII., and the practice of ecclesiastical taxation was discontinued in 1664.[1] From that time Convocation had nothing to do; but, as it was suffered to sit, it had opportunities for wrangling. At last, in the reign of George I., a hot controversy arose between the two Houses on a sermon of Bishop Hoadly, the Bishop of Bangor. 'In the ferment of that age,' wrote Hallam, 'it was expedient for the State to scatter a little dust over the angry insects; the Convocation was accordingly prorogued in 1717, and for nearly 150 years never again sat for any business.[2] It would, perhaps, have been the logical consequence of this state of things that Convocation should cease to meet. But the English are a singularly conservative people, and Convocation, though it had nothing to do, continued to assemble, and, after the Lower House had elected its prolocutor, to vote an address to the Crown. Its further activity was then prevented by its formal prorogation.'

[1] *Life of Bishop Wilberforce*, vol. ii. p. 137.

[1] I have used Hallam's exact words. *Const. Hist. of England*, vol. ii. pp. 404 *seq.*

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 409.

In 1852, after a long interval, under the stimulus of the Gorham judgment and the energetic counsel of the Bishop of Oxford, Convocation displayed a little fresh activity. Several petitions were presented to both Houses, praying them to take steps to procure from the Crown the necessary licence for their meetings for the despatch of business.[1] The Queen's advocate interposed, and said that he felt it to be his duty as legal adviser to the Archbishop to declare that such a motion was without precedent. Some protest was raised against this dictum, but, like a famous town clerk, the Archbishop terminated controversy by proroguing the assembly.[2] In the following autumn, however, when Lord Derby was still Prime Minister, Convocation was not only suffered to meet, but to continue in session for several days.[3] It was even permitted to appoint a committee to consider an address to the Crown on the subject of clergy discipline.[4]

The position which Convocation thus temporarily obtained was very different from that which those who had promoted its revival had desired to obtain for it. Men like Dr. Pusey were convinced in 1852 that laymen were ignorant of the constitution of the Christian Church [5] and should have no share in the interpretation of doctrines; and they trusted that jurisdiction on such subjects might be transferred to the Upper House, or that the prelates who composed that House might, at any rate, be accepted

[1] These words are taken from an article on Convocation in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* by Sir Travers Twiss.

[2] *Life of Bishop Wilberforce*, vol. ii. p. 138.

[3] The Royal writ of exoneration from business, which it had been usual to issue, was suspended on this occasion. See Sir Travers Twiss in article already cited.

[4] *Life of Bishop Wilberforce*, vol. ii. p. 154.

[5] *Life of Pusey*, vol. iii. p. 352.

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as the authoritative advisers of the Privy Council on ecclesiastical matters.[1] It so happened, however, that, while Churchmen of the class of Dr. Wilberforce were agitated by the possible spectacle of a clerical Parliament in debate, another subject was exciting greater public interest. For the growing introduction of ritual was alarming old-fashioned Churchmen, and Lord Shaftesbury was saying that he 'would rather worship with Lydia on the bank by the river-side than with a hundred surpliced priests in the temple of St. Barnabas.'[2]

The churches of St. Barnabas and St. Paul.

The church of St. Barnabas, situated in what was then known as Pimlico, was consecrated by Bishop Blomfield in 1850, a few weeks after the delivery of the Gorham judgment. Its erection was mainly due to the energy of Mr. Bennett—a man who was indefatigable as a preacher and a pastor, the incumbent of St Paul's, Knightsbridge. He was a prominent Ritualist,[3] and his 'ritual' at St. Paul's had already elicited a remonstrance from his bishop. Mr. Bennett declined to give way, but as the bishop on his part stood firm he offered to resign his incumbency, and Bishop Blomfield accepted his resignation.[4] He was succeeded by Mr. Liddell, a brother of Lord Ravensworth, and it was soon evident that Mr. Liddell was not disposed to alter either the ritual which had been adopted or the ornaments which had been used

[1] See on this point some excellent letters from Lord John Russell to the Bishop of London and Archbishop of Canterbury in *Life of Lord J. Russell*, vol. ii. pp. 116, 117.

[2] *Life of Lord Shaftesbury*, vol. ii. p. 334.

[3] See *Memoirs of Bishop Blomfield*, vol. ii. p. 146, and *Life of Archbishop Tait*, vol. i. p. 215.

[4] For this resignation see *Life of Sidney Herbert*, vol. i. p. 158. A year later Mr. Bennett was made incumbent of Frome by Lady Bath, acting for her son, a minor. An attack upon this appointment was made in Parliament.

by Mr. Bennett. At St. Paul's an altar, or high altar, had been placed on a platform at the east end of the church; a wooden cross had been affixed to the altar and candlesticks were placed upon it. A credence table had also been placed in the chancel for the reception of the elements before consecration. The altar at St. Paul's was made of wood and capable of being removed, but from its size and weight was difficult of removal.

At St. Barnabas ritualism had gone a little further. The nave of the church was separated from the chancel by a screen of carved wood, with brazen gates, and a wooden cross was elevated and fixed on the screen. But this was not the only distinction between the two churches. At St. Barnabas the altar, in defiance of a distinct decision,[1] was made of stone; it was surmounted with a metal cross ornamented with jewels; it was covered with richly embroidered cloths, which differed from one another at different seasons, while at the time of administration embroidered white linen, bordered at the ends with elaborately worked lace, took the place of the 'fair linen cloth' prescribed by the eighty-second canon.[2]

There was another distinction between the two cases. At St. Barnabas the two churchwardens approved the ornaments introduced into the church. At St. Paul's one of the churchwardens, Mr. Horne,

[1] The decision was given by Sir H. Jenner Fust in the case of St. Sepulchre's, Cambridge, in 1843. See *Life of Pusey*, vol. ii. p. 483. Dr. Pusey two years afterwards wished the Archbishop of York to sanction for Holy Cross Church, Leeds, a movable stone altar or a carved wooden altar with a stone slab. *Ibid.*, p. 384. It is difficult for the lay mind to understand the ethics of distinguished clerics who try by subterfuge to evade decisions which they dare not disobey.

[2] See Brodrick and Fremantle, *Privy Council Judgments*, p. 123 and note, and p. 126.

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supported Mr. Liddell, while the other, Mr. Westerton, was strongly opposed to the ornaments. In the case of St. Paul's Mr. Westerton himself applied to the Consistory Court for a faculty to remove the 'obnoxious articles.' In the case of St. Barnabas an inhabitant of the Chapelry, Mr. Best, applied for a monition to the churchwardens to remove them.

Dr. Lushington's judgment.

Both cases were argued before the Consistory Court together. The judge, Dr. Lushington, held that there was nothing illegal in placing candlesticks on the Communion Table provided that the candles were only lit 'for the purpose of giving necessary light.' He dismissed the exception to the screen and brazen gates at St. Barnabas. But he held that the stone altar at St. Barnabas, the credence tables at both churches, the crosses on the altars and screen, and the embroidered altar-cloths were all illegal. Mr. Liddell appealed from this decision to the Court of Arches, and the Dean of the Court, Sir J. Dodson, affirmed the judgment of the Consistory Court.

This decision, given in 1856, placed the Ritualists in some little difficulty. The Courts which they had consented to recognise, the Consistory Court of the Diocesan, the Arches Court of the Primate, had gone against them, and they had no alternative but to accept the decision, or to appeal, as any Erastian might have appealed, to the Privy Council. Mr. Liddell decided on this course. The Judicial Committee was reinforced for the purpose of the appeal by the Archbishop of Canterbury (Dr. Sumner) and the new Bishop of London (Dr. Tait), and in an elaborate judgment, delivered in March 1857, their lordships held that the stone altar at St. Barnabas was illegal, and must be removed, and that crosses per-

The appeal to the Privy Council.

manently attached to the table could not be allowed. But, reversing the judgment of the Courts below, they went on to say that crosses (in contradistinction to crucifixes) might be erected as architectural ornaments, if they were not attached to the table, and were not intended to be adjuncts of superstitious reverence; that credence tables were permissible; that the use of embroidered cloths for the table was not illegal, but was subject to the discretion of the diocesan.[1] Mr. Liddell subsequently endeavoured to evade a portion of this decision by replacing the cross which he had been directed to remove from the table by a metal cross in the reredos immediately behind it. His bishop (Dr. Tait) declined to sanction this apparent evasion of the law. But, on a fresh appeal to the Privy Council, it was decided that 'such a cross in such a position had not been declared by the previous judgment to be illegal.'[2]

'The surpliced priests in the temple of St. Barnabas' who had aroused Lord Shaftesbury's scorn had won—from their point of view—a notable victory. Crosses recognised as ornaments, candlesticks, with candles to be lighted when necessary—and darkened chancels could produce the necessity—embroidered cloths and credence tables. Verily things had changed in their favour since the days of the controversy about the surplice and the black gown ten years before.

As one consequence of this decision, the Ritualists were disposed to reconsider some of the objections which they had hitherto urged against the jurisdiction of the Privy Council in ecclesiastical matters.

[1] For this case see Brodrick and Fremantle, pp. 117–155, and *Life of Archbishop Tait*, p. 217.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 218.

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Even Churchmen as stern and uncompromising as Dr. Pusey are not wholly blind to expediency, and they could not avoid perceiving that the Privy Council was deciding in their favour many points which the Court of Arches had decided against them. They were, moreover, not only acquiring confidence in the Privy Council; they were losing confidence in the Bench of Bishops. Lord Palmerston, in his choice of men for the episcopate, was guided by the advice of Lord Shaftesbury; and Lord Shaftesbury avowedly selected men acceptable to the Low Church, and not offensive to the working classes. During the earlier years of Lord Palmerston's Administration, especially, the Bench of Bishops became more and more opposed to the changes which the Ritualists were endeavouring to make in the conduct of the Church service; and under the influence of these 'wicked' appointments—as the Bishop of Oxford called them—Dr. Pusey and his friends became less and less inclined to put their trust in bishops.[1]

The bitterness of the struggle between High Church and Low Church was, moreover, temporarily allayed by the presence of a common danger. In outward ritual there was no agreement between them. But on such fundamental points as the divinity of Christ, Biblical inspiration, and the eternity of rewards and punishments, they were at any rate agreed. There was, however, another party in the Church which was gradually rising into importance, and agreed with neither High Church nor Low Church. For while High Church was resting on authority, and Low Church on faith, while Low Churchmen

[1] *Life of Lord Shaftesbury*, vol. iii. pp. 194–200; *Life of Bishop Wilberforce*, vol. iii. p. 84.

The Broad Church.

were basing dogma on the Bible, and High Churchmen on the interpretation which authority had given to the Bible, other men, who came to be known as Broad Church,[1] were affirming that the truth of religion, the authenticity of the Bible itself, and the authority of that book, must be determined by judgment, the judgment not of the Church but of each reverent and careful inquirer. Outside the ranks of the clergy this view was held by almost every intelligent layman who had been at pains to examine for himself the difficulties which science and philosophy were raising. It had certainly received strong confirmation from science. The whole scheme of Christianity, some men thought, had been destroyed by the discovery of Copernicus that the sun did not move round the earth, but that the earth moved round the sun. To the criticism that science and Scripture contradict each other as to the motion of the earth, Mr. Newman replies, 'We cannot decide till we know what motion is, and then it may turn out that science is false or reconcilable to Scripture.'[2] But the man of science knows that the earth revolves round the sun, just as the ordinary wayfarer knows that the wheel revolves round its axle. We may possibly be under a delusion as to the revolution of the wheel; but for the practical purposes of life we must trust the evidence of our senses and assume that it does revolve. The misfortune for the Church was, and is, that the

[1] The term was first used, it is believed, by Dean Stanley in an article in the *Edinburgh Review* on the Gorham controversy. 'There is no need for minute comparison of the particular formularies of the Church to prove the general truth that it is, by the very condition of its being, not High or Low, but Broad.' *Life of Maurice*, vol. ii. p. 607.

[2] *University Sermons*, 1872, p. 348; Sir Leslie Stephen, *The English Utilitarians*, vol. iii. p. 501.

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Church insisted, on the faith of the Bible narrative, on maintaining the contrary opinion.

The geologists.

This terrible blow which orthodoxy had sustained from the discovery of Copernicus, and from its reluctance to admit the truth of facts which were obvious to every person of education and intelligence, was strengthened by the attitude adopted by the religious world toward the revelations of the geologists. Instead of frankly admitting that the sacred narrative was based on the knowledge available at the time it was composed, the doctrine of inspiration, which, in the ecclesiastical sense of the word, is nowhere claimed in the Old Testament itself, induced the upholders of orthodoxy to undertake the vain task of endeavouring to reconcile science and Scripture. That attempt was from the very first hopeless. For while astronomy showed the doctrine of Genesis, that the earth existed before the sun, to be hopelessly opposed to scientific truths, geology proved that the order of creation was in some respects inaccurately stated in Holy Scripture; and that the idea of a universal deluge, which the Book of Genesis affirmed, was at variance with the conclusions established by science. The criticism of scholars, moreover, created a new difficulty. For it was shown that in various passages of the Old Testament language and commands were attributed to God which were not consistent with the idea of a just and benevolent Deity. All these difficulties were accentuated by insistence on the dogma that the Bible was God's message to man. But they disappeared if it were once acknowledged that the Bible contained the ideas which men—which some of the best men whom the world has produced—have from time to time held about God.

Outside the Church these views were held by a series of distinguished men. In the early thirties Sir Charles Lyell published his 'Principles of Geology,' in which he rejected 'the doctrine of discontinuity, of sudden and inexplicable changes suggesting the necessity of supernatural intervention before things could resume their natural course.' The earth, so he taught, had been the scene of gradual changes, not of abrupt cataclysms, and these changes had been protracted over a period of time which it was almost impossible to conjecture. 'Without himself accepting the transformation of species, he made it a more credible theory by removing what had once seemed the insuperable obstacles opposed to the gradual transition from one organic type to another.'[1]

The 'Vestiges.'

In the decade which followed the publication of Sir Charles Lyell's great work an Edinburgh publisher, Mr. Robert Chambers, made a still greater impression by his 'Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation.' In his conclusions, briefly stated, Mr. Chambers anticipated much of the doctrine on which Herbert Spencer insisted, and some of the revelations which Mr. Darwin gave to the world. 'He founded the doctrine of evolution in Britain, and created the atmosphere which made free discussion of man's origin a possibility.'[2] Throughout the whole of the universe, from the stellar system to the animal creation, Mr. Chambers detected, or thought he detected, one universal 'law' of development. 'There is a unity of composition proper to each great type, such as

[1] I have ventured to borrow this account of Sir Charles Lyell's conclusions from Mr. Benn, *History of Rationalism*, vol. i. p. 374.

[2] *Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 9.

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the Vertebrata, Articulata, &c., and in a less degree there is a unity of composition running through the whole animal kingdom'; and life itself was probably to be explained on the same principle; the organic world had been developed from the inorganic world by electrical or other action.[1]

While geology and philosophy were thus throwing new doubts on the beliefs which had hitherto passed current among orthodox Christians, Mr. Newman's own brother, Francis, was assailing them from another quarter. Francis Newman, like his more famous brother, had been reared in an Evangelical atmosphere. Beginning life with 'an unhesitating, unconditional acceptance of whatever is found in the Bible,'[2] an unremitting study of the New Testament convinced him that, whatever John and Paul thought about Christ's divinity, they did not teach the doctrine of three co-equal persons in a triune God.[3] Having advanced so far, Francis Newman arrived at some still more startling conclusions. A critical examination of the Old Testament, under German guidance, convinced him—as later on it was to convince Dr. Colenso—that the 'so-called Mosaic books are conglomerates formed out of older materials inartistically and mechanically pieced together.' A critical examination of the New Testament showed him that the Evangelists were inconsistent with one another, and inaccurate in reporting historical occurrences. But Francis Newman was not content with loosening the stones of the edifice. He pronounced the death of a God to be unintelligible,

Mr. Francis Newman.

[1] Benn's *Rationalism*, vol. ii. pp. 10, 15, and the *Vestiges*.

[2] *Phases of Faith*, p. 1.

[3] Benn's *Rationalism*, vol. ii. p. 19.

and the doctrine of vicarious suffering to be grossly immoral. 'Not on any ground would he accept the sinlessness of Jesus Christ as an article of faith.'[1] Christianity—the Christianity which was taught by the Church—was deprived of its dogmas and its articles when it was interpreted by this intrepid adversary.

In a chapter which is only intended to illustrate by a few prominent examples the tendency of thought it is not possible to discuss the ideas of other thinkers. The importance of 'Phases of Faith' arises from the fact that its author ventured to express the ideas on which other men were pondering.[2] And the doubts to which he gave expression were shared by many of the most prominent of his contemporaries. Miss Martineau went so far as to declare that 'the majority of sensible and thoughtful persons were without theological belief';[3] and almost every one was struck by the growing infidelity which characterised the younger men at Oxford after the collapse of the Tractarian movement.

But inside the Church an intermediate position was held by a group of remarkable men: Dr. Whately (who became Archbishop of Dublin), Mr. Milman (who became Dean of St. Paul's), Dr. Arnold (the most famous of head masters), Mr. Stanley (who succeeded Dean Trench at Westminster), Dr. Jowett (who exercised a wider influence on the rising

[1] Benn's *History of Rationalism*, vol. ii. p. 26; *Phases of Faith*, p. 153.

[2] 'Carlyle had not cared, Grote and Mill had not dared, to publish their opinion of the reigning religion. Charles Hennell had spoken without the authority of a scholar. Francis Newman was a scholar armed at all points, whose competence no one could deny; and not only a scholar, but a master of a clear and impressive language, the apt vehicle for a masculine, straightforward logic, which puts the tortuous sophistry of his brother to shame.' Benn's *History of Rationalism*, vol. ii. p. 27.

[3] *Autobiography*, vol. ii. p. 293.

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generation than any other Oxford don), Dr. Robertson (who attracted men by his eloquence at Brighton), and Mr. Maurice, whom Mr. Kingsley described as 'the most beautiful human soul whom God has ever, in His great mercy, permitted me to meet on earth,'[1] were among the large and increasing body of men who, sympathising neither with Tractarians on one side nor Evangelicals on the other, wished to include them all in one common Establishment. The term Broad Church, indeed, was destined to cover ultimately a good many people to whom it was not originally intended to be applied. The man who had ceased to believe, but who found it still convenient to conform, was glad to shelter himself under its name. The man who was striving to reconcile the revelations of science with the text of the Bible accepted the epithet as applicable to his own opinions; while the man who simply desired to enlarge the boundaries of the Church, to base it on a broad foundation, and to thrown down all party walls, naturally regarded the name as peculiarly descriptive of his own aims.

Mr. Maurice.

Of the men who have been named in the preceding paragraph Mr. Maurice was perhaps the best example of liberal thought. Mr. Maurice had strong religious convictions. He held the doctrine of the Apostles' and the Nicene Creeds with 'an earnest love.' He accepted the Prayer Book and the Thirty-nine Articles. No doubt the meaning which he applied to certain passages of Scripture and certain dogmas was different from that applied to them by other men. With Mr. Maurice a knowledge of God was eternal life. Not to know God was eternal death.

[1] *Life of Maurice*, vol. ii. p. 554.

'That belief thoroughly and heartily entertained was the very ground and root of our Charity'; it even reconciled him to the Athanasian Creed, since it took the sting out of the damnatory clauses, for hell consisted in whatever was contrary to God's nature and will. But while he clung with all the strength of his loving nature to the faith, he disliked dogmas. 'The substitution of dogma for God, the characteristic tendency of Pusey and his school, is surely leading to a fearful atheism or to a devil-worship.' With him the Incarnation brought home to men in a Man the very knowledge of God which Mr. Mansel (in his famous Bampton lectures) declared to be impossible. With him, as with Dean Stanley, 'the Atonement was the at-one-ment of God with man in Christ.' Every discovery made by Mr. Darwin or Mr. Huxley was 'a revelation to man by God, whether the discoverer accepted it in that sense or not'[1]

Some of these opinions, no doubt, raised a storm of hostility. Mr. Croker attacked Mr. Maurice in the 'Quarterly Review' for supporting the same doctrine that Mr. Robert Owen was openly advocating,[2] and the Council of King's College actually removed him from the professorship of the college, on the ground that his views 'regarding the future punishment of the wicked and the final issue of the day of judgment were of dangerous tendency and calculated to unsettle the minds of the theological students of the college.' Thus one of the most religious men in England was removed from his professorship because he held opinions which seemed to other men

[1] See *Life of Maurice*, vol. i. pp. 378, 525; vol. ii. pp. 148, 328, 564, 571.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 72, 73.

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inconsistent with the normal interpretation of some difficult and some doubtful passages in Scripture. But if Mr. Maurice suffered from the intolerance of others, he was in himself one of the best examples of toleration which has ever been displayed by a firm believer. He had a deep antipathy to Dr. Hampden's views, yet he resented the opposition to his promotion to the episcopal bench. He had no sympathy with Mr. Bennett, yet he thought his prosecution 'an outrageous mistake.'[1] His knowledge of ecclesiastical history taught him that 'every attempt to put down some heresy had begotten some other heresy,' and he discerned in it a 'clear and direct sentence of God upon all attempts to restrain the experience of thought and belief,' because the restraint only introduced 'another negation and contradiction'; and he based 'toleration not upon the uncertainty of truth, but upon its certainty; not upon the absence of a revelation of it, but upon the existence of revelation and upon the promise that the spirit of truth shall guide us into the perception of it.'[2]

The views which Mr. Maurice entertained were not shared by any great school in the Church, but a large number of men in it were attracted to him by the breadth and charm of the preacher and the man. His congregation consisted of the salt of the earth, of 'intellectual and highly educated men.'[3] The invitation[4] which Tennyson addressed to him after his removal from his professorship is an enduring monument to the respect and affection which his care for

[1] *Life*, vol. i. p. 446; vol. ii. p. 614.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 385.

[3] See the account of him in the *Life of the Duke of Argyll*, vol. i. p. 399.

[4] To be godfather to Tennyson's eldest son. See the *Memoir*, vol. i. pp. 338, 339.

the right, his valour and charity, had won from the most distinguished of his contemporaries. And other men than the Poet-Laureate sympathised with the desire for freedom and tolerance, to which Mr. Maurice so fondly clung. Some of these men, six of whom were clergymen, decided to display the courage of their convictions by publishing a book of essays on some of the subjects which were distracting the Church. Among these writers were Dr. Temple, head master of Rugby; Dr. Williams, the vice-principal of Lampeter; Mr. Pattison, rector of Lincoln College; and Dr. Jowett, Regius Professor of Greek at Oxford. They agreed that each of the seven contributors should be responsible only for his own article. But the whole volume was avowedly designed to 'illustrate the advantage derivable to the cause of religious and moral truth from a free handling in a becoming spirit of subjects peculiarly liable to suffer by the repetition of conventional language and from traditional methods of treatment.' [1]

Essays and Reviews.

The volume, in the first instance, attracted little notice. It looked very much as if it would fall stillborn from the press. The 'Guardian,' indeed, condemned it a few weeks after its publication. A long and vigorous article in the 'Westminster Review' a little afterwards attracted attention to it. But when 'Bishop Wilberforce denounced its teaching in unmeasured terms,' both in his Autumn Charge and in an article in the 'Quarterly Review,' 'its celebrity and circulation increased with a bound.' 'An agitation of the wildest sort immediately began. Addresses to

[1] Preface to *Essays and Reviews*, 1861.

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the Archbishops came up from the rural deaneries on every side calling attention to the mischievous tendency of the volume.'[1] Lord Shaftesbury most unnecessarily declared that 'if the book were true the Bible was false,'[2] and Archdeacon Denison denounced it as 'of all books in any language incomparably the worst.'[3]

Whilst the flame was still burning which the Bishop of Oxford had stirred into existence from the smouldering embers, the bishops met to consider what they should do, and they finally decided that the Archbishop of Canterbury should write and publish a reply to one of these addresses, and that in this reply he should state that twenty-seven of the bishops agreed with him 'in expressing the pain it had given them that any clergymen of our Church should have published such opinions as those concerning which you have addressed us. We cannot understand how these opinions can be held consistently with an honest subscription to the formularies of our Church, with many of the fundamental doctrines of which they appear to be at variance.' The archbishop went on to say that the bishops were gravely considering whether the publication of the book was an act which could be visited in the ecclesiastical courts or justify its synodical condemnation! At a later meeting the question of

[1] *Life of Archbishop Tait*, vol. ii. p. 278. Bishop Wilberforce said in his charge that men were 'in danger of being robbed unawares of the very foundations of the faith,' if they should be persuaded to 'accept allegorically, or as parable, or poetry, or legend, the story of a serpent tempter, of an ass speaking with man's voice, of an arresting of the earth's motion, or of a reversal of its motion.' *Ibid.*, p. 279, note. Dr. Pusey said almost the same thing. *Life of Pusey*, vol. iv. p. 42.

[2] *Life of Lord Shaftesbury*, vol. iii. p. 162.

[3] *Life of Archbishop Tait*, vol. i. p. 302.

prosecution was left to individual bishops, and the Bishop of Salisbury decided on prosecuting Dr. Rowland Williams, one of the contributors to the volume, who, though he was chiefly known as vice-principal of Lampeter, held a preferment as vicar of Broad Chalke in the Salisbury diocese.[1] Mr. Fendall, a layman, subsequently took proceedings against Mr. Wilson, the vicar of Great Staughton, in Huntingdonshire, another of the contributors, and the two suits were practically heard together, both in the Court of Arches, in which they were originally tried, and before the Privy Council.[2]

Prosecution of the writers of *Essays and Reviews.*

Dr. Williams's essay was nominally a record of the Biblical researches which Bunsen had made in Germany, and some doubt existed whether the opinions in the essay could legally be fastened on Dr. Williams, or whether they were mere reproductions of statements made by the author whom he was reviewing. The opinion of Bunsen was notorious. He rejected Archbishop Ussher's chronology,

[1] The letter was drawn up by the Bishop of Oxford. *Life of Bishop Wilberforce*, vol. iii. pp. 1–6; cf. *Life of Archbishop Tait*, vol. i. pp. 275 *seq.* Dr. Tait's action in joining the bishops exposed him to sharp criticism from both Dr. Stanley, the Dean of Westminster, and Dr. Temple, the Head Master of Rugby, and one of the contributors to the volume; and I regret to say that in this controversy Dr. Tait comes out very badly. Dr. Pusey's objections to the book were detailed in a letter to the *Guardian*. See his *Life*, vol. iv. p. 39. Far the most temperate examination of the volume from a clerical or episcopal standpoint will be found in the eighth charge of the Bishop of St. Davids, *Remains, Literary and Theological, of Connop Thirlwall, Lord Bishop of St. Davids*, vol. ii. pp. 1–54. For more recent criticism from an opposite standpoint, see Benn's *History of Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century*, vol. ii. p. 114. It is a pleasure to add that Mr. Sidney Herbert, a strong High Churchman, endeavoured in an admirable letter to dissuade the Bishop of Salisbury from prosecuting Dr. Williams. *Life of Sidney Herbert*, vol. ii. p. 434.

[2] The cases were heard separately in the Court of Arches, but judgment was pronounced upon both cases together; in the Privy Council the two cases were heard and adjudged together.

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and demanded a much longer period than six thousand years for the development of mankind. He made 'the Pentateuch Mosaic as indicating the mind and embodying the developed system of Moses, rather than as written by the great lawgiver's hand.' He assumed that passages in the Bible, supposed to be specially predictive, are a history of past occurrences. The Incarnation became in his hands purely spiritual, and justification by faith a verdict of forgiveness upon repentance.[1] But the charges which were ultimately brought against Dr. Williams, and on which the Dean of Arches decided against him, were that (1) 'he had advisedly maintained and affirmed that the Bible or Holy Scripture is an expression of devout reason . . . not the Word of God, and (2) that he had contravened the eleventh article of religion by adopting Bunsen's opinion as to justification.'[2]

Mr. Wilson's essay on the National Church seemed to some minds even more objectionable than that of Dr. Williams.[3] Mr. Wilson, it should be recollected, was one of the four tutors who, 'with Tait as their leader, protested against Tract XC.,' and perhaps from this circumstance his presence with the other essayists caused surprise and indignation. It is unnecessary to give any detailed account of his con-

[1] See *Essays and Reviews*, pp. 54, 60, 69, 81, 82.

[2] Dr. Williams incurred additional displeasure because he was supposed to have adopted what Dean Stanley called a 'flippant and contemptuous tone,' and what Archbishop Davidson has since called 'a rude flippancy' in his essay. See for Dean Stanley the article in the *Edinburgh Review*, April 1861, p. 479, and *Life of Archbishop Tait*, vol. i. p. 279. I think if any one now will take the trouble to read Dr. Williams's *Essay* he will feel some surprise at these opinions.

[3] See *Life of Archbishop Tait*, vol. i. p. 279. Archbishop Davidson says that some pages of his essay gave more pain perhaps to devout minds than any other in the volume.

tribution. The charges against him, which were ultimately carried to the Privy Council, were (1) that he had affirmed in effect that the Scriptures in the Old and New Testament were not written under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, and that they were not necessarily at all, and certainly not in parts, the Word of God; and that (2) he had advisedly declared and affirmed, in effect, that after this life, and at the end of the existing order of things on this earth, there will be no judgment of God, awarding to those whom He shall then approve, everlasting life or eternal happiness, and to those whom He shall then condemn, everlasting death or eternal misery.[1]

Decision of the Privy Council.

In a very careful judgment, which he delivered in 1869, Dr. Lushington, the Dean of Arches, rejected several of the charges in both cases, but decided against the essayists on the points set out in the preceding paragraphs, and condemned them both to one year's suspension;[2] and it was on these points, therefore, that the Privy Council had to pronounce a decision. The committee which was summoned for the purpose was unusually strong. The Chancellor, Lord Westbury, who presided, was assisted by two ex-Lord Chancellors, Lord Cranworth and Lord Chelmsford, and by Lord Kingsdown, who, as Mr. Pemberton Leigh, had sat on the Gorham case some years before, and who, as a judge, had probably few equals, and no superior, on the Bench. Joined with these men as assessors were Longley, Archbishop of Canterbury; Thomson, Archbishop of York; and Tait, Bishop of London,

[1] I have used the exact words of Lord Westbury's judgment. Brodrick and Fremantle, pp. 286, 287.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 252.

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who was destined to be promoted a little later to the primacy, and who displayed on several occasions a judicial capacity which many judges might envy. The judgment which was delivered by the Chancellor was a model of lucid exposition. The Court, so he declared, had no power to pronounce any opinion on 'Essays and Reviews' as a whole; it had only to deal with the few short extracts from Dr. Williams's and Mr. Wilson's essays, which were the subject-matter of the appeal. As the prosecutions of these gentlemen were of the nature of criminal proceedings, it was necessary that there should be precision and distinctness in the accusation; and it was the duty of the Court to recollect that it had no jurisdiction or authority to settle matters of faith; but that it had merely to consider the true and legal construction of the articles and formularies of the Church. Upon the case tried in this way the Court affirmed (1) that the passages quoted from Dr. Williams's essay did not, taken collectively, warrant the charge that he had maintained the Bible to be neither the Word of God nor the rule of faith; (2) that these passages did not warrant the specific charge that justification by faith means only the peace of mind or sense of approval which comes of trust in a righteous God; (3) that the Church, neither in its Articles nor in its Ordination Service nor in the Nicene Creed, had affirmed that every part of every book of Scripture was written under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit and is the Word of God; and (4) that the Court could not find in the formularies any such distinct declaration of the Church as to require them to condemn as penal the expression of hope by a clergyman that even the ultimate pardon of the

wicked who may be condemned on the day of judgment may be consistent with the will of Almighty God.[1]

The lay members of the Court were, therefore, unanimous in deciding that the judgment of the Dean of Arches should be reversed. The two Archbishops dissented from that portion of the decision which (1) dismissed the charge that Dr. Williams had maintained the Bible not to be the Word of God, and (2) which declared that the Church had nowhere affirmed that every book of Scripture was written under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. But Bishop Tait agreed with the lay judges on this point.[2]

The decision of the Court was accepted with comparative composure by the average layman. Even in 1864 the average English layman had too much intelligence to believe that a beneficent God had arrested the motion of the earth on its axis in order that an aggressive tribe might have increased opportunity for slaughtering some unoffending Philistines, or that an ass had really spoken to reprove a hesitating prophet. Dr. Pusey might believe such things,[3] but the average English layman, whether he had read his Horace or not, agreed with the famous

[1] Brodrick and Fremantle, pp. 281-289.

[2] I am particular on this point, as Lord Selborne, in his *Memorials, Family and Personal*, vol. ii. p. 476, implies that the two archbishops dissented from the whole judgment, and Mr. Herbert Paul, possibly misled by Lord Selborne, declares that the two archbishops dissented from the conclusions of the Committee. *History of Modern England*, vol. ii. p. 397. Archbishop Thomson subsequently explained that he believed that eternity of punishment rested on the same ground as the eternity of blessedness, but that the charge on this point against Mr. Wilson was so worded that he considered him entitled to a verdict on technical grounds. *Life of Pusey*, vol. iv. p. 49.

[3] See his extraordinary letter to the *Guardian* in *Life of Pusey*, vol. iv. p. 40.

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conclusion with which the poet wound up his fifth satire.[1] The average layman, therefore, was not disturbed by being authoritatively told that statements which his common sense told him were untrue were not inspired by God. Nor was he greatly troubled by learning that the highest authorities in Church and State were agreed that a clergyman should not be hounded from his living for expressing a pious hope that the damnatory clauses of a creed which he disliked were not to be taken in their literal sense; and he laughed at the epigram which was widely circulated at the time, that Lord Westbury 'had dismissed hell with costs.'[2]

But if the ordinary English citizen was disposed to regard the judgment of the Court as the judicial expression of an opinion to which he had been long inclining, the ordinary English clergyman received the tidings with dismay. Without going so far as Dr. Pusey, who thought that, if the judgment was not repudiated, the Church of England would be destroyed or would become the destroyer of souls,[3] the clergy of both schools of thought were thrown into what Archbishop Davidson has called 'a wide-spread and not unnatural panic.'[4] Whatever else the judgment did, it had the effect of bringing High Church and Low Church together. Eleven or twelve thousand of the clergy actually signed a declaration

[1] Credat Iudaeus Apella
Non ego. Namque deos didici
securum agere aevum:
Nec si quid miri faciat natura, deos id
Tristes ex alto cœli demittere tecto.

[2] *Memorials, Family and Personal*, p. 476. Lord Selborne wrote: 'dismissed eternal punishment, with costs.' But I prefer the shorter expression, which is usually given.

[3] See his letter to the Bishop of Oxford in *Life of Pusey*, vol. iv. p. 52.

[4] *Life of Archbishop Tait*, vol. i. p. 316.

in which they declared their firm belief that the Church of England and Ireland, in common with the whole Catholic Church, maintains without reserve or qualification the inspiration and divine authority of the whole canonical Scriptures as not only containing but being the Word of God, and further teaches, in the words of our Blessed Lord, that the punishment of the cursed equally with the life of the righteous is everlasting.[1] The Convocation of Canterbury, calling itself a Synod, led by Bishop Wilberforce, formally condemned the book as containing teaching contrary to the doctrines received by the United Church of England and Ireland in common with the whole Catholic Church of Christ.[2]

The Synodical condemnation.

The synodical condemnation of 'Essays and Reviews' by Convocation had little or no effect. It could be said of it, as was said of the famous curse in the Ingoldsby Legends, 'Nobody seemed one penny the worse.' Lord Houghton, indeed, brought the matter before the House of Lords, and asked the Government to take the opinion of the law officers on the power of Convocation to pass a synodical judgment,[3] and as to the immunity of its members from

[1] *Life of Archbishop Tait*, vol. i. p. 317, and *Life of Pusey*, vol. iv. p. 54.

[2] The exact words will be found in *Hansard*, vol. clxxvi. p. 1536.

[3] The statute 25 Henry VIII., c. 19, sec. 1, enacts that the clergy shall not presume to 'put in use any constitutions or ordinances, provincial or synodal, or any other canons' in Convocation (which shall always be assembled by the king's writ) unless they have the king's assent to make such canons and constitutions.' And in the case of Long *v.* the Bishop of Capetown, Lord Kingsdown, in delivering judgment for the Privy Council, had said: 'A very elaborate argument was entered into at our bar, in order to show that diocesan synods may be lawfully held in England without the licence of the Crown. . . . It is not necessary to enter into the learning of the subject. It is admitted that diocesan synods, whether lawful or not, unless with the licence of the Crown, have not been held in England for above two centuries.' Brodrick and Fremantle, p. 322 and note.

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proceedings at common law. But the Chancellor, after carefully explaining that if Convocation had really passed a synodical judgment, or attempted to give effect to it, its members would incur the penalty of a præmunire, went on to tell their lordships that the so-called synodical judgment was only 'a well-lubricated set of words.' As a judgment it had no meaning whatever; and, having regard to the impotency of the thing, her Majesty's Government did not intend to take any action in the matter. The decision of the Government was probably as wise as the language of the Chancellor was unfortunately indiscreet. The Chancellor's speech, in fact, if it had any effect at all, had the effect of diverting attention from the foolish action of an ecclesiastical body to his own unbecoming language.[1]

While the excitement caused by 'Essays and Reviews' was still agitating the Church, another and more important publication increased the apprehensions of the orthodox. The main complaint against 'Essays and Reviews' was that six out of the seven essayists had been clergymen, and that five out of six clerical authors occupied positions in which they

[1] The Chancellor's language—'a well-lubricated set of words—a sentence so oily and saponaceous that no one can grasp it'—was of course an allusion to the nickname which the Bishop of Oxford had acquired, 'Soapy Sam.' The Bishop of Oxford, before the close of the debate, severely criticised the Chancellor's language: 'If a man has no respect for himself, he ought to respect the tribunal before which he speaks.' He ought not 'to descend to a ribaldry in which he knows that he can safely indulge, because those to whom he addresses it will have too much respect for their character to answer him in like sort.' And the feeling of the peers who heard the debate, and of the public who read it, were with the Bishop and not with the Chancellor. The Bishop of London, whose opinion was more weighty because he had dissented from the action of Convocation, condemned also in measured language the speech of the Chancellor. For the whole debate see *Hansard*, vol. clxxvi. pp. 1535-1566.

had special opportunities of influencing youth.[1] In 1863, however, orthodoxy was startled by a more striking portent, for a bishop came forward to deny the authenticity of six important books of the Old Testament.

Mr. Colenso had begun life as a poor Cornish boy. But his mathematical ability had induced some friends to procure him a sizarship at Cambridge, and their opinion had been justified by his university career, which he brought to a brilliant conclusion as Second Wrangler. He became for a short time mathematical master at Harrow. But his reputation extended far beyond the limits of the hill on which Harrow stands. His text-books on algebra and arithmetic were adopted in almost every public school; and such slender mathematical knowledge as the ordinary English gentleman possessed was based on the text-books which Mr. Colenso had published.

Dr. Colenso.

In 1853 Mr. Colenso was selected by Dr. Gray, the Bishop of Capetown, who was supposed to exercise a metropolitan jurisdiction in South Africa, for the bishopric of Natal, which three years afterwards was constituted a separate colony. Dr. Colenso threw himself into his new work with much zeal. He largely occupied his earlier years in his new diocese with the study of the Zulu language and the translation of the New Testament and parts of the Old Testament into that tongue. The man who deliberately sits down to translate a book is likely to find more in it than the ordinary and casual reader; and, as the bishop proceeded with his task, he found some old

[1] Dr. Temple was Head Master of Rugby; Dr. Williams, Vice-Principal of Lampeter; Mr. Baden-Powell, Professor of Geometry; Mr. Jowett, Professor of Greek at Oxford; and Mr. Pattison, Rector of Lincoln College.

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doubts, whose ghosts he fancied he had laid, reviving in his mind. While translating the story of the Flood, a simple-minded but intelligent native looked up and asked 'Is this all true? Do you really believe that all the beasts and birds, and creeping things upon the earth, large and small, from hot countries and cold, came there by pairs and entered into the ark with Noah? And did Noah gather food for them all?' Thus questioned, the Bishop suddenly realised the feeling that he did not believe; and he set himself to examine, with the aid of the best authorities on the subject,[1] the historical narrative which we call the Pentateuch.

The first results of his examination were published in 1862, under the title of 'The Pentateuch and Book of Joshua critically examined.' In his own language, it showed[2] that the Pentateuch, as a whole, could not have been written by Moses, or by any one acquainted personally with the facts which it professes to describe; and further, that the so-called Mosaic narrative, by whomsoever written, could not be regarded as historically true. The first part was followed by a second, third, and fourth part in 1863, and by three other parts in subsequent years.

The first part of the inquiry is mainly occupied with an examination of arithmetical difficulties raised by the Pentateuch. The difficulty of supposing that seventy persons, the original family of Jacob in Egypt,

[1] Mr. Paul, oddly enough, in his *History of Modern England*, vol. ii. p. 400, says that Dr. Colenso 'knew little or nothing of Biblical research in Germany.' Dr. Colenso, on the other hand, apprehended an imputation that the whole apparatus of his book had been drawn bodily from the German Rationalists. *Colenso on the Pentateuch*, part i., Preface, p. xiv. Mr. Benn has some very severe remarks on Mr. Paul in relation to his allegation. *History of Rationalism*, vol. ii. p. 140, note.

[2] *Colenso on the Pentateuch*, part i. p. 8.

could have increased in a little over two centuries[1] to 600,000 fighting men, or to a population of some 2,500,000; the still greater difficulty that this vast population, which, as a pastoral people, must have been spread over a large area, could have been warned in a few hours to prepare and keep the original Passover; the impossibility of organising the orderly evacuation of the country in which these vast numbers were settled, with the flocks and herds by which they were accompanied, and of sustaining these vast herds for forty years in a wilderness: these and other difficulties, even more inexplicable, startled the arithmetician.[2] Having set out these arithmetical problems in his first part, he proceeded, in the following year, to analyse in the second part the contradictory or discordant accounts of the same events in the Pentateuch—the two different versions, for example, of the Creation and of the Flood; the internal evidence, which showed that these different accounts were contained in two different narratives composed apparently by writers, one of whom knew God as Elohim,

Dr. Colenso on the Pentateuch.

[1] According to the accepted chronology, the Israelites were 215 years in Egypt.

[2] Voltaire, in his *Essai sur les Mœurs*, had stated the difficulty in another form. He had pointed out that the number of Jews slain from the date of the worship of the golden calf to the restoration of the ark after its capture by the Philistines amounted to 239,020 Jews. And he went on: 'Voilà deux cent trente neuf mille vingt Juifs exterminés par l'ordre de Dieu même, ou par leurs guerres civiles, sans compter ceux qui périrent dans le désert, &c. . . . Si on jugeait les Juifs comme des autres nations, on ne pourrait concevoir comment les enfans de Jacob auraient pu produire une race assez nombreuse pour supporter une telle perte.' Vol. i. pp. 188–189. It was sometimes conjectured that the 600,000 men in the Pentateuch had been arrived at by adding an additional 0 to the various sums of which this total was composed. But the correction would have enormously increased Voltaire's difficulty. For while it was incredible that seventy persons should have grown to a population of 2,500,000, it was still more incredible that any population short of 2,500,000 should have supplied the victims for the wholesale massacres of the Pentateuch.

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the other, as Jehovah; and he found reason for believing that the name Jehovah was not introduced before the time of David, so that a history in which the name was frequently found must of necessity have been composed long after the time of Moses. The third part was directed toward showing that the Book of Deuteronomy was not the work of the author of the remaining books of the Pentateuch, and that there were grounds for asserting that it was written in or about the age of the reign of Josiah.[1] The fourth part strengthens some of the previous narratives, and proceeds to a detailed and exhaustive criticism of the first eleven chapters of Genesis. Three additional parts were subsequently published. But to these no further allusion is necessary, as the proceedings which were taken against the author were founded on the first four parts.

Many of Dr. Colenso's criticisms were already familiar to German students. Some of them had been anticipated in Western Europe. Father Simon, in the seventeenth century, had treated the Pentateuch as a gradual growth, and his work, though destroyed in France at Bossuet's suggestion, had been reprinted in Holland and widely circulated. Three quarters of a century afterwards, 'Astruc, the son of a Huguenot pastor, published those epoch-making researches into the composition of Genesis in which the so-called Elohist and Jehovist narratives were first distin-

[1] I have given of course the barest outlines of Bishop Colenso's work. Having set out the poison I ought to supply the antidote: I think Dr. MacCaul's examination of Bishop Colenso's difficulties both ingenious and in some points successful. Canon Cook's article in the *Speaker's Commentary on the Bible*, a work expressly undertaken to remove the doubts occasioned by recent criticism (see *infra* p. 276), has probably restored no one's faith which had been shaken by Bishop Colenso's criticism.

guished.'[1] And Dean Milman, in his 'History of the Jews,' wound up a paragraph, which might almost have been written by Colenso, with the final statement that 'some general error runs through the whole numbering of the Israelites in the desert'; while in another note he declared that 'of the difficulties and discrepancies which occur in the sacred writings of the Hebrews, perhaps two-thirds are found in passages which contain numbers.'[2] If, however, Dr. Colenso had been anticipated in some of his important criticisms by English, and in many of them by French and German writers, no previous critic had produced so grave an indictment against the authority of the Pentateuch, or of the Hexateuch as a whole, nor had any earlier indictment been attended with such success. It is not too much to say that before Dr. Colenso wrote, nine out of every ten English laymen believed that the Pentateuch (with the exception of a few verses at the end) was the work of Moses, and that Moses in its preparation had been assisted by God; and that thirty years afterwards nine out of every ten English laymen, in any way qualified to pronounce an opinion on the subject, were aware that the Pentateuch was written neither by Moses nor in Moses' time, but consisted of various distinct documents of later date.[3]

Whatever judgment may be formed upon the book itself, the ferment which it occasioned is beyond a doubt. Lord Shaftesbury, it is true, was

[1] Benn's *History of English Rationalism*, vol. i. p. 197.

[2] Milman's *History of the Jews*, vol. i. p. 58; my copy is the 2nd edition. The passage apparently occurs on p. 57 of the 1st edition. Benn's *History of Rationalism*, vol. i. p. 322.

[3] *History of the Jews*, vol. i. p. 144, note. In this note Milman anticipated Colenso by saying that 'the number of the firstborn is quite out of proportion to that of the adult males.'

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disposed to regard it as 'a puerile and ignorant attack on the sacred and infallible Word of God.'[1] The arithmetical arguments were pooh-poohed by Bishop Wilberforce as containing no more than what every one knew to be false; and by Matthew Arnold as containing no more than what every one who counted knew to be true.[2] But this opinion did not represent the general feeling. The laity, already shaken in belief, might be disposed to accept Bishop Colenso's book as one more proof that the old doctrine of inspiration was untenable. Yet the clergy, who had protested against Lord Westbury's judgment in 'Essays and Reviews,' could hardly be expected to accept with patience a much more serious attack on the traditional doctrine of the Church.

The consternation which Dr. Colenso's book created was naturally increased by his own position. Many men, who honestly thought that free inquiry should be encouraged, demurred to the spectacle of a bishop proclaiming the results of his researches. It is, after all, only reasonable that, if we accept the pay of any calling, we should abide by the conditions of the service; and a clergyman has no more right to deny the doctrine which he is paid to preach than a soldier to resist the officer whom it is his duty to obey. Dr. Colenso himself had some doubt whether he should not resign his see before he published his criticism. Dr. Lushington's judgment in the case of 'Essays and Reviews,' however, relieved him from his difficulty. When the Dean of Arches was declaring that the fanciful interpretation of a passage on the belief

[1] *Life of Lord Shaftesbury*, vol. ii. p. 103.

[2] Benn's *History of Rationalism*, vol. ii. p. 143.

that a book was not written by the person whose name it bears is not to deny the canonicity of the portion of Scripture that contains it, to question the authenticity of the Pentateuch became obviously possible. Dr. Colenso, therefore, renouncing his first intention, determined to retain his bishopric.[1]

A few months before the appearance of the work on the Pentateuch Dr. Colenso had published a new translation of the Epistle to the Romans, with an explanation from 'a missionary point of view'; and the opinions expressed in this book had roused the susceptibilities of Bishop Gray, who supposed, not unreasonably, that he possessed metropolitan authority in South Africa.[2] Bishop Gray, a masterful and militant High Churchman, and the correspondent of Bishop Wilberforce, was anxious that this treatise (which has long since been forgotten) should be condemned by the English prelates, and that its author should be tried in the Archbishop of Canterbury's Court. It so happened that Bishop Gray, who was concerned in a case before the Privy Council,[3] came to England in 1862, and that Bishop Colenso, who was passing his work on the Pentateuch through the press, was also in London in the autumn of that year. The protagonists in the coming contest were, therefore, both in this country, and their presence added

Bishop Gray's proceedings.

[1] See preface to Part I. of Colenso on the *Pentateuch*, p. xii, note, and p. xxxiii. For the passage in Dr. Lushington's judgment, *Brodrick and Fremantle*, p. 259.

[2] 'He, not without some reason, considered the Letters Patent under which he acted to confer on him an authority which, at the time when he acted under them, Her Majesty had no authority to grant.' Lord Kingsdown, in Long *v.* Bishop of Capetown, *Brodrick and Fremantle*, pp. 316, 317.

[3] Long *v.* the Bishop of Capetown, decided in 1863 against the bishop. Mr. Wilberforce, in writing his father's *Life*, says that it was decided 'in the bishop's favour.' It is odd that on such a point he should not have taken pains to verify his facts. *Life of Bishop Wilberforce*, vol. iii. p. 113.

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interest and excitement to the dispute between them.

The publication of 'The Pentateuch and Book of Joshua' had, at any rate, the effect of diverting attention from the 'Epistle to the Romans.' It was hardly worth while to comment on the heterodoxy of the criticism on the Epistle, when the much more serious onslaught on Old Testament history had been delivered. The bishops, at a meeting in February 1863, on the advice of Bishop Wilberforce, resolved by a large majority—'(1) to advise the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel to withhold its confidence from the Bishop of Natal until he has been cleared from the charges notoriously incurred by him; (2) to inhibit the bishop from preaching in their dioceses.' Against both these decisions one Bishop (Dr. Tait of London) had the good sense to protest. He saw clearly (1) that the Society must pay respect to all those at the head of the several colonial sees simply in virtue of their offices, and (2) that while individual bishops might properly prohibit the Bishop of Natal from officiating in their dioceses, collective action would be regarded as a sentence—and a sentence of a very severe character—on a man before trial. He prevailed, therefore, on his fellow-bishops to substitute for the 'collective inhibition,' which Bishop Wilberforce was proposing, an address,[1] in which Dr. Colenso was asked to consider whether he could, without harm to his own conscience, retain his

Meeting of the Bishops.

[1] The biographer of Bishop Wilberforce says that the bishop's private diary shows that his hand drew the address. The biographer of Archbishop Tait replies that the draft address is in Dr. Tait's own handwriting. *Life of Bishop Wilberforce*, vol. iii. p. 120, and *Life of Archbishop Tait*, vol. i. p. 342, note. The address was signed by forty-one bishops—English, Irish, and Colonial—the only dissentient being the Bishop of St. Davids.

position when he could no longer discharge its duties, or use the formularies to which he had subscribed. Dr. Colenso naturally refused to take any step which would imply that his conduct had been legally or morally wrong, and accordingly nothing came of this correspondence.

In the meanwhile the Lower House of Convocation was increasing the difficulties which the bishops were experiencing. It was communicating with the Upper House, and asking it to appoint a committee to examine the obnoxious volumes. The members of the Upper House did not take the trouble to attend in any numbers to discuss this suggestion. By a majority of three bishops to two it was adopted, and fell immediately still-born. But the Lower House, under the guidance of Archdeacon Denison, assumed the duty which it had wished a committee of the Upper House to undertake. It declared, in May, that the book involved 'errors of the grossest and most dangerous character.' The Upper House incorporated these words in a resolution submitted to it by Bishop Sumner of Winchester, but sensibly declined to take any further action, as it was understood that the book was shortly to be submitted to the judgment of an Ecclesiastical Court.[1]

Action of Convocation.

The fact was that Bishop Gray of Capetown was preparing to return to South Africa, and was stating his intention, whatever secular Courts might do, of exercising his purely spiritual function of trying a suffragan for heresy.[2] It required both courage

[1] *Life of Archbishop Tait*, vol. i. pp. 328 349. Bishop Thirlwall (of St. Davids) made some excellent remarks on the conduct of Convocation in this case, and in the case of *Essays and Reviews*, in Charges, vol. ii. pp. 59–73.

[2] *Life of Bishop Wilberforce*, vol. iii. p. 121.

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and assurance to make such a communication even to a friend. Much more courage was required to persist in the intention after the 24th of June 1863. For on that date the Privy Council had knocked the bottom out of Bishop Gray's position. The bishop had originally been appointed, under letters patent from the Crown, with jurisdiction over the whole of South Africa. On the subdivision of his diocese, in 1853, he had surrendered his letters patent, and the Crown had issued fresh letters patent reappointing him to the new or reduced diocese of Capetown, but giving him metropolitan jurisdiction over the new sees of Grahamstown and Natal, which were simultaneously formed. But in issuing the new letters patent, the advisers of the Crown had overlooked the fact that, in the interval between 1847 and 1853, the Cape had become an autonomous colony. And in the case of Long *v.* The Bishop, the Privy Council decided that letters patent, issued by the Crown after the establishment of a constitutional Government in a colony, are ineffectual to create any jurisdiction, ecclesiastical or civil, within the colony.[1]

Bishop Gray holds a trial of Dr. Colenso.

But Bishop Gray, whatever defects he might have had, was not lacking in courage. On his return to the Cape he cited the Bishop of Natal to appear before him for trial. He presided himself at the proceedings, with the Bishops of Grahamstown and the Orange Free State as his assessors. When Bishop Colenso refused to appear, he heard the case for the prosecution. On the 16th December 1863 he delivered his judgment, giving himself, in the present Archbishop of Canterbury's words, 'a licence of

[1] Lord Selborne, *Memorials, Family and Personal*, vol. ii. p. 482, and *Brodrick and Fremantle*, pp. 293, 310.

criticism and comment not usually regarded as judicial'; and he deposed the Bishop of Natal from his bishopric, prohibiting him from the exercise of any divine office within any part of the Metropolitan Province of Capetown. On Bishop Colenso's agent protesting against the legality of the proceedings, he replied that he could recognise no appeal except to the Archbishop of Canterbury, and that he must require that appeal to be made within fifteen days. He had the assurance to go himself in the following May to Natal to 'take charge' of the diocese, and he took occasion of his visit to deliver a 'fiery' charge which, Mr. Keble said, 'looked like a fragment of the fourth century recovered for the use of the nineteenth,' and would have been less unbecoming in the mouth of some heated partisan than in that of a bishop who was claiming metropolitan authority.[1]

The intemperance of a fiery prelate had entirely altered the aspect of the controversy. Men there were who were honestly opposed to Dr. Colenso's opinions, and would have gladly seen him removed from the Church for his presumption in impugning the authenticity of Holy Scripture. Other men there were who rejoiced at the spread of free inquiry, but who considered that it was hardly seemly that destructive criticism should proceed from the paid members of the ecclesiastical garrison. But if men who agreed with, and men who disagreed from, Dr. Colenso were at one in thinking that he would do well to resign his office, Dr. Gray's conduct created a reaction in Dr. Colenso's favour. To the average layman freedom was a much more important thing than faith. And the spectacle of a bishop summoning a brother

[1] *Life of Archbishop Tait*, vol. i. pp. 352-357.

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bishop before him, presuming to try him in his absence for his opinions, to condemn him unheard, to depose him from his diocese, and to take upon himself the exercise of his functions, would have been intolerable in any case. It was, if possible, more intolerable when this conduct was the conduct of a man who knew that the Privy Council had decided, in his own case, that he had not a shred of authority to act as he was acting. Better, far better, that a dozen bishops should repudiate the authenticity of the Pentateuch than that this one bishop should presume to revive the machinery of persecution.

The Privy Council annuls Bishop Gray's sentence.

Dr. Colenso naturally appealed from Dr. Gray to the Queen in Council, and the Privy Council as naturally decided that the Bishop of Capetown had no jurisdiction whatever over Bishop Colenso, and therefore that the proceedings against him were null and void in point of law.[1]

If Bishop Gray had been endowed with an ordinary amount of either tact or temper he had now the opportunity of withdrawing from a contest in which he had been worsted from first to last. For while the Privy Council had judicially decided that he had no jurisdiction in Natal, there was nothing in this decision affecting in any way the authenticity of the Pentateuch, or any other point of doctrine. Based on arguments, which no ecclesiastic could deny that a Civil Court had a right to decide, it showed conclusively that Bishop Colenso's heresy was as much beyond the cognisance of Bishop Gray as of any

[1] There was some doubt whether an appeal lay to the Privy Council in this case, for if, as Bishop Colenso insisted, 'there was no sentence of any court or judge having lawful jurisdiction,' there was nothing from which there could be an appeal. Lord Selborne's remarks in *Memorials, Family and Personal*, vol. ii. pp. 484-486.

other bishop, either at home or in the colonies. But Bishop Gray thought otherwise, and on Dr. Colenso's return to Natal he thought proper to pronounce a solemn sentence of the Greater Excommunication, and to require it to be publicly read and promulgated in the cathedral of the diocese of Natal. The document declared John William Colenso separated from the communion of the Church of Christ, and to be taken of the whole multitude of the faithful as a heathen man and a publican.[1]

There was a time in the history of Europe when excommunication was a great and terrible weapon. 'By our common law,' wrote Hallam, 'an excommunicated person is incapable of being a witness or of bringing an action.' In life he was denied the offices of the Church; in death he was refused a regular sepulture. In addition to these penalties the excommunicated persons were 'to be shunned, like men infected with leprosy, by their servants, their friends, and their families.'[2] And so long as the people generally were either so ignorant or so superstitious as to submit to the claim of an ecclesiastic to pronounce the sentence, its efficacy was undoubtedly great. But the Church of modern Europe had shaken off the ecclesiastical thraldom of the Middle Ages, and the thunders of the prelate who had endeavoured to revive excommunication in

[1] I have cited in the text Archbishop Davidson's words (*Life of Archbishop Tait*, vol. i. p. 359). I should like to add my tribute to the excellence of a book which, in style, in arrangement, and in good sense, affords an admirable contrast to the 'Lives' of Dr. Pusey, Bishop Wilberforce, Bishop Gray, and Bishop Colenso; to mention only four out of the voluminous biographies of ecclesiastics in this period.

[2] Hallam's *Middle Ages*, vol. ii. p. 168.

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the nineteenth century excited ridicule instead of alarm.[1]

There were, indeed, men of temperament very different from that of Bishop Gray who wished to punish Dr. Colenso with more modern weapons. The trustees of the Colonial Bishoprics Fund—of whom Mr. Gladstone was one—decided to withhold from the Bishop the wages of his office. Mr. Gladstone based his own responsibility for the decision on the language of the judgment. He held that 'there was no see of Natal in the sense of the founders of the fund, and therefore, of course, no bishop of such a see.'[2] Mr. Gladstone had, of course, a capacity which few men have possessed of persuading himself that what he wished or thought was right. But less subtle intellects were not misled by the prejudices which occasionally obscured Mr. Gladstone's judgment. The Master of the Rolls swept these arguments aside, and, in 1866, confirmed Dr. Colenso in the enjoyment of the wages of his office.

Ecclesiasticism in England, however, had not yet finished with Dr. Colenso. Bishop Wilberforce, though he had endeavoured at the eleventh hour to dissuade Bishop Gray from resorting to the extreme of excommunication, urged on the Upper House of Convocation the solemn duty of endorsing the Bishop of Capetown's action by a formal declaration that the Church of England is not in communion with Bishop Colenso

[1] In the eighteenth century Bishop Wilson proposed a form of excommunication, which was reviewed in Tract XXXVII. of the *Tracts for the Times*. Perhaps nothing has set the lay mind more strongly against priestcraft than the knowledge that men so good, so gentle, so kindly as Wilson and Keble should have advocated the restoration of ecclesiastical discipline. Ecclesiasticism apparently may turn a saint into a fiend.

[2] *Life of Gladstone*, vol. ii. p. 168.

but in communion with Bishop Gray.[1] Happily, the good sense of Bishop Tait prevailed, and the Upper House contented itself with affirming the harmless proposition that the Church of England continued in communion with Bishop Gray.[2] At the Pan-Anglican Conference,[3] which was held in 1867, Bishop Gray again endeavoured to obtain a disavowal of Bishop Colenso's opinion and a recognition of his excommunication. He was ultimately persuaded by the Archbishop of Canterbury to refrain from a proposal which his Grace considered would have caused a dissolution of the assembly. He only succeeded in inducing the Conference to pass a resolution[4] with respect to the proper steps to be taken in the event

The Pan-Anglican Conference.

[1] In 1864 Bishop Wilberforce had told Bishop Gray that 'if Colenso returns to Natal, or attempts contumaciously to exercise his ministry, I would at once proceed to excommunication.' *Life of Bishop Wilberforce*, vol. iii. p. 122. But when Bishop Wilberforce knew later, that the bishops of the Church of England would not join as a body in ratifying a sentence of excommunication on Bishop Colenso, he begged Bishop Gray not to excommunicate, as excommunication was 'a dangerous, awkward, and, upon the whole, an inefficient weapon.' Mr. Keble thought Bishop Wilberforce right in discouraging the resolution to excommunicate in this case, 'but it is a most sorrowful and heart-breaking reason which makes me think so—that nobody now, at least no Anglican, really believes in excommunication.' *Ibid.*, pp. 126-128. Mr. Keble was a good authority on the subject, for he had written the *Life of Bishop Wilson*.

[2] *Life of Archbishop Tait*, vol. i. pp. 380, 381. Bishop Wilberforce's biographer ignores his father's action in these proceedings, and, quite inaccurately, says: 'Beyond a correspondence with Bishop Gray, respecting an episcopal successor to Bishop Colenso, Bishop Wilberforce had no more to do with the matter until the Pan-Anglican Synod.' *Life of Bishop Wilberforce*, vol. iii. p. 129.

[3] The Pan-Anglican Conference was originally proposed by the Canadian bishops. The Archbishop of Canterbury hesitated to summon such a Synod in 1866, but sent out invitations for it in 1867. The meeting, which was attended by seventy-eight bishops, and which was held at Lambeth, terminated, according to Bishop Wilberforce's biographer, peacefully, on the 27th of September. *Life of Bishop Wilberforce*, vol. iii. p. 230. The reader acquainted with Bishop Tait's diary is tempted to ask what the author's idea of peace may be.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 230.

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of its being decided to consecrate a new bishop for Natal, yet he publicly announced that the Conference had by the resolution approved the appointment of a new bishop. To the great scandal of the Church, a new bishop was, in fact, elected by those members of the Church in Natal who agreed with Bishop Gray, and the English Church in Natal was split up into the friends of Bishop Colenso and the friends of Bishop Macrorie, just as in a previous age Pope and anti-Pope had divided the Church of Rome.

Dr. Colenso's criticism on the Old Testament.

The controversy which had agitated the Church for half a dozen years had originally been aroused by Dr. Colenso's attack on the authenticity of the first six books of the Old Testament. Whatever judgment men might form on its merits, only the position of the Old Testament was assailed, and the New Testament, as a whole—especially the Gospel narratives—was not assailed. In fact, in the preface to the first part of his 'Pentateuch,' while expressly stating that he should 'not shrink from the duty of examining in what way the interpretation of the New Testament is affected by the unhistorical character of the Pentateuch, he had strongly deprecated the methods of those who endeavoured to establish the genuineness of the books of Moses by the testimony of Christ. 'To make use of such an argument is to bring the sacred ark itself into the battlefield, and to make belief in Christianity itself depend entirely upon the question whether Moses wrote the Pentateuch or not.'[1] But Dr. Colenso could hardly have been ignorant that criticism was already being applied to the New Testament. As early as 1834 Strauss had published the earlier volume of the 'Leben Jesu,'

[1] Preface to part i., p. xxx.

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a work 'in which he grouped together,' with great brilliancy and acuteness, all the historical discrepancies in the Gospel story which had ever been discovered. The story, thus told, looked like a myth.[1] The book made a profound impression in Germany; it was translated into English by George Eliot in 1844; and Lord Shaftesbury alluded to its author in terms which his biographer should have had the good taste to exclude from his biography.[2] In 1863 M. Renan issued, in the earlier volume of the 'History of Christianity,' the 'Vie de Jésus.' In 1865 Mr. Seeley published anonymously the 'Ecce Homo'; while, a year before Mr. Seeley wrote, another writer, whose style was as vigorous as his reasoning was clear, produced 'The Creed of Christendom,' a book which was destined to make a profound impression on many a young mind halting between the opinions which he had learned on his mother's knee and the doubts which inquiry and study were instilling into his mind.

Ecce Homo.

Thus 'Ecce Homo' was published at the time when the controversy around Colenso was raging. Its effect was probably increased by the fact that M. Renan had arrived at somewhat similar conclusions two years before. To Dr. Pusey, indeed, the book gave the same sort of pain as the 'Vie de Jésus,'[3] while even a man like Sir J. Fitzjames Stephen, who afterwards became the most thorough rationalist of the age, called its author a wolf in sheep's clothing.

[1] Tholuck to Pusey. *Life of Pusey*, vol. i. p. 322.

[2] *Life of George Eliot*, vol. i. p. 125 *seq.* Lord Shaftesbury wrote: 'In the *Times* of three days ago I saw announced the death of Strauss. "We shall soon know the grand secret," said the murderer, Thistlewood, just before he was executed. Strauss knows it now. The thought is awful beyond experience.'

[3] *Life of Gladstone*, vol. ii. p. 167.

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And there was, indeed, much in the book itself and in the treatment of its subject which was calculated to shock and distress a generation that still clung to the old traditions and the old interpretations which had satisfied their fathers.

It was, perhaps, a consequence of the reluctance to shock the public conscience that 'Ecce Homo' was published anonymously. Its author, in his own lifetime, hesitated to connect his name with opinions which were calculated to cause pain to many devout people. Yet in 'Ecce Homo' there is none of that destructive criticism which was already being applied to Holy Scripture. Its author, Mr. Seeley, sets out with the avowed intention of obtaining a clearer conception of the work, the character, the objects of Jesus Christ. A German scholar, it is difficult to believe that he was unacquainted with the works of Strauss. Yet there is not the slightest evidence, from the first to the last page of the book, that either Strauss's writings or German criticism had any influence on his opinions. The whole book is constructed on the assumption that the Gospels—or the biographies, as Mr. Seeley almost invariably calls them—are genuine and authentic memoirs. It is from these books themselves that Mr. Seeley builds up his whole conclusion. And the conclusion is the conclusion implied by the title, 'Behold the Man.'

It is true that in one or two passages Mr. Seeley seems to accept in Christ a capacity for working miracles, which implies something more than human power. He declares that the temptation was 'an excitement of mind caused by a nascent consciousness of supernatural power.' He states in one passage that there is a concurrence of evidence in favour of

the greatest miracle of all, the Resurrection; and he asserts in another that Christ professed to work miracles, and that, if He had not been believed to work miracles, Christianity itself would have failed.[1] But these opinions are stated with great caution, and Mr. Seeley goes on to argue that Christ's 'masterpiece' was not any miracle which He worked, but His 'temperance in the use of miracles.'[2] It was not 'the signs' which He gave but His refusal to give a sign on which Mr. Seeley is inclined to lay the chief stress.

Criticism of *Ecce Homo* on the New Testament.

An author does not leave on his readers the impression of a genuine faith in a capacity for working miracles when he rests his arguments, not on the miracles which Christ accomplished, but on the miracles from which He steadily abstained. In no other respect is there a trace of the Divine in the 'Homo' whom Mr. Seeley presents to us. The kingdom of God is the restoration of theocratic government. God's presence in man was no new thing: it had long been recognised. Christ, as Head of the Christian kingdom, was the Son of God; but then every king, as God's representative, deserved to be called Jehovah's son. Christ Himself was merely a new Moses, the greatest of the prophets. We are asked to admire His human brain, His human heart; and, so far from assuming that He entered as God on a mission inspired and directed by God, we are invited to believe that He thought out His whole campaign in the Wilderness after His baptism. It is not, perhaps, surprising to find that, with Mr. Seeley, the sacrament of the Lord's Supper becomes a common meal, in that it is compared with the memorial

[1] Cf. *Ecce Homo*, pp. 10, 12, and 43.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 47.

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banquets of certain societies or—for Mr. Seeley's language is blunt—with a club dinner.[1]

It was this negation of the God in Christ which made Lord Shaftesbury denounce 'Ecce Homo' as the most pestilential book ever vomited from the jaws of hell.[2] On the other hand, the reverence with which it is written attracted even greater minds than Lord Shaftesbury's. Immersed as he was in other work, Mr. Gladstone found time to review the book in a series of articles in 'Good Words.' Mr. Gladstone's friendly intervention revived the book, which was apparently dying. The orthodox were reassured by his arguments; the curious were excited by his notice; and if Lord Shaftesbury was right in saying that 'Ecce Homo' was vomited from the jaws of hell, he should have attached some measure of the responsibility to the Leader of the Liberal party, without whose assistance the book might have fallen back into the abyss.

The Creed of Christendom.

There is no evidence that Mr. Gladstone ever read the other book to which reference has been made. Yet 'The Creed of Christendom' was a far more serious contribution to Gospel criticism than 'Ecce Homo.' Written in 1848, published in 1850, selling slowly till 1873, but rapidly in the next ten years, it exerted a remarkable influence on the men who grew up to manhood in the earlier part of the second half of the nineteenth century. The first volume anticipated the conclusions at which Bishop Colenso subsequently arrived on the character of the Pentateuch—that it lacked authenticity. But it was the criticism of the Gospel narrative itself which arrested

[1] *Ecce Homo*, pp. 20, 22, 24, 76, 81, 164, 166, 176.

[2] *Life of Lord Shaftesbury*, vol. iii. p. 164.

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the attention of the reader. The truth of the Gospel, or of the dogmas which Christianity had deduced from the Gospel, had always been largely rested on the prophecies of the Old Testament concerning the Messiah, and on the miracles recorded in the New. It came as a shock of surprise to many an earnest person whose religious views had been taught him—as orthodoxy unhappily still continues to teach religion—by a careful concealment of all the arguments on the other side, to be told that no single prediction clearly referring to Jesus Christ, and intended by the utterer to relate to Him, could be found in the whole of the Old Testament.[1] It came as a still more disagreeable surprise to read that the author of St. Matthew's Gospel, writing for the Jews, and therefore anxious to establish the connection between the prophecies of the Old Testament and their fulfilment in the New, quoted, as prophecies, sayings which were not in the Old Testament, misquoted other sayings, and applied to Christ other predictions which—in Mr. Greg's language—'manifestly had no more reference to Jesus than to Napoleon.'[2]

The Creed of Christendom.

The cardinal fact, however, in the life of Jesus Christ was His resurrection from the dead. This, in Mr. Greg's own language, 'is the great fact to which the affections of Christians turn with the most cherished eagerness, the grand foundation on which their hopes depend, on which their faith is fixed.'[3] But when he came to examine the evidence on which the great fact depends, he found much to shake his belief in it. As even the orthodox are

[1] *Creed of Christendom*, vol. i. p. 85.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 138.

[3] *Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 140.

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agreed that the concluding verses of Mark's Gospel are not to be found in the ancient manuscripts, and as there is little doubt that St. Mark's is the earliest of the three Synoptic Gospels, and that it 'contains, at all events, in many parts the original document or tradition from which Matthew and Luke borrowed,'[1] it follows that the earliest Gospel which has come down to us contains no mention of the resurrection of Christ from the grave. The evidence of the resurrection must rest, therefore, (1) on the testimony of the other Evangelists, (2) on that of the author —whoever he may have been—who saw fit to add a supplemental chapter to St. Mark's Gospel, and (3) on the vision of St. Paul—'a vision visible to Paul alone of all the bystanders, and therefore subjective merely.'[2] On the examination of these accounts Mr. Greg arrived at the conclusion that, while there was 'ample evidence that the belief in Christ's resurrection was very early and very general,' there was no 'direct testimony of any one of the twelve nor of any eye-witness at all that they saw Him on earth after His death.'[3] Such indirect testimony as remained contained, moreover, as Mr. Greg thought, inconsistencies which it was hopeless to reconcile. Without entering into minor contradictions which would shake the credibility of a witness in a court of justice, 'Luke and Matthew contradict each other

[1] The words are taken from Dr. Abbott's article on the Gospels in the 9th edition of *Encyclopædia Britannica*, but Mr. Greg was aware that the genuine Gospel Mark ended with the 8th verse of chap. xvi., and that Mark's Gospel, if not the original one, was at least the earliest. *Creed of Christendom*, vol. ii. p. 143, note.

[2] *Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 147. I have not specified the account in the Acts, because the author of the Acts of the Apostles was one of the Evangelists.

[3] Mr. Greg rejected the account in St. John, chap. xxi., as a spurious addition to the fourth Gospel. *Ibid.*, p. 145.

past all possibility of reconciliation.' For, according to St. Matthew, Christ enjoined His disciples to go into Galilee, where they should see Him, and they did go into Galilee, 'unto a mountain where Jesus appointed them,' and there Jesus did appear to them in accordance with His promise; while, according to St. Luke, Christ commanded them not to depart from Jersualem, and it was in Jerusalem, or its vicinity, that Jesus was seen. But if St. Luke thus contradicts St. Matthew on the question of locality, he contradicts himself on another point of equal importance. For while, in his Gospel, he represents the Ascension as taking place on the evening of the third day after the Crucifixion, in the Acts he places the Ascension forty days after the Resurrection, and says that Jesus was seen of the disciples during the whole interval.[1]

New Commentary on the Bible.

The serious difficulties which were thus created induced Mr. Denison, the Speaker of the House of Commons, to take an unusual step. He proposed that a new commentary on the Bible should be published, 'edited by the foremost living scholars with every appliance of modern culture and research,' and with great liberality he undertook 'to provide funds almost to any amount for such a work undertaken by good hands.' He made the offer, in the first instance, to Dr. Tait, the Bishop of London, and, with Dr. Tait's assistance, a strong committee was

[1] According to Archbishop Tait (*Life*, vol. ii. p. 529), an intelligent Roman Catholic priest defended the Lourdes miracles on the ground that the evidence for them was very much the same as that for the Resurrection. This dangerous argument reminds the reader of the Tractarian controversy. 'Newman and his school had argued from the credibility of [Gospel] miracles to the credibility of [Patristic] miracles. This reasoning is now reversed, and the untrustworthiness of the Evangelists is inferred from the untrustworthiness of the Fathers.' Benn, *History of Rationalism*, vol. ii. p. 98.

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appointed to superintend the work, which was entrusted to the editorship of Mr. Cook, the preacher at Lincoln's Inn, who, before the first volume appeared, had been rewarded with a canonry at Exeter.[1] It was of evil augury for the success of this great venture that its editors at the outset purposely refrained from consulting Dr. Tait, from the fear lest he might suggest that Dean Stanley should be asked to contribute to the volumes.[2] But perhaps even Dean Stanley's picturesque pen and extended knowledge could not have rescued the ponderous production from the fate which awaited it. Whatever consolation it may have brought to the devout who have passed their lives, from infancy to old age, without venturing to open the pages of criticism, it may be safely said that the work has never satisfied any inquirer whose belief had been shaken by the revelations of science or of scholarship. Incredible as it may seem, the 'Introduction to the Pentateuch' does not mention Bishop Colenso's name;[3] it simply fails to grapple, from the first page to the last, with Colenso's arguments. Still more incredible as it may seem, while admitting that the concluding verses of St. Mark do not occur in the earlier manuscripts, it defends their authenticity. Where an acknowledged mistranslation occurs in the English Version, as in the famous passage in Job, 'I know that my Redeemer liveth,' or where a spurious addition has

[1] Canon Cook was one of the chief contributors to *Aids to Faith*, a book which, under the editorship of Archbishop Thomson of York, was intended as a reply to *Essays and Reviews*. *Life of Archbishop Tait*, vol. p. 526.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 525.

[3] To be quite fair, Colenso's name does occur in three notes, one noticing, to dismiss, one of his minor objections, the two others citing an orthodox *Examination of Bishop Colenso's Difficulties* pp. 6, 10, 13.

been incorporated in the text, as in the 'three witnesses' of St. John, the commentator shelves the difficulty in his note, but explains it in a supplemental note at the end of the chapter, which perhaps was not intended to be read, and which, in this instance at any rate, is couched in language which it is difficult even for an educated man to understand. And hence it has happened that a work which evades some difficulties and fails to grapple with others has been rejected by every honest man who endeavours to ascertain the truth, as unworthy of its subject and its projector.[1]

The books which have thus been noticed, the many other books on similar subjects, were well calculated to disturb the conscience of many earnest believers. It is impossible to avoid feeling compassion for the clergyman who had grown up from boyhood in a confident assurance that the Bible was the Word of God, and that Christ, the Divine Son of God, had descended into hell, risen from the dead, and ascended into heaven; and who suddenly discovered that a bishop of his own Church, supporting the most competent criticism of the day, was declaring that the Bible was not even an authentic narrative, and that both the Old Testament and New Testament were full of errors. It is perhaps impossible to avoid

[1] It may be added that the efforts which were made in 1870 to revise the English text of Holy Scriptures had much the same fate as the *Speaker's Commentary*. The revisers showed the same hesitation to grapple with real difficulties, and assigned to the margin of the work the correction of disputed passages. The language of the new text, moreover, failed to attain the dignity of the old; and perhaps the Revised Version is now chiefly remembered by the unseemly complaint of the High Church party that, in administering Holy Communion to the revisers at the commencement of their work, the Sacrament had been given to Mr. Vance Smith, a learned Unitarian. *Life of Archbishop Tait*, vol. ii. pp. 63 *seq.*

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feeling still greater compassion for the clergyman who, after waiting in vain hope for an authoritative reply to criticism which was shaking his faith, found that authority had nothing better to give him than the 'Speaker's Commentary.' But if nothing but pity can be felt for the devout and earnest men suddenly confronted with a new revelation which introduced a new meaning into their old faith, no such pity need be felt for the Ritualist clergyman. For while the whole essentials of Christianity were at stake, while the whole basis of religion was threatened, he was occupying his uninstructed mind with the mere trappings of public worship. Like those monarchs who, in a fancied zeal for the organisation of an army, devote their chief attention to the shape of the men's capes or the buttons on their tunics, he was devoting his whole life to an attempt to introduce new usage, or to revive old usage, in conducting Divine service. The innovations thus made were strenuously resented by the large mass of the laity. And the laity, in the contest with the clergy, were gradually obtaining one marked advantage. Up to the middle of the nineteenth century the average English clergyman was at least as well educated as, was probably even better educated than, the average layman. The bulk of the men who graduated in the great universities entered Holy Orders, and few men who had not been at a university were ordained to the ministry. The clergy in their youth had received the full advantage of university training, and they had mixed at the university with other men, some of whom, at any rate, were aware of the tendencies of modern criticism and modern thought. But after the middle of the century, when university reform

The Ritualistic clergy.

was annually attracting a large number of men to Oxford and Cambridge, and the whole education of the country was becoming better and more diffused, the supply of graduates for the ministry rapidly fell off. The Church had to rely largely on other sources for candidates for Holy Orders, and the bishops either instituted or fell back on theological colleges for the purpose. How great the change was may be inferred from the following fact. In 1841, the year in which 'Tract XC.' was published, 242 graduates of Oxford and 38 literates were candidates for Holy Orders. In 1861, the year in which 'Essays and Reviews' appeared, 159 graduates of Oxford and 241 literates were examined for the ministry of the Church.[1]

The Theological Colleges.

Whatever merit the theological colleges may have had, no one can doubt that the education which was given there was far inferior to that which was obtainable at the older universities. A hostile critic, Bishop Colenso, said that the theological colleges were institutions which at present exist for raising an inferior class of clergy to fill the vacant pulpits of the land.[2] But a more thoughtful critic said scornfully, in Convocation, 'Literate or illiterate, they often mean merely the same thing.' And there was something even more fatal to the Church than educational deficiency. The candidates for Holy Orders were not only badly educated, but they received no education at all in the very subjects which, in common honesty, ought to have been open to them. King's College, London, was something more than a theological college; yet even at King's College Mr. Maurice

[1] The figures were given by Sumner, Bishop of Winchester, and are quoted by Colenso, part ii., preface, p. xi.

[2] *Ibid.*

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was removed from his professorship because he held that eternal life was the knowledge of God. At St. Aidan's, which, in 1862, supplied the twentieth part of the candidates for the whole English Church ministry, the students were taught that 'every word, every syllable, every tittle of the Bible is just what it would be had God spoken from heaven without any human intervention,' and that every scientific statement is infallibly inaccurate.

It naturally followed that the clergy were losing caste as a class. The clergyman whom Crabbe portrayed or whom Miss Austen described was, at any rate, an English gentleman, educated at an English university, where he had perhaps rowed in the college eight or played in the college eleven, and had taken part in the usual round of university life. The clergyman of the latter half of the nineteenth century had very generally relinquished habits inconsistent with a more serious conception of the sacerdotal calling. But his education had become narrower, and his training had kept him more apart from the wider knowledge that was essential for a right understanding of the doubts and difficulties which beset the orthodox theology.

Let no unworthy inference be drawn from what has been written. Among the clergy in the latter half, as in the first half, of the century there were men of an intellectual eminence of which any society might be proud; there were men endowed with knowledge and capacity which few laymen could command; there were men who, apart from the reverence due to them for the manner in which they discharged the duties of their calling, were qualified to amuse and instruct the most cultivated circles. It

is not the qualifications of the educated moiety but the shortcomings of the ill-educated moiety which it is possible to question. And, in the ill-educated moiety, it is fair to remember the great men who were devoted to the duties of their sacred calling, who strove to raise their flocks to a sense of higher things, and who, often in poverty, often in woe themselves, laboured to alleviate the sufferings, to assuage the sorrows, of those to whom they ministered.

Educational and social changes among the clergy.

Yet, when all this has been said, the fact remains that the relative position of the clergy and laity had been altered. The visitor at a country house in the first half of the century who made a stay of any duration was tolerably sure to meet one or more of the neighbouring clergy at his host's dinner-table. The visitor at a country house at the end of the century did not expect the same experience. No doubt in both periods there were houses at which the clergyman habitually dined. In a Church where the patronage of many livings is in private hands, and reserved as a comfortable provision for the squire's nearest relations, it would have been strange if it had been otherwise. But those who are old enough to carry back their recollection to the days which preceded the Crimean war—those, even, who derive their knowledge of country houses from the light literature of the day—will probably recognise the difference. In the middle of the nineteenth century the presence from time to time of the clergyman at the squire's dinner-table was the rule; at the end of it, it was the exception.

Thus it followed that when, after 1860, Ritualism in the Church became increasingly active, the conduct of the agitation fell into the hands of a different

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class from that which had originated the Oxford Movement. Whatever opinion a man may form of the views which were advocated in the 'Tracts for the Times,' it is impossible to refrain from a feeling of reverence for such men as Cardinal Newman and Mr. Keble. Their superiority was so marked, their culture was so high, their lives were so pure, their influence was so good, that posterity loves to number them among the great men of their generation. But it was quite otherwise with the men who shocked public opinion by the innovations which they introduced into divine service after 1860. Ritualism, so a severe critic has recently said, made 'converts among the idlest, the silliest, and most ignorant members of the well-to-do classes.'[1] Without subscribing to this uncompromising judgment, it is certainly true that the congregations of Ritualists did not contain the highest leaders of thought, and that many of them were of small intellectual capacity.

Spread of Ritualism.

Ritualism acquired some strength from the Westerton judgment. In 1858 Mr. Stuart, the incumbent of St. Mary Magdalene's, Munster Square, insisted on the use of lights at the celebration of the sacrament. In the same year the innovations of a tactless clergyman, Mr. Bryan King, at St. George's-in-the-East, led to riots which were a scandal to the Church, and attracted attention in Parliament. About the same time Mr. Poole, one of the curates at St. Paul's, Knightsbridge, was censured by his bishop and ultimately deprived of his licence for his conduct in asking 'outrageous questions from persons who came to him in confession.' In 1860 the English Church

[1] Benn's *History of Rationalism*, vol. ii. p. 343.

Union held its first meeting, and in 1863 the 'Church Times' issued its first number. The ritual movement, especially in London, was evidently acquiring force and organisation.[1] It was also arousing keen

[1] Philosophic students will be disposed to think that the causes which produced a revival of Ritualism in or after 1860 lay deeper than might at first be supposed. There is an interesting passage in Prince Hohenlohe's *Memoirs*, in which, writing in 1864, he remarks that in Western Germany many people thought that the Reformation had 'stopped half-way,' and that the time had come for remodelling Christianity in accordance with the spirit of modern thought. In contrast with this broad Protestant movement, the orthodox Lutheran party closes its ranks, disputes the necessity for progress, and one section would even be willing to return to the bosom of the Roman Church if she would or could make them a few concessions. This being out of the question, they content themselves with increased strictness in their own doctrinal sphere, and adopt as much of the ritual and organisation of this Church as is in any degree possible. *Memoirs of Prince Hohenlohe*, vol. i. p. 133. When the historian finds the same symptoms at the same time in different countries it is a fair inference that causes common to both of them are in operation.

The story of the disgraceful riots at St. George's-in-the-East will be found sufficiently for the purposes of this chapter in *Life of Archbp. Tait*, vol. i. pp. 228–249. Mr. Bryan King, the injudicious rector, adopted eucharistic vestments in 1856, and in 1858 he had lighted candles on the altar, though he declared that they were lit to give light. Mr. Stuart, of St. Mary Magdalene's, boldly defended the use of lighted candles as coming under the words of the Ornaments Rubric. Mr. Poole, of St. Barnabas, appealed to the Archbishop, and from the Archbishop to the Privy Council. But the Court declined to interfere with the Archbishop's decision. The judgment and the history of the case will be found in Brodrick and Fremantle, *Privy Council Judgments*, p. 176. But Mr. Poole was only the humble victim on whom the Privy Council deliberated. A Mr. Beckett, of Leeds, had been censured by Bishop Longley for the indelicate questions proposed by him to married women in the confessional as early as 1850. Walsh, *Secret History of the Oxford Movement*, p. 81. In the same year Dr. Pusey admitted that he had exercised the office of father confessor for a dozen years. *Life of Pusey*, vol. iii. p. 269. Archdeacon Manning regularly used the confessional while he was still denouncing the errors of the Church of Rome. *Life of Manning*, vol. i. p. 492. *The Priest in Absolution*, which was brought before the House of Lords in 1877, was compiled by Mr. Chambers in 1863. Walsh, *Secret History of the Oxford Movement*, pp. 93–97. The Society of the Holy Cross was founded in 1855. I have no desire to write harshly of earnest men; but I am bound to add that the secrecy with which all these measures were adopted and conducted tended naturally to increase the distrust which the whole ritual movement excited.

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antagonism among a certain section of the people. The wiser heads in the nation were, indeed, disposed to treat with contempt clergymen whose ideas about religion seemed concentrated 'on the shape of tunicles or the number of candles to be lighted'[1] on the altar. The masses of the people were moved, not to contempt but to anger, by the practices of Ritualism. They had no sympathy with men who were introducing into the services of the Church ceremonial opposed to long-continued usage and, as they believed, to law. They could not understand why a curate should not be required to obey his bishop as implicitly as a subaltern in the army was bound to obey his superior officer. They could not understand why the bishops themselves did not enforce obedience to what was believed to be the law.

Opposition to Ritualism.

Things were in this state when, on the 1st of February 1866, Archbishop Longley, in receiving a strong deputation which complained of the increase of Ritualism, declared that it was the intention of the bishops to ascertain what the law did and did not allow; and, in accordance with that assurance, four men of eminence at the bar, Sir Roundell Palmer, Sir Hugh Cairns, Mr. Mellish, and Mr. Francis Barrow, were consulted on the legality of the disputed usages. These eminent counsel, in a very full opinion, reported that vestments, altar lights, incense, the ceremonial mixing of water with the Sacramental wine, and the use of wafer bread were illegal. Upon the publication of this opinion the English Church Union presented a case upon the other side for the opinion of no fewer than nine eminent lawyers, including Sir Robert Phillimore, Sir

[1] The language is Archbishop Tait's. *Life*, vol. i. p. 403.

James Hannen, Sir W. Parker Deane, and Sir John Duke Coleridge; and these advisers considered that, with the exception of incense, the use of which they unanimously declared illegal, the other usages in dispute were not forbidden by law.[1]

This conflict of opinion did not diminish the difficulties of the bishops. It was plain, indeed, that the legality of the new practices could only be settled by litigation; and the more liberal prelates were opposed to harassing any party in the Church with legal proceedings. In the year, however, in which these opinions were given, Convocation was endeavouring to find some solution of the controversy; and early in 1867 both Houses agreed in a resolution that 'no alterations from long-sanctioned and usual ritual ought to be made in our churches until the sanction of the bishop of the diocese has been obtained thereto.'[2]

The opinion of Convocation, however, carried no legal weight, and the men who had not listened to the views of their own diocesan paid little heed to the views of the two ecclesiastical Houses. It was obvious that if the dispute was to be settled, some stronger authority than Convocation must be employed to settle it; and Lord Shaftesbury, who at any rate was in earnest, actually introduced a Bill into the House of Lords to enforce the 58th Canon, which enjoins that every minister saying the public prayers, or ministering the sacrament or other rites of the Church, shall wear a decent and comely surplice with sleeves, to be provided at the charge of the parish.[3] But before the Bill came on for second

[1] Report on Ecclesiastical Discipline, *Parl. Papers*, 1906, p. 57, and Archbishop Davidson's evidence, question 12892; cf. *Life of Archbishop Tait*, vol. i. pp. 401 *seq.*

[2] *Ibid.*, vol. i. p. 406.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 408. The canon goes on to provide that the clergy,

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reading the Government decided to appoint a Royal Commission to investigate the whole subject;[1] and Lord Shaftesbury's Bill was naturally rejected, in order that the Commission might have the opportunity of suggesting a remedy for the difficulties which had arisen.[2]

Royal Commission on ritualistic practices.

The Commission, a large and representative body of twenty-nine members, decided on at once addressing itself to the question of vestments. The extreme Ritualists were endeavouring to distinguish the different seasons of the Church by the colour of the vestments which they wore—white, from the evening of Christmas Eve to the octave of the Epiphany; red, on the Vigil of Pentecost and all other feasts; violet, from Septuagesima to Easter; black, on Good Friday and other fasts; green, on all other days. And there is no doubt that the variety of the many-coloured vestments was a source of irritation to the average layman. The ordinary Englishman dislikes nothing more than the man milliner; and the man milliner appears doubly contemptible when he fills the sacred office of a minister of the Church. The Commissioners themselves were so impressed by this consideration that, within a few months of their appointment, they unanimously agreed to report that it was 'expedient to restrain in the public services of the Church all variations in respect of vesture from that which has been the long-established usage of the said Church, and that this may be best secured by providing aggrieved parishioners with an easy and

being graduates, may wear upon their surplices the hoods of their degrees; and not being graduates, 'some decent tippet of black, so it be not silk.' *Hansard*, vol. clxxxvii. p. 481. *Life of Bishop Wilberforce*, vol. iii. pp. 205 *seq.* *Life of Lord Shaftesbury*, vol. iii. p. 227.

[1] *Hansard*, vol. clxxxvii. p. 72.

[2] *Life of Archbishop Tait*, vol. i. p. 409.

effectual method of complaint and redress.' Unanimity on the Commission had been secured by the substitution of the milder word restrain for the stronger words abolish or prohibit; and this amendment was made at the suggestion of the Bishop of Oxford, a prelate whose voice throughout the controversy was almost always raised on the side of authority, but whose action always betrayed his sympathy with the Ritualists. In its amended shape the report was deplored by both parties in the Church. The Low Church felt that it did not go far enough. Dr. Pusey feared that it had extirpated vestments altogether. The bishop and his immediate friends knew that it had left matters very much as they were.[1]

Having dealt in their first report with these many-coloured vestments, the Commissioners addressed themselves in their second report to the kindred subjects of lighted candles and incense. On these two points they failed to secure the unanimity which had characterised their first report. They declared that, so far as lighted candles were concerned, there was not sufficient evidence of their use during the preceding three centuries till within the last twenty-five years. The use of incense, they went on to say, was very recent, and at variance with the usage of three hundred years. Clinging to the old recommendation that the parishioners should have an easy remedy against the innovations of their clergy, they suggested that this remedy should be given by aiding them to appeal to their diocesan, who, subject to an appeal to the Archbishop *in camera*, should be empowered to make an order dealing with the subject.

[1] *Life of Bishop Wilberforce*, vol. iii. pp. 214, 215.

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Report of the Commission.

The third report of the Commission dealt with the Lectionary prescribed by the Prayer Book. It involved no doctrinal points; and, except that a few lovers of English may have regretted the final disappearance of the Apocrypha from the service of the Church, its introduction was generally accepted both by High Church and Low Church. The fourth and final report of the Commissioners dealt with the rubrics of the Prayer Book generally. But, in the controversial matters affected by the report, as in the equally controversial matters dealt with in their second report, the Commissioners failed to arrive at that unanimity of opinion which they secured in their first report; and their recommendation in consequence failed to carry the weight which unanimity secures.[1]

[1] The fourth report largely turned on the use, the disuse, the amendment, and the explanation of the Athanasian Creed. Perhaps nothing in the long Ritual controversy illustrates better the difficulty of reconciling the different parties in the Church of England. There was no doubt that (1) the Creed was offensive to a large proportion of the lay members of the Church; (2) that it was struck out of the American Prayer Book with the assent of the bishops of the English Church, who were consulted on the subject; (3) that it was not used in the first half of the nineteenth century in more than half of the parishes of England; and (4) that it was only restored to general use after the Oxford Movement. There was also no doubt that, so far from being written by St. Athanasius, it did not exist till the century after his death, and that in the old days it was described by Gennadius, Patriarch of Constantinople, as 'the work of a drunken man' (*Gibbon*, vol. vi. p. 291, note), whilst a modern authority said of it, 'If it's true I am d——d, but I am d——d if it's true.' But the proposal to remove the Creed from the public services of the Church excited a memorable controversy. Dean Stanley, who advocated its omission, denounced the damnatory clauses as falsehood of the most misleading and dangerous kind (*Life of Tait*, vol. ii. p. 145). Canon Liddon, who desired its retention, declared that he would resign his preferment and retire from the ministry of the Church if this most precious Creed is either mutilated by the excision of the (so-termed) damnatory clauses or degraded by an alteration of the rubric which precedes it. *Ibid.*, p. 137. Dr. Pusey was apparently ready to follow Canon Liddon. *Life of Pusey*, vol. iv. pp. 208, 230, 235. Archbishop Tait, who disliked the creed but whose tem-

The proceedings of the Commission were protracted over four years. Appointed by the Government of Lord Derby, the Commissioners reported during the Government of Mr. Gladstone. While they were sitting legislation became plainly impossible, and the Bills which Lord Shaftesbury introduced in 1868, 1869, 1870, to reform and facilitate procedure in the ecclesiastical courts, necessarily failed.[1] But if the Legislature was temporarily precluded from dealing with the subject, the law courts were still active. The temporary truce, which the presence of a common danger—the publication of 'Essays and Reviews'—had established in the Church, was over, and High Church associations were denouncing Low Church opinions, and Low Church associations High Church practices. It is a remarkable fact that, up to the eve of the appointment of the Ritual Commission, the decisions of the Privy Council had, as a rule, been in favour of comprehension. In Escott *v.* Mastin, in Liddell *v.* Westerton, in Gorham *v.* The Bishop of Exeter, in Ditcher *v.* Denison, in the double suit connected with the publication of 'Essays

perament was always in favour of compromise, was ready either to accept the creed with some explanatory rubric or to take it out of the Church Services and keep it in the Articles. It soon became evident that neither party in the Church was prepared to adopt any arrangement. The spirit which ruled the famous Council of Nice remained in Convocation, and the 'precious' creed was retained in its integrity to stimulate one party in the laity to anger, and another party to scorn. Perhaps there it will continue to remain until, in Dean Stanley's language, it carries off the other two creeds upon 'its back.' *Ibid.*, p. 161. Before that day arrives it is possible that some earnest man may consider the propriety of adopting a suggestion which Mr. Charles Buller made in the early days of the Oxford Movement, that immediately after the Apostles' Creed the words 'as is by statute appointed and provided' should be printed in the Prayer Book. *Life of Lord Houghton*, vol. ii. p. 198.

[1] *Life of Lord Shaftesbury*, vol. iii. pp. 234, 237, 246–248. Cf. *Life of Archbishop Tait*, vol. ii. pp. 110–113.

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and Reviews,' and in the still more famous proceedings connected with Bishop Colenso, the Court had almost uniformly shown a desire to protect the clergyman against whom the complaint had been made. It is true that the decision in at least two of these cases—those concerning Bishop Colenso and Archdeacon Denison—had turned on purely technical points, involving, neither directly nor indirectly, matters of doctrine. But it seems reasonable to say, dangerous though it be to generalise on the subject, that from 1842, when the case of Escott *v.* Mastin was heard, to 1864, when Lord Westbury 'dismissed hell with costs,' the Privy Council had as a general rule dealt leniently with offenders, whether they belonged to the High Church, the Low Church, or the Broad Church party.

Decisions of the Privy Council.

Courts of law are, no doubt, expected to administer the law as they find it; but the greatest judges, in administering the law, have not wholly excluded from their decisions questions of policy. The expression 'judge-made law,' which in this country and in this age is mentioned with honour, is due to the interpretation which judges have assigned to the statute and common law. Judges in ecclesiastical matters cannot be wholly free from the considerations which influence judges in the ordinary courts. They may have thought, legitimately enough, that when two parties in the Church were engaged in an unseemly wrangle about large points of doctrine and small points of ritual, it was undesirable to drive men from the Church by pronouncing either their opinions or their practices illegal. At any rate, the decision of the Privy Council during those years was, on the whole, in favour of comprehension.

After 1867, when the Ritualist Commission was appointed, the same thing can hardly be said of the decisions of the Privy Council. It may have been that the acts which they were asked to check, and the opinions which they were invited to condemn, were more obviously illegal than those which their predecessors had sanctioned or condoned. It may have been that the men who sat on the Council in the immediately succeeding years were more resolute champions of Christianity and the Church than Lord Westbury; it may have been that they were insensibly influenced by the growing alarm at the spread of infidelity on one side, and by the serious dislike of clerical insubordination on the other. Whatever may have been the causes, a careful analysis of the cases points to the conclusion that, while from 1842 to 1865 the decisions of the Privy Council had on the whole been in favour of comprehension, after 1865 they were, on the whole, in favour of restraint.[1]

[1] I have instanced in the text in support of this view the cases against Mr. Mackonochie and Mr. Purchas, but it must be recollected that, on the other side, the case of Mr. Voysey points to the same conclusion. Mr. Voysey was deprived of his living—the deprivation was confirmed by the Privy Council in1871—for advocating in *The Sling and the Stone* what would now be called Theism. Whatever sympathy may be felt for Mr. Voysey, it is difficult to see that any tribunal could have allowed a clergyman to remain in the Church who openly denied the doctrine of the Trinity. Yet the effects of Lord Westbury's judgment in the *Essays and Reviews* case had been so large that Liberal clergymen seem to have persuaded themselves that (in Mr. Herbert Paul's language) 'a clergyman of the Church of England might preach any doctrine he pleased and repudiate any doctrine he pleased.' *Hist. of Mod. England*, vol. iii. p. 356. The contrary decision in the Voysey case opened their eyes to the fact that, whatever liberty might be allowed to members of the Church, clergymen of the Church of England would not be suffered openly to deny its most important dogmas. The Voysey case is of further interest because it was one of the causes, if not the chief cause, which induced the historian, Mr. J. R. Green, to finally abandon a clergyman's career. See *Letters of J. R. Green*, pp. 280, 291, 295; and cf. Benn's *Rationalism*, vol. ii. p. 345.

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The first case of importance arose in connection with the services of a new church, St. Alban's, built by the munificence of a wealthy layman on the north side of Holborn. Mr. Hubbard, the founder of the church, nominated as its vicar Mr. Mackonochie, a clergyman who had acted as curate in the notorious parish of St. George's-in-the-East, and who, it is fair to add, had been placed in charge of that parish during the absence of its ill-judging rector, and had won the approval of his diocesan.[1] It was soon evident that Mr. Mackonochie intended to introduce into the services of the new church the practices of extreme Ritualists. Candles were lit on the Communion Table—or altar, as it was now called[2]—almost from the commencement; coloured vestments were introduced in 1864, the use of incense in 1866, and water was ceremonially mixed with wine in the chalice, and the sacrament was elevated in the face of the congregation. In a catechism, drawn up by Mr. Mackonochie for children, the children were taught to pray to Christ for the prayers of His Holy Mother, and of all His saints. They were told that their ghostly father was the priest who heard their confession, and they were taught to pray for the dead, and thus obtain for them more grace and peace.[3] Honest men may, no doubt, believe in the truth of such doctrines as those which Mr. Mackonochie taught, or in the use of such practices as those which he adopted; but ordinary minds find it difficult to under-

[1] *Life of Archbishop Tait*, vol. i. p. 244.

[2] It is a remarkable proof of the growth of Ritualism that such a man as Archbishop Davidson slips into the expression 'altar lights.' *Ibid.*, vol. i. p. 407. In 1850 anyone calling the Communion Table an 'altar' would have been regarded as a dangerous Ritualist.

[3] See *ibid.*, pp. 433, 434, note.

stand how any honest man could teach such doctrines or adopt such practices in the shelter of the Church of England.

Prosecutions of Ritualists

The excitement caused by the practices at St. Alban's and other churches in London and elsewhere made prosecution almost inevitable, and in 1868 a case was promoted, at the instigation of the Church Association, by Mr. Martin, who took a keen interest in the district, against Mr. Mackonochie. The case was heard in the Arches Court in March 1868, and Sir Robert Phillimore, who had lately been appointed Dean of Arches, decided against the (ceremonially) mixed chalice, the censing of persons and things, and the elevation of the sacrament, but in favour of altar lights.[1] The judgment, therefore, was in one sense a compromise, and Mr. Mackonochie decided on accepting it in preference to appealing from a spiritual court to a civil tribunal. Mr. Martin, the promoter, however, or the Church Association, was not inclined to adopt this course, and decided to carry to the Privy Council that part of Sir Robert Phillimore's judgment which was in favour of Mr. Mackonochie. Thus it happened that the question of the legality of lights and candles on the altar was definitely brought before the highest tribunal.

From 1855 to 1868 the law on the subject had been governed by Lushington's judgment in the case of Westerton *v.* Liddell. 'All lighted candles on the Communion Table are illegal except when they are lighted for the purpose of giving necessary light.'[2] But Dr. Lushington's judgment had never been obeyed

[1] *Life of Archbishop Tait*, vol. i. p. 429. The judgment is reprinted in the second *Report of the Ritual Commission*, p. 353.

[2] See *Life of Archbishop Tait*, vol. i. p. 219.

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by extreme Ritualists. Mr. Stuart, of St. Mary Magdalene's, for example, lit candles on the Communion Table in broad daylight, and distinctly declined to obey the diocesan's command to abstain from doing so.[1] A similar practice was followed in All Saints', Margaret Street, and in other churches, and the knowledge that a Royal Commission was actually engaged in considering the legality of lights to some extent justified Sir Robert Phillimore in reviewing and even in reversing his predecessor's judgment. The Privy Council, however, which in this case had for its president Lord Cairns, Mr. Disraeli's Chancellor, was not moved by Sir Robert's reasoning, and reversed his judgment. From thenceforward the symbolical use of candles on the Communion Table was unquestionably illegal.[2]

While High Churchmen were still smarting under the effects of a decision which condemned the legality of many of their practices, they were provided with a more genuine cause of alarm by Mr. Gladstone's appointment of Dr. Temple to the see of Exeter. The High Church party knew Dr. Temple as the author of the opening treatise in 'Essays and Reviews,' and though probably many Ritualist clergymen had not read that book, and many others, if they had read it, had neither the knowledge nor the ability which would have entitled them to express an opinion on it, they thought themselves entitled to denounce a prelate who was destined to prove one of the great bishops of the English Church.[3] They even described the appointment 'as perhaps the greatest sin with respect

[1] *Life of Abp. Tait*, vol. i. p. 221.

[2] Mr. Paul, *History of Modern England*, vol. iii. p. 196, has criticised the reasoning of this judgment. I have not followed him in this criticism, for it is more important to state the fact than to examine the reasons of great judges.

[3] For the appointment see *Life of Bishop Wilberforce*, vol. iii. p. 319; *Life of Pusey*, vol. iv. p. 206.

to fidelity to revealed truth in which the Church of England has been involved since the Reformation.'[1]

At the time at which the appointment was made the different parties in the Church were agitated by another suit brought against a clergyman of extreme views, Mr. Purchas. Mr. Purchas was the incumbent of a Brighton church, and the case against him was originally promoted in the Court of Arches by his diocesan, Bishop Gilbert of Chichester. Mr. Purchas went far beyond the usages of extreme Ritualists. He adopted many extravagances, such as the exhibition of a stuffed dove in the communion service, which induced some people to believe that he was not perfectly sane.[2] But the main points on which the case turned were (i) the use of vestments, (ii) the eastward position or the position of the clergyman in consecrating the elements with his face to the east and his back to the congregation, (iii) the use of wafer bread in the communion service, and (iv) the mixing of water with wine in the chalice. On all these points Sir Robert Phillimore, the new Dean of Arches, in February 1870 virtually decided in Mr. Purchas's favour, and on all of them a year afterwards Sir Robert Phillimore's judgment was reversed by the Privy Council.[3]

Case of Mr. Purchas.

Incidentally this judgment marked the close of a long controversy, for it drove the black gown from the pulpit. The Privy Council, in deciding that vestments could not be used, had declared that the surplice was the only vestment which could be

[1] *Life of Abp. Tait*, vol. ii. p. 60.

[2] See Lord Nelson's speech in *Hansard*, vol. ccxviii. p. 802.

[3] For the Purchas case see *Law Reports* (*Privy Council Cases*), vol. iii. p. 605. But cf. *Life of Archbishop Tait*, vol. ii. p. 92; *Life of Pusey*, vol. iv. p. 222; and the *Report of the Commission on Ecclesiastical Discipline*, p. 59, with Archbishop Davidson's evidence, Q. 12917.

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legally worn in parish churches, and the black gown became as illegal as the chasuble or the cope or any other of the fantastic vestments which Ritualism favoured. This part of the decision might possibly have been accepted. Bishop Wilberforce was himself of this opinion. But 'the imperative injunction to consecrate at the north end' of the Communion Table, so he declared, cut far deeper and would not be obeyed. There was, indeed, some difficulty in understanding the importance which the Ritualists attached to the position of the minister.

The eastward position.

The custom of facing eastward for prayer or worship is ancient and widespread; its origin has been traced to various primitive ideas and practices, to solar worship among others. It seems to have merged, afterwards, into the usage of looking toward the holy city, the birthplace or home of a religion. The Jews were in the habit of turning to Jerusalem, as Daniel turned in prayer, and as the Mahomedans now turn toward Mecca; the early Christian congregations adopted this ritual usage by looking toward Jerusalem, which was for most of them to the eastward. But the practice had never been uniform. In St. Peter's itself the high altar is placed at the west end of the church. The Pope, when he celebrates mass, stands behind the table facing the congregation; and in the early reformed churches the table itself was placed, not north and south, but east and west, and the officiating minister stood in the middle of the north side of the long table at which the communion was administered.[1] The practice of the Church, therefore, had not been continuous or universal; and even Dr. Pusey himself attached no great signifi-

[1] Stanley's *Christian Institutions*, p. 52.

cance to the matter.[1] If, however, it is difficult for the ordinary layman to appreciate the importance which Ritualists attached to the decision, it is fair to add that it is equally difficult to understand the objection which Low Churchmen felt to the eastward position. There was force in a protest signed by a large body of clergymen at the time that the 'rubrics affecting this particular question having been diversely observed ever since they were framed, the Judicial Committee has given them a restrictive interpretation which tends to narrow the Church to the dimensions of a sect.' There was good sense in the regret which the bishops almost unanimously expressed four years afterwards that the position of the minister, though 'it has never been formally declared by the Church to have any doctrinal significance, is now regarded by many persons of very opposite opinions as a symbol of distinctive doctrine.'[2]

The decision of the Privy Council, however unimportant it may seem to the lay mind, provoked alarm and consternation in the Church. The good which the Westerton judgment had done, in reconciling extreme parties to the jurisdiction of the Privy Council as a Supreme Court of Appeal, was lost. The murmurs of objection to the court which were heard in 1868 after the Mackonochie case 'became very strong and outspoken'[3] after the Purchas case in 1871. Earnest men, but narrow men, convinced that a civil court had no right to interfere in

[1] *Life of Pusey*, vol. iv. pp. 210, 211.

[2] Archbishop Davidson's evidence, *Q.* 12918, 12939. He seems, however, to have attached more importance to the point in 1877, at the time of the Ridsdale judgment. *Life of Archbishop Tait*, vol. ii. p. 291.

[3] Archbishop Davidson's language, *Royal Commission on Ecclesiastical Discipline*, vol. ii. *Q.* 12955.

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an ecclesiastical case, found no difficulty in persuading themselves of the virtue of disobedience. Both Mr. Mackonochie and Mr. Purchas refused to yield to the decisions of the court, and both of them were suspended from their functions for their refusal to comply with the directions of a tribunal that they disapproved.[1] So general was the dissatisfaction with the court that when Lord Selborne introduced in 1873 a Bill for establishing a Supreme Court of Judicature many Churchmen, including the Bishop of Winchester and Lord Salisbury, wished to transfer ecclesiastical appeals from the Privy Council to the purely civil court which the Bill established; and though amendments made with this object were rejected in the Lords, the change was made almost without notice in the Commons. It required the indignant remonstrance of Archbishop Tait to procure such a modification of the measure as to provide that in ecclesiastical cases the Court of Appeal should be strengthened by the presence of bishops, sitting not as judges but as assessors.[2]

Resistance to Privy Council jurisdiction.

If the decision of the Privy Council was producing on one side disobedience, the disobedience of the Ritualists was provoking intense irritation among the laity. The masses of the people hated the practices of the Ritualists; they disliked their societies, their confraternities, their sisterhoods, and, above all, their open resort to habitual confession. They could not

[1] Mr. Mackonochie justified his disobedience by declaring that there was no ecclesiastical court, *i.e.* no duly constituted court. See his evidence before the Commission on Ecclesiastical Courts (1882), *Q.* 6089. Lord Lyttelton, who was a sympathetic critic of Ritualism, declared openly in the House of Lords that the Ritualists, in saying that they would not obey the law because the law was bad, were guilty of rebellion. *Hansard*, vol. ccxx. p. 390.

[2] Lord Selborne, *Memorials, Personal and Political*, vol. i. pp. 302–312; *Life of Archbishop Tait*, vol. ii. pp. 117–121.

understand why these men should be suffered to disregard the judicial decision of a duly constituted court, and they thought that, if the law was not strong enough to enforce obedience in the Church, overwhelming reasons existed for making the law stronger. Lord Shaftesbury, who had the courage of his opinions, had, year after year, introduced a Bill into the House of Lords to remedy the mischief. But nothing had resulted from his successive efforts. In 1874 Archbishop Tait, after conferring with the bishops of both provinces, and with their authority, introduced a measure to deal with the difficulty. In the Bill, as it was originally drawn, a council was to be formed in each diocese, composed of both clergy and laymen, to which complaints of ritual irregularity were to be referred. The bishop, on the advice of this council, was to issue an admonition or order, but the offending cleric was to be allowed an appeal to the archbishop, whose decision was to be final.[1] Before the Bill was actually explained by its author, its provisions, which it had proved impossible to keep secret, were attacked with great vigour by Dr. Pusey in the 'Times.'[2] Lord Shaftesbury vehemently resisted the proposal on the ground that it gave too much power to the bishops;[3] and when Convocation met, the Lower House informed the Upper House, with regret, that it could not accept the Bill.[4] It was tolerably plain that a measure opposed by

[1] The Archbishop's speech in introducing the Bill is in *Hansard*, vol. ccxviii. p. 786. Archbishop Davidson's description of the Bill is in *Life of Archbishop Tait*, vol. ii. p. 191, and seems to have been repeated by him, word for word, in his evidence before the Commission on Ecclesiastical Discipline, Q. 12923.

[2] *Times*, March 19, 24, and 30, 1874; *Life of Archbishop Tait*, vol. ii. p. 194.

[3] *Life of Lord Shaftesbury*, vol. iii. p. 345.

[4] *Life of Archbishop Tait*, vol. ii. p. 404.

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Dr. Pusey, Lord Shaftesbury, and the Lower House of Convocation could not pass without radical amendment. The Bill, however, was suffered to emerge from its second reading.[1] In committee Lord Shaftesbury, at the instigation of Lord Cairns, introduced a series of clauses, transferring to a single lay judge to be appointed by the two archbishops all the jurisdiction under the Act, and these clauses were finally carried.[2] Thus the Bill, which in its original shape had proposed that matters of discipline should be summarily decided, possibly *in camera*, by the diocesan or on appeal by the archbishop, in its amended shape placed the decision in the hands of a new lay judge.

Archbishop of Canterbury's Bill, and Amendments.

There was no doubt that Lord Shaftesbury's amendment had largely recast the measure. He would himself have gone a good deal further, and would have struck out the discretion which the Bill left to the diocesan to veto or arrest any proceedings.[3] But the Archbishop resisted any change in the practice which since 1840 had given a discretion to the diocesan.[4] His character, his opinions, were equally adverse to any such alteration. He relied on the personal influence of the bishop to restrain the indiscretions of the recalcitrant clergymen, and he probably attached much more importance to those portions of the Bill which were intended to increase the influence of the diocesan than to those other portions of it which were designed to

[1] *Hansard*, vol. ccxix. p. 65.

[2] By 112 votes to 13. The archbishops ultimately voted for the clause, in preference to losing the Bill. *Ibid.*, p. 959, and *Life of Archbishop Tait*, vol. ii. p. 210.

[3] See *Hansard*, vol. ccxix. p. 1143; and *Life of Archbishop Tait*, vol. ii. p. 211.

[4] See Lord Cairns's speech, *Hansard*, vol. ccxx. p. 39.

strengthen the jurisdiction of the courts. For it was the characteristic of this good and eminent man to believe that other men were as temperate and liberal as himself. All the experience which he had gained in a troubled episcopate had not convinced him that Ritualists were unlikely to listen to the language of remonstrance, or that when the whole foundations of belief were shaken by 'such books as Mill's "Life and Posthumous Essays," or "Supernatural Religion," or by Matthew Arnold's attacks,' good men, like Colenso, could weaken the defence by sapping the surrounding earthworks,[1] and earnest men, like Pusey, could raise mutiny among the garrison by unimportant questions of postures and vestments.

The Bill passes the House of Lords.

Radically modified by Lord Shaftesbury's amendments, the Bill at the end of June passed the House of Lords. But it had obviously a more difficult ordeal before it. A Bill which reaches the House of Commons in the last days of June, and reaches it in the charge of a private member, has not much chance of becoming law. It has less chance when the session has been deferred to an unusually late period by the incidents of a general election and of a change of Government. The Archbishop, indeed, made a strong appeal to Mr. Disraeli to aid in passing the measure; but Mr. Disraeli cautiously refrained from pledging himself to do so. When Mr. Russell Gurney, in whose charge the Bill had been placed, introduced the second reading on the 8th of July, there did not seem much prospect of its passage. The only member of the Cabinet who spoke to the motion, Mr. Gathorne Hardy [Cardinal Hardy, as Lord Shaftesbury

[1] See an extract from the Archbishop's diary describing a conversation with Colenso. *Life of Archbishop Tait*, vol. ii. p. 306.

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called him[1]], argued strongly against it,[2] and Mr Disraeli himself at the close of the evening refused to hold out any hope that the debate could be resumed. There seemed every prospect, therefore, when the House adjourned, that nothing further would be heard of the Bill in the session of 1874. But Mr. Disraeli was not as other men. He could not help noticing during the progress of the debate that men on both sides of the House were anxious that the Bill should pass; the newspapers supplied their testimony of the feeling of the country, while the fact that Mr. Gladstone[3] emerged from his temporary retirement to oppose the measure, and increased by doing so the embarrassment of his already embarrassed followers, furnished him with an

[1] 'Cardinal Hardy and Monsignor Salisbury.' Lord Shaftesbury's Diary, 18th of July. *Life*, vol. iii. p. 347.

[2] *Hansard*, vol. ccxx. p. 1423,

[3] Mr. Gladstone, depressed by the result of the general election and conscious of the weight of increasing years, was expressing to his more intimate friends a desire to retire from the leadership of the Liberal party, and his attendance in the House of Commons throughout the session of 1874 was intermittent and irregular. He suddenly returned to oppose a measure which the Government, through the Duke of Richmond, had introduced to abolish patronage in the Church of Scotland. The Bill received warm support from some of Mr. Gladstone's own colleagues and from the Liberal party. But Mr. Gladstone succeeded in persuading himself that it was 'precipitate, unwise, and daring,' and vehemently opposed its passage. *Life of the Duke of Argyll*, vol. ii. p. 314, and *Hansard*, vol. ccxx. p. 1113. A few days after his strange denunciation of a measure which most Liberals approved, he committed himself to the equally vehement opposition, referred to in the text, to Archbishop Tait's Bill. This attitude tended to increase the estrangement which had already arisen between his followers and himself. They were simply desirous to restrain the excessive ritual of some foolish clergymen. He persuaded himself that the House of Commons was 'in danger of becoming a debased copy of an ecclesiastical council, in which all the worst men and the worst qualities of the worst men would come to the front.' Morley's *Life of Gladstone*, vol. ii. p. 502. Of the many misfortunes which may beset a great statesman, perhaps one of the most harmful is an excessive subtlety of intellect which induces its possessor to deduce the most important conclusions from the commonest of common things.

opportunity of appealing from his rival to the public.[1] For Mr. Gladstone had made the mistake not merely of opposing the second reading of the Bill, but of embodying his objections to it in a series of elaborate resolutions;[2] and Mr. Disraeli saw that these resolutions would inevitably increase the difference between Mr. Gladstone and his followers by arousing the prejudices and exciting the fears of Protestant England.

Discussion in the House of Commons.

After four days' reflection, therefore, Mr. Disraeli came down to the House, and after declaring that Mr. Gladstone's action pointed 'to the abolition of that religious settlement which had prevailed in this country for more than two centuries,' and talking of 'the great danger if these propositions were not to be discussed,' he suggested that the standing orders on the following Wednesday should be postponed, and the House, on that day, should sit beyond its usual hour in order that the resolutions which, if they were passed, would 'give a new form and colour to English politics,' might be disposed of.[3] And in the debate on the second reading he further emphasised his position as a faithful adherent 'to the principles and practices of the Reformation' by declaring the Bill to be a Bill to put down Ritualism.[4] For anything except the purposes of party, the phrase was both untrue and unjust. If a Bill may be judged by the language of its author, the Bill was one to simplify the machinery of the law, and his great desire in promoting it had been to hurt

[1] Mr. Traill, in his *Life of Lord Salisbury*, says that 'it was not likely that such a chance would escape Mr. Disraeli, and upon this hint he spoke,' p. 122. But Mr. Disraeli certainly did not speak upon this hint. He waited, on the contrary, four days before committing himself. See *Hansard*, vol. ccxx. p. 1525.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 1391.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 1325-1327.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 78.

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the feelings of no party in the Church.[1] Mr. Disraeli, by an injudicious phrase, had converted a measure, introduced in the hope of securing peace, into a provocation of war.[2]

From a tactical standpoint his success was immediate. The Bill was read a second time without a division, and on the following night the resolutions were formally withdrawn.[3] With Mr. Disraeli's active assistance, the Bill passed rapidly through committee, and the Commons even refused to allow the bishop to retain the discretion which the Lords had assigned to him.[4] Mr. Disraeli himself personally begged the Archbishop to accept this amendment. The Archbishop had, from the first, maintained that the discretion of the bishop was an essential feature in the whole scheme. He reluctantly gave way; but the episcopal Bench declined to follow in this new concession. As they were supported by other Peers, the Bill was restored in this respect to the shape in which it had been sent to the Commons,[5] and the Commons, after some debate, decided to yield.

The Public Worship Regulation Bill becomes law.

In the discussion which then took place, Parliament had exhibited an unusual spectacle. The ties which usually united men on either side of the House were dissolved, and Mr. Gladstone's late colleagues in the House of Lords stayed away from the final division. His colleagues in the House of

[1] *Hansard*, vol. ccxx. pp. 411, 413.

[2] Mr. Disraeli spoke in the same speech of 'mass in masquerade.' *Hansard*, vol. ccxxi. p. 80.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 89, 118.

[4] If the bishop refused to allow proceedings, an appeal was to lie against his decision to the archbishop. *Ibid.*, pp. 884–888. Mr. Gladstone endeavoured to restore the Bill to its original shape on report, but was beaten by 118 votes to 95. *Ibid.*, pp. 1066, 1095.

[5] *Hansard*, vol. ccxxi. p. 1254.

Commons gave him 'the conspicuous adhesion of their absence.'[1] His late Solicitor-General and Sir William Harcourt took the chief part in opposing him. If the divisions on the front Opposition bench were sharp, equal differences of opinion existed in the Cabinet. Lord Salisbury in one House, Mr. Gathorne Hardy in the other, took an active part in opposing the measure. Lord Salisbury, indeed, in opposing the Commons' amendment, thought proper to repudiate 'the bugbear of a majority in the House of Commons,' and to deprecate the bluster of those who thought the Peers should give way,[2] and Mr. Disraeli, in replying to Lord Salisbury, said of him, in language which was long remembered, 'He is not a man who measures his phrases. He is a master of gibes and flouts and jeers. Perhaps he is not superior to the consideration that by taunting respectable men like ourselves as being a blustering majority he might stimulate the *amour propre* of some individuals to take the very course he wants, and to defeat the Bill.'[3] Such language was, to say the least, unusual when it was applied by one Minister to another; and men who recollected the sharp dissension some years before between the two combatants speculated on the possibility of a new and serious breach between the two statesmen, and the possible disruption of the Conservative Ministry.

If the session ended in the heated atmosphere of an ecclesiastical controversy, it soon became apparent that heat was the only real product which had resulted from the new law. It had been hoped that the new Act would simplify litigation; it proved

[1] The phrase is Sir W. Harcourt's. *Hansard*, ccxxi. 1345.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 1253, 1254.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 1358, 1359.

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'an exceedingly cumbrous mode of procedure.'[1] It had been hoped that the increased authority which the Act attached to the diocesan office would conduce to obedience, and it was soon plain that extreme clergymen had no more reverence for their bishop than for the law. It had been hoped that the Bill would, at any rate, provide some easy machinery for restraining illegal practices, and to the consternation of all parties it was found that the 'contumacy' of the clergymen led indirectly to their imprisonment.[2] A clergyman in prison could assume the airs of a martyr; and martyrdom, even tempered by the mild atmosphere of the nineteenth century, is more potent than constraint. In the few succeeding years with which this history is concerned, Mr. Enraght of Bordesley, and Mr. Dale of St. Vedast, were also imprisoned for contumacy, or, as their admirers affirmed, for conscience sake.[3]

In the same few years another case of great importance was carried to the Privy Council. Mr. Ridsdale, the incumbent of St. Peter's, Folkestone, adopted in his church all the ornaments and devices of advanced Ritualism. As Archbishop Tait's personal remonstrances failed to produce any effect, a suit was lodged before Lord Penzance, who had been chosen under the new Act as the permanent

[1] Archbishop Tait, Royal Commission on Ecclesiastical Discipline, *Q.* 12937.

[2] Mr. Tooth, the first of these martyrs, was admonished, and afterwards inhibited by the Provincial Court of Canterbury. He defied the inhibiters, and was committed to Horsemonger Lane Gaol for contempt of court. See *Life of Archbishop Tait*, vol. ii. p. 245.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 421, 422. The still more notorious imprisonment of Mr. Green followed in 1881. But I am not attempting to carry the narrative beyond 1880. So great was the failure of the Act that, in 1881, Archbishop Tait himself advocated and obtained the appointment of a Royal Commission on ecclesiastical courts.

Administration of the law by the Privy Council.

judge in the Court of Arches. Lord Penzance decided against Mr. Ridsdale, who thereupon appealed to the Privy Council on four points: (1) The wearing of vestments; (2) the use of wafer bread; (3) the erection of a crucifix upon a rood screen; and (4) the eastward position. The Privy Council decided against Mr. Ridsdale on the first and third of these points. But they held that the charge of using wafer bread of an illegal kind had not been proved, and that the eastward position was not illegal if the manual acts of the ministrant were visible to the congregation.[1] The judgment, therefore, so far as the eastward position was concerned, reversed the decision which had been given in the Purchas case. The Privy Council, to that extent, showed that disposition to compromise which it had displayed from 1842 to 1865, and which it had abandoned after 1865.

Looking back over the decisions of the Privy Council during the long period with which this chapter has been concerned, it is obvious that they had largely extended latitude of opinion. The Gorham judgment, the dismissal of hell with costs in the case of 'Essays and Reviews,' and the fact that Bishop Colenso was still presiding over his episcopate in Natal, all tended to enlarge the opinions which clergymen were permitted to hold, though the change in practice was equally great. The long controversy about the black gown had been definitely settled by the pronouncement that the surplice was to be worn in every parish church. The Communion Table was suffered to be made of wood as heavy and difficult of removal as skill could make it. Crosses were

[1] *Life of Archbishop Tait*, vol. ii. p. 239; and cf. Archbishop Davidson's evidence, *Q.* 12939 (*p*).

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permitted to be fixed on chancel screens and placed on or above the table. Candles were no longer forbidden, and could be lighted for the purpose of giving light. The officiating clergyman was allowed to stand with his back to the congregation provided his manual acts were visible to the congregation; the mixed chalice was no longer prohibited; and, though vestments were forbidden and incense illegal, it was a matter of common knowledge that vestments were frequently worn and incense constantly used. 'Mass in masquerade,' to quote Mr. Disraeli's unbecoming phrase, had survived the decisions of the highest tribunal and the decree of the Legislature; and Ritualism, which the Public Worship Regulation Act was designed to put down, flourished unchecked. On the other hand, if the Ritualists had been accorded some liberty, and had assumed great liberty, of practice, the main point for which they had originally contended had been lost. For the real leaders of the movement cared much less for ornaments and vestments, for incense and postures, than for the supremacy of the Church; and, on this point, at any rate, they had been decisively defeated. 'The History of Anglican doctrines, from the Gorham case to the Public Worship Regulation Act,' so wrote Mr. Wilfrid Ward, in the life of his father, 'has been one long assertion of the principle for which Arnold contended, and a denial of the principle which Newman maintained. It is Parliament and the Privy Council which ultimately determine what doctrines and principles are admissible within the Established Church. . . . Bishops who—as Bishop Phillpotts did—have attempted to assert their prerogatives as exponents of Anglicanism have been overruled. The Erastianism,

which it was the object of the movement to overthrow, has beyond question come forth triumphant.'[1]

Attitude of laymen towards Ritualism.

To the instructed layman, moreover, the Ritual movement suggested another consideration. He was disposed to regard with impatience, or even with contempt, the attitude of clergymen who occupied themselves with postures and vestments, while they neglected or ignored the great contemporary discoveries which were shaking religion itself to its foundations. The Church had originally taught that the earth was the centre of the heavens, that it had been created some 6000 years ago, that man, who had been originally created in the image of God and given universal dominion over all other creatures, had fallen from his position of perfection and had only now attained the possibility of pardon by the sacrifice of the Son of God, the second person of the Trinity. And science had proved that the earth was a small planet revolving round a comparatively small sun, and that the whole solar system was infinitely insignificant contrasted with the other innumerable systems which the discoveries of the nineteenth century had revealed to us. Science again had shown that, so far from being recent in creation, the solar system had existed for millions of years; and that man had been present on the earth for a period at any rate ten times as long—and possibly some hundreds of times as long—as that which religion had assigned to him. The doctrine of evolution, which Herbert Spencer had done so much to make popular, and which Darwin had applied to biology, had shown incidentally that there had been no fall, but that man had gradually risen from a lower to a higher nature. Criticism, coming to the aid

[1] *W. G. Ward and the Oxford Movement*, p. 376.

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of physical science, had shown that the earlier books of the Old Testament were creations of a late age; that the Bible itself, so far from being a message of God to man, was essentially a history of man's belief about God; and that even in the New Testament there were divergences and contradictions which, if they had occurred in any lay history, would have thrown doubt on the accuracy of the narrative. When the inspiration of the Bible, when the resurrection of Christ were in dispute, how could men be wrangling over the posture of a clergyman or the ceremonial mixing of the chalice?

Some men there were who perhaps thought that a Church which had survived the discoveries of Galileo and Copernicus had nothing to fear from modern science. But they hardly understood the tremendous change which was revolutionising criticism in the early days of the Ritualist movement. In 1859 Canon Rawlinson, in preaching the Bampton Lectures, argued that as Adam was for 243 years the contemporary of Methuselah, who conversed for 100 years with Shem, who was for 50 years contemporary with Jacob, who probably saw Jochebed, Moses' mother, Moses might have obtained the history of the Deluge at third hand, and of the Temptation and of the Fall at fifth hand.[1] It is almost incredible that in the last half of the nineteenth century a learned man—and Canon Rawlinson was one of the most learned of men—should have based the tradition of the Deluge on the prolongation of human life for 900 years. Herodotus, whom he had translated, concurs with the Psalmist in limiting man's ordinary life to

[1] *Bampton Lectures*, 1859, p. 50. I owe the reference to Professor Huxley, *Collected Essays*, vol. iv. p. 210.

Scientific criticism.

seventy years.[1] Only four years after the publication of the Bampton Lectures Dr. Smith was employed to edit the 'Dictionary of the Bible,' and he entrusted the article Deluge to a man of very considerable ability. When the article came to him he found it so treated that he could not venture to put it in. There was not the time for a second article, and he therefore referred his readers to the word Noah in a future volume. 'Under that name,' said Professor Carpenter, 'you will find an article written by a distinguished professor of Cambridge, of which I remember that Bishop Colenso said to me at the time, "in a very guarded way the writer concedes the whole thing."'[2] The only commentary which the reader of the article will make on this remark is to question whether Bishop Colenso should have added to his sentence the words 'in a very guarded way.' 'What has become,' wrote Professor Draper in his great book on the 'Intellectual Development of Europe,' 'of the time-honoured doctrine of the human destiny of the universe? . . . It has disappeared. In vain was Bruno burnt and Galileo imprisoned; the truth forced its way at last. The end of the conflict was a total rejection of authority and tradition and the adoption of scientific truth.'[3]

Scientific truth, indeed, labours under one disadvantage. The mass of mankind have neither the knowledge nor the capacity to appreciate the great revelations vouchsafed to us in the nineteenth century; and men with slender knowledge and slenderer

[1] Herodotus, bk. i. ch. 32, and Psalm xc. 10.

[2] Official Correspondence of the National Conference of Unitarian and other Christian Churches held at Saratoga, 1882, p. 97, quoted in White, *Warfare of Science and Theology*, i. p. 235.

[3] Draper, *Intellectual Development of Europe*, vol. ii. p. 293.

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capacity accepted the crude arguments with which authority endeavoured to reconcile tradition and science. But if the masses of even educated men were incapable of appreciating the new ideas which science had introduced, many of them were insensibly influenced by the teachings of literature. The great writers, the great poets of the age were abandoning the creeds to which men had hitherto clung—even the doctrine of the immortality of the soul was gradually disappearing. Wordsworth, in the beginning of the century, had endeavoured to infer it from the 'Recollections of Early Childhood.' But among the tens of thousands who have read or even learned by heart one of the most beautiful poems of the nineteenth century, a very small minority could have derived any comfort from 'the vision splendid' allowed to the child but denied to the man.[1] Tennyson, with far truer insight, said that the discoveries of his own time shook his reason to its foundation, and he turned back on faith. Swinburne, a few years later, actually revelled in the opposite doctrine, and thanked 'whatever Gods there be, That no life lives for ever.' Henley, adopting Swinburne's language, thanks 'whatever Gods may be for his unconquerable soul,' and boasts that the 'menace of the years finds and shall find him unafraid.' Stuart Mill, in language as striking as Henley's, refused to call the God preached by Mansel in his Bampton Lectures good, and added, 'if he sends me to hell for saying it, to hell I will go'; while Clough, in his 'Easter Day,' repeated,

Tendencies of literature and poetry.

> This is the one sad gospel that is true,
> Christ is not risen.

[1] The idea of the 'Intimations of Immortality' is reproduced by Rossetti in his poem on Sudden Light: 'I have been here before.'

In a chapter which is already too long it would perhaps be out of place to dwell too closely on the effect which literature was producing on the highest thought. It is perhaps wiser to concentrate attention on the work of one man who exerted an unrivalled influence on his generation. Few men indeed who have made their mark in English literature have ever succeeded in expressing so accurately as Mr. Tennyson the thought of the generation which was rising up around him; and few men who have written in any language have ever explained so clearly and so fully the various phases of doubt through which he slowly attained to faith. For 'In Memoriam' is a poem on which its author spent the best part of ten years; and in it we may still trace the workings of one of the most cultivated and, in a true sense, the most religious minds of his age.

Tennyson's 'In Memoriam.'

There are probably many persons who regard 'In Memoriam' as a beautiful dirge—as a monument raised by love to the memory of a friend. They would say that what Milton had done for King in 'Lycidas' Tennyson did more effectually in 'In Memoriam' for Arthur Hallam.[1] And in one respect they are right. For the work which Tennyson thus did he did so well that he has impressed on posterity an ideal figure of Arthur Hallam that only this poem could have produced. Yet the reader who simply regards 'In Memoriam' as a matchless tribute to the memory of a friend may have appreciated the beauty but has

[1] I purposely omit the *Adonais* of Shelley and the *Thyrsis* of Matthew Arnold, because the men who were commemorated in these poems had already achieved greatness. King and Arthur Hallam, on the contrary, were merely brilliant students, the promise of whose spring was unduly destroyed by the death of King in the Irish Channel, and of Hallam in Vienna.

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certainly missed the significance of the poem. Its chief interest lies not in the friend who is struck down in Vienna, but in the friend who survived in England. For it contains both a confession and a creed—a confession of a struggle with doubt, a creed commemorating the victory of Faith over Reason.

Religious fears and hopes.

In the first section of the poem, indeed, the poignancy of the author's sorrow leaves no room for higher or deeper thought. But as the first section draws to a close with the reflection, which has since done something to console so many a mourner, 'tis better to have loved and lost than never to have loved at all,'[1] the poet hardly dares keep his Christmas Eve. Sorrow, as a new year commences, is still with him. Yet, as the new year opens into spring, sorrow can be sometimes lovely like a bride—just as the old year which at the beginning of the poem has no glow, no bloom, in the thirty-ninth section has its 'golden hour, when flower is feeling after flower.' The crushing desolation which had pressed down thought is compensated by the strong hope that death may not sunder the dead from the living. The doubt, indeed, arises, as it has arisen to many a man before, whether human nature in its baseness could bear that those whom we had loved should see with clear eye the hidden shame. His friend Mr. Maurice, one of the purest of his contemporaries, wrote twenty years after 'In Memoriam' was published, 'Dare I feel the thought of being looked through and through by one whose love is worth all the world to me? Can I bear that he should have the pain of knowing all my wrong?'[2] Mr. Tennyson put

[1] Cantos xxvii., xxix.
[2] *Life of Maurice*, vol. ii. p. 620.

the same question in other words, and supplied the answer—

I wrong the grave with fears untrue:
. . . . .
There must be wisdom with great death:
The dead shall look me through and through.

Be near us when we climb or fall:
. . . . .
To make allowance for us all.[1]

The poet's thoughts and reflections.

A man who could write in this way, who could feel a passionate desire for the company of his dead friend, was naturally drawn to reflect on the immortality of man or, as the poet puts it, on the immortality of life. The dream, the aspiration, is clear, 'That nothing walks with aimless feet; that good shall fall at last—far off—at last, to all.' But is it anything but a dream?—the dream of an infant crying in the night, with no language but a cry? The wish, indeed, that life may not fail beyond the grave is derived from what we have 'the likest God within the soul.' Yet Nature, through Science, sends another answer to the still small voice of the God within us. She cares not for the single life, however careful she may seem to be of the type; and the poet recognising the truth of inevitable death falters where he had firmly trod; he stretches lame hands of faith and faintly trusts the larger hope. The doubt which imparts so sad a tone to these melancholy stanzas is next deepened by a more formidable difficulty. Hitherto Nature had seemed at least careful of the type. But Nature, through Science, dispels even this illusion.

From scarped cliff and quarried stone
She cries, 'A thousand types are gone:
I care for nothing, all shall go.'

[1] Canto li.

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What assurance, what hope was left that even man, her last work, who seemed so fair, should escape the universal doom, and that he too should not be blown about the desert dust and sealed within the iron hills?

Science had said her last word. Reason had found no escape from the teachings of Science, and man, with no hope of a future, seemed a monster, a dream, a discord. Yet the passionate longing in the poet for some answer, some redress, induces him to break off abruptly from these terrible stanzas. The note changes as quickly as Timotheus' song in 'Alexander's Feast':

Faith and love subdue doubts.

> Peace; come away: the song of woe
> Is after all an earthly song.[1]

And when the second Christmas after his friend's death comes round, the sorrow is tempered with joy:

> The yule-clog sparkled keen with frost,
> No wing of wind the region swept,
> But over all things brooding slept
> The quiet sense of something lost.[2]

Thenceforward, and throughout the rest of the poem, the poet strikes another and a different note. The sense of blank despair which pervades the earlier portion of the poem is gone, and though doubt remains, doubt itself is justified in language which will be quoted as long as English is read. For had not his dead friend himself had doubts, and was not he the great example at which the poet was aiming?

> Perplext in faith, but pure in deeds,
> At last he beat his music out.
> There lives more faith in honest doubt,
> Believe me, than in half the creeds.

[1] Canto lvii. [2] Canto lxxviii.

Who after this shall tell him doubt is devil-born?[1]
No, in the future,

> If e'er when faith had fall'n asleep
> I heard a voice, 'believe no more.'
>
> . . . . .
>
> A warmth within the breast would melt
> The freezing reason's colder part,
> And like a man in wrath, the heart
> Stood up and answered, 'I have felt.'
>
> . . . . .
>
> And what I am beheld again
> What is, and no man understands;
> And out of darkness came the hands
> That reach thro' nature, moulding men.[2]

Love, if it had not conquered doubt, had driven out despair, and when Christmas again comes round he can call on the bells to ring out the faithless coldness of the times and to ring in the Christ that is to be—a truer and purer religion than even Christianity. For by this time he had been drawn to believe in God:

> That God, which ever lives and loves,
> One God, one law, one element,
> And one far-off divine event
> To which the whole creation moves.

And in the introduction—which, like all introductions worth reading, was written at the end and not at the beginning of the poem, where it is found—he finally concludes:

> Strong Son of God, immortal Love,
> Whom we, that have not seen thy face,
> By faith, and faith alone, embrace,
> Believing where we cannot prove.
>
> . . . . .

[1] Canto xcvi.

[2] *Ibid.*, cxxiv. The lines in the text are those which Mr. Henry Sidgwick said he could never read without tears. See *Tennyson: A Memoir*, by Hallam, Lord Tennyson, vol. i. p. 303.

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Thou wilt not leave us in the dust:
Thou madest man, he knows not why,
He thinks he was not made to die;
And thou hast made him: thou art just.

Consolation from trust in God.

It is true that the phases through which Tennyson passed from doubt to faith cannot be followed by a logical process. Religion is the creation not of reason but of emotion; it appeals not to the mind but to the heart. And it was just because Tennyson was able to crush out the doubts which his reason had inspired, and to fall back on faith as something better than knowledge, that he exerted so large an influence on the generation that was growing up below him. They, like he, had seen their faith shattered by the surprising revelations which science had made to them. The Old Testament had been proved inauthentic; the New Testament, in some important respects, contradictory. Men hardly knew what to think, or what to believe. Then the poem, which some of the best and wisest minds were reading, revived the thought that 'all is right, that darkness shall be clear, that God and time are the only interpreters, and that love is king.'[1] 'In Memoriam' impressed on a doubting world 'the ineffaceable and ineradicable conviction that humanity will not and cannot acquiesce in a godless world.'[2]

It must not be supposed that all the men who read 'In Memoriam' accepted the conclusions of the author. Many others, indeed, stopped short at the conclusions at which Tennyson himself had arrived. They saw that life did walk with aimless feet; that

[1] *In Memoriam*, author's notes, p. 217. (1905.)

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 220. The last sentence is Mr. Henry Sidgwick's.

type after type was doomed to destruction, that the little system of our own sun must have its day and cease to be; and that, sooner or later, everything must be involved in common ruin. In what they knew, or in what they did not know, they found no clear proof of an intelligent or beneficent omniscience. They invented—or the ablest of them invented—the term Agnostic to indicate that they knew nothing. Knowledge had increased beyond the wildest dreams of an earlier generation. Veil after veil had revealed new mysteries, and yet the great problems of life and immortality, of God and man, remained unknown and unknowable. Love—and yet some of these men had perfect love—was powerless to lead them to faith. They were too honest, too strong to shrink from the teachings of their reason. They declined to bow to a God whom they did not accept, or to profess confidence in an immortality of which they had no certain hope.

The steadfast Agnostic.

To these men life had nothing to offer beyond the grave. The world, whether it were good or evil, had its own pleasures, its own sorrows; and they at any rate might eat and drink without fear of the morrow. And some of them, no doubt, followed this teaching. They could say, they did say with Dryden, 'If this life is worth the winning, then we think it worth enjoying.' But there were others of these men who amidst their doubts led a better, holier, and more religious life. They felt from the depth of their earnest nature that the consciousness of their disbelief imposed on them the duty of righteousness. With no faith in God, with no hope in a future, they strove to set a higher example than

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Conclusion.

even Christians had to offer. Santa Teresa had said, years before, that she did not fear hell nor hope for heaven, but loved God for Himself alone. The agnostic—the best agnostic of his day—rose to a still higher level. For he had no fear of hell, and no hope for heaven, yet loved good for itself alone.

CHAPTER XX.

IRELAND, FINANCE, AND THE FALL OF LORD BEACONSFIELD.

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The policy of 'Too Late.'

WHEN the melancholy chapter of Irish history during the nineteenth century is finally written, perhaps the policy of England towards Ireland may be described as 'too late.' For England was too late in repealing the penal legislation of the eighteenth century; she was too late in admitting the claim of the Roman Catholics to sit in Parliament; she was too late in abolishing Irish tithes and in reforming Irish municipalities; she was too late in disestablishing the Irish Church and in passing an Irish Land Act; she was too late in acknowledging that the English government of Ireland should be conducted on Irish ideas; she was too late in acting—nay, she has not yet acted—on the policy which she thus proclaimed. From first to last she was too late.

If England made the fundamental mistake of delaying her gifts to Ireland, she made also the error, even more disastrous, of never granting them of her own free will. It required the Clare election to force Sir Robert Peel to yield to the emancipation of the Roman Catholics; it required the Fenian movement to convert Mr. Gladstone to the policy of striking at the Irish upas tree. It would be contrary to human nature to expect that the Irish should be grateful

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for concessions which they had won for themselves. Irish farmers might be content with land reform, Irish Catholics of Whig opinions might be content with the disestablishment of the Irish Church.[1] But a set of men was rising in Ireland who were not satisfied with the Acts of 1869 and 1870. They saw, or thought they saw, that there was only one way in which the Irish could hope to be governed according to Irish ideas, and that way was that the Irish should govern themselves. Just as the emancipation of the Roman Catholics in 1829 preceded the demand for repeal, so the Irish measures of 1869 and 1870 preceded the demand for Home Rule.

Concessions extorted from England.

The Home Rule movement launched.

While Parliament, in fact, was engaged in passing the Land Act, an Irish meeting in Dublin was declaring that 'the true remedy for the evils of Ireland is the establishment of an Irish Parliament with full control over our domestic affairs.'[2] Six by-elections took place in Ireland in 1871 and 1872; at all of them members were returned pledged to Home Rule. The attitude of Ireland was so pronounced, the feelings of the Irish were so strong, that Mr. Gladstone, in the autumn of 1871, thought it necessary to refer to it. 'He spoke of the political delusions to which the Irish people were periodically subject, the lengths to which England had gone in meeting their complaints, the removal of all their grievances except that which related to higher education. Any inequalities which still existed between England and Ireland were in favour of Ireland. And as to Home Rule, if Ireland was entitled to it Scotland was better entitled, and even more so Wales.' 'Can any sensible man, can any rational man, suppose that, at this time of day,

[1] See O'Brien's *Life of Parnell*, p. 64. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 66.

in this condition of the world, we are going to disintegrate the great capital institutions of this country for the purpose of making ourselves ridiculous in the sight of all mankind, and crippling any power we possess for bestowing benefits, through legislation, on the country to which we belong?'[1]

Mr. Butt.

Among the four men, however, who had been returned as Home Rulers at casual elections in Ireland in the year in which Mr. Gladstone thus spoke, one —Mr. Isaac Butt—was not moved from his purpose by the Prime Minister's declaration. Mr. Butt was perhaps the most eloquent member of the Irish Bar alive at the time; he had sat in Parliament from 1850 to 1865 as a Tory or as a Liberal Conservative; he had many friends in England; while a cultivated man and a moderate politician was exactly the sort of person to commend himself to men of various opinions. On the other hand, he had the natural affection which every good man feels for his own country and his own fellow countrymen. He had defended, as counsel, the leaders of the Young Ireland movement in 1848; he was selected to defend the Fenian prisoners in 1865. He 'flung himself zealously into the cause of his clients. He . . . became the friend as well as the advocate of the prisoners. The purity of their intentions, the uprightness of their aims, their courage, their honesty, their self-sacrifice, produced a deep impression on the generous and impulsive advocate, and made him feel that there was some-

[1] The speech will be found in the *Times* of the 27th of September, 1871. The quotation in the text is from Mr. G. Russell, *Life of Gladstone*, p. 221. At the time of Mr. Gladstone's speech, four of the by-elections referred to—Meath, Westmeath, Galway, Limerick—had been decided; Galway Co. and Kerry were won by the Home Rulers in the following January. Sullivan, *New Ireland*, vol. ii. pp. 325, 338.

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thing essentially rotten in the State when such men were driven to such desperate courses.'[1]

Mr. Butt did not confine his exertions to defending the Fenian prisoners. He led the agitation for their release; he founded the Home Government Association; he invented the name of Home Rule. He led others to institute a similar league in England, and when the Irish vote was strong in an English constituency he exacted from the candidate a pledge to vote for an inquiry into the demand made by a large proportion of the Irish people for the restoration to Ireland of an Irish Parliament.[2]

The two theories.

Thus, throughout the Ministry of 1868, there were two streams of thought which were affecting the relations between England and Ireland. On the one hand, Mr. Gladstone and the men who thought with him were ready to remove every genuine grievance of which the Irish complained, but were determined to maintain the union of the two countries. On the

[1] *Life of Parnell*, vol. i. p. 61. I quote the passage because Englishmen will never understand the Irish question till they learn that the men, whom they regard as traitors, murderers, and felons, the Irish look upon as some of the purest and most self-sacrificing members of the human family. Cf. for Mr. Butt, Sullivan, *New Ireland*, vol. ii. pp. 306 *seq.* The same difference may be traced in the men returned by the Irish to Parliament. In 1869 the County of Tipperary had returned Mr. Jeremiah O'Donovan Rossa, who, in 1865, had been convicted of treason felony, and was actually undergoing imprisonment; and, on Mr. Gladstone's motion, the House declared that he was incapable of being elected or returned as a member. *Hansard*, vol. excix. pp. 122 *seq.* In 1875, the same constituency chose as its representative Mr. John Mitchel, who had been sentenced to penal servitude in 1848, and who had escaped from Van Diemen's Land before his sentence expired. The House in his case also quashed the election and ordered a new writ, and the constituency again returned Mr. Mitchel. This second election was immediately followed by Mr. Mitchel's death, and the House took upon itself to direct the Clerk of the Crown to amend the return by substituting the name of Mr. Stephen Moore, the defeated candidate, for that of Mr. Mitchel. Cf. O'Brien's *Life of Parnell*, vol. i. pp. 76, 77.

[2] *Ibid.*, vol. i. p. 123.

other hand, Mr. Butt and the members of the Home Rule Association were slowly arriving at the conclusion that the only remedy for Ireland was to entrust the Irish with the management of their own affairs; that mere reforms, like the disestablishment of the Irish Church and the amendment of the Irish land laws, whether they were conceded to argument or exacted by agitation, went only a little way towards satisfying the aspirations of the Irish; and that the real fundamental grievance of Ireland lay in her government by a race which was so convinced of the wisdom of its own institutions and its own laws that it could not understand their being inapplicable to a people whose origin, whose customs, whose religion, and whose history had imbued them with other ideas.

Mr. Butt's amendment to the Address in 1874

In 1874 the formation of a new association [1] and the presence of a solid body of members [2] pledged to Home Rule brought the question in a concrete shape before Parliament, and Mr. Butt moved an amendment to the Address which pointed, not in words but in substance, to the concession of Home Rule. In a speech of great moderation he told the House that 'he did not at present ask it to concede Home Rule to Ireland. That question remained to be discussed, and perhaps to be discussed for many years. But first the advocates of Home Rule must satisfy the

[1] This Association was formed at a meeting in Dublin, attended by men of all parties. 'The Orangeman and the Ultramontane, the staunch Conservative and the sturdy Liberal, the Nationalist leader and the Imperial Unionist, the Fenian sympathiser and the devoted Loyalist' were all present. See the list in Mr. A. M. Sullivan's *New Ireland*, vol. ii. pp. 300–302.

[2] The Home Rulers carried about sixty seats in the 1874 election. Sullivan, *New Ireland*, vol. ii. p. 397. There had been ten Home Rulers in Parliament before the dissolution. *Ibid.*, p. 398.

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English people that they were not seeking separation. Ireland had given up the idea of separation because she had before her the prospect of obtaining another and a far better thing. He did not believe that Ireland would ever be content with the existing state of things; but if Englishmen approached the subject with unprejudiced minds there would be no difficulty in framing a measure which would make Ireland contented, while the integrity of the Empire would be perfectly maintained.' Studiously moderate as Mr. Butt's language was, his proposal did not commend itself to the new Parliament. His amendment was rejected by a large majority, the minority consisting almost exclusively of Irish Home Rulers.[1] Undeterred by defeat, however, towards the end of the session he again drew attention to the subject; he was again defeated, and by a majority so large that, if large majorities could settle anything for all time, the question of Home Rule in Ireland might have been regarded as definitely rejected.[2]

His subsequent motions defeated.

Mr. Butt did not desist from his labours, however, in consequence of his defeat. In 1876, for example, he moved for a select committee to inquire into the nature of the demand made by a large proportion of the Irish people for the restoration to Ireland of an Irish Parliament, and was again defeated by a large majority;[3] while in 1877 he delegated the duty to a friend whom he supported in the debate, and whose motion was rejected by a still larger majority.[4]

[1] The House divided, Ayes 50, Noes 314. For the reference in the text see *Hansard*, vol. ccxviii. pp. 110, 111, 117, 171.

[2] For the debate, *Hansard*, vol. ccxx. pp. 700, 874. For the division, Ayes 61, Noes 458, *ibid.*, p. 965.

[3] *Ibid.*, vol. ccxxx. p. 738. The House divided, 291 votes to 61. *Ibid.*, p. 819.

[4] *Hansard*, vol. ccxxxiii. p. 1742. The division was Ayes 67, Noes 417. *Ibid.*, p. 1845.

In conducting the agitation Mr. Butt proved himself 'a model of courtesy and moderation. . . . He was a perfect type of the constitutional agitator seeking by legal methods to change the law, but doing no violence to it.'[1] Unhappily, the men with whom he associated were gradually receiving a new illustration of the old lesson that English statesmanship concedes nothing to Irish agitation constitutionally conducted. English members 'listened to Mr. Butt's arguments with great good humour, and voted against him when he had quite finished. He was regarded as an exemplary politician, and his Parliamentary methods were considered most respectable. Ministers paid him many compliments . . . . But they conceded him nothing.'[2] The debates which were raised year after year had no more practical effect than if they had taken place in the debating society of a great university.

Failure of the constitutional movement.

If the speeches which Mr. Butt made year after year fell on deaf ears, the action of the House of Commons tended to strengthen the arguments of the Irish. For it was difficult for any one to defend the existing arrangement unless it could be shown that the Imperial Parliament was as ready to deal fairly with Ireland as with any other part of the United Kingdom, and that it would not refuse to Ireland a consideration which it was always ready to give to Scotland or England. But, unhappily, the Parliament of 1874 showed no inclination to waste its time on Irish legislation or to defer to Irish ideas. In 1876, so wrote an Irish writer, 'measures were

Rejection of Irish Bills by the Parliament of 1874.

[1] The expression is Mr. Barry O'Brien's, *Life of Parnell*, vol. i. p. 80.

[2] *Life of Lord Randolph Churchill*, vol. i. p. 84.

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announced for dealing with the subjects of union rating, electoral county boards, deep-sea fishing, reclamation of waste lands, grand jury reform, municipal reform, parliamentary reform.' But none of the Irish Bills found their way to the statute-book.[1] In 1874 Mr. Butt himself 'introduced a Bill to assimilate the privileges of Irish corporations in some small respects to the privileges of English boroughs.' It was accepted by the Government, passed the House of Commons, and was thrown out by the House of Lords. In 1876 another Bill to assimilate the Irish municipal franchise to that of England was supported by forty-one out of fifty-seven Irish members who voted upon it, and was thrown out by 176 votes to 148. In the same year a motion condemning the restricted nature of the Parliamentary franchise in Irish boroughs, which was supported by three Irish members out of four, was rejected by 179 votes to 166.[2] In the same way a Bill for representative boards in counties to manage fiscal affairs was defeated by 181 votes to 153.[3] The natural wishes of Irish members, their desire to obtain for their fellow-countrymen the advantages which had been granted to England were contemptuously rejected. Parliament seemed almost to take a pleasure in showing that it had neither leisure nor inclination to deal with any Irish subject.

Dissatisfaction of the Extremists with Mr. Butt's methods.

The neglect of the House of Commons to attend to Irish wishes or to place Ireland on an equal footing with England induced some Irish members to disapprove the courteous attitude which Mr. Butt

[1] O'Brien's *Life of Parnell*, vol. i. p. 91.

[2] *Hansard*, vol. ccxxviii. pp. 703–763.

[3] *Ibid.*, vol. ccxxx. pp. 745, 746.

still maintained. Among the members who had been elected to advocate the cause of Home Rule was a wealthy Ulster merchant, Mr. Joseph Gillis Biggar. Mr. Biggar, in the language of one of his fellow-countrymen, 'had no oratorical faculty or literary gifts; he had no respect for the House of Commons; he had no respect for any English institution'; 'he had come to the British Parliament to see how much mischief he could do to the British Empire.' Mr. Biggar thoroughly disapproved his leader's tactics. He thought that Mr. Butt, instead of trying to rub the English down, should rub them up. 'He had but two ideas—to rasp the House of Commons and to make himself thoroughly hated by the British public.'[1]

The opportunity which Mr. Biggar desired came to him early in 1875. The Queen had been advised to promise in her speech from the throne that the various statutes now in force for the preservation of peace in Ireland would be brought to the notice of Parliament, 'with a view to determine whether some of them may not be dispensed with,' and, in accordance with this promise, Sir Michael Hicks Beach, who held the office of Chief Secretary for Ireland, explained, on the 1st of March, the policy of the Government.[2] Sir Michael was able to suggest some material relaxation in the provisions of the

Mr. Biggar's four hours' speech on the Peace Preservation (Ireland) Bill.

[1] O'Brien's *Life of Parnell*, vol. i. p. 81. It ought perhaps to be stated that, at the close of the session of 1874, the Irish had opposed or obstructed the passage of the Expiring Laws Continuance Bill. Among other expiring Acts, the Peace Preservation Act was included in this Bill. As Mr. Disraeli, however, speaking in 1875, condoned the action of the Irish in this matter, I have not thought it right to lay much stress upon it. For the obstruction, *Hansard*, vol. ccxxi. pp. 721, 979. For Mr. Disraeli's admission, *ibid.*, vol. ccxxii. p. 331.

[2] *Hansard.*, vol. ccxxii. pp. 5, 998.

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law.[1] The Bill thus introduced was read a second time, three weeks afterwards, after a two nights' debate, in the course of which Mr. Disraeli described the proposal 'as a measure of necessity framed in a spirit of conciliation.'[2] He might have added that, if Irish members had taken, and naturally taken, their full share in that debate, they had conducted it in accordance with the traditions which had always been regarded as sacred in Westminster. Mr. Biggar had himself taken part in the discussion, and had explained to an inattentive house, which emptied as he rose, the impolicy, even from an English standpoint, of exceptional and unpopular legislation.[3] Perhaps the hopelessness of securing even an audience on that occasion suggested to him other expedients. At any rate, on the 22nd of April, on the motion for going into committee, he moved an amendment opposing the proposal. The exact terms of that amendment, or the arguments of the speech in which it was brought forward, are of no importance. The important fact is that Mr. Biggar succeeded in occupying four hours of Parliamentary time. The longest Parliamentary session does not much exceed 1300 hours. If every one of the 670 members of the House of Commons were to speak for two hours these speeches would occupy the whole of the time of Parliament and leave no leisure for work. And Mr. Biggar had shown that it was possible for one of the least eloquent of men, by arming himself with a

[1] There were four Acts in force: the Crime and Outrage Act 1847; the Peace Preservation Act 1870; the Protection of Life and Property Act 1871; and the Unlawful Oaths Act 1839. For a description of these measures, see Sir Michael Hicks Beach's speech, *ibid.*, p. 999. For the administration, *ibid.*, p. 1000.

[2] *Ibid.*, vol. ccxxiii. p. 282.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 260.

good deal of Parliamentary literature, to occupy twice the number of hours in a single speech.[1]

Irish members, though they imperfectly appreciated what Mr. Biggar was doing, were quick to observe the advantages which his loquacity had given them. In the early hours of the following morning they moved the adjournment of the debate, and when this motion was defeated by a large majority, one of their number, Major O'Gorman, renewed it, declaring that if the liberties of his country were to be destroyed by a despotic and insolent majority those liberties should die hard. In the subsequent debates the Irish members showed a similar disposition to speak and to divide; and, with these tactics, they succeeded in arresting the progress of the Bill for some weeks. Neither Mr. Biggar, however, nor any other Irish member repeated the strange performance of the 22nd of April. Mr. Butt, whose influence was still great, though he opposed the Bill at every stage, observed the customary rules of Opposition. The Bill made slow but gradual progress, and, passed by the House of Lords at a single sitting, became law before the end of May, when the temporary provision of some of the exceptional powers enjoyed by the Irish Government expired.

Early Parliamentary obstruction in 1875.

On the 22nd of April, the day on which Mr. Biggar consumed four hours of Parliamentary time, a new member, Mr. Charles Stuart Parnell, a young man twenty-nine years old, took his seat as member for Meath.[2] Four days later he made his first speech in support of Mr. Biggar's amendment.[3] But there was nothing either in his speech or in his

Mr. Parnell takes his seat as member for Meath

[1] For Mr. Biggar's speech, *Hansard*, vol. ccxxiii. p. 1451.

[2] *Ibid.*, vol. ccxxiii. p. 1442.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 1643.

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relations with the Irish members to indicate that he was likely to secure any strong Parliamentary influence. He had, indeed, inherited from his mother, a daughter of an American naval officer, an antipathy amounting to hatred of the English race.[1] But he was a Protestant and an Irish landlord, and Protestants and Irish landlords were not popular characters among the ordinary Irish members. Even his friends, too, doubted whether he had either the capacity or the dexterity which would enable him to make his mark at Westminster; and in the session of 1875 he did nothing either to win the confidence of his Irish colleagues or to excite the alarm of his English opponents. Even in 1876 he did little or nothing to attract attention. On one occasion, however, in that year, when Sir Michael Hicks Beach was summing up the debate on Mr. Butt's annual motion for Home Rule, Mr. Parnell dissented with some violence from Sir Michael's description of the Fenian prisoner as the Manchester murderer, and on Sir Michael expressing his regret that any member of this House should apologise for murder, Mr. Parnell added: 'I wish to say as publicly and as directly as I can that I do not believe, and never shall believe, that any murder was committed at Manchester.' The Irish members vigorously cheered a statement which they had not expected from the cold and unsympathetic man whom they had not yet learned to trust. Even the Fenians out of doors confessed that his utterance was a revelation. From that moment they never lost sight of Mr. Parnell.[2]

[1] *Life of Parnell*, vol. i. p. 39.

[2] The incident is reported in *Hansard*, vol. ccxxx. p. 808. Cf. O'Brien's *Life of Parnell*, vol. i. pp. 95, 99. For the Manchester 'murder,' see *ante*, vol. ii. p. 297.

And the moment was come when the Irish were in some need of a new leader Mr. Butt had been admirable in his methods, but he had not advanced his cause. The views of Ireland were explained in excellent English year after year; but the demands of Ireland, whether they were reasonable or whether they were unreasonable, were equally rejected.[1] The time had come for other methods to force attention to the real views of Irish members. The time had come when Mr. Butt himself was to be slowly ousted from his position as Irish leader and to pass altogether out of a world in which he, too, had perhaps appeared too late.

Super-session of Mr. Butt.

In 1877 the new tactics first displayed themselves. Mr. Disraeli, at the close of the previous session, had retired from the struggles of the Lower to the quiet dignity of the Upper House. Sir Stafford Northcote, one of the most amiable of men and one of the most capable of financiers, reigned in his stead. But the calm which had rested on the political ocean since the general election of 1874 had been rudely disturbed by the growing tempest in the East. When Parliament met in 1877 men's minds were full of the Conference at Constantinople, and were ultimately swayed by the horror which atrocities in Bulgaria had provoked and the fears which the policy of Russia was exciting. The skilful Irish writer who, in his 'Life of Parnell,' has done so much to make the character of his leader intelligible to the English people, when he comes to the session of 1877 heads his chapter 'War.' And war, or the possibility of

New departure.

[1] *Life of Lord Randolph Churchill*, vol. i. p. 85. And see Lord Randolph's speech: 'I have no hesitation in saying that it is inattention to Irish legislation that has produced obstruction.' *Ibid.*, p. 90.

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war, was in every one's thoughts. But the war which Mr. O'Brien was thinking of when he wrote his chapter had hardly occurred as a possibility to any of the 658 gentlemen who composed the House of Commons. An Irish member, indeed, who had sat in Parliament since 1872—Mr. Romayne—had already told his friends that if they wanted to get their own work done they should prove that they were strong enough to 'prevent the English from getting theirs.'[1] But, except for Mr. Biggar's rather clumsy tactics, no Irish member had thoroughly adopted Mr. Romayne's advice.

Neglect of Ireland in the Queen's Speech of 1877.

With a somewhat lofty disdain of Irish demands the Queen, in opening Parliament in 1877, referred to no Irish measure except the constitution of a Supreme Court of Judicature in Ireland and the extension of an equitable jurisdiction over Irish County Courts. The Irish were demanding to be placed on an equality with England in respect to the Parliamentary and municipal franchise; they were asking for better education and a stronger Land Act; and the English Government were offering them a Supreme Court of Judicature. They were asking for bread and they were given a stone. Mr. Parnell saw that he was not strong enough to obtain the bread, but he had the perspicacity to see that he had strength to prevent his English colleagues from obtaining their share of the loaf. Early in 1877, under the pretext of improving legislation, he set himself to obstruct English measures. Obstruction was no new thing in the House of Commons. So far back as February 1718 a long and heated debate was protracted till about eight in the evening, and in 1718 it was

[1] *Life of Parnell*, vol. i. p. 93.

usual for the House to adjourn before daylight was over.[1] In 1771, on the famous contest with the printers for the publication of the debates, the House sat till past 4 A.M., the minority availed itself of motions for adjournment, amendments, and other Parliamentary forms to protract the opposition, and Burke declared that posterity would bless the pertinaciousness of that day; while, in the nineteenth century, Mr. Disraeli, in 1846, and the Conservatives, in the debates on the Clerical Disabilities Bill and on the Education Bill in 1870,[2] as well as on the abolition of purchase in 1871, had shown how a minority, by persistent opposition, might make life in Parliament intolerable.[3]

Obstruction in the past.

But, though the example had already been set, obstruction in Parliament had never been systematically pursued till Mr. Parnell deliberately adopted it. In the words of his biographer, 'he singled out the Mutiny Bill and the Prisons Bill for attack. Anyone reading "Hansard" now would see nothing unusual in his proceedings. For anything that appears to the contrary, he might have been influenced by a *bonâ-fide* desire to improve both measures. He was

Mr. Parnell inaugurates a system of obstruction.

[1] For this debate, see *Commons Debates* 1714–1717, p. 128. In 1659 the Speaker was directed to take the Chair at 8 A.M., and the House was ordered to rise at noon. But this rule was soon relaxed. Candles were, however, only allowed to be introduced on special motion; and in 1690, Sir William Widdrington and Sir Herbert Price were sent to the Tower for bringing in candles against the desire of the House. Burton's *Diary*, vol. i. p. 36 note. In 1717–1718, according to Sir Courtenay Ilbert, whose memorandum on Parliamentary Practice I have had the great advantage of seeing, the Serjeant-at-Arms was ordered to take care that candles be brought in without any particular order for the purpose whenever the House should be sitting after daylight.

[2] See Mr. Sullivan's amusing account of obstruction on these two occasions in *Hansard*, vol. ccl. pp. 1507–1510.

[3] Cavendish's *Debates*, vol. ii. p. 395, and May's *Parl. Hist.*, vol. ii. p. 41.

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cool, calm, business-like, always kept to the point, and rarely became aggressive in voice or manner. Sometimes he would give way with excellent grace, and with a show of conceding much to his opponents; but he never abandoned his main purpose, never relinquished his determination to harass and punish "the enemy."'[1] Mr. Butt, on one occasion, protested against the course which Mr. Parnell was taking. Mr. Parnell quietly replied that Mr. Butt had not been in the House when he had given his reasons for taking it. He knew that influence with the Irish was already slipping away from Mr. Butt and falling to himself; and he knew that—whatever Englishmen might think—no Irish Nationalist would quarrel with a man who was striving to make the House of Commons both impotent and ridiculous.[2]

Mr. Parnell, at any rate, was not deterred from his purpose by his leader's remonstrance. On the previous occasion he had been delaying the progress of the Army Mutiny Bill. Four days later he was renewing the same tactics with the Naval Mutiny Bill. And, in each case, he had the dexterity to move amendments to these measures which were intended to reduce the brutal punishment still permitted both in the army and in the navy: amendments which consequently obtained the support of many English Liberals.[3] But, later in the session, a still more striking incident occurred. The House, at the end of July, was in Committee of Supply. At twelve o'clock an Irish member, Mr. O'Connor Power, moved

The Mutiny Bills obstructed.

[1] O'Brien's *Life of Parnell*, vol. i. p. 107.

[2] For the incident, *ibid.*, pp. 112, 113, and cf. *Hansard*, vol. ccxxxiii. pp. 1044-1050.

[3] For the obstruction on the Naval Mutiny Bill, *ibid.*, pp. 1222 1236.

to report progress on the ground that he objected to voting away public money at that late hour.[1] Mr. Parnell, according to his biographer, thought this method of obstructing public business was a little too transparent, but he supported his colleague; a division was claimed, and by 128 votes to 8 the House decided to go on.[2] Another Irish member, Mr. O'Donnell, at once moved that the Chairman do leave the Chair; and the House again decided by 127 votes to 6 to go on with its business. But the Irish members had, by this time, made up their minds that business should not proceed. Through the early hours of a fine summer morning they maintained the struggle till, at last, at a quarter past seven, when the majority was weary with a protracted struggle, the Ministry gave way and suffered the House to be adjourned.[3] In this wearying and discreditable struggle a small minority of five members had shown their capacity to arrest the business of the House, and at the same time to bring the House itself into contempt. A fortnight later, in a speech at Manchester, Mr. Parnell openly avowed his intention of continuing the policy. Ireland had never obtained anything from England by conciliation. 'Did we get the abolition of tithes by the conciliation of our English tormentors? No; it was because we adopted different measures. Did O'Connell gain emancipation for Ireland by conciliation? Catholic emancipation was gained because an English king and his Ministers feared revolution. Why was the English Church in Ireland disestablished and disendowed? It was because there

All-night sitting in Committee of Supply.

Parnell's speech at Manchester.

[1] *Hansard*, vol. ccxxxv. p. 651.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 652, and *Life of Parnell*, vol. i. p. 128.
[3] *Hansard*, vol. ccxxxv. p. 662.

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was an explosion at Clerkenwell, and because a lock was shot off a prison van at Manchester. We will never gain anything from England unless we tread upon her toes; we will never gain a single sixpenny-worth from her by conciliation.'[1]

Before the end of the month arrived a fresh opportunity for obstruction presented itself. The Government had introduced a Bill enabling the various colonies to unite in a common confederation. The matter was, to some extent, complicated by the fact that, while the Bill was before Parliament, news arrived that Sir Theophilus Shepstone had annexed the Transvaal Republic, which had become, in consequence, a British colony. A small minority of English members disliked a policy which they had the prescience to foresee might lead to grave trouble; and the second reading of the Bill encountered, in consequence, some opposition.[2] On the consideration of the Bill in committee, on the 25th of July, Mr. O'Donnell, declaring that the Bill was being pressed forward with objectionable haste, and that more information was wanted on the annexation of the Transvaal, moved that progress be reported. The motion led to a heated and disorderly discussion, in the course of which Mr. Parnell observed[3] that, as an Irishman coming from a country which had experienced to the fullest extent the results of English interference in its affairs, and the consequences of English cruelty and tyranny, he felt a special satisfaction in preventing and thwarting the intentions of the Govern-

Obstruction of the South Africa Bill.

[1] *Life of Parnell*, vol. i. p. 130.

[2] It was read a second time by 81 votes to 19 on the 9th of July.

[3] *Hansard*, vol. ccxxxv. p. 1002. *Ibid.*, p. 1809.

ment in respect to this Bill. In an unguarded moment, losing his customary patience, Sir Stafford Northcote moved that these words be taken down, and when the Speaker resumed the Chair, proposed that Mr. Parnell be suspended. The whole House was indignant with Mr. Parnell's conduct. But Mr. Whitbread had the good sense to plead that so serious a step should not be taken without consideration, while an Irish member, Mr. Sullivan, had the dexterity to contend that, however improper it might be for a member to resist the business of the House, there was nothing either unusual or improper in resisting the intentions of a Government. This point was pressed home by Mr. Knatchbull Hugessen, and Sir Stafford Northcote himself had to admit that he had no desire to punish a member for thwarting the Government. But this admission made Sir Stafford's position almost hopeless, for the terms of his resolution no longer corresponded with his new contention. The debate was accordingly adjourned; and, as a matter of fact, never renewed. The adjournment of the debate enabled Mr. Parnell to resume his seat and proceed with his obstruction; in the duel between Sir Stafford and the Irish leader, Sir Stafford had undoubtedly been worsted by his adversary.[1]

Two days later Sir Stafford Northcote, though he did not persevere with his motion against Mr. Parnell, asked the House to adopt two new rules for preventing obstruction. The first of these rules sanctioned

[1] *Hansard*, vol. ccxxxv. pp. 1815, 1817, 1822. Mr. Lang, in his *Life of Sir Stafford Northcote*, vol. ii. p. 129, says that organised obstruction began with the South African Confederation Bill. It would have been much more true to say that it culminated in the discussion of that Bill.

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New Rules of Procedure. Their failure.

the suspension during the remainder of a debate of a member[1] who had twice been declared out of order, or who had twice disregarded the authority of the Chair. The second of them restricted any member in committee from moving more than once that progress be reported, or making any kindred motion. These resolutions, the first which persistent obstruction had necessitated, were carried by large majorities on the 27th of July. But the new weapons broke in the hands of those who forged them. On the 31st of July the South African Bill was again in committee; obstruction was again resorted to by Mr. Parnell and a little group of three or four Irishmen. From 5.15 P.M. on a Tuesday till 2 P.M. on Wednesday afternoon the struggle was maintained; no appeal was made to the new rules, no effort was made to enforce them, and the fight only ended when the Bill finally passed through committee.[2]

Parnell's growing popularity in Ireland.

The proceedings in 1877 made Mr. Parnell detested among English members of Parliament. Proud of the House of Commons, anxious to maintain its honour and to follow its traditions, they resented the conduct of a new member who was almost openly avowing his desire to tarnish its honour and to pour contempt on its rules. But the very reason which made Parnell unpopular in England was ensuring his popularity in Ireland. Here was a man who was showing, as no one had

[1] Or more strictly a motion that the member be not heard during the remainder of the debate. *Hansard*, vol. ccxxxvi. p. 25.

[2] *Hansard*, vol. ccxxxvi. pp. 227-302, and cf. Lang, *Life of Northcote*, vol. ii. p. 132, and *Life of Forster*, p. 414. The Rules or Resolutions of 1877 'appear to have been merely sessional orders, and were not renewed in subsequent sessions.' Sir C. P. Ilbert's Memorandum, p. 20.

ever shown before, what a small minority in the House of Commons could do; a man who, if he could not obtain justice for Ireland, was making legislation for England impracticable. He was even convincing his fellow-countrymen that something might be done by means of Parliamentary action. 'Parliamentarianism,' as his biographer put it, 'was apparently becoming a respectable thing. It might be possible to touch it without becoming contaminated.'[1] In September, when the Parliament adjourned, the Home Rule Confederation of Great Britain showed their sense of Mr. Parnell's services by making him their President. In the following January a conference was held in Dublin, in the vain hope of closing the widening breach between Mr. Parnell and Mr. Butt; and Mr. Parnell made it clear that he intended to persevere in his own tactics.[2]

His connection with the Fenian party.

Mr. Parnell's strength lay in his conduct in Parliament. But he realised that he could not afford to dispense with the assistance which organisation, and organisation of a desperate nature, was lending to the cause of Ireland. He never joined the Irish Republican Brotherhood, but he 'leant' on it for support; 'he walked,' so his biographer admits, 'on the verge of treason-felony, and so won the hearts of many of the rank and file.'[3] For himself he relied on what he called himself the Parliamentary machine, but he encouraged the Fenians to collect arms, and to do everything they were doing in the cause of Ireland.

No Government could neglect the new situation

[1] *Life of Parnell*, vol. i. p. 165.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 142, 154.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 157.

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which had thus arisen. For the first time in history a small body of discontented men, under the guidance of a cool and dexterous leader, was apparently prepared, not to obstruct a particular measure, but to make business impracticable, by pursuing a course of general obstruction. The time-honoured rules of the House of Commons, framed originally in the interests of minorities, were inadequate for dealing with a new state of things; and, though Parliament was absorbed by the crisis in the East and the rumours of war which were agitating this country, the House of Commons, at the very opening of the session of 1878, appointed a Select Committee 'to consider the best means of promoting the despatch of public business.'[1] The committee, which comprised some of the most respected and influential members of the House, and which also included Mr. Parnell, agreed upon a report,[2] which the most Conservative member of the House could not condemn as revolutionary. It proposed that (*a*) when Supply or Ways and Means was the first order of the day on Mondays the Speaker should leave the Chair without putting any question to the House; (*b*) when a Public Bill had passed any particular stage, the next stage should be appointed within a month; (*c*) when private members' Bills were put down for consideration, those which had passed most stages should be considered first; (*d*) that no member in committee should have power to move more than once a motion to report progress, or to

Appointment of a Select Committee to consider the despatch of public business.

Their report.

[1] *Hansard*, vol. ccxxxvii. p. 379.

[2] The appointment of the committee will be found in *ibid.*, vol. ccxxxviii. p. 361. Mr. O'Brien says, humorously enough, as to Parnell being placed on this committee:—'The chief criminal was not put into the dock: he took his place among the judges.' *Life of Parnell*, vol. i. p. 155. For the report, *Parl. Papers*, 1878, No. 208.

speak more than once on such a motion; (*e*) that when a motion for adjournment or for reporting progress had been defeated by a majority of more than two to one, and had been supported by less than twenty members, the Chairman or the Speaker might dispense with a subsequent motion of the same nature; and (*f*) that when a member had been named by the Speaker or the Chairman for disregarding the authority of the Chair, or abusing the rules of the House, he might, after an explanation, to be limited to ten minutes, be suspended for the rest of the sitting. The first of these resolutions was made, with some amendments, a Sessional Order in 1879; the last of them, strengthened and amended, in 1880.[1]

Obstruction suspended in 1878.

While the Select Committee of 1878 was sitting Mr. Parnell abstained from the deliberate tactics of obstruction which had characterised his conduct in 1877. The man, in fact, who was raising obstruction into an art knew instinctively when to obstruct and when to abstain. He felt that when the House of Commons was inquiring into its own methods, when men's minds were agitated by war and the rumour of war, and when Parliament itself was at last seriously occupied with an Irish measure for which Irish opinion cared,[2] the time was not favourable for a policy of obstruction.

In 1879, however, the contest was renewed under other conditions. At the opening of that year

[1] Sir C. P. Ilbert's Memorandum, pp. 25, 26.

[2] In 1878 the Government introduced and carried a Bill establishing an Intermediate Education Board for Ireland, endowed with 1,000,000*l.* from the Church surplus, and authorised to hold examinations (on secular subjects) and to grant prizes of 20*l.* or 30*l.* tenable for two or three years, for which youths, wherever educated, from sixteen to eighteen years of age, were eligible to compete. See *Hansard*, vol. ccxli. p. 1482.

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Mr. Butt still remained the nominal leader of the Irish party. He defeated a resolution calling for more strenuous Parliamentary action, at a meeting in Dublin early in February. But he was already showing symptoms of physical failure, and in a little more than three months from the Dublin meeting he passed quietly away. His death made a profound impression on the Parliamentary tactics of the Irish members. While he lived, the man who could speak with authority as their leader was openly advocating constitutional methods for obtaining his ends. When he died his mantle fell on Mr. Parnell, who had no respect for the House of Commons, and who thought that the first condition of success lay in making life in the House of Commons intolerable. It was almost inevitable, in these circumstances, that obstruction should again occur. The failure of Sir Stafford Northcote, at the opening of the session, to carry the whole of the resolutions on which the Committee of 1878 had agreed, and the fact that three long nights had been spent in discussing the first of them, did not discourage obstructionist tactics;[1] and, in the course of 1879, the House again found itself reduced to impotence by the action of a small minority of its members.

Death of Mr. Butt. Mr. Parnell succeeds to the leadership of the Irish party.

Renewal of obstruction in 1879.

It is due to Mr. Parnell to say that, in obstructing the Government in 1879, he displayed a skill in selecting his ground which invested even obstruction with popularity. Since his first entrance into Parliament he had consistently opposed the brutal and degrading punishments which were still permitted in the army and in the navy, and in 1878 he had served on a committee to which the Mutiny

[1] *Hansard*, vol. ccxliii. pp. 1338, 1524, 1658.

Act and the Marine Mutiny Act were referred,[1] and which drew up or revised a new measure for the government and discipline of the military forces of the Crown. The Bill which was thus prepared was introduced by Colonel Stanley, as Secretary of State for War, early in 1879,[2] in a speech in which he incidentally expressed a hope that the Bill might pass as rapidly as the original Mutiny Act of 1689.[3] He was soon undeceived. Mr. Parnell at once pointed out that it would be hardly possible to pass so complicated a measure in a short time, and that it would be far better to introduce an ordinary Mutiny Act for the year and give the House full leisure to consider the provisions of the Bill. Colonel Stanley himself found it necessary in March to accept the suggestion which was thus made in February.[4] And this concession was soon proved necessary. The Bill was only read a second time in April after a debate raised by a Scotch Liberal member on the expediency of ensuring to officers 'accused of any military offence a speedy and impartial trial by a military tribunal, selected under regulations enacted by Parliament.'[5]

[1] For Mr. Parnell's action in 1878 see *Hansard*, vol. ccxxxix. p. 54, 122 *seq.* For the appointment of the Select Committee, *ibid.*, p. 1191. The committee was intended to frame codes for the government of the army and the navy, which would supersede the necessity of re-enacting all these provisions annually. The idea of consolidating these codes had been before Parliament since 1869. See Colonel Stanley's speech in introducing the Bill, *Hansard*, vol. ccxliii. p. 1912.

[2] On Lord Derby's resignation in 1878 Lord Salisbury, the Secretary of State for India, was appointed to the Foreign Office. Mr. Gathorne Hardy replaced Lord Salisbury at the India Office, and Colonel Stanley (Lord Derby's younger brother) became Secre- of State for War.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 1911.

[4] *Ibid.*, vol. ccxliv. p. 283 and p. 881.

[5] Mr. Jenkins, who represented Dundee, and who moved the amendment, avowed his desire in doing so to restrain the powers of the Commander-in-Chief within such a compass as to make it impossible that any injustice could be done. *Ibid.*, vol. ccxlv. pp. 455, 457.

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It was only suffered to get into committee after an assurance from the Secretary of State that 'courts of inquiry, whatever might be their application for legitimate uses, were not to be strained so as to supersede courts martial.'[1] But these preliminary discussions were merely foretastes of the struggle that was to come. From the middle of May to the middle of July the Government found itself involved in a struggle which could only be ended by compromise, and which led, two years afterwards, to the success of the cause which Mr. Parnell had the credit of advocating.

Flogging in the army.

The struggle arose from the obstinate determination of official England and of military men to retain a form of punishment for soldiers to which public opinion was opposed. More than sixty years had passed, indeed, since a human being who had the misfortune to be a soldier could be torn to pieces in presence of his fellow-men by 1000 lashes. In 1812 the work of reform was commenced by a regulation that no regimental court martial should thenceforward be allowed to order that more than 300 lashes should be inflicted on any prisoner. In 1836 general courts martial were restricted from ordering more than 200, district courts martial more than 150, and regimental courts martial more than 100 lashes.[2] In 1867 a vote of the House of Commons condemned all floggings in times of peace.[3] But official England still clung to the melancholy delusion that a sharp and decisive punishment was necessary in war time, and flogging—to the disgust of most reasonable people—was retained as the punish-

[1] *Hansard*, vol. ccxlv. p. 1514.
[2] *History of England*, vol. iv. pp. 429, 430.
[3] *Ante*, vol. ii. p. 423.

ment of the soldier in war time. On the 20th of May, Mr. Hopwood, who sat for Stockport, urged that flogging should be abolished altogether. His proposal was resisted by Colonel Stanley and by Sir William Harcourt, who had served on the committee of the previous year, and it was defeated by a large majority.[1] In ordinary circumstances this division would have been regarded as decisive. But on the next occasion on which the Bill was before the committee Mr. Parnell again reverted to the subject. Sir W. Harcourt had argued on the previous occasion that if flogging was abolished capital punishment would have to be resorted to, since, in active service, there was occasionally no alternative between some short sharp punishment like flogging and taking the soldier's life. Mr. Parnell now stated that from inquiries which he had himself made among army officers he had ascertained that this argument was based on a delusion. Other effective punishments, some of which he himself mentioned, were available.[2] The Ministry, however, still adhered to the old official views. Just as the Jamaica planters, in the old days of slavery, founded their case on what Mr. Canning called an abstract admiration of the cart-whip, and resolutely claimed their freeborn right to use the instrument at their pleasure,[3] so in the later days of Mr. Disraeli military England still professed an abstract admiration for the lash and a resolute claim to use it at its pleasure.

The support which military men received from the front benches of the House of Commons apparently

[1] *Hansard*, vol. ccxlvi. pp. 836, 871, 882, 884.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 1579.

[3] *History of England*, vol. iii. p. 396.

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made all opposition hopeless. But the men who were opposed to the lash had one virtue which is usually ascribed to the British soldier—they did not know when they were beaten. Immediately after the division on Mr. Parnell's amendment Mr. Hopwood proposed that the number of lashes should be reduced from fifty to six.[1] He supported his proposal by contending that, as the cat had nine tails, six strokes involved the infliction on the unhappy sufferer of no less than fifty-four lashes. Mr. Hopwood's amendment was still under discussion when the morning sitting came to a close. At the adjourned debate Mr. Brown, the member for Horsham, urged the Government to meet the minority half-way by reducing the number of lashes to twenty-five, and a much more notable advocate, Mr. Chamberlain, recommended that the actual offences for which flogging could be inflicted should be put into a schedule. Mr. Brown's suggestion, powerfully supported by Mr. Bright and Lord Hartington, was ultimately adopted by Colonel Stanley, and the number of lashes which could thenceforward be inflicted on a soldier was reduced to twenty-five.[2] At the same time Colonel Stanley agreed to accept Mr. Chamberlain's recommendation and to name in a schedule the offences for which flogging could be inflicted.[3]

Reduction in number of lashes.

Persistence had won a new victory over officialism, and to the victory Mr. Parnell and his coadjutors, who had spoken over and over again, had undoubtedly contributed. Colonel Stanley probably considered that the concession which he had made had ensured

Further amendments.

[1] *Hansard*, vol. ccxlvi. p. 1583.
[2] *Ibid.*, vol. ccxlvii. pp. 65, 73, 76.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 58.

the passage of his measure. He was quickly undeceived. Mr. Hopwood at once proposed that punishment should be inflicted by a whip with only one tail and of a pattern to be approved by Parliament. His amendment, which received Mr. Parnell's support, was defeated.[1] But another morning's sitting had again been consumed, and no progress had been made in the measure.

When the House next met to consider the subject some excitement prevailed on both sides. A whole month had passed since the flogging clauses of the Bill had been reached, and practically no progress had been made. In one sense, indeed, such progress as had been effected had been progress backwards. For on the 20th of May the House had sanctioned the principle of flogging for all offences for which imprisonment could be inflicted, and on the 17th of June it had limited the infliction of the punishment to offences enumerated in a schedule which had neither been drawn nor considered, and had reduced the number of lashes to twenty-five. On the 19th Mr. Parnell made a strong appeal to the Ministry to make progress possible by giving up flogging altogether.[2] In that case he would wash his hands of the Bill and refrain from any further connection with it during its progress through committee. The modest tone in which his appeal was made was not imitated by Mr. Chamberlain, who denounced the 'wretched' Bill, who avowed his intention 'to persist in his opposition to the practice of flogging,' and who expressed his gratitude to Mr. Parnell for standing up against the system when he himself and

Mr. Chamberlain supports Parnell.

[1] *Hansard*, vol. ccxlvii. pp. 79, 83.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 194.

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other members had not got the courage of their opinions.[1] In private conversation he went even further, and declared that Mr. Parnell's 'obstructive tactics were the only tactics to succeed.'[2]

The Ministry, however, still refused to give way. A motion to report progress was withdrawn,[3] and the debate was again resumed. A few days before, one of Mr. Parnell's followers, Mr. Callan, had suggested that it would facilitate business if Colonel Stanley would place in the library 'some specimens of this cat with nine tails.'[4] Mr. Parnell now supported this suggestion. 'It would be interesting to know,' he said, 'what the Government knows about these cats. I venture to think that they do not know anything at all about them.'[5] But the Government had made up its mind to stand firm. Ministers refused even to accept the amendment or to produce the cat, and Colonel Stanley had the satisfaction before the House rose of passing his clause.[6]

The passage of the clause, however, did not settle the controversy. For the next fortnight the time of the House was largely occupied in discussing the various provisions of the Bill which followed in the draft, and in the discussion the Irish members and Mr. Parnell bore the chief part. These debates had no immediate reference to the 'cat,' whose retention inspired them. At last, on the 3rd of July, in a clause relating to the management of military prisons, Mr. Parnell found an opportunity of reverting to the subject, and his supporters proposed that, as twenty-five lashes had been now accepted as the

[1] *Hansard*, vol. ccxlvii. pp. 206-208.
[2] *Life of Parnell*, vol. i. p. 180, note.
[3] *Hansard*, vol. ccxlvii. p. 217.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 71.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 223.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 253.

extreme limit in the army, the same limit should apply to gaols.[1] In the discussion on this amendment Mr. Callan declared that he had at last succeeded in procuring at the Admiralty specimens of the cat or cats used in the navy. He found that there were three cats. One, which he obtained from the stores, a heavier weapon; another, which was used on board the 'Duke of Wellington'; and a third, a severer instrument still, which was reserved for the Marines.[2] He added that he felt sure that the sight of these cats would fill members with horror and disgust. Mr. Parnell again urged that the House should have the opportunity of seeing the cats before they proceeded any further. English members of position and authority supported Mr. Parnell's contention, and after a long debate, which degenerated into a wrangle, the House separated, having accomplished nothing, except to give up their usual Saturday holiday to a further consideration of the measure.[3]

Further obstruction of the Mutiny Bill.

Mr. Callan's description and Mr. Parnell's insistence brought about the production of the cats, and the production of the cats proved fatal to the position of the Government. Mr. Chamberlain, on the Saturday, corroborating Mr. Callan's description, declared that the punishment which the instruments would inflict was not the punishment which they had been discussing. He declared that the opposition to the Bill was not confined to the Irish members, that many English members supported the course which Mr.

The Government make concessions.

[1] *Hansard*, vol. ccxlvii. p. 1354.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 1355. It is fair to say that Mr. W. H. Smith (as First Lord of the Admiralty) contradicted the assertion that there was any distinction between the cat for the Marines and the navy cat. *Ibid.*, p. 1359.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 1403.

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Parnell and his followers were taking, and he called on the Government to facilitate progress by consenting to abolish flogging altogether.[1] Mr. Cross, on the part of the Government, undertook that corporal punishment in a military prison should not be inflicted for any offence for which it could not be given in an ordinary gaol.[2] Even this concession did not terminate the discussion, and the debate or altercation on the Bill was protracted till after midnight. On Monday Colonel Stanley came down to the House and decided to confine corporal punishment to offences punishable with death under the provisions of the Act.[3]

There was no doubt that the cause of humanity had won a great victory. The Government had been forced to give up almost every position for which they had contended. They had restricted the number of lashes to twenty-five, they had undertaken that no soldier should be flogged in prison for any offence for which an ordinary prisoner could not be similarly punished, they had been compelled to produce the 'cat' for the inspection of the House of Commons, and, finally, they had undertaken that no soldier should be flogged at all for any offence for which he could not be legally put to death. It was amazing that the Government, having yielded so much, should not have frankly abolished corporal punishment altogether. Mr. Chamberlain, in strong terms, appealed to the Ministry to do so. Unhappily, they decided to adhere to the last, and perhaps least tenable, of the various positions to which they had been driven. In vain Lord Hartington himself came to the rescue and

[1] *Hansard*, vol. ccxlvii. p. 1554.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 1564, 1566.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 1726.

separated himself from his more advanced followers below the gangway.[1] Mr. Chamberlain stung him, in reply, by calling him the noble lord, lately the leader of the Opposition, but now the leader of a section only,[2] and the House at last, after a long and exhausting altercation, adjourned without adding a line to the Bill.[3]

The Government refuse the total abolition of flogging and the Bill passes.

For another ten days the fierce struggle continued. Mr. Parnell and his allies still insisted on the unconditional abolition of flogging. Colonel Stanley, on the other hand, refused to make any further concessions. At last, in the middle of July, Lord Hartington, who had hitherto given the Government the advantage of his support on the Bill, declared that the concessions which had been made had induced him to reconsider his position. Flogging was only defensible if it were indispensable for discipline. But if flogging was abandoned, as the Government had now abandoned it, for almost every offence, and merely retained as a possible alternative for death, it was no longer possible to retain it on the grounds on which it had hitherto been defended. And its retention as a substitute for death might lead to a new difficulty. For a court-martial might presumably sentence a man to death with the intention that he should not be shot but flogged; and a commanding officer might, in that case, allow the penalty to be carried out contrary to the intention of the court-martial. Lord Hartington desired to avoid the difficulty by inserting some words into the Bill to make it clear that flogging could only be administered in those cases where death would

[1] *Hansard*, vol. ccxlvii. p. 1734.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 1807.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 1820.

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otherwise have been actually inflicted.[1]' Whether his words would have effected his object may be a matter of doubt; but at any rate the Government refused to assent to his amendment,[2] and, in consequence, Lord Hartington, proceeding one step further, asked the House to affirm that 'no Bill for the discipline and regulation of the army will be satisfactory which provides for the permanent retention of corporal punishment for military offences.'[3] The amendment, resisted by the whole strength of the Conservative party, was defeated by an apparently decisive majority,[4] and, after a little more discussion, the Bill was at last suffered to pass.[5] For two more years corporal punishment was still permissible in an army on active service, in those cases where a soldier might be put to death. In 1881, under another Ministry, it was abolished altogether.

Progress of the spirit of humanity in the 19th century.

In one sense it is perhaps out of place to devote so many pages of history to the gradual accomplishment of a reform which every reasonable person now admits to be wise. But, in another sense, the final abolition of flogging in the army marks a new stage in the history of manners, and justifies the conclusion which the present author has on more than one occasion endeavoured to establish—that the people of this country, from 1815 and throughout the period with which this work is concerned, were becoming more humane and more opposed to all forms and kinds of cruelty. It is true that the great struggle which raged round the cat-o'-nine-tails in 1879 was initiated by the leader of the Irish party; that it was

[1] *Hansard*, vol. ccxlviii. p. 458.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 460-464.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 634.
[4] By 289 votes to 183. *Ibid.*, p. 716.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 1355.

conducted by deliberate obstruction in the House of Commons, and that it was successful through methods which any one who cares for the credit of Parliament must deplore. But it is fair to recollect that if Mr. Parnell resorted to obstruction he would not have achieved the success which he secured if all that was best in opinion had not been on his side. There is no doubt that throughout the struggle public sympathy, or, at any rate, a large measure of public sympathy, was with the men who were denouncing the lash and not with the men who were defending it; that men like Mr. Chamberlain approved the tactics to which Mr. Parnell resorted, and thought that the end at which he aimed justified the means which he employed; or that the experience of thirty years has shown that Mr. Parnell was right and that Colonel Stanley, and those whom he represented, were wrong.

The ethics of obstruction.

The time of Parliament is the property of the public, and the man who wilfully and unnecessarily consumes Parliamentary time purloins the property of the public. But if one set of men is engaged in persistently attacking an abuse which another set of men is occupied in as persistently defending, it does not necessarily follow that the responsibility for wasting time should rest on the small band of assailants who make the attack. If a Minister, night after night, insists on maintaining positions from which he is forced successively to retreat, is he to share no portion of the blame for the useless expenditure of time and temper? Should he be struggling in a cause which the public interests may demand and the public conscience approve, history may approve his resolution and deplore his defeat But should he be merely

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striving to maintain some abuse which has descended from a worse age, it is not right that the responsibility for wasting time should rest with those who attack the abuse and not with himself in supporting it.

There is no vidence that Colonel Stanley liked the task which was thrown on him. On the contrary, in speech after speech, he showed that it was highly distasteful to him. The strange thing about the debates on flogging in the session of 1879 was that the two men who were at the head of the army and of the navy were among the kindest-hearted men of the day. Colonel Stanley, from his service in the army, had indeed been trained among conditions which may have disposed him to regard it with favour. But Mr. Smith, the member for Westminster, who had been First Lord of the Admiralty [1]—a man who had made his fortune by success in business—was drawn from a class which had no sympathy with corporal punishment. There was something almost pitiful in the position of these two men who were compelled to defend instruments of punishment which they had never seen and which they were forced to disclaim when they were produced. There was something not only pitiful but illogical in their maintaining, in the first instance, that flogging was necessary for the sake of discipline, and at the last clinging to it, not for the sake of discipline, but as an alternative to death.

Colonel Stanley and Mr. W. H. Smith.

Yet if history must condemn the men who, in order

[1] On the formation of Mr. Disraeli's Government in 1874 Mr. Gathorne Hardy (Lord Cranbrook) had been placed at the War Office; Mr. Ward Hunt at the Admiralty. Colonel Stanley, it has already been stated (*ante*, p. 345, note 2), had succeeded to the War Office on the changes which followed Lord Derby's resignation. Mr. Smith became First Lord of the Admiralty after Mr. Ward Hunt's death in 1878.

to satisfy their official admirers, stood up night after night to defend a degrading punishment which in their hearts they must have disliked, it cannot entirely exculpate their opponents, who, with no love for Parliament, but with a desire to discredit the House of Commons, availed themselves of every expedient to thwart and obstruct the conduct of business. But just because the man who loves Parliamentary government dislikes the methods which Mr. Parnell adopted to bring Parliament into contempt, he deplores the fact that the conduct of the Government and Colonel Stanley should have put Mr. Parnell in the right and should have forced the historian to admit that a reform at which he rejoices, and which should have been conceded to right feeling, was carried by obstruction.

The obstructionists.

The continuous obstruction which protracted the session of 1879 to the middle of August almost compelled the Government to devise fresh measures for the conduct of Parliamentary business; and, in the beginning of 1880, Sir Stafford Northcote fell back on the recommendation of the Select Committee of 1878, and decided on arming the Speaker with fresh powers. He proposed a new standing order to the effect that when a member had been named by the Speaker or Chairman for disregarding the authority of the chair or wilfully obstructing the business of the House, he should, on motion made without debate, be suspended for the remainder of the sitting; and when the offence was repeated three times, the member should be suspended for one week, and, further, until the House should decide that the suspension should cease. After a long debate, protracted over three sittings, Sir Stafford Northcote's proposal was adopted

New Standing Order of 1880 for suspension of obstructive members.

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and made a standing order.[1] But if the new standing order provided the House with a new weapon of punishment, it failed to arrest the disease which it had been devised to cure. And it became necessary in other times to resort to more drastic and more doubtful measures to enable the House of Commons to get through its allotted duty.

The Irish Nationalist movement outside Parliament.

So far, however, as the Parliament of 1874–80 and the period to which this book is confined are concerned, the matter ended here. The conduct of the Irish members and the skill of their leader in organising obstruction had compelled the House of Commons to revise its old rules and devise some remedy for delays; and, unhappily, the difficulties of the Government were not confined to obstruction in Parliament. The death of Mr. Butt in May 1879[2] placed Mr. Parnell at the head of the Irish party, and Mr. Parnell was promoting a new and formidable agitation. For, however much the Irish may have desired self-government, there was one thing which the Irish tenant desired still more; and, notwithstanding the benefit which the Land Act of 1870 had conferred on the tenant, the land question was again forcing itself into prominence.

1874. Finance.

From the first formation of the new Government attention was directed to its finance. The election, on which it had floated to power, had been partly fought on the elaborate promises which Mr. Glad-

[1] *Hansard*, vol. ccl. pp. 1434, 1708

[2] O'Brien's *Life of Parnell*, vol. i. p. 181.

stone had made of large remissions of taxation; the surplus at the Minister's disposal—if it seemed too small for Mr. Gladstone's spacious programme—was large enough for comprehensive changes, and the new Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Stafford Northcote, had learned the principles of finance at Mr. Gladstone's footstool, and had become the historian of financial history from Sir Robert Peel's great Budget of 1842 to Mr. Gladstone's great Budgets of 1860 and 1861. It was hardly possible, indeed, to expect that the new Ministers would stultify themselves by even endeavouring to give effect to proposals which they had denounced, on the hustings, as impracticable. But it was equally impossible to deny that Sir Stafford had an opportunity which was unique. He himself calculated that the surplus of revenue over expenditure in 1875 might 'fully reach the extraordinary amount of 6,000,000*l*.'[1]

[1] Sir Stafford Northcote's figures in his first Budget were:

Revenue.		*Expenditure.*	
Customs	£20,740,000	Debt	£26,700,000
Excise	28,090,000	Consolidated Fund	1,580,000
Stamps	10,880,000	Army	14,485,000
Assessed Taxes	2,360,000	Purchase Commission	658,000
Income Tax	5,500,000	Navy	10,180,000
Post Office	5,300,000	Civil Service	11,287,000
Telegraphs	1,250,000	Post Office	2,882,000
Crown Lands	375,000	Telegraphs	938,000
Miscellaneous	3,500,000	Packet Service	999,000
		Customs and Inland Revenue	2,694,000
		Ashanti War	100,000
	£77,995,000		£72,503,000

The Auditor-General, however, had recommended that the interest on advances made for land purposes should in future be treated as revenue. This interest amounted to £500,000, and would therefore raise the revenue to £78,495,000, or to, say, £6,000,000 more than the ordinary expenditure. *Hansard*, vol. ccxviii. pp. 637-645.

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The Surplus.

There can be no doubt that, if Mr. Gladstone had remained in office, he would have increased this surplus by further reductions in the military and naval expenditure, and by a rearrangement of the duties which a later generation describes as death duties, and that, with the surplus thus increased, he would have made the sweeping and drastic changes which he had foreshadowed in his address to his constituents at Greenwich. Sir Stafford Northcote was precluded from either of these courses. A Conservative Government was not likely, on its first accession to office, to diminish the expenditure on armaments. Lord Lauderdale, in one House, was already declaring that the navy had been starved for the last five years;[1] and Mr. Ward Hunt, who had been placed at the head of the Admiralty, was about to make a sensation by announcing that he did 'not mean to have a fleet on paper.'[2] The Government was still less likely in 1874 to raise the death duties, for any revision of the death duties involved the increased taxation of land, and land was still sacred in the eyes of a Conservative Cabinet.

Disposal of the Surplus in the Budget of 1874.

The course which Sir Stafford took was much more simple. (1) He took 7,000,000*l.* of stock which the Government held in trust for the Post Office Savings Bank, and converted it into a temporary annuity, expiring in 1885. (2) He made a present to the ratepayers of the country by authorising a grant of 4*s.* a head per week to the local authorities for each pauper lunatic maintained in a lunatic asylum, and by increasing the contribution of the Government to the police from one quarter to one half the cost of their pay and clothing.

[1] *Hansard*, vol. ccxviii. p. 211. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 871.

(3) He raised the payments which the Government had previously made to the rates of those parishes in which Government property was situated. (4) He repealed the tax on horses, he swept away the sugar duties, and he reduced the income-tax from 3*d.* to 2*d.* in the pound. The grants which he thus made to the relief of local taxation increased the expenditure by 1,010,000*l.*, the remissions of taxation reduced the revenue of the financial year by 4,020,000*l.*, and the difference between the cost of the terminable annuity and the stock which it replaced amounted to rather less than 500,000*l.* These various changes had reduced the magnificent surplus of 6,000,000*l.* to a paltry balance of 620,000*l.*[1]

Reception of the Budget.

The scheme had nothing in it comparable with Mr. Gladstone's programme. It was open to the objection that, by diminishing the cost of each lunatic to the ratepayer, it induced the guardians of the poor to transfer feeble-minded persons from workhouses to asylums; consequently the number of lunatics, or of persons confined in lunatic asylums, rapidly increased, and an impression was created that insanity was extending, while in reality much of the extension was due to the classification as insane of people who had previously been regarded as paupers.[2]

[1] *Hansard*, vol. ccxviii. pp. 648–677.

[2] In 1874 there were 62,027 registered lunatics in England and Wales; in 1884 the number had risen to 78,598; in 1894 to 90,067. In the decade which followed Sir S. Northcote's grant the number increased by 16,571; in the succeeding decade by 11,471. In the decade which succeeded the Budget, therefore, the increase was 50 per cent. greater than in the succeeding decade, though, of course, the population generally was growing, and the increase in lunacy ought to have increased in proportion to the population. These figures show conclusively that a large portion of the increase was due to the removal of feeble-minded people from the workhouses to asylums, in consequence of the encouragement afforded by Sir S. Northcote's Budget.

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But if the Budget in some respects was open to criticism, it satisfied expectation. A Budget which reduced the income tax to 2*d.*, which afforded some relief to ratepayers, and which swept away the sugar duties, had attractions for most classes of the population.

General prosperity.

The year proved on the whole prosperous. The harvest was good; the people were comparatively well off; their consumption of duty-paying articles increased; the pressure of pauperism diminished; and the revenue derived some benefit from these various causes. Even the accidents of the calendar helped the Chancellor of the Exchequer. For 1875–76 was leap year, and it added an additional day to the financial year, which contained, moreover, no Easter or Good Friday, and consequently was 'a model year for the financier.' [1]

Increased expenditure in 1875.

Many things, therefore, conspired to help Sir Stafford, and as a matter of fact he was able to look forward to a revenue of 75,685,000*l.* If the expenditure had only remained stationary, and had not exceeded the 72,503,000*l.*, at which he had placed the expenditure of the previous financial year twelve months before, there is no doubt that he would still have had an ample gift in store for the taxpayer. But Sir Stafford Northcote was about to discover—if his elaborate financial studies had not already made him acquainted with the fact—that successful finance depends as much on contraction on one side of the account as on elasticity on the other. Out of his revenue he had to provide for an expenditure of 75,268,000*l.*, and he found himself,

[1] *Hansard*, vol. ccxxiii. p. 1029.

therefore, with a balance so small that any larger or heroic remedies were plainly impossible.[1]

An increase of nearly 3,000,000*l.* in the expenditure of the country had crippled Sir Stafford Northcote's hands. But it must not be concluded that the whole of this increase was necessarily wrong. Part of it (some 500,000*l.*) was due to the arrangement which Sir Stafford had made for the more rapid extinction of debt, and was certainly neither

[1] The improvement in the condition of the country was remarkable. The consumption of tea rose to 4 lbs. 4 oz. per head; sugar, tobacco, and other commodities were equally in demand; while the consumption of spirits (1·30 gallon per head) rose to a point which, I believe I am right in saying, it had never attained before in the nineteenth century, and which, happily, it has never reached since. The growth of expenditure in 1875 was remarkable. In the last year of the previous Conservative Administration Mr. Ward Hunt had provided in his Budget for an expenditure of £73,428,000, or, if the money voted for the Abyssinian war be deducted, of £70,428,000. *Ante*, vol. ii. p. 290, note. The Estimates of 1874-5, the last for which Mr. Gladstone's first Ministry was responsible, provided for an expenditure of £72,503,000, or, if the cost of the Ashanti war be deducted, of £72,403,000. But the first estimates for which Sir S. Northcote was responsible provided for an expenditure of £75,268,000. The increase in one year was practically 50 per cent. greater than in the five years of Mr. Gladstone's Administration. The Budget figures of 1875–6 are as follows:—

Revenue.		*Expenditure.*	
Customs	£19,500,000	Debt	£27,215,000
Excise	27,800,000	Consolidated Fund	1,590,000
Stamps	10,600,000	Army	14,678,000
Assessed Taxes	2,450,000	Purchase	638,000
Income Tax	3,900,000	Navy	10,785,000
Post Office	5,750,000	Civil Service	12,656,000
Telegraphs	1,200,000	Post Office	3,036,000
Crown Lands	385,000	Telegraphs	1,098,000
Miscellaneous	4,100,000	Packet Service	878,000
		Collection of Revenue	2,694,000
	£75,685,000		£75,268,000

Sir Stafford Northcote reduced the surplus of £417,000 to £367,000 by a slight change in the Brewers' Licence Duty. *Hansard*, vol ccxxiii. pp. 1022–1031.

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unwise nor unreasonable. Another portion of it (more than a million) was due to the provision for the relief of the rates, and involved, therefore, rather a transfer of charges than an increased burden on the country. A further portion was attributable to the inevitable increase of the great and on the whole profitable business which the Post Office discharges. But when all these deductions were made, a substantial sum was due to the increase in the Army and Navy Estimates. Mr. Ward Hunt's unnecessary declaration that he did not mean to have a fleet on paper had made it impossible to avoid some increase in the Navy Estimates.

The Budget of 1875.

Unable, from the condition of his balance sheet, to do anything for the taxpayer, Sir Stafford decided to make his second Budget the foundation of a great scheme for the ultimate reduction of the debt. The total National Debt exceeded 775,000,000*l.*; it imposed a charge on the taxpayer, according to Sir Stafford's Budget figures, of 27,215,000*l.*, and Sir Stafford decided on raising this sum at once to 27,400,000*l.*, and in the two succeeding years to 27,700,000*l.* and to 28,000,000*l.*, and to apply the difference between that sum and the amount required for the service of the debt to the purchase and extinction of the capital. This scheme was in one sense open to the objections which had been urged against the Sinking Fund by the ingenious Dr. Price in the eighteenth century, and which various statesmen had borrowed from Dr. Price in succeeding years. While it was based on the undoubted fact that a small sum of money gradually accumulating at compound interest could ultimately be relied on

to extinguish a large sum of money, it overlooked the essential consideration that the benefits of the arrangement would cease in any one year in which the revenue of the country was insufficient to cover its expenditure, including the provision for the Sinking Fund. For if it were insufficient, the deficiency could only be supplied either by drawing on the Exchequer balances or by raising fresh debt; and there was plainly no advantage in purchasing and extinguishing debt by one operation if it was concurrently necessary to raise and increase debt by another.

Strictly speaking, therefore, the only real way of effectually reducing debt was to keep the expenditure below the revenue, and to apply any surplus in the income to the reduction of its liabilities. This was already done under an arrangement which is now known as the old Sinking Fund, and with which Sir Stafford Northcote, in creating his new Sinking Fund, was careful not to interfere. This truth was expounded with great force in a subsequent debate by Mr. Gladstone.[1] Yet something more can be said for Sir Stafford Northcote than Mr. Gladstone imagined. If it be conceded that the only true way of reducing a mortgage on an estate is by taking care that the income of the property exceeds the expenditure of the owner, it does not follow that the proprietor is unwise if he sets aside a definite sum for a gradual extinction of the liability. Even if some unforeseen expense should prevent him from carrying out his intention, something is gained by keeping the desirability of reducing the charge distinctly before

The new Sinking Fund.

[1] *Hansard*, vol. ccxxiv. p. 290.

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him. Sir Stafford Northcote's new Sinking Fund unhappily did not fulfil all its author's expectations. It has been suspended over and over again to meet the extravagances of one Ministry or the difficulties of another. But it has served its end in keeping prominently before Parliament the duty of seizing every legitimate opportunity for reducing the debt of the nation, and it has in consequence survived the perils which it has constantly encountered.

Imperialism and the Budget of 1876.

The Budget of 1875 presents a pitiful contrast to that of 1874. Before the Budget of 1876 was proposed new events, indirectly affecting finance, complicated the situation. The Prime Minister was making the Queen an Empress, and purchasing the Suez Canal shares. A policy founded on Imperialism imposed fresh responsibilities and expenses on the nation, and the comparatively moderate establishments which had previously satisfied this country no longer satisfied the spacious ideas that had originated in the new policy. Thus, while in 1874—the first year of his Chancellorship—Sir Stafford had found himself in the fortunate possession of a large surplus which he had inherited from his predecessors; in 1875 he had only with difficulty adjusted the expenditure to the revenue; and in 1876 he stood face to face with a large deficit.

Deficit.

The deficit, such as it was, could undoubtedly be traced to increased expenditure. In 1874 the Budget estimate of expenditure had been placed at rather over 72,500,000*l.*; in 1875 at rather over 75,250,000*l.*; in 1876 it was estimated at 78,044,000*l.* In two years the expenditure of the country had in-

creased by 5,500,000*l.*, and 2,000,000*l.* of the increase was due to the army and the navy.[1]

In a short two years, in a period of peace abroad and prosperity at home, the whole aspect of the financial situation had been changed. An unusually large surplus had been converted into an inconveniently large deficit, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer had to choose between suspending his new-fangled arrangement for reducing the debt and the imposition of fresh taxation. He chose the latter course, and added another penny to the income-tax. The income-tax payers had never felt much expectation that Mr. Gladstone's promise of repeal would be redeemed. Such slight hopes as they might still feel were incidentally weakened by Sir Stafford Northcote. For he raised the minimum sum at which the tax should commence from 100*l.*

The Budget of 1876.

[1] The figures for 1876-7 were as follows:

Revenue.		*Expenditure.*	
Customs	£20,250,000	Debt	£28,010,000
Excise	27,650,000	Consolidated Fund	1,590,000
Stamps	11,000,000	Army	15,282,000
Assessed Taxes	2,500,000	Army Purchase	464,000
Income Tax	4,100,000	Army, Payment for Government of India	170,000
Post Office	5,950,000	Navy	11,289,000
Telegraphs	1,325,000	Civil Service	13,309,000
Crown Lands	395,000	Post Office	3,220,000
Miscellaneous	4,100,000	Telegraphs	1,128,000
		Packets	852,000
	£77,270,000	Collection of Revenue	2,730,000
Deficit	774,000		
	£78,044,000		£78,044,000

Sir Stafford Northcote stated that the military and naval expenditure (estimated in the Budget) had risen from £24,815,000 to £26,571,000. But if the estimates alone are taken, excluding the Ashanti war, the increase had been from £24,655,000 to £26,571,000, or very nearly £2,000,000.

See *Hansard*, vol. ccxxviii. pp. 1119-1122.

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to 150*l.* a year; he raised the deduction from the assessment of the smaller incomes from 80*l.* to 120*l.*, and he allowed anyone with less than 400*l.* a year — instead of 300*l.* a year — to make this deduction. In consequence of these changes the numerous class of persons who had less than 150*l.* a year had no longer any reason for desiring to get rid of the tax. The still larger class of persons who had more than 150*l.* and less than 400*l.* a year had their objections to its continuance sensibly diminished.

In one sense there was a justification for increasing the income-tax, which Sir Stafford Northcote himself failed to realise. The policy which the Conservative party had advocated, and which Sir Stafford had adopted, of relieving the rates had practically transferred some 1,900,000*l.* annually from the shoulders of the ratepayer to the shoulders of the taxpayer. But more than three-fourths of this sum, or 1,500,000*l.*, had been contributed, so it was calculated, by the upper and middle classes. In the same year in which this reform had been effected the contribution of the working classes to the taxation of the country had increased from 36 to 41 per cent.[1] It is true that the increased contribution of the working classes to taxation had been largely due to their exceptional prosperity, which had stimulated the consumption of spirits, beer, tobacco, and tea. Signs, however, were already visible that the higher wages which had produced these results were no longer obtainable. Mr. Goschen, indeed, said in the House of Commons that from 1873

[1] These figures will be found set out in detail by Mr. Holms in *Hansard*, vol. ccxxxiii. pp. 1469-1471.

to 1877 the wages of ironworkers had fallen 37½ per cent., and that within the last few years there had been an average fall of wages of 50 per cent.[1] And if the subject, therefore, was approached from the standpoint of relative taxation, or of the diminishing capacity of the working classes to contribute, there seemed reason for saying that if increased taxation was necessary it should fall on the upper and middle classes.

The Budget of 1877.

For the moment, indeed, increased taxation was fortunately avoidable. In the Budget speech of 1877, the expenditure of the year was placed at 78,794,000*l.*—an increase of 750,000*l.* over the Budget estimate of the previous year. But as the revenue at the same time was computed at 79,020,000*l.*, there was a small surplus of 226,000*l.* In these circumstances, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer put it, he had a Budget ready made to his hands.[2] He had neither the necessity of imposing nor the opportunity of remitting any taxation.[3]

[1] *Hansard*, vol. ccxxxiii. p. 1492. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 999.

[3] The Budget figures for 1877–8 were as follows:

Revenue.		*Expenditure.*	
Customs	£19,850,000	Debt	£28,000,000
Excise	27,500,000	Local Loan	220,000
Stamps	10,920,000	Suez Canal	200,000
Assessed Taxes	2,532,000	Consolidated Fund	1,600,000
Income Tax	5,540,000	Army	14,538,700
Post Office	6,100,000	Home Forces, India	1,000,000
Telegraphs	1,300,000	Purchase Commission	500,000
Crown Lands	410,000	Navy	10,979,829
Miscellaneous	4,840,000	Civil Service	13,726,198
Error	28,000	Collection	2,767,165
		Post Office	3,261,461
		Telegraphs	1,232,814
		Packets	767,877
	£79,020,000		£78,794,044

Ibid., vol. ccxxxiii. pp. 994–999.

CHAP. XX.

1878.

The financial situation in 1878.

Lord Melbourne once said that 'if you make an estimate of your expenses for the coming year, and upon this estimate you find that they exactly amount to, or only fall little short of, your income, you may be sure that you are an embarrassed if not a ruined man.'[1] Sir Stafford Northcote in 1878 experienced the truth of Lord Melbourne's cynical conclusion. The policy of the Cabinet or of the Prime Minister was destroying the financial situation. When the First Lord of the Treasury was announcing that England was not a country which had to ask herself whether she could support a second or a third campaign, when the Cabinet was asking for a vote of credit of 6,000,000*l.*, when it was calling out the Reserves and moving Indian troops to the Mediterranean, economical administration was plainly impossible. With a revenue which had risen to 79,460,000*l.*, Sir Stafford Northcote found himself face to face with a deficiency of 1,560,000*l.*; and this lamentable deficit only represented a portion of the difficulty. For it made no provision for the redemption of the Exchequer bonds which had been issued for the vote of credit, or for the supplementary estimates which the warlike policy of the Cabinet had necessitated. The gross deficit of the year had, in consequence, to be placed at from 5,300,000*l.* to 5,800,000*l.*[2] So serious a situation had not occurred

The Budget of 1878.

[1] Sanders, *Lord Melbourne's Papers*, p. 93.

[2] Sir Stafford Northcote said that £3,500,000 of the vote of credit of £6,000,000 had been actually spent; that a further sum of £700,000, or possibly £1,500,000, would be required: and that £2,750,000 had been temporarily borrowed. He placed therefore the deficit for the forthcoming year at (1) ordinary deficit, £1,560,000; (2) redemption of exchequer bonds, £2,750,000; supplementary estimates, £1,000,000 or £1,500,000. Total, £5,300,000 or £5,800,000. *Hansard*, vol. ccxxxix. p. 551.

since the close of the Crimean war. Sir Stafford Northcote endeavoured to meet it by raising the income-tax from 3*d.* to 5*d.* in the pound, by imposing an additional duty of 4*d.* in the pound on tobacco, and by increasing the tax on each dog from 5*s.* to 7*s.* 6*d.* From the first of these expedients he hoped to derive in the current financial year 3,000,000*l.*, from the second of them 750,000*l.*, from the third of them 100,000*l.* Some slight alterations in the house-tax and income-tax were estimated to cost some 80,000*l.*, and Sir Stafford treated the increased duty on dogs as a set-off against these alleviations. He therefore hoped to obtain in the year some 3,750,000*l.* to meet a deficit of 5,300,000*l.* to 5,800,000*l.* The difference of 1,550,000*l.* or 2,050,000*l.* he held over to be dealt with in another year.[1]

The Budget—the painful Budget,[2] as Mr. Gladstone at once called it—was unsatisfactory enough to any one who recollected the heritage to which Sir

[1] The Budget figures for 1878-9 were:

Revenue.		*Expenditure.*	
Customs	£19,750,000	Debt	£28,000,000
Excise	27,500,000	Other Charges or Debts, and Consolidated Fund	2,479,000
Stamps	10,930,000	Army	15,595,800
Assessed Taxes	2,660,000	Home Charges, Indian Army	1,080,000
Income Tax	5,620,000	Navy	11,054,000
Post Office	6,200,000	Civil Service	14,816,475
Telegraphs	1,315,000	Post Office	3,313,215
Crown Lands	410,000	Telegraphs	1,114,972
Interest on Advances	1,075,000	Packets	773,245
Miscellaneous	4,000,000	Collection of Revenue	2,793,068
	£79,460,000		£81,019,775

or in round numbers £81,020,000. *Hansard*, vol. ccxxxix. pp. 541, 542.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 557.

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1878.

Sir Stafford Northcote as Chancellor of the Exchequer.

Stafford Northcote had succeeded. But the Chancellor of the Exchequer had not yet reached the limit of his difficulties. The summer of 1878 indeed brought peace with honour. But peace in Europe was followed by war in Asia, and by an unfortunate concurrence of events war in Asia was almost immediately followed by war with a savage race in Africa. In these circumstances Sir Stafford Northcote's task in 1879 became far more difficult, and, to a man of his temperament, far more distasteful than his task in 1878. The fact was that nature had adapted Sir Stafford for quite other times and other colleagues than those he was connected with. He would have done admirable service as Mr. Gladstone's lieutenant from 1869 to 1874, and would have avoided the mistakes and surprises which distinguished Mr. Lowe's Chancellorship. But he was utterly unfitted both by temperament and by conviction to be the financial adviser of a Ministry which was purchasing Suez Canal shares and throwing down the glove to Russia. He must have bitterly resented the action of agents who, drawing their inspiration from the Prime Minister, were imposing missions on a barbarous monarch in Cabul, or despatching ultimatums to a savage chief in Zululand. It was Mr. Disraeli's fortune to raise the whirlwind. To Sir Stafford was allotted the humbler and less popular task of raising the wind.

Financial difficulties.

An imperial policy can rarely be reconciled with sober finance. Lord Beaconsfield had hardly brought peace with honour back from Berlin before Sir Stafford had to confess that the price to be paid for replacing the good arrangements of the Treaty of San Stefano by the bad arrangements of the Treaty of Berlin

was far heavier than he had expected. In April he had anticipated that an additional 1,000,000*l.* or 1,500,000*l.* would cover the remaining expenditure under the vote of credit; and that this amount could be met by the additional taxation which he had imposed, and which would, as he hoped, be sufficient also to repay some of the Exchequer bonds which he had issued. In August he had to confess that supplemental estimates raised this amount of 1,000,000*l.* or 1,500,000*l.* to 3,366,000*l.*, and that an additional 400,000*l.* would also be required for military purposes in Africa. For the deficiency which thus resulted Sir Stafford made no provision. He satisfied himself that the revenue of the year 1879–80, relieved of the exceptional charges arising from votes of credit and from military embarrassment in Africa, would, after providing for the whole expenditure of the year, be adequate to discharge some portion of the deficiency. Undeceived by the bitter experiences of his Chancellorship, he made no further addition to taxation. Like a great compiler of balance-sheets in an immortal novel, he waited for something to turn up.[1]

And something did turn up with a vengeance. The expenditure of the year actually exceeded Sir Stafford Northcote's estimate by 4,388,000*l.*[2] The

[1] The Supplementary Estimates were:

Army	£1,845,000
Navy	678,000
Civil Service	75,000
For winding up Account of Abyssinian war	20,000
For bringing Indian Troops to Malta	748,000
	£3,366,000

The actual expenditure under the vote of £6,000,000 reached £6,427,000. *Hansard*, vol. ccxlii. pp. 1304, 1305. Or, according to a later statement of Sir Stafford Northcote, to £6,125,000. *Ibid.*, vol. ccxlv. p. 284.

[2]

Original estimate, April 1878	£81,020,000
Supplementary estimate in August 1878	84,386,000
Actual expenditure	85,407,000

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actual expenditure of the year exceeded 85,000,000*l.*, and exceeded the revenue[1] by more than 2,000,000*l.* Since the conclusion of the Crimean war the expenditure had never approached the sum which it had thus attained under Sir Stafford's guardianship of the Exchequer. The whole amount which Sir Stafford had provided in four successive Budgets for his new Sinking Fund was only equal to the deficiency for which imperialism at the head of the Ministry and irresolute control at the Exchequer were responsible;[2] and, notwithstanding the special step which Sir Stafford Northcote had taken to reduce the debt of the nation, the total amount of the National Debt on the 31st of March 1879 stood at almost the precise figures at which Sir Stafford had found it five years before.

The Budget of 1879.

Bad as the retrospect was, the prospect was not much more satisfactory. The revenue of 1879–80 was indeed placed at 83,055,000*l.*, the expenditure at only 81,153,000*l.* The surplus on paper therefore could be reckoned at 1,900,000*l.* But the expenditure made no provision for the expenses of war in South Africa, for the expenses of intervention in Afghanistan, or for the redemption of the temporary

[1] Actual expenditure . . £85,407,000
Actual revenue . 83,115,000
Deficiency £2,292,000

[2] New Sinking Fund:
1875 6 . . £280,150
1876–7 . . 624,780
1877–8 . . 764,823
1878–9 . . 638,876
£2,308,629

As the deficiency of 1878–9 was £2,292,000, it followed that the whole sum provided by the New Sinking Fund only exceeded the deficiency of a single year by about £17,000. The figures for the New Sinking Fund will be found in a convenient form in the statistical abstracts.

debt which Mr. Disraeli's Eastern policy had involved. That debt amounted to 4,750,000*l.*,[1] and 'according to our original plan,' to quote Sir Stafford Northcote's own words, ought to have been discharged before the end of 1880.[2] Sir Stafford coolly proposed to postpone its discharge for another year. Having thus disposed of one portion of his inconvenient deficiency, he dealt even more summarily with the others. So far as Afghanistan was concerned, the Government had already announced its intention of lending the Government of India 2,000,000*l.* without charging them any interest on the loan. As the loan would be repaid in annual instalments of 300,000*l.*, all the Chancellor of the Exchequer had to do was to provide for the interest on the outstanding portions of it. The Government in fact had discovered a method for providing the people with the excitement of a distant war without requiring them to contribute any appreciable sum to its cost. Yet if the unfortunate operations in Afghanistan, which were about to lead to the Treaty of Gandamuk, with all its fatal consequences, might be undertaken with a light heart and a light purse, the cost of warfare in South Africa could not be thrown on the Dutch settlers, who owed us a nominal allegiance in the Transvaal, or on the British settlers who had proved their loyalty to the British Crown in Natal. But Sir Stafford thought that, in addition to what had already been spent, his so-called surplus of 1,900,000*l.* would 'be sufficient to meet the

[1] £2,750,000 had been borrowed in 1878, and the remaining £2,000,000 in 1879. *Hansard*, vol. ccxlv. p. 287.

[2] *Ibid.*

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charge, whatever it may be, that falls upon us in respect of the Zulu War.'[1]

Vote of credit for Zulu war.

'We are all liable to error when we prophesy,' said Mr. Disraeli on one occasion.[2] Sir Stafford Northcote, at any rate, was an example in 1879 of the truth of his chief's apothegm. In April he had regarded his so-called surplus of 1,900,000*l.* as ample for all the requirements. Before the end of the Session he was asking for a vote of credit of 3,000,000*l.* for the purposes of the war, which he was supplementing in March 1880 with a supplemental estimate of 1,225,200*l.* A miserable war, undertaken without forethought, conducted without credit, concluded without honour, had, it was admitted, cost the country from first to last 5,138,000*l.*[3] People were beginning to ask one another whether the great advantage of being governed by Lord Beaconsfield was worth the price it was costing.

And people were not merely doubting the wisdom of a Government which had narrowly escaped from

[1] The Budget forecast for 1879–80 was as follows:—

Revenue.		*Expenditure.*	
Customs	£20,000,000	Debt	£28,000,000
Excise	27,270,000	Temporary Debt and Consolidated Fund	2,620,000
Stamps	10,780,000	Army	15,645,700
Assessed Taxes	2,700,000	Home Charges, Indian Army	1,100,000
Income Tax	9,250,000	Navy	10,586,894
Post Office	6,250,000	Civil Service	15,084,851
Telegraphs	1,340,000	Post Office	3,368,825
Crown Lands	390,000	Telegraphs	1,115,195
Suez Canal Shares' Interest	1,175,000	Packets	766,725
Miscellaneous Revenue	3,900,000	Collection of Revenue	2,865,383
	£83,055,000		£81,153,573

Hansard, vol. ccxlv. p. 287.

[2] *Collected Speeches*, vol. ii. p. 89.

[3] *Hansard*, vol. ccli. p. 819.

war in Europe, and which had undertaken two unpopular wars in Asia and Africa, but the time was rapidly approaching when they would be given an opportunity of pronouncing their judgment upon it. The Parliament of 1874 had survived its sixth session, and since the dissolution of 1865 no Parliament had entered on its seventh session. In no circumstances, therefore, could the old House retain its existence much longer. Its final dissolution might be expected at any moment. Mr. Gladstone, in a torrent of vehement rhetoric—to which more detailed reference will immediately be made—was already asking the country to decide between the practices of the Ministers and his own ideas of the principles on which government should be founded.[1] Some chance elections, resulting in Ministerial victories at Southwark and Liverpool, were doing the Cabinet the disservice of suggesting that the tide of popular opinion had not yet turned against Lord Beaconsfield and his colleagues. The Ministry came to the conclusion that it was wiser to put its fate 'to the touch' without further delay; and on the 8th of March Sir Stafford Northcote was authorised to announce that Parliament would be dissolved before Easter.[2]

Decline in foreign trade.

Sensational finance can rarely be expected on the eve of a dissolution. Sir Stafford, it may be assumed, was only anxious to avoid the necessity of imposing new and unpopular taxation. The times, it must be confessed, were bad enough. In 1869, the first year of Mr. Gladstone's premiership, the total value of our foreign trade amounted to 532,000,000*l.*; in 1874, the year in which he left office, it had

[1] See the fine passage in Morley's *Life of Gladstone*, vol. ii. pp. 594–96.

[2] *Hansard*, vol. ccli. p. 557.

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increased to 667,000,000*l.*; in 1879 it had fallen to 611,000,000*l.* But if the foreign trade of the country was in sorry case, its chief domestic industry was in distressful circumstances. The years in which Mr. Gladstone had held office had been years of sunshine. The years in which Lord Beaconsfield governed the country were years of rainfall. The crops failed. In the olden time, before the days of Free Trade, the failure of the crops usually led to a rise in prices, which may possibly have assisted the farmer, but which inflicted the miseries of dearth on an entire people. In the later days of the nineteenth century the price of corn no longer depended on the harvest at home; and the farmers were not necessarily compensated for its failure by a rise in prices. It was calculated by a competent statistician, Mr. Giffen, that the average price of agricultural produce was one-third lower in 1877–79 than in 1867–69.[1] Every class connected with agriculture—and the Conservative Government of Lord Beaconsfield was largely dependent on the agricultural classes—was suddenly confronted with severe distress.

Agricultural distress and its causes.

The distress which fell on the agricultural classes was the heavier to bear because it was unexpected. In the early years of Mr. Gladstone's Government everything had gone well with them. The landlords were able to increase their rents, the farmers their profits, the labourers their wages.[2] No one seemed to anticipate that the whole conditions of agriculture

[1] *Edinburgh Review*, January 1883, p. 140. I endeavoured many years ago in this article to state the conclusions derived from a careful analysis of the voluminous Report of the Agricultural Commissioners of 1879, and I have freely availed myself of the knowledge thus acquired, and of the facts produced in this article in writing the paragraphs in the text.

[2] The strike of agricultural labourers, organised by Mr. Arch, which I hope to deal with in

were about to be altered. Yet two things had already occurred which were destined to shake agricultural prosperity in England to its foundation. The first of these was the close of civil war in America; the second of them the rapid extension of steam in the commercial marine.

The energy which carries a country into success throughout a great war almost always finds scope —after peace is declared—in other directions. In the United States, after 1865, it was largely applied to the development of the vast undeveloped area of the Western States. The production of wheat in the United States rose from 292,000,000 bushels in 1875 to 448,000,000 bushels in 1879. But simultaneously with this vastly increased production, the improvement of locomotion in America and the rapid extension of the British mercantile marine enabled this vast addition to the world's supply of food to be exported at no appreciable cost. Some 17,000,000 bushels of wheat had been exported in 1869; some 122,000,000 were exported in 1879. 'Influenced by this vast supply, the price of wheat in the United Kingdom fell to 38*s.* per quarter, the lowest price to which it had fallen for nearly thirty years.' The worst harvest which the farmer had experienced for many years was accompanied by the lowest prices which the actual generation of farmers had ever known. The revolution which was taking place may be described in another way. In every year from 1869 to 1879, 'about 100,000 fewer acres were sown with wheat in the United Kingdom, and some 1,500,000 more acres were sown with wheat in the United States.'[1]

Import of wheat from the United States.

another chapter, occurred in 1874; and cf. as to the rise in rent and the rate of wages Sir R. Giffen's conclusions, reproduced by me in *Edin. Rev.*, Jan. 1883, p. 141.

[1] *Ibid.*, Jan. 1883, p. 143.

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Agricultural statistics.

Thus a rapid contraction of foreign trade was followed or accompanied by a rapid depression in the value of our chief domestic industry. The agricultural produce of this country, before 1879, was estimated by competent authority to be worth 260,000,000*l.* Of this sum it was further computed that 138,000,000*l.* was absorbed by labour, manure, and other expenses. The balance of 122,000,000*l.* had been divided between landlord and tenant, the former appropriating 70,000,000*l.* as rent, the latter retaining the remaining 52,000,000*l.* as profit. The bad harvest and diminished prices of 1879 lowered the value of agricultural produce by 42,000,000*l.*, and two thirds of the loss fell on the tenants, the remaining third on the landlords. The country gentlemen of England found their rents reduced from 70,000,000*l.* to 56,000,000*l.* a year; their tenantry simultaneously were confronted with a shrinkage of profits from 52,000,000*l.* to 24,000,000*l.*[1]

Effects of decreasing prosperity.

The effect of contraction in trade and depression in agriculture was very notable. It is not desirable to burden the pages of history with many figures. But perhaps it may be permissible to give three instances of what occurred. The consumption of spirits in the United Kingdom rose from 0·98 gallons per head in 1869 to 1·27 gallons in 1874; it fell to 1·11 gallons in 1879. The number of marriages in England and Wales rose from 176,000 in 1869 to 202,000 in 1874; it fell to 182,000 in 1879. The number of persons committed for trial fell from 15,000 in 1869 to about 12,000 in 1874; it rose to about 13,000 in 1879. The people in 1879 could

[1] The figures on which these assertions are hazarded will be found in detail in the article to which I have already referred.

afford neither to drink nor to marry as they had drunk and married in 1874. But universal distress was again increasing the roll of criminals in the country.

Effects on the revenue.

Distress naturally made its mark on the revenue. The merry days when it had advanced by leaps and bounds had gone, and gone perhaps for ever; and though Sir Stafford Northcote, in 1879, had estimated his receipts with caution, the results had failed to reach his modest anticipations. In April 1879 he had expected 83,000,000*l.*; in March 1880 he confessed that he would probably only receive 81,000,000*l.* The happy fortune which had temporarily closed hostilities in South Africa, and had spread a veil over a disastrous future, enabled him to reduce his estimated expenditure to 81,486,000*l.* He persuaded himself that he could rely on a revenue of 81,560,000*l.* He thus established, in his own words, an equilibrium between revenue and expenditure. He had not anything to offer the electors, but he was at any rate imposing no fresh taxation on the country.[1]

[1] The Budget figures for 1880-81 were as follows:

Revenue.		*Expenditure.*	
Customs	£19,300,000	Debt, Permanent	£28,000,000
Excise	26,140,000	Other Debt and Consolidated Fund	2,757,478
Stamps	11,100,000	Army	15,541,300
Assessed Taxes	2,760,000	Home Charges, Indian Army	1,100,000
Income Tax	9,000,000	Navy	10,492,935
Post Office	6,400,000	Civil Service	15,436,432
Telegraphs	1,420,000	Post Office	3,420,404
Crown Lands	390,000	Telegraphs	1,210,736
Suez Canal Shares and Miscellaneous	5,050,000	Packet Service	710,468
		Collection of Revenue	2,816,709
	£81,560,000		£81,486,462

Hansard, vol. ccli. p. 823, and *Ann. Reg.* 1880, Hist., p. 38.

Sir Stafford Northcote, however, hoped to obtain an additional £700,000 from the effects of a Bill—the Probate and Administration

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1880.

Six years of Conservative finance.

The financial history of England, during the years in which Sir Stafford Northcote occupied the Chancellorship of the Exchequer, is melancholy reading. He acceded to office at a time when the resolute control of an economical Ministry had contrived to prevent any serious addition to the national expenditure, and had amassed a surplus available for large financial reforms. He left it six years afterwards with an expenditure greatly increased, and with a revenue barely adequate for the demands on it. His predecessor had enabled him to reduce the income-tax to 2*d.* in the pound; his own necessities compelled him to increase it to 5*d.*

It is true that of the increased expenditure some portion was due to the relief afforded to the rates, and some other portion to the arrangements made for the extinction of the debt. But it was doubtful whether the doles which had been meted out to the ratepayers had not had more effect in encouraging extravagance in administration than in relieving the rates, while it was certain that all the operations of the New Sinking Fund had no appreciable effect on the debt of the nation.

Imperialism.

Finance, or the burden of increased taxation, had added to the growing unpopularity of the Government. But it did not require the five-penny income-tax to seal the fate of a discredited Ministry. The country in the last few years had received an object-lesson in the true meaning of that Imperialistic policy which the Prime Minister had promulgated.

Duties Bill; and with the help of this £700,000 and the aid of the new Sinking Fund he converted £6,000,000 of debt created through the policy of the Government into a temporary annuity. *Hansard*, vol. ccli. p. 825.

It had led to the Berlin Treaty, which had advanced the frontier of Russia in Europe and Asia; it had led to the profitless occupation of Cyprus, and the conditional guarantee of Turkish Armenia; it had done nothing to carry out the arrangements prescribed at Berlin for the rectification of the frontiers of Greece and of Montenegro. Imperialism interpreted by Lord Lytton had brought us fresh trouble in Afghanistan. Imperialism interpreted by Sir Bartle Frere had added a new and distressful page to the distressful story of South Africa. Lord Beaconsfield, indeed, was again asserting that the ineffable blessings of peace 'cannot be obtained by the passive principle of non-interference. Peace rests on the presence, not to say on the ascendency, of England in the Councils of Europe.'[1] But a sentiment which might have elicited applause in the days of the London Conference or the Geneva Arbitration no longer commanded acceptance. Lord Beaconsfield's own policy had discredited Imperialism.

Mr. Gladstone's retirement.

And if faith in Lord Beaconsfield was rapidly declining, faith in his great rival was again in the ascendant. Six years before Mr. Gladstone had experienced a defeat which seemed almost irretrievable. He had reached the age 'at which most of the leading Commoners of the century had terminated their political career'; it was no secret that he was anxious

[1] Lord Beaconsfield was called to account for his phrase by Lord Granville (*Hansard*, vol. ccli. p. 991), and he was compelled to explain that by ascendency 'he did not mean supremacy; that the word ascendency is one which involves important moral attributes, and is not a word of offence, but one which will always be accepted in a liberal and generous spirit' (*ibid.*, p. 1000), an explanation which will hardly satisfy etymologists, but which took the sting out of the author's sentence. It may be worth while adding that on the same occasion Lord Beaconsfield turned his word 'presence' into 'influence.'

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to make the retirement of the Ministry the occasion of his own.[1] His frequent absence from the House during the session of 1874, the formal selection of Lord Hartington as Leader of the Liberal party in the Commons[2] in the commencement of 1875, seemed to ratify and confirm his decision. His friends knew that he was expressing a distaste for political life in a new and unfamiliar Parliament.[3] The public saw that he was throwing his whole soul into a controversy on the Vatican decrees, which were as remote as Homer from British politics. If he had not passed the Rubicon which divided office from retirement, he had, at any rate, sold his London house.[4] With occasional visits to Westminster, he was living 'even and industrious days at Hawarden, felling trees, working at Greek mythology and ethnology, delighting in the woods and glades of the park and in the tranquillity of his Temple of Peace.'[5] Above all, the days were rolling on. Every day that passed was apparently separating him by an ever-increasing interval from the contests in which men delight in their youth or in their maturity, but from which they shrink in their age.

The revival of his political activity.

But the old hunter who hears the whimper of the pack, the old war horse who 'smelleth the battle afar off,' cannot remain in quiet ease in his paddock. Mr. Gladstone had shown in 1874 that a comparatively harmless measure for abolishing patronage in the Scotch Church and a wholly inefficient attempt to enforce discipline in the English Church could

[1] Morley's *Life of Gladstone*, vol. ii. p. 498.

[2] For all this see Lord Fitzmaurice's *Life of Lord Granville*, vol. ii. p. 145.

[3] See his letter to Mrs. Gladstone in Morley's *Life of Gladstone*, vol. ii. p. 500.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 522.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 525.

rouse him from his retirement, and force him into the forefront of the struggle. He had shown in 1876 that the atrocious misgovernment of Turkey could infuse into him the fiery indignation of the Crusaders. His rhetoric had roused the conscience of the nation; his arguments had saved it from the reproach of war for the defence of misrule. His advice had been justified at Berlin. For if the hand that signed the treaty was the hand of Mr. Disraeli, the policy which saved Bulgaria from the Turk was the policy of Mr. Gladstone.

His attacks on the Government.

It was not only the policy of the Government towards Turkey which was raising the severe indignation with which Mr. Gladstone was overflowing. Their neglect of legislation at home, their 'mischievous' additions to taxation and expenditure, their 'needless wars, unprofitable extensions of the Empire, and unwise engagements'[1] were kindling his wrath. Six years before, the weight of accumulating years had induced him to withdraw from the political arena, and deeply to desire an interval between Parliament and the grave. Neither the recollection of the laborious efforts which had oppressed him in 1874 nor 'the menace of the shade' had any effect in damping his ardour in 1880. He was determined that the country should condemn and reverse the policy of the last few years. And he instinctively felt that he was the man who could obtain its reversal and condemnation.

He is invited to contest Midlothian.

Greenwich was hardly a suitable seat for a man of Mr. Gladstone's temperament. Though it had received him in 1868, and returned him by a reduced majority in 1874, he had never been in touch with the somewhat narrow views of a

[1] Morley, *Life of Gladstone*, vol. ii. p. 607.

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metropolitan constituency. In 1878 'he formally declined an invitation from the Liberals' of Greenwich again to contest that constituency. 'At the end of the year it was intimated to him that he might have a safe seat in the city of Edinburgh without a contest.' But a safe seat without a contest was the one thing which it was undesirable that a man of Mr. Gladstone's temperament should secure. And in January 1879 'it was resolved by the Liberal committee of Midlothian that Mr. Gladstone should be invited to contest the metropolitan constituency of Scotland.' Midlothian had been for years a Tory seat, and its representative, Lord Dalkeith, was the eldest son of the Duke of Buccleuch, one of the most popular and powerful of Scottish noblemen. The contest was certain to be fierce, and Mr. Adam, the Scotch Whip, only ventured on anticipating a majority of 200. Mr. Gladstone was himself conscious of the difficulties before him. The struggle, so he told Lord Granville, 'will be a tooth-and-nail affair.'[1]

The Midlothian campaign.

The commencement of that struggle has been told by a writer whose words cannot be improved, and may perhaps, therefore, be pardonably purloined. It was on the 24th of November that Mr. Gladstone quitted Liverpool for Edinburgh. The journey was a triumphal procession. 'Nothing like it had ever been seen before in England. . . . On this journey of a bleak winter day, it seemed as if the whole countryside were up. The stations where the train stopped were crowded, thousands flocked from neighbouring towns and villages to main centres on the line of route, and even at wayside spots hundreds assembled, merely to catch a glimpse of the express as it dashed

[1] Morley's *Life of Gladstone*, vol. i. p. 585.

through. At Carlisle they presented addresses, and the traveller made his first speech, declaring that never before in the eleven elections in which he had taken part were the interests of the country so deeply at stake. He spoke again with the same moral at Hawick. At Galashiels he found a great multitude with an address and a gift of the cloth they manufactured. With bare head in the raw air, he listened to their address, and made his speech; he told them that he had come down expressly to raise before the people of the country the question in what manner they wished to be governed; it was not this measure or that, it was a system of government to be upheld or overthrown. When he reached Edinburgh after nine hours of it, the night had fallen upon the most picturesque street in all our island, but its whole length was crowded, as it has never been crowded before or since, by a dense multitude, transported with delight that their hero was at last among them. . . . All that followed in a week of meetings and speeches was to match. People came from the Hebrides to hear Mr. Gladstone speak. Where there were six thousand seats, the applications were forty or fifty thousand. The weather was bitter and the hills were covered with snow; but this made no difference in cavalcades, processions, and the rest of the outdoor demonstrations.' An aristocratic Minister speaking at Edinburgh soon after estimated the number of words in Mr. Gladstone's Midlothian speeches in 1879 at 85,840, and declared that such performances were an innovation on the Constitution and aggravated the evil tendency of democracy.[1] With much truer insight Lord Rosebery, who pre-

[1] Morley's *Life of Gladstone*, vol. ii. pp. 587-589.

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sided over his meetings, said, 'He has passed through one long series of well-ordered triumphs from his home in Wales to the metropolis of Scotland. There has been no village too small to afford a crowd to greet him, there has been no cottager so humble that he could not afford a light to put in his window; as he passed mothers have brought their babes to lisp a hurrah; old men have crept forth from their homes to see him before they died. There have been no prepared ebullitions of sympathy; there have been no calculated demonstrations. The heart of the nation has been touched.' [1]

Lord Hartington and Mr. Gladstone.

The effect of these speeches was not merely disastrous to the Ministry; it was inconvenient to the Liberals themselves. For nearly five years Lord Hartington had been the nominal leader of the Liberal party in the House of Commons, just as Lord Granville had been its actual leader in the Lords. But Mr. Gladstone's progress and Mr. Gladstone's fiery eloquence were defining the relative worth of names and things. Lord Hartington's speeches might commend him to moderate men as a leader whose judgment was always cool and whose opinions were always clear. But Lord Hartington could not have attracted a tithe of the crowds who were thronging to hear Mr. Gladstone's Midlothian speeches, or even to catch a glimpse of his passing train. It would be very unfair to compare either of the two men with the great protagonists in the second book of 'Paradise Lost.' But it is true that Lord Hartington, like Belial, 'with words clothed in reason's garb,' was disposed for 'ignoble ease and peaceful sloth.' Mr. Gladstone's sentence from first to last was for open war.

[1] *Ann. Reg.* 1879, Hist., p. 119.

Lord Hartington himself was conscious of the embarrassment which Mr. Gladstone's reappearance was causing. He saw that he could not pretend to lead when Mr. Gladstone had emerged from his retirement. He proposed to suggest to Mr. Gladstone that he should resume the leadership, and to make the suggestion in such a way that Mr. Gladstone would be compelled to adopt it or bear the responsibility of leaving his party without guidance or direction. But this wise suggestion did not commend itself to some of the more prominent men in the party. Mr. Forster, though he saw the difficulties of the situation, preferred Lord Hartington. Lord Granville, ever anxious to defer a troublesome decision, was in favour of doing nothing;[1] and when Parliament was actually dissolved Lord Hartington still remained the nominal leader of the Liberal party in the House of Commons.

Lord Hartington proposes that Mr. Gladstone should resume leadership.

On the day which followed the official announcement of the dissolution Lord Beaconsfield published in the press a political manifesto in the shape of a letter to the Duke of Marlborough, the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. In this manifesto Lord Beaconsfield appealed for support on the double ground that the Conservative party could alone be trusted to maintain the union with Ireland and to assert the power of England. According to Lord Beaconsfield, a danger, greater than pestilence or famine, was distracting Ireland. A portion of its population was attempting to sever the constitutional tie which united it to Great Britain, and the Liberal party, 'having attempted, and failed, to enfeeble our colonies by their policy of decomposition,

Lord Beaconsfield's letter to the Duke of Marlborough.

[1] See the correspondence in Lord Fitzmaurice's *Life of Lord Granville*, vol. ii. pp. 181-188.

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might perhaps now recognise in the disintegration of the United Kingdom a mode which would not only accomplish but precipitate their purpose.' Even men disposed to support Lord Beaconsfield were not prepared to accept these sonorous and empty phrases. Mr. Gladstone brushed them aside in a few decisive sentences:—

Mr. Gladstone's reply.

'Those who endangered the Union with Ireland were the party that maintained there an alien Church, an unjust land law, and franchises inferior to our own; and the true supporters of the Union are those who firmly uphold the supreme authority of Parliament, but who exercise that authority to bind the three nations by the indissoluble tie of liberal and equal laws. As to the colonies, Liberal administration set free their trade with all the world, gave them popular and responsible government, undertook to defend Canada with the whole strength of the Empire, and organised the great scheme for uniting the several settlements of British North America into one Dominion; to which, when we quitted office in 1866, it only remained for our successors to ask the ready assent of Parliament. It is by these measures that the colonies have been bound in affection to the Empire; and the authors of them can afford to smile at baseless insinuations. Gentlemen, the true purpose of these terrifying insinuations is to hide from view the acts of the Ministry, and their effect upon the character and condition of the country.'[1]

Mr. Gladstone, at any rate, was determined that the misdeeds of the Tory Ministry should not be

[1] *Ann Reg.*, 1880, Hist., p. 34; Morley's *Life of Gladstone*, vol. ii. p. 606.

hidden from the eyes of the electors. On the morning of the 16th March he entered on a campaign which was one continuous progress to victory. 'Hundreds of people grew to thousands long before his train left King's Cross.' At Grantham, at York, at Newcastle, where the train successively stopped, he made little addresses, afterwards described as a sort of table of contents of the more elaborate speeches to be delivered in Midlothian itself. As he crossed the Tweed the fervour did not cool, and when at last he reached Edinburgh he encountered a scene almost as wonderful as that which had met him four months before.[1] The enthusiasm which Mr. Gladstone excited by his powers communicated itself to the entire people. It was noticed afterwards that at every place where he spoke the supporters of the Conservative Ministry were defeated. But the magic of his presence exerted itself far beyond the range of his voice and the fire of his glance. Other men, no doubt, on the Liberal side of the House contributed to the result. If Mr. Gladstone's figure had not commanded every eye, Lord Hartington's exertions would have won general approval. But the distinctive feature of the great struggle of 1880 was that the people were rallying under one champion, and pronouncing their verdict on one subject.

His second journey to Midlothian.

'We have none of the forms of a judicial trial. There are no Peers in Westminster Hall, there are no judges on the woolsack. But . . . it is a grander and a more august spectacle than was ever exhibited either in Westminster Hall or in the House of Lords. For a nation, called to undertake a great and responsible duty, has found its interests mismanaged, its honour

Mr. Gladstone's closing words.

[1] Morley's *Life of Gladstone*, vol. ii. p. 608.

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tarnished, its strength burdened and weakened by needless, mischievous, unauthorised, and unprofitable engagements, and it has resolved that this state of things shall cease, and that right and justice shall be done.'

The General Election of 1880.

Strange to state, while one man was rousing an entire nation, the men who should have known had no idea of the influence which he was exercising. The 'Times' steadily refused to believe that there was 'any feeling in the country at all in harmony with the strength of Mr. Gladstone's language.'[1] With rare exceptions, neither the statesmen opposed to Mr. Gladstone nor the followers who supported him had the faintest conception of the impending catastrophe. Yet the country was about to speak with a voice which was to be audible in every town and village, from John o' Groat's House to Land's End. At one sweep it was to turn a Parliament of 351 Conservatives and 250 Liberals into a Parliament of 349 Liberals and 243 Conservatives.[2] Never before had it spoken as it was speaking in 1880. Not in 1841, when it had swept away Lord Melbourne; not in 1857, when it had confirmed Lord Palmerston in power; not even in 1868, when it had dismissed Mr. Disraeli, had the country's verdict been so clear as it was on this occasion. Never since the general election of 1833 had Conservatism suffered so crushing a defeat. Another quarter of a century was to pass before it was again to encounter so fatal a disaster.

Additional interest attached to the contest from the personal issue involved in it. On the one side

[1] *Ann. Reg.*, 1880, Hist., p. 47.

[2] In addition there were fifty-one Home Rulers in the Parliament of 1874, and sixty in the Parliament of 1880.

Lord Beaconsfield's supporters undoubtedly claimed that he had redeemed Great Britain from the reproach of a narrow and selfish policy which had discredited the country abroad, and had made the people dissatisfied at home. On the other side, it was asserted that the Imperialism which Lord Beaconsfield had endeavoured to cherish had ended in failure. The betrayal of Denmark in 1864; the London Conference of 1871; the surrender at Geneva, may have been humiliating episodes in our history. But they were at any rate free from the embarrassments which had followed a policy of Imperialism in Europe, in Asia, and in Africa.

The claims of the two parties.

The people were stirred to the depths by the trumpet tones in which Mr. Gladstone aroused their conscience. They were already ashamed of the sorry part which their representatives had played. A great opportunity of effecting improvement in the government of Turkey had been lost through jealousy of Russia. The Prime Minister of England had constituted himself the champion of massacre and misrule. He had not arrested the advance of Russia; he had failed to cancel the leading stipulations on which Russia had insisted. But he had incurred the reproaches of honest men by his annexation of Cyprus; and he had sown the seeds of later trouble by a useless guarantee. Men were openly saying that, afraid to attack Russia in Europe, he was assailing her through a second-rate power in Afghanistan. And the strange difficulty into which, in defiance of warning, we had drifted in Afghanistan was rendered doubly dangerous from the vast and inconsiderate policy on which we had embarked in South Africa.

Causes of Lord Beaconsfield's fall.

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To a nation, dimly conscious that it had gained little honour, that it had sustained discredit, and that it had incurred unprofitable expenses, Mr. Gladstone's appeal came in tones of thunder. The art of government—according to Lord Beaconsfield—was to wave the Union Jack in the face of the world, or, as he would himself have put it, to give England ascendency in the Council Chamber of Europe. The art of government, in Mr. Gladstone's language, was to do what was right; to eschew evil and do good; to seek peace and ensue it. The world, perhaps, will never rise to the high ideals which animated Mr. Gladstone in his Midlothian campaign. But the British people in 1880 had been so alienated by the worst features of Lord Beaconsfield's policy, that they had almost convinced themselves that they were prepared for worthier and better things.

Conclusion.

And here, in the words of a far greater historian, I will make an end. I doubt whether the time has come to tell the history of the country for the quarter of a century that followed 1880. I know that I have neither the heart nor the strength to tell it. So 'here will I make an end. And if I have done well and as is fitting the story, it is that which I desired; but if slenderly and meanly, it is that which I could attain to.'

[*N. B.—It was Sir Spencer Walpole's intention to include in this volume a chapter on the events and transactions of the annexation of the Transvaal, the Zulu War, and the campaigns in Afghanistan during the years* 1878–81. *He purposed also to review in a separate chapter the condition of the working classes, and the successful efforts made by their leaders to enforce their claims and improve their position. But these parts of his plan he did not, unhappily, live to carry out; and 'The History of Twenty-Five Years' has so far been left by him incomplete.—A. C. L.*]

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